• Fall of Man Paradox
    [Deleting duplicate]
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    I"m happy you find meaning in this.fishfry

    Did you try to make sense of my 'elevator pitch'? I wasn't communicating nonsense. It wasn't even my work I was talking about...

    I'm within epsilon. I no longer have any idea what we are conversing about.fishfry

    Epsilon, eh? Will a few figures push you over the edge? That's where I need to go to move this forward...
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Unknown territory for me. No Wikipedia page I can find (among 26,000+), but perhaps it's under a different heading. You are full of surprises. Are you Niqui? :cool:jgill

    No, it's just a paper which perhaps only I believe is important. I'm guessing I'm the only person to have used the term 'Niqui arithmetic'. And it's only important if we are to drill into the ontology of numbers. If I am not asked 'but what is 1/1 at a fundamental level?' then I don't need to mention Niqui arithmetic or the SB-tree. At this point, I think this is the better option because we've been stuck in the weeds of 1D continua far too long...

    I know you asked me to proceed a long time ago but weeds get in the way...
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    If you supply a two-sentence summary I'll read it. In Silicon Valley they call it your "elevator pitch."fishfry

    Niqui arithmetic: Niqui's method allows you to take as input a symbol and a pair of locations in an unlabelled tree and it returns a corresponding location in the tree. It does not presuppose any mathematics other than Peano arithmetic.
    My interpretation: It just so happens that if you label the nodes of the tree according to Stern-Brocot then those symbols correspond to the familiar operators of arithmetic.
    Why this is important: If one can informally say that Peano defined the natural numbers according to discrete ordered positions along a line then that is no different than me saying that Niqui defined the fractions according to discrete ordered positions along a tree.

    Oh now I have to converse about proof assistants? You know, if you've been picking up the lingo, that's great. Not of interest to me. It's impressive what they're doing. Just not an interest of mine.fishfry

    I mentioned this only to suggest that my view may not be pre-axiomatic. I think Peano arithmetic is very important and Niqui took that to the next level. I also don't care to converse about proof assistants.

    No such thing as infinite natural numbersfishfry

    Sorry, I meant to say "an infinite number of natural numbers" as in " natural numbers". I can see how this was misleading because when I later wrote "arbitrary natural numbers" I was referring to placeholders that can be populated by any natural number you come up with.

    Honestly you sound very crankish about all this.fishfry

    I'm just looking at things from the perspective of a computer. A computer doesn't access infinite sets, it always works with the finite set of finite inputs provided to it - so why not only assert the existence of those inputs (and whatever abstract objects it actually manipulates to deliver an output) and see how far this restricted math can go?

    Why not just go learn some math.fishfry

    What I'm proposing is not entirely philosophical.

    I'm not the guy for this any longer.fishfry

    I think we got stuck in the weeds because I began to justify how fractions can exist in my view but that justification doesn't interest you.

    Ok as far as it goes, but I have to suspend disbelief.fishfry

    I think temporary suspension of disbelief is probably the best path forward so that we can jump to the good stuff before you decide to quit...or have you already decided...
  • Fall of Man Paradox



    NIQUI ARITHMETIC

    Niqui arithmetic doesn't start by populating the nodes of a tree with fractions using the mediant operation. Rather, it doesn't assign any number to any node. It simply takes a pair of arbitrary nodes and outputs a resulting node based on the chosen arithmetic operation. It's entirely location-based. As an afterthought, we can observe the behavior of these nodes and realize that their behavior corresponds perfectly to the familiar arithmetic, provided we label the nodes according to the SB-tree's labeling. And when we label the nodes in this manner, a peculiar property related to mediants becomes apparent. But in no way does Niqui arithmetic rely on the mediant operation.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Each row of the tree involves medians, which require ratios of integers and arithmetic of these ratios. So, your top down approach always involves bottom up procedures. You cannot correlate rational numbers with nodes without using expressions like a/b. Instead of simplifying, you are complicating something you assume. Just my opinion.jgill

    As I was suggesting to fishfry, in the context of Stern-Brocot, what fundamentally exists is the algorithm for Niqui arithmetic. The illusion of the SB-tree emerges from our contemplation of this algorithm. When we examine the illusion, we notice interesting mediant relations between the nodes, but all of these relations stem from Niqui arithmetic. What I'm proposing is that Niqui arithmetic is more fundamental than the SB-tree. Interestingly, the SB-tree was discovered before Niqui arithmetic, but mathematics often reveals its truths in unexpected ways.

    And perhaps you'll argue that almost no one views the SB-tree as a result of explicitly considering Niqui arithmetic. I would counter that by saying that when looking out the window no one consciously processes the mathematical properties of the light waves hitting their eyes, yet that is precisely what we are doing subconsciously.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    EDIT: After posting this I realized that there might be some confusion about Niqui Arithmetic. I have since posted another message entitled NIQUI ARITHMETIC. Please read that first.

    You missed the point of my asking you what the notation 1/1 means, in the absence of building up the rationals from the integers, the integers from the naturals, and the naturals from the axioms of set theory. Or even PA if you can do that.fishfry

    Peano arithmetic can be formalized in Coq. Similarly, Niqui arithmetic on the SB tree, which builds on Peano arithmetic, has been proven in Coq. There's an unquestionable structure to natural numbers and fractions that we both agree on. What we disagree on is the ontology related to these necessary truths. You believe that Peano arithmetic applies to infinite natural numbers, whereas I believe it applies to arbitrary natural numbers. By this, I mean that Peano arithmetic corresponds to an algorithm designed to take as input any arbitrary pair of natural numbers and output the expected natural number. My ontology does not require the existence of any number. I only need numbers when I want to execute the algorithm, and I only need two numbers at that, not an infinite set.

    Although the above focuses on Peano arithmetic, the same applies to Niqui arithmetic. While the actual computations of Niqui arithmetic involve the manipulation of symbols or electrical signals, an elusive structure emerges in our mind when studying the algorithm—the SB-tree. Nobody has ever envisioned the complete tree, but we have seen the top part, and when I say 1/1 occupies a particular node, that top part is all I need to see. I don't need to assert the existence of an unseen complete tree; after all, it is merely an illusion that helps us understand the underlying algorithm (Niqui arithmetic).

