I know I should give up, but I just can't.

It might have but I was addressing only that sentence. Are you saying that that sentence can't stand on its own as a claim?

?

Yes, I am absolutely 100% saying that. Part of reading and talking and thinking is understanding how sentences fit together. (And you wouldn't have mentioned the SEP to begin with unless you were understanding that sentence in the context of the post as a whole!)

Let's talk a little bit about how philosophical discussion (or any most discussion) works. People make arguments. Arguments are made of many different parts. To understand an argument you have to understand the different parts.

Do you think that sentence had any relationship to what came before it? What came before that sentence?

Bonus hint: Read Willow's response defending you (it didn't go over his head)

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)

Man, I guess not.

Keep going!

You're literally playing out in slow motion my initial post going over your head, so I'm glad to indulge you. Go on...

No

Yes, the SEP has a relationship to philosophy.

Now that we've gotten that out of the way, let's circle back (again)

Ok, right, so you think that I was suggesting your quote came from a bad non-philosophical source. That's what I assumed you thought.

I just got confused because you said "Talk about going over someone's head. my post wasn't at all about you calling a source into question."

So, now that we've had a unnecessary exchange of posts because you wanted to also be the one talking about things going over people's heads, even if it didn't make sense for you to do so, let's circle back.

".....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)"

So, now that we've had a unnecessary exchange of posts because you wanted to also be the one talking about things going over people's heads, even if it didn't make sense for you to do so, let's circle back.

".....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)"

Does the SEP have any relationship to philosophy? Or is it "enitrely different" than received views in philosophy?

Ok, right, so you think that I was suggesting your quote came from a bad non-philosophical source. That's what I assumed you thought.

I just got confused because you said "Talk about going over someone's head. my post wasn't at all about you calling a source into question."

So what is the significance of the fact that you quoted the SEP? In what way does that constitute a response to what I said?

I did type what I have in mind and I have no idea why you would respond with the fact that you quoted the SEP. I could maybe understand that you confusedly thought I was questioning your sources (suggesting that they didn't come from a bona fide philosophical source) -but you said that's certainly not where you were going with that.

Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background. — csalisbury

What do you think I meant - or was suggesting - when I said this?

I still suspect things are going a bit over your head, but maybe I'm wrong. What did my post mean?

I guess you got me. Why did you mention one of your quotes was from the SEP?

I'm not quick enough to understand, so please break it down for me.

Actually Willow, I began a long discussion, asserting nothing a priori, accepting Terrapin's answer on their own terms - until, in one post, he refused to respond to the questions. I asked him to respond to that post multiple times and he not only failed to do so, but failed to give a reason why he's not responding to it - he basically ignored it, repeatedly.

As for his arguments --- what arguments? He's simply stated that he's a nominalist and a physicalist and a few of his beliefs. And that's fine, I'm not saying he shouldn't be those things! but there's nothing philosophically interesting about stating what you believe.

If anyone's interested, I'll lay out that whole first discussion and if there's anyone who's willing to take it up where Terrapin gave up, I'd love to continue it.

Haha, yet one of the sources I quoted was the SEP.

.....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)

Oh, I just can't help myself, damn it. Bolding, below, is mine.

So yes, personal identity is physical. — terrapin

Personal identity is the concept you develop about yourself that evolves over the course of your life. — Terrapin, quoting a definition he suggests is representative

Strangely, Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background.

No one's asking you to change your mind, Terrapin, we're just asking you to be consistent enough to make discussion possible. As things stand, this has proven impossible. This is not an attack on your character, it's just asking that you play by the minimal rules necessary to have philosophical debate. One can't play chess if the other player is free to call the queen a pawn, or a pawn a queen, as it suits them. I have had long debates with many people I staunchly disagree with, I have no problem with brooking ideas that don't mesh with mine. Those are my favorite debates! That's what I've been trying to do here.

If you would like to respond to this by suggesting that I don't understand basic philosophical ideas or some such, I will not be surprised, but I'll be bummed out all over again.

That's true. I've had month-long conversations with TGW and a few others. I value those conversations a lot. TGW, in particular, I disagree with on almost everything, but he can follow and respond to arguments, and I get a lot out of debating with him.

I still think the best way to talk about the OP is to delicately draw out the aporias of common-sense understandings of identity (whether that be an eternal soul or brain-states.) This doesn't leave you with an answer, but it leaves you with a better sense of what the problem is. I've become more and more convinced that aporia isn't something to be overcome, but maybe the terminus of philosophical inquiry. Like the old socratic cliche - you come only to know that you don't really know much of anything. A big part of the problem is that you have these analytic/continental or spiritual/material splits where both sides come in with a kind of a priori understanding that the other is wrong - and that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to have a good faith, good old fashioned dialectic discussion.

No worries, sorry I got prickly.

last word

thank you for your participation.

Sorry, Terrapin, we're not getting anywhere. Chalk that up to whatever you please.