    As far as the sense of what you're doing, it eludes me. Are you building the constructive real line? Lost on me.fishfry

    I'm trying to establish parallel ontologies: Actual vs. real. At this point, we have actual numbers (fractions) and real numbers. We have actual points (k-points corresponding to fractions) and real points (k-lines corresponding to real numbers). This distincting is rather bland in 1D but it becomes much more consequential in 2D when establishing a foundational framework for geometry and calculus.

    eiπ+1=0fishfry

    The Philosophy Forum appears to be quirky. I tried quoting this multiple times, sometimes including the spaces surrounding it, sometimes not, and about half the time it puts a column of 1-character lines.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    I'm curious to know what that notation 1/1 means. In abstract algebra class I learned how to construct the rational numbers as the field of quotients of the integers. That's as bottom-up as you can be. So what is this 1/1 you speak of?fishfry

    Please allow me to respond in the context of the SB-tree. Fractions correspond to nodes. Reals correspond to arbitrarily long paths (well, almost but providing clarifying details would bloat this post). There's no point to introduce natural numbers, integers, or rational numbers as disagreement would ensue. I would say they are all fractions but you would likely say they are all reals.

    The cut at fraction 1/1 is fully captured at row 1 of the tree. The algorithm corresponding to the cut at real 1.0 generalizes how the cut would be captured at any arbitrary row beyond row 1 (well, to be precise I should really use ε_left and ε_right instead of just ε). Finally, the execution of the cut at 1.0 happens on a particular row once the computer chooses values for the ε's. What should be clear is that none of this happens at the bottom of the tree. This is an entirely top-down approach.

    If you fixed your notational issues I could quote your markup.fishfry

    I think it's just that Latex does not get used properly in quotes. I'm rewriting my last post in plain text and using the notation I recently proposed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I'd like to distinguish between a fraction and a real. The fraction description is finite (e.g. 1/1), whereas the real description is infinite (e.g. 1.0, which can be represented as an algorithm that generates the Cauchy sequence of fractional k-intervals: <9/10, 11/10>, <99/100, 101/100>, <999/1000, 1001/1000>, <9999/10000, 10001/10000>, ...

    Because fraction descriptions are finite, a cut at a fraction can be planned and executed all in one go. A cut of <-∞, +∞> at the fraction 1 results in: <-∞, 1> ∪ 1 ∪ <1, +∞>.

    Because real descriptions are infinite, a cut at a real must be planned and executed separately.

    The algorithm to cut <-∞, +∞> at the real 1.0 is generalized as: <-∞, 1-ε> ∪ 1-ε ∪ <1-ε, 1+ε> ∪ 1+ε ∪ <1+ε, +∞> where ε can be an arbitrarily small positive number.

    In the spirit of Turing, the execution of the cut of <-∞, +∞> at the real 1.0 could have us replace ε with 1/10 as follows: <-∞, 9/10> ∪ 9/10 ∪ <9/10, 11/10> ∪ 11/10 ∪ <11/10, +∞>
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One thing that I've failed to get across is that I'm not outlining a procedure which will be used to construct infinite numbers. These systems I'm outlining, such as <-∞, 1> ∪ 1 ∪ <1, +∞>, are valid systems in and of themselves. Finite systems such as these are all we can ever construct in the top-down view.
  • Fall of Man Paradox


    I'd like to distinguish between a fraction and a real. The fraction description is finite (e.g. ), whereas the real description is infinite (e.g. which can be represented as an algorithm that generates the Cauchy sequence of fractional intervals: ).

    Because fraction descriptions are finite, a cut at a fraction can be planned and executed all in one go. A cut of at the fraction results in: .

    Because real descriptions are infinite, a cut at a real must be planned and executed separately.

    The algorithm to cut at the real is generalized as: where can be an arbitrarily small positive number.

    In the spirit of Turing, the execution of the cut of at the real could be: , where in this case is replaced by .

    eyes glazed?
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Anyway. Yes I understand the difference. No I don't understand what POINT you are making about the difference.

    I haven't made a point yet. I just wanted to clarify this as I previously found it a stumbling block in our conversation.

    simulation theorists, mind uploading theorists, "mind is computational," etc -- I think all these people are missing something really important about the world. So I think I'm a bit of an anti-construcivist!!fishfry

    I'm a computational fluid dynamics analyst, so I naturally approach things from a simulation perspective.

    Once you get a countably infinite infinity, you immediately get from the powerset axiom an uncountable infinity.fishfry

    In the context of a potentially infinite complete tree, to me it makes sense to talk about potentially (countably) infinite nodes and potentially (uncountably) infinite paths. In this sense, the paths have more potential than the nodes. I don't think any beauty is lost in reducing infinity to a potential.

    But here are only countably many ways to talk about things. Leaving most of the world inexpressible. Now the constructivists are entirely missing that much of the world...fishfry

    As QM suggests, something funny happens when we're not observing the world. I consider this to be the magic of potential. Anyway, this is fluffy talk about potential...let me get to the beef.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    You can always find a rational interval small enough to suit the needs of any computation you do, by analogy with always being able to find a suitably large but finite natural number when you need it for a computation.....We call that "finite but unbounded."....Is that a fair understanding of your point?fishfry

    That is a fair understanding of my point but I do want to highlight one thing: it's not always about the computation. If I want to focus on algorithm design (and not execution), I can keep ε's floating around. The ε's only need to be replaced when I execute the algorithm and perform the computation. Fair?

    To be actually infinite is far stronger. It's like putting out a good but rational approximation to a real number, versus "printing it all out at once" as it were. Having not just as many digits of pi as you need; but rather all of them at once.fishfry

    Yes, actual infinities are beyond computation.

    That's the magic of the axiom of infinity.fishfry

    It does seem to be a bit magical. I'd like to avoid magical thinking if at all possible.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Ok. I feel like we're about to go through this same exposition again. At least the notation's less confusing.fishfry

    I'll try to do a better job this time. But first, one other area of confusion has been the distinction between infinite and arbitrary as it relates to an algorithm's design vs. it's execution. A Turing algorithm for constructing N, is designed to output a set of m elements, where m can be arbitrarily large. By this I mean that the algorithm itself sets no limit on the size of its output; rather, the size of the output depends on the execution (i.e., the chosen 'precision' based on available resources). Please note that I'm not saying that m is a particular number, nor is it infinity. Instead, when talking about the algorithm itself, m serves as a placeholder for a value that is determined only upon execution of the algorithm. Upon execution, m is replaced with a natural number and the output is a finite set. In a similar vein, when I speak of ε being arbitrarily small, I am using it as a placeholder to describe an algorithm. Upon executing that algorithm, ε is replaced with a positive rational number that is small, but by no means the smallest. Is this clear?
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    I wish you wouldn't presume to speak for "a constructivist standpoint".TonesInDeepFreeze

    I think it's fair to say that my top-down view likely fits under the constructivism umbrella, but my view does not represent constructivism as a whole. It is a fair request that I represent my view, not constructivism as a whole.

    constructivism in the broadest sense does not disallow construction of infinite sets.TonesInDeepFreeze

    Within the context of my view, we can talk about algorithms designed to construct infinite sets (as in your example) but we cannot talk about the complete output of such algorithms. Rather, in the spirit of Turing, we can only talk about the partial output of such algorithms, which necessary is a finite set.

    Cantor's proof that there is no enumeration of the set of real numbers is accepted by constructivism.TonesInDeepFreeze

    Cantor's proof holds value within the context of my view.

    I don't have interest in going down another path like that with you. But I don't have to do that merely to correct certain misstatements and provide you with explainationssTonesInDeepFreeze

    So be it.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Read the proof to its end. The union of the range of the function is an infinite union of disjoint intervals and that union is (0 1).TonesInDeepFreeze

    From my perspective, we can only discuss objects that can be explicitly constructed. Since the complete output of the function cannot be generated all at once, it is meaningless to talk about the range of the complete output. However, I acknowledge that the standard view assumes that you can discuss the range of the function whereby the range unions to (0 1). You don't have to keep repeating your point; I understand it. I'm just viewing this from a constructivist standpoint, and from my perspective, my statement holds: you cannot explicitly write the union of infinite disjoint intervals.

    The use of 'can' there is merely colloquial. We may state it plainly: Any set of sentences is a set of axioms. More formally: For all S, if S is a set of sentences, then S is a set of axioms.TonesInDeepFreeze

    Again, we're approaching this from different ontological perspectives. It seems you're trying to point out flaws in my viewpoint by identifying how it differs from yours. If you want to challenge my perspective effectively, it would be more impactful to identify actual contradictions or limitations within my own ontology rather than highlighting its differences from yours.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    In another thread going on right now, it's been pointed out that there are uncountably many mathematical truths, and that most of them can't even be expressed, let alone proven.fishfry

    In that thread they state that "any set of sentences can be a set of axioms." I want to distinguish between what is (i.e. actual) and what can be (i.e. potential). It is tempting to actualize everything and declare that there are uncountably many mathematical truths. However, I would argue that these truths are contingent on a computer constructing them. When I speak of finite necessary truths I'm referring to the rules of logic itself.

    So what? My mathematical ontology is not confined to what's computational. Yours is. So you should study constructivism. It's pointless to try to discuss it with me...fishfry

    I'm trying to establish a view of calculus which is founded on principles that are restricted to computability (i.e. absent of actual infinities). You don't have to abandon your view of actual infinities to entertain a more restricted view. Perhaps we can set aside the more philosophical topics and return to the beef.

    Please use a different notation. The notation (a,b) means something else. But you immediately have problems. What does "between" mean unless you define an order relation?fishfry

    The term 'line' comes loaded with meaning so to start with a clean slate I'll use 'k-line' to refer to objects of continuous breadthless length (in the spirit of Euclid). I'll use <a,b> to denote the k-line between a and b excluding ends and <<a,b>> to denote the k-line between a and b including ends. If b=a, then <<a,b>> corresponds to a degenerate k-line, which I'll call a k-point and often abbreviate <<a,a>> as "a". I'll call the notation <a,b> and <<a,b>> k-intervals.

    The systems always start with a single k-line described by a single k-interval (e.g. <-∞,+∞>). A computer can choose to cut the k-line arbitrarily many time to actualize k-points. For example, after one cut at 42, the new system becomes <-∞,42> U 42 U <42,+∞>.

    The order relation comes from the infinite complete trees.

    Are we at a place where we can we move forward?
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    But the specific mathematical statement you made earlier was incorrect. You'd do yourself a favor by recognizing that fact.TonesInDeepFreeze

    This is my statement you're referring to: "I can write (0,1) as the union of arbitrarily many disjoint intervals. However, I cannot write (0,1) as the union of infinitely many disjoint intervals."

    In your response, you did not explicitly present the union. Instead, you described a function that takes a natural number as input and outputs an interval. At no point did you actually show a union of infinite intervals in its entirety.

    I understand that, classically, your function is interpreted as identifying infinite intervals that exist simultaneously. However, I do not accept that perspective. I believe that you need to construct the objects you are discussing.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    What you just said is an utter disconnect. That no finite partial sum is 1 in no way contradicts that (0 1) is an infinite disjoint union of intervals.TonesInDeepFreeze

    Bringing your original comment back...

    Let f be the function whose domain is the set of natural numbers such that:

    f(0) = (0 1/2)
    for n>0, f(n) = [(2^n - 1 )/2^n (2^n+1 - 1)/2^n+1)

    The range of f is an infinite partition of (0 1). That is: the range of f is infinite; every member of the range of f is an interval; the range of f is pairwise disjoint, and the union of the range of f is (0 1).
    TonesInDeepFreeze

    What I'm trying to convey is that f(0) U f(1) U f(2) U ... doesn't fit into any computer, just as complete infinite series do not fit on a computer. What makes sense computationally is f(0) U f(1) U f(2) U ... f(N) when N can be an arbitrarily large natural number. Just as Turing focused on computations of partial sums when considering computable reals, I want to focus on computations of partial unions when considering infinite unions. Within the constraints of computation, there is no partial union of intervals from f which corresponds to (0,1).
  • Fall of Man Paradox


    You clearly have a lot of knowledge, and many of your posts, including your recent ones, are informative and well-intentioned. However, sometimes I feel bad after reading your posts. Even though I have a thick skin for criticism (as seen with fryfish’s posts), I still sense that fryfish likes me despite their criticisms. On the other hand, I feel like you dislike me or what I represent. I can’t debate classical mathematics to your level of formality, and you don't seem interested in my ideas, so I’m not sure what we have left to discuss.