It may just be a problem with the forum format, but I'm increasingly dismayed by how difficult it is to sustain a discussion. Too often single posts are treated as stand-alone statements to poke holes into by whatever means, as though nothing came before them. That or as launchpads for whatever is on one's mind at the moment. I was a bit irritated but it was nothing personal, it's a general problem that I myself sometimes contribute to. I did something similar on Street's selection thread.

Terrapin cited causality as one explanatory factor. This is what I was responding to - in terms of the argument, I'm making no commitment to any theory of causality - I'm trying to demonstrate that if one appeals to causality here, it fails on its own terms.

The world of philosophy is huge! But an argument cannot progress if we spend it hunting influences, seeking proper names. If we do this, we become more like birdwatchers than philosophers, seeking examples in the wild by their distinguishing marks. It is far more fruitful to follow the argument itself, and where it leads.

Obviously, causality is a very complex topic. Did I explain causality tout court? No, certainly not, nor was I trying to.

And what did my comments have to do with supporting whether someone has a "good reason" for feeling some way?

Ok, let's do a recap and recall how we got here.

The first line of questioning established that you hold two important beliefs: A person has many many many brain states throughout their life and identity does not persist through time.

This raises an obvious question:

If, as you say, "Your consciousness, your sense of self, etc. are simply brain states re your particular brain" and if identity does not persist over time, then how is it that we talk of the the same person having multiple brain states throughout their life, rather than a myriad of people, one for each brain state?

Either we need a more robust theory of identity, or we need a robust conception of some other type of continuity.

It is useful to examine a problem as abstract as this by focusing on a concrete and visceral example: Alex is worried about his future torture because he believes that he (not someone else) will experience that torture.

Here is what I said:

Thus if nervous Alex (brain state 1) is nervous because he is about to be tortured (this will be agonizing brain state 2) (I'm abstracting here! of course there are multiple brain states throughout!) then he is confused. He won't be the one being tortured. There's nothing to worry about.

Is this fair? If not, why not?

Let me break this down. I'm offering a hypothetical example of a man awaiting torture according to the viewpoint of someone who neither believes in the persistence of identity over time nor has supplied an alternative, robust explanation of continuity. I am not insinuating that, based on your own beliefs, you ought to agree with the scenario as I've presented it. I'm offering up something absurd as a foil that will allow you to articulate your own position.

Importantly, this is where the 'good reason' comes into play. "There's nothing to worry about. Is this fair? If not, why not?" is synonymous with 'does he have a good reason to worry [that he, not some different future alex, will suffer?]" It's possible that you may not be familiar with this usage of 'good reason.' It's very common among the english speakers I know, but perhaps it's a regional thing. If so, I apologize for the confusion.

As I'd hoped, you did not simply agree with my scenario (implicitly agreeing that yes, there is something Alex has to worry about) but began tentatively to articulate a corrective:

That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time.

Now we're getting somewhere. We seem to both agree that we'd be worried if we were soon to be tortured (while we may not agree about whether we can worry about existing again after death, we understand worrying about things that will happen to us within our own lifetime.) To understand this, we ought look not to identity, but to connection.

I then asked you to explain what you meant by connection here, since it's doing a lot of work! You gave some reasons and I explained why those reasons, while fine, are not enough to explain why one would be worried about one's future torture.

Note where we are in terms of the argument: We are still trying to understand why the fear of impending torture is different than the fear of existing again after death. This significance of this question is that identity and brain-states alone don't explain why you, I, anyone would worry about our future torture. You have recognized this and offered the additional idea of 'connection'

So you offer a quick sketch of what you mean by connection, I explain why it seems insufficient to address the question at hand.

And that's where everything goes haywire.

You ask me to explain the causual connection of the torturer to the victim. I do. You ask what my point is. I say my point is that causal connection cannot explain why T1 Alex has a good reason to worry about T2 Alex's suffering, as you had implied. Instead of responding to the argument, you say that you never said anything about 'good reasons' (though it's perfectly clear what 'good reason' means in this context) and then to talk about the nature of justification and fact.

What I want to do is to take up where we left off. If there's something particularly irksome about the term 'good reason' to you, I am all too happy to jettison it, because I'm interested in the argument itself.

So to return once more to where this all came from

"[For T1 Alex looking ahead to the torture of T2 alex] There's nothing to worry about. Is this fair? If not, why not?"

Again, I would love nothing more than to continue this conversation in good faith.

So here is where we are: You laid out what you meant by 'connection.' I responded with my doubts. Can you respond to that? You still have not.

Just to note, by the way, that this whole thing started because I had said, "That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time," and then you asked me to elaborate that, so I did.

Yes, you gave a two or three sentence elaboration, and I responded to it very clearly, point by point. Here's that post again, since it's where you appear to have lost the plot:

Fair enough. One might think that 'personal identity' is a subclass of the much broader class of 'identity' but if there is no identity over time, then personal identity is just a way of talking. The 'identity' part of 'personal identity' is far too loose. Yes? Personal identity literally can have nothing to do with identity if identity doesn't persist across time. Do you agree?