    Regarding the hyperlink, I admit I was rude. I was upset and wanted to throw some rudeness back at you. I should go back and switch the link to be a Rickroll for good measure.

    Anyway, I gave a proof that you are incorrect when you claim that the interval (0 1) is not an infinite union of disjoint intervals, whether or not you want to take a minute to understand the proof.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I don't think we'll agree on terms. For example, in another message to you which you ignored I explained that I want to think of the infinite series 9/10 + 9/100 + 9/1000 + ... as a Turing computable algorithm, which can output arbitrarily precise partial sums but never output a 1. I get what you're saying, but in this sense, your function will never output intervals which will union to (0 1).

    No Cantor crank would ever have the self-awareness to know that he or she is a crank.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I've been very open about my views on Cantor, actual infinities, my informal training, and my motivations. While I don't believe any Cantor crank shares my perspective, if someone wants to label me a Cantor crank, that's their prerogative.

    They are included in classical mathematics.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I need to rephrase my statement as I was using 'classical mathematics' in an unorthodox sense. I should have said bottom-up mathematics instead of classical mathematics. Combinatorics transcends the distinction of bottom-up and top-down mathematics. Again, this distinction wouldn't interest you since it relates to the ideas I'm proposing.

    Whatever I say will be flavored by my top-down view which you're not interested in. I think I don't have anything for you.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Not true. I published papers when I was active that never assumed infinity was actualized....so, your statement is not entirely correct.jgill

    Certain areas of mathematics, like combinatorics, are sufficiently distant from foundational issues and actual infinities. These areas transcend the label of 'classical' mathematics.
  • Fall of Man Paradox


    I'm putting this comment in a separate post because I wanted my main post to be 'smallish' and I'm not expecting a response from this.

    So after all this time your interval notation does not not stand for its conventional meaning?fishfry

    Here are quotes from my earlier posts. You don't have to read all bullets as they all say the same thing. I'm just trying to highlight that the confusion is not for lack of me trying.

    • "Suppose I introduce a new concept called 'k-interval' to define the set of ANY objects located between an upper and lower boundary. Would you then consider allowing objects other than points into the set?"
    • "Yes, the endpoints are rational, and the object between any pair of endpoints is simply a line."
    • "Revisiting the analogy above, when I utilize an interval to describe a range, I am referring to the underlying and singular continuous line between the endpoints"
    • "Yet, between each tick mark, there exists a bundle of 2ℵ0 points to which we can assign an interval."
    • "I propose that we redefine the term interval from describing the points that lie between endpoints to describing the line that lies between endpoints."
    • "One thing I need to make clear though is that when I write (0,4) I'm referring to a bundle between point 0 and point 4. I'm not referring to 2ℵ0 points each having a number associated with them. "
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    And also, if I could make this request ... can you write shorter posts? Short and to the point.fishfry

    I believe the main issue is that new topics are added more often than old ones are removed, leading to bloated posts. I'll not respond to a few of your comments to address this request.

    I'm fine with cutting strings. You have never explained to me how this serves as a new foundation for math.fishfry

    Label the original string (-inf,+inf). Cut it somewhere. Label the left partition (-inf,42). Label the right partition (42,+inf). Label the small gap between the strings 42. Now you have a new system: (-inf,42) U 42 U (42,+inf). But you seem to get hung up on those intervals number being continuous even though I'm saying that those intervals describe continua - abstract string in this case.

    If you have a set of rules (a bottom up concept) that let you know when two representations denote the same number, then why do you need the computer? Why not just accept that the rules themselves bring all possible numbers into existence already?fishfry

    Moving forward, instead of writing "computer+mind", I'm just going to write "computer".

    I believe that true mathematical rules exist independently of computers. These rules are necessary truths and finite in number. If one assumes they describe actually existing objects, such objects must exist beyond our comprehension, as no computer could contain them.

    However, if we assume that mathematical objects must exist within a computer, then not all mathematical objects can actually exist and it becomes a matter of a computer choosing which objects to actualize.

    I believe in the mathematical existence of the abstract objects they describe.fishfry

    Please allow me to use the SB-tree as something concrete to talk around. I acknowledge that any infinite complete tree will do.

    We outline the rules for constructing the SB-tree and can mentally construct it to an arbitrary depth. Everything we ever actually construct is finite. Why insist on believing in the computationally impossible — the existence of the complete SB-tree?

    There simply aren't enough algorithms to generate all the sets. There are countably many algos and uncountably many subsets of the natural numbers.fishfry

    You've said that the reals correspond to unending paths down the infinite complete binary tree, so indeed, there are potentially paths that cannot be algorithmically defined. This doesn't mean the rules for constructing the tree are incomplete; it simply means there are paths computers can never traverse. Computers cannot exhaust these rules.

    Or here's how I see it. When I see the tree, I do not see paths and nodes. Instead I see a continua at each row, being cut by the numbers at each row. For example, I see the top two rows of the SB-tree as:

    Row 1: 0 U (0,1) U 1 U (1,+inf)
    Row 2: 0 U (0,1/2) U 1/2 U (1/2,1) U 1 U (1,2) U 2 U (2,+inf)
    ...

    With this view, I would rephrase the conclusion as follows: computers cannot completely cut continua. Computers cannot exhaust cutting. Actually, I would go one step further and assume that computers are all that's available, so I would simply say that continua cannot be completely cut. But we know that already, you'll never cut a string to the point where it vanishes.

    I'd ask you to accept that rather than continually expressing disappointment with my posts.fishfry

    Sometimes I push back as a form of defense. Nevertheless I'll try and be more mindful of this. I'm very appreciative of our conversation. Thanks!
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    You said that numbers get instantiated when they appear in a computation. I asked you whether one number or several numbers get instantiated when various representations exist. Who determines that they act the same? Where is that process, that brings a number into existence?fishfry

    I was trying to convey that the representation itself is not important; what matters is the behavior. If in my mind x+x=2, then x behaves like 1. Similarly, if y+y=2, then y also behaves like 1. In this scenario, 1 has multiple representations (x and y) in my mind, but that isn't an issue because they both behave the same.

    But I must highlight that to conclude that x=1, I don’t work through an infinite checklist, considering all possible arithmetic equations involving 1. No, I'm mindful of the consistent and finite set of rules associated with the construction and arithmetic of the SB-tree (or equivalent tree), so all I need to do is declare that x will behave like the node occupied by 1. At that moment, I bring 1 into existence and it is representation in my mind is the character x.

    Is God watching all this and keeping track of everyone's version of each number? This seems like a cumbersome idea.fishfry

    We each are the god of the mathematical systems that inhabit our own minds. If we want to compare my (-inf,1) U 1 U (1,+inf) with your (-inf,42) U 42 U (42,+inf) we need to agree to the SB-tree and compare the nodes where my 1 and your 42 lie. If they correspond to the same node, then our systems are equivalent. While nobody explicitly does this, it's the unspoken agreement we make when comparing systems. I don't see why we would need a third party to arbitrate the comparison.

    I believe no such thing, what are you talking about? I believe in the axioms of ZF and not much else. They are purely a human artifact.fishfry

    Since no human artifact can be infinite, is it fair to say that you believe in the axioms but not in the infinite objects they describe? If so, this directly supports my thesis—forget about the existence of infinite sets and instead focus on the (Turing) algorithms designed to generate these infinite sets.

    It's hard to develop a theory of the reals without the axiom of infinity.....Even constructivists have infinite sets, not not noncomputable ones.fishfry

    I'm receptive to a constructivist approach to the axiom of infinity. If were talking about computable infinite sets in the same way that Turing talked about computable real numbers I have no problems, provided we do not assert the existence of infinite objects.

    But there is something to be said for infinitary math. Why shouldn't we enjoy having such a lovely theory of the infinite? What is the harm?fishfry

    What harm is there in relying on Newtonian mechanics when it performs admirably for slow-moving objects like ourselves? Similarly, what harm is there in embracing General Relativity when the singularities it predicts are distant from our everyday experience? There's a certain beauty in their simplicity; as a mechanical engineer, I rely on Newtonian mechanics daily and will continue to do so regardless of advances in physics.

    Yet, as physicists began pulling the loose threads of classical physics, a more fundamentally robust and aesthetically compelling framework emerged: Quantum Mechanics. There is something to be said for pulling the loose threads.

    You say, Start with a line. Make a cut. I don't know what these things are.fishfry

    It would be much easier if you would just roll with the intuitions for a little while so we wouldn't get stuck on the first step. Let's sweep through the whole idea informally and if it has any merit then we can sweep through again and formally define things. Think of a line as a piece of string. Think of a cut as what you do with scissors to partition the string. You're making this more complicated than it needs to be.

    You're just approximating the reals.fishfry

    No, I'm not. Yes, I'm referring to (Turing) algorithms that produce rational approximations with arbitrary precision, but the algorithm itself is exact. The algorithm perfectly encapsulates the essence of the real. That's why I'm emphasizing the algorithm itself, not its output.

    And if it did, the contradictions would be repaired. People wouldn't stop doing infinitary math.fishfry

    I agree to both sentences! (1) That's what I'm trying to do and (2) I'm just trying to throw a 'potential' in front of the 'infinitary math'.

    I don't follow the analogy you're making. Cantor has underestimated or overestimated his discoveries?fishfry

    Cantor has already received considerable acclaim, making it difficult to envision greater recognition for him. What I meant to convey is that Cantor unearthed something monumental, yet his interpretation was poop (actual infinities). I believe that in the future, it will be recognized that his true discovery lay in articulating the potential within continua and mathematics as a whole.

    You have been making use of open intervals all along, haven't you?fishfry

    I'm using open interval notation to describe the bundle (line) the lies between its endpoints. This bundle cannot be described as an infinite set of individual points, because as I mentioned before, we can only talk about individual points when the line has been cut. For this reason, I'm reluctant to say that I've been proposing open sets.

    The noncomputable reals are telling us something. Infinitary math is telling us something.fishfry

    I agree with this sentiment. Whether it's noncomputable reals, the halting problem, Gödel's incompleteness theorems, or the liar's paradox, they are all screaming at us that there is a potential in mathematics that cannot be fully actualized. But Classical mathematics aims to actualize everything, much like classical physics. They both suffer the same flaw...and I believe are both addressed with the same resolution: a top-down view.

    The history of math is expansive, never contractive. Nobody says, "Those complex numbers, they were a step too far." But they say that about infinitary math.fishfry

    Yeah, you're going to lose some things with constructive mathematics, be it LEM or the axiom of choice. But by and large I'm proposing a much more beautiful structure. Just as classical physics was a natural stepping stone to QM, actual-infinitary-math is a natural stepping stone to potential-infinitary-math.

    I don't have an eye glaze factor when I'm coding, but I do when I do math.fishfry

    I can reframe my examples in Python if that's your preference. The main drawback however is that my posts would get longer.

    Are you getting frustrated? I'm sorry, I thought I was helping the best I can.fishfry

    It's frustrating to think that I'm running out of ways to communicate my ideas so I'm starting to think that the conversation might end prematurely with the least desirable conclusion (that you don't know whether my ideas are right or wrong). But perhaps it's too soon to talk about the end. I'm getting value out of every post you and I write so I'd be grateful if we keep going and just take it one day at a time.

    I don't know why you are acting as if I'm not attending to what you say. I sense a difference of perspective that I'm not privy too. Everything seems fine at my end.fishfry

    It's just that at some point we'll need to talk beef and I'll need to figure out an alternative way to communicate the bullet post.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    One of the best ways you can respond to someone who brings a problem to you is to just ask them to explain it all to you in detail.fishfry

    Agreed. But sometimes the person will not see the flaw in their argument unless explicitly identified by someone else.