Let's look at each of your connections with reference to this central question: Why should nervous Alex (Alex1) be nervous about becoming tortured Alex (Alex2)?

1. Causal connection. The executioner's feeling of duty is causally connected to Alex's anguish. [in other words the executioner has a 'brain state' that is causally connected to Alex's anguished 'brain state'] Does that mean that the executioner should be nervous about the torture he himself is to soon feel, being causally connected to it? Clearly not. So causal connection does not get at the matter.

2.Contiguity. The executioner's blade is contiguous with alex's flesh, both in space and in time. Does that mean the blade should be nervous about the torture it is to soon feel? Clearly not. So contiguity does not get at the matter.

3. Memory. If nervous Alex is aware he'll be knocked unconscious prior to execution and given a drug that'll prevent recollection, would he be right not to be nervous about the impending torture (since, at that time, he won't remember earlier states?) Clearly not. So memory does not get at the matter.

4. Sense of self. Well what is this? Is the sense of self a physical thing? Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state the only way it can extend across multiple brain states is to be connected. Through what? Through a sense of self! But what is a sense of self. Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state...

In all seriousness though, there's a point in any debate where you can tell your interlocutor has moved the goalposts way back in order to deflect the actual questions that they're not sure how to answer. You've quite clearly done this. I am perfectly willing to have a good faith conversation with you, but if it's going to devolve to 'well, someone who's about to be tortured doesn't have a 'good reason' to be worried about that,' what's the point, man?

Again, there aren't any facts about whether someone has a "good reason" to feel any particular way....Different people will feel that something counts or doesn't count as a good reason for feeling some way, but they could feel either way about any reason.

& We're done! Thanks for playing Terrapin. You've defended your position well! I raised some objections and you made the very good point of someone who is about to be tortured has no reason to be worried about that.

I didn't say anything pro or con about "having a good reason"--there are no facts about whether one has a good reason to feel some way of other.

If you're willing to state, for the record, that a person who knows he is going to be tortured soon has no good reason to be anxious about his impending torture, then we can leave it at that. (please please please don't do the juvenile thing of saying something like 'well, there's no good reason to be anxious if it's inevitable!' That would miss the point entirely.)

But that was what we were talking about!

I brought up causal connection as an example of the non-identity connection of Alex @ T1 to Alex @ T2. That was the whole point of that.

Once more:

You cited causality as a way of understanding why T1 Alex has good reason to be nervous about T2 Alex's suffering. Since the executioner is also causally responsible for T2 Alex's anguish, yet has no reason himself to worry about suffering that anguish, then pointing to causality doesn't explain why T1 alex's anxiety is justified.

As far as I can tell the 'sense of self' is the only thing you've offered that explains why T1 alex is justified about being nervous about T2 Alex's anguish. The other explanations are easily dispatched.

Okay, and you're saying that has what to do with the causal connection between Alex at T1 and Alex at T2

I'm not saying it has anything at all to do with it.

You cited causality as a way of understanding why T1 Alex has good reason to be nervous about T2 Alex's suffering. Since the executioner is also causally responsible for T2 Alex's anguish, yet has no reason himself to worry about suffering that anguish, then pointing to causality doesn't explain why T1 alex's anxiety is justified.

I think i might be losing you, Terrapin.

Ok.

The executioner's muscles move a knife which cuts into Alex's flesh and his nerves and cause pain.

I'm assuming you're not asking for the physio-mathematical explanation of how sharp edges cleave flesh? I'll admit I'm not qualified to provide that.

You're asking me to detail how the executioners knife is causally related to Alex's anguish?

That's a conflation of two different ideas.

And I clearly presented two ways of understanding the relationships between the two terms.

Let me do it again.

Does there exist any identity that persists over time? Yes or No.

If no, then 'personal identity' is a conventional term that doesn't have to do with actual identity. It refers to something that is not, strictly speaking, an identity. While it means something quite specific and is not meaningless, it doesn't actually refer to a persisting identity.

If yes, then you are wrong to say that identity can't persist over time.

What am I missing?

Also re this, sure, one might think that, and it's not that there's no relation, but the way the terms are used conventionally in philosophy is really two quite different ideas.

True, but we're talking as peers aren't we. If you think that identity does not persist over time, then the very idea of personal identity is incoherent. The only way to salvage it is to make it a conventional term that has nothing to do with identity. Unless you're claiming that identity doesn't persist over time except for one kind of identity, personal identity, which does.

If duty is too abstract (we can easily say, using your way of talking, that his sense of duty is a brain state and thereby reinscribe it in the chain of physical causality you're talking about, but let's pass that over) but then let's say the executioner qua physical mass is causally connected to alex's anguish (a brain state.) He causes Alex's brain-state. Yet he, the executioner, justifiably feels no anxiety about suffering Alex's anguish.