    There's nothing at stake for me here. I enjoy trying to relate your ideas with things I know in math, but there's never going to come a point where I "digest" this.fishfry

    By "digest" I didn't mean to suggest that you would accept it. But there's value in being able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

    Do these three computers each instantiate the existence of the same number 42? And how would you know?fishfry

    If a human thinks of a duck and somehow in their computations the duck behaves exactly like the mathematical object 42, then (within that person's thoughts) the duck represents an instance of the number 42. As the old saying goes, "If it swims like a 42, and quacks like a 42, then it probably is a 42." I think we both agree that absent of an intentional being giving mathematical meaning to the duck (or to electrical activity within a computer), no mathematics is going on.

    But if at a later time the human's thoughts of the duck do not correspond to the number 42, then the duck is no longer an instance of 42. The number 42 is contingent on thought. It's existence is temporary.

    If we frame our views within this context, the difference is that you believe in an infinite consciousness whose thoughts eternally encompass all numbers. On the other hand, I believe there is no such preferred consciousness; rather, there are only finite consciousnesses whose thoughts can hold only a finite number of numbers at any given time.

    In finitism (rejecting the axiom of infinity) we can do a fair amount of number theory, but not analysis. You can't do calculus, you can't do physics. You can do finite approximations, but the underlying theory is infinitary.fishfry

    Computers perform calculus, and everything they do is finite. So, you're essentially arguing that there's a disconnect between the theory and the practice. Remember, in the case of calculus, the practice came first, and mathematicians later developed an actual-infinity-based theory to justify the practice. Might it be possible that a potential-infinity-based theory could provide a better justification for the practice? This one-minute video by Joscha Bach, titled "Before Constructive Mathematics, People Were Cheating," eloquently captures my view: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jreGFfCxXr4

    You should research that claim rather than just proclaim it. This is one of the reasons I am never going to "digest" your ideas. Many clever people have given these matters considerable thought. You should do a literature search on this idea to clarify your thinking.fishfry

    While I haven't done much research on logic, I have a reasonably strong grasp of basic classical calculus. I understand that continuity is essential for classical calculus—my view starts with continua. I also understand that limits are essential for classical calculus—my view achieves the same ends by using arbitrariness. If you don't want to entertain my ideas simply because clever people weren't able to make calculus work within a finitist framework, that's fine as well. But let's be clear—it's not that you can't digest my ideas; it's that you won't entertain them.

    Can you see that grandiose claims made without sufficient background come down to untrained feelings and intuitions? Not that there's anything wrong with that. But it supports my belief that there is nothing to digest.fishfry

    I understand how my claims appear. I'd like to support my position but it's quite hard if you don't look at my figures or words. You ask for the beef but the only comments you respond to are the bun.

    I think you have a bad idea, not in the sense that it's absolutely wrong; but in the sense that you have a very naïve understanding of what's involved, so that it seems grandiose.fishfry

    I believe my view is naïve in the same sense that Naïve Set Theory is naïve (minus the contradictions).

    Why? Infinitary set theory is perfectly clear of contradictions. Well, as far as we know.fishfry

    Joscha Bach seems quite confident that classical mathematics is filled with contradictions.

    Are you a Cantor crank by any chance?fishfry

    You’ve probably heard the story of Penzias and Wilson, who struggled with persistent background noise on their radio receiver, initially attributing it to pigeon droppings. It turned out to be the cosmic microwave background radiation from the Big Bang, earning them a Nobel Prize. I believe Cantor has interpreted his incredible discoveries as mere pigeon droppings.

    The open sets were your idea.fishfry

    I don't think I mentioned open sets.

    Did I post this Andrej Bauer article, Five Stages Of Accepting Constructive Mathematics?fishfry

    Funny you mention this. I skimmed through it a few days ago and then watched his YouTube lecture by that name yesterday. Now, I'm in the middle of his lecture on LEM. I'm really excited about watching his lectures.

    Someone could show me a diagram or list that was 100% correct and brilliant, and my eyes would still glaze.fishfry

    Is your preferred format essay?? How did you become a mathematician and not an english major? But seriously, how am I supposed to communicate my ideas to you? This might not be the best chat forum etiquette, but would you be open to a Google Hangout? ...Please feel no need to even respond to that idea...
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Such books don't axiomatize the principles used. And those books make use of infinite sets.TonesInDeepFreeze

    That's what I was trying to convey—I don't have axioms and formal rules, but rather concepts relevant to a typical practitioner of calculus. My approach would achieve the same methods as traditional calculus but without relying on actual infinities. I agree that current calculus texts depend on actual infinity, which I believe is both unnecessary and undesirable.

    I think even constructivist and intuitionist set theories have a version of the axiom of infinity.TonesInDeepFreeze

    But isn't it more like a potential infinity?

    I'd like to know whether a "no complete, only potential, infinity" concept has been axiomatized in a way that would be to the satisfaction of cranks if they were ever to actually learn about such things.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I wonder if what is missing isn't the axiomatic systems—of which constructivists offer many—but rather the relevant and accessible intuitions for a typical practitioner of calculus.

    You give me link to some unidentified video so that I would have to take my time to watch through to find out, or guess, what it is you want me to know about it.TonesInDeepFreeze

    To be honest it's because I didn't feel like continuing the dialogue with you because I find some of your comments offensive.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Your line items are helpful to you, and that is the ultimate goal. Technically it doesn't matter whether I ever understand your ideas or not, as long as I am useful as a sounding board. So if you will take the glass half full approach to my not relating to your charts and graphs and lists, then you can feel free to keep posting them and my eyeballs will feel free to be glazed.fishfry

    Trying to make my ideas clearer so that your eyes might not glaze over has indeed helped me collect my thoughts. I've also benefitted in other of your recommendations, such as construtivism which I really appreciate. So thanks for the glass half full. But there will come a point where no further progress can be made if I can't produce post that you are able to digest.

    Check out this guy.fishfry

    I do plan to do a deeper investigation into Constructivism and certainly Brouwer will be a part of that. Thanks.

    constructivism seems more reasonable...But intuitionism...that's just a little out there for my taste.fishfry

    I, on the other hand, am particularly drawn to intuitionism because I find it to be the least 'out there'. In this perspective, what exists are not infinite, eternal abstract objects in some inaccessible realm, but rather the finite set of objects currently being 'thought' by active computers. In my view, if the number 42 is not presently within the thoughts of any computer, then 42 does not currently exist.

    You're not constructing the familiar reals? First time I'm hearing this. Maybe you're constructing the computable reals. Is that what you're doing?fishfry

    In line with my intuitionistic view, I'm not constructing any infinite set, rather constructing computable reals one cut at a time. More importantly, I can stop at any point and still have a working system. There's no need to complete the impossible task of constructing all the real numbers...after all, computers do math without ever having the complete set of real numbers in memory.

    I'm pretty sure, but have no specific info about this, that people already decided you can't do analysis, that is calculus and the theory of the reals, without the axiom of infinity. But I could be wrong. I think if you could do analysis without the axiom of infinity that would be impressive.fishfry

    I disagree with this decision. I believe it is possible to perform analysis without relying on the axiom of infinity. While I don't have formal rules or detailed structures yet, I possess concepts that would be found in an introductory calculus textbook, or perhaps an introductory engineering calculus textbook. Admittedly, this is a significant claim that requires substantial support...it's just that your eyes glaze over...

    But infinities are one of the most fun and interesting part of math! I always liked infinities. I think I just don't understand the psychology of someone who doesn't like the axiom of infinity.

    Tell me, what makes you interested in trying to do math without infinite sets?
    fishfry

    Cantor's proofs are quite fascinating. Many people, often labeled as "infinity cranks," argue that actual infinities are riddled with contradictions. These individuals are in the minority, as most mathematicians do not share this view. I'm intrigued by the idea of a mathematics that does not rely on actual infinity, as I believe this approach is more aligned with true mathematics. It promises to be free of contradictions and brings with it the potential for beauty and advancement.

    I would interpret that as your intuition that the open intervals with rational endpoints are a basis for the usual topology on the reals. All the open sets are unions (perhaps infinite) of open intervals with rational endpoints. But then again ... do you allow infinite unions and intersections of sets? Do you want to get rid of infinitary operations as well as infinite sets?fishfry

    Why do you talk of everything, such as 'all the open sets'? I can't imagine a computer holding this infinite set in memory. I'd rather talk about what I know is possible, such as a computer which holds a few open intervals with rational endpoints. As for infinitary operations, my long post with many bullets (let's call it the bullet post) addresses my view.

    Did I miss a post? Or do you mean the long list of definitions and principles that glazed my eyes a bit?fishfry

    Yes, the bullet post.

    Sorry I'm still confused. Did you mean the big list?fishfry

    Yes, the bullet post.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Let me know when (or if) you have a system with formation rules, axioms and inference rules.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I think only at that time would we enjoy talking with each other.

    Depends on what you mean by "applied". Ordinary mathematics, even as used for basic applied interests such as speed and acceleration use ordinary calculus, which is premised in infinite sets.TonesInDeepFreeze

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jreGFfCxXr4
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Didn't say that, just got a little overwhelmed by all the line items. I'll take a look at it.fishfry

    Oh ok, that's great to hear. Yeah, sorry for the large number of line items...

    But what about my point about constructivism? If you reject the noncomputable reals, you're a constructivist.fishfry

    You're right, I'm likely a constructivist/intuitionist. I say 'likely' because there's a lot of material to go through, and I need more time to fully understand it all. However, my views align with the key principles of constructivism. My main frustration with the material I've found so far is that it doesn't seem to address what I'm talking about...

    Suppose I grant that you have some alternative construction of the reals. What of it? All models of the reals are isomorphic to one another.fishfry

    With my view, reals are constructed one at a time. It is impossible to construct reals, let alone reals. Given this, it's pretty clear that I'm not constructing the familiar reals.

    My point exactly. If you have an alternative view of the reals, nothing changes.fishfry

    I think it is more correct to say that I have an alternate view of continua for which reals only play a supporting role. If mathematics were reformulated to be entirely absent of actual infinities would that be significant?

    I don't see what ideas you've challenged.fishfry

    I'm working towards a foundation free of actual infinities.

    It took weeks for me to understand your bundles, and just when I did, you took them away.fishfry

    Okay, I was too rash to take the bundles away. I think they're a useful way for us to find common ground. One thing I need to make clear though is that when I write (0,4) I'm referring to a bundle between point 0 and point 4. I'm not referring to points each having a number associated with them. If I cut that bundle, a midpoint will emerge and I can assign to that point any number between 0 and 4. A number is only assigned when the cut is made. How does that sound?

    "Binary numbers" aka real numbers can never be algorithms, since there are way too many of them. There are uncountably many reals and only countably many algorithms.fishfry

    I comment on this in the long post which you haven't responded to.

    Sigh. I am not getting much from this latest post.fishfry

    Yeah, the other post of mine was more beefy.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    I'm not commenting on your other postfishfry

    I understand the previous post was lengthy, and I know you don't owe me anything. However, I wonder if this marks the end of our discussion. I'm unsure how to keep it going since anything more might just be more words to skip over. If you have any advice on how to continue, I'd appreciate it. If you'd prefer to end our conversation here, I accept that and thank you for the discussion!
  • Fall of Man Paradox


    In my post directed to both you and fryfish, I either directly or indirectly addressed a lot of your shared points. Below are my responses to your unshared points. Please let me know if I failed to respond to any of your points.

    If one proposes a mathematics without infinite sets, then that is fine, but the ordinary mathematics for the sciences uses infinite sets, which are not derivable from the rest of the set theoretic axioms, thus requiring an axiom.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I agree that applied mathematicians often formulate their theories with infinite sets, but that is largely because those are the tools provided by pure mathematicians. In practice, applied mathematicians do not actually use infinite sets. I believe that applied mathematicians would welcome a different set of tools which allowed their theories to be reformulated free of infinite sets, while still retaining their usefulness.

    For that matter, we don't physically experience breadthlessness, so breadthlessness is itself an idealization, just as infinitude is an idealization.TonesInDeepFreeze

    1D continua (i.e. lines) are a simpler version of the 3D continua we experience. Comparatively, infinitude is a more complex version of the finitude we experience. As such, the idealization of lines and the idealization of infinitude are not comparable.

    The notion of length is quite coherent. In context of the reals, length is a property of segments not of points.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I agree with this. But if the segment is built entirely from points, where would the length come from if not the points?

    Who said anything equivalent with "the continuum constructed in this fashion is paradoxically beautiful and only to be seriously discussed by the experts"? Specific quotes are called for. Otherwise the claim is a flagrant strawman.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I started writing a defence for that comment but given that fryfish has entertained a long conversation on the topic with me, a non-expert, I think it's better for me to just take that statement back.

    It has been proposed in this thread that a sequence converges as n gets arbitrarily large. A sequence is a function. A function has a domain. If the domain is not infinite, then n cannot be arbitrarily large.TonesInDeepFreeze

    I am proposing that we not work with the infinite sequence itself (which cannot exist in a computer) but rather the algorithm designed to generate the infinite sequence (which is described with finite characters and, as per Turing, halts if executed.) As for the domain, I am proposing that we not work with an infinite set of numbers, but rather a line upon which arbitrarily many fractions can emerge by means of cuts.

    One is welcome to work it out in some other way. But then the natural question is: What are your primitives, formation rules, axioms and inference rules?TonesInDeepFreeze

    I agree that a formal treatment is the ultimate destination for a math idea. I see this informal forum conversation as the journey which may be slowly taking me toward that destination or may be leading me toward the junkyard to dump my ideas. Either way, this journey is useful to me.

    It was claimed that Russell's paradox is "still there". In what specific post-Fregean systems is it claimed that the contradiction of Russell's paradox occurs?TonesInDeepFreeze

    I think it's best for me to just take this claim back.

    Back to the poster who claims to offer an alternative to classical mathematics: The word 'isolate' keeps coming up. What is a rigorous mathematical definition of 'isolate'?TonesInDeepFreeze

    In earlier posts I described 'potential' points which existed only in bundles that can be isolated by means of a cut. I have since scrapped that idea. Instead of proposing that cuts isolate points, I am now proposing that cuts create points.

    It was claimed that the interval (0 1) is not an infinite union of disjoint intervals. It is false that the interval (0 1) is not an infinite union of disjoint intervals.Ostensively: (0 1/2) U [1/2 3/4) U [3/4 7/8) U ...TonesInDeepFreeze

    Treating your example algorithmically and using the notation described in my recent post I would say the following: (0, 1/2) U [1/2, 3/4) U [3/4, 7/8) U ... !⥱ (0, 1)
    In other words, that algorithm can never output the interval (0, 1).

    But I think the original discussion was about describing a line as the union of fundamental objects. Defining a line as the union of smaller lines would be a circular definition, which is why I want to take the line as fundamental.

    'Dedekind cut' is not defined in terms of 'gaps', nor 'executions', nor algorithms. 'Dedekind cut' is mathematically defined and we see mathematical proofs that the set of Dedekind cuts is uncountable.TonesInDeepFreeze

    In the context of computation, this distinction is moot since we can only ever speak of arbitrarily many cuts. As such, I'm willing to withdraw my comment about uncountably many cuts made to countably many rationals.

    Instead of that comment, let me reframe my position in the context of cuts as described in my recent post to you and fryfish. If we inspect the outcome of a real cut, we cannot determine what real algorithm was used to make that cut. This is because when executing real cuts we are forced to select a fractional interval at some finite depth in the Cauchy sequence of intervals, and whatever that interval may be could correspond to potentially different real cuts.

    If a Dedekind cut does not correspond to the cut described above, it likely corresponds to one that is infinitely precise such that it results in a cut at a point (not a line). This would be akin to the impossible and non-sensical task of selecting the final interval in the Cauchy sequence of intervals, whose interval would contain only a single number. Of course, there is no final term. From the computational perspective, this type of cut is not possible so has no relevance in the top-down view. If it holds together in the bottom-up view then fine.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
     

    In my post directed to both you and TonesInDeepFreeze, I either directly or indirectly addressed a lot of your shared points. Below are my responses to your unshared points. Please let me know if I failed to respond to any of your points.

    set theorist Joel David Hamkins is investigating Infinite-time Turing machines.fishfry

    I'm skeptically curious :)

    You seem to be unhappy that abstract math doesn't climb into the wiring cabinet and start patching cables. Do I have that right? I don't think you don't know what you're talking about. I think I don't know what you're talking about. I'm throwing out guesses. You don't like infinities, ok there's finitism. You want things to be algorithmic, ok there's constructivism. You want there to be a minimal positive real, ok that's computer arithmetic. None of it sticks. Why do you reject the doctrines you espouse?fishfry

    • Computers - Clearly physical computers are limited by our finite observable universe, but I think that we are also in agreement that the abstract computers of mathematics also cannot be infinite. They can be arbitrarily large but are nevertheless finite. I'm interested in abstract computers, not physical computers. 
    • Infinities - I think it's impossible to model a continuum using a finite set of indivisibles. However, I'm proposing that we model a continuum using an evolving finite set of divisibles. As we make cuts, the finite set grows, but it remains finite. As we make joins, the finite set shrinks, but never becomes empty.
    • Algorithmic - I don't want to use algorithms to construct indivisibles. I want to use algorithms to deconstruct (i.e. cut) divisibles (i.e. continua).
    • Minimal positive real - I'm not saying that there exists a minimal positive number. Rather, I'm saying that we can generalize the output of algorithms by using a placeholder. So when I say that we cut (0,1) arbitrarily many times to produce an arbitrarily small number, I'm not saying that we can make infinitely many cuts or that there exists an infinitely small number. Rather, I'm saying that you can pick a positive number as large as you please and divide 1 by it.

    Shouldn't the first principles be self-evident?
    — keystone

    Of course not...non-Euclidean geometry...
    fishfry

    Ok fair point. Agreed.

    If I stipulate that every mathematicians that ever lived is a bad person for doing whatever you think they did ... would it help? Can you step back a tiny bit and see that if every smart person who ever lived is a dummy acting from bad faith ... well, maybe it's you, and not them.fishfry

    We need to make a distinction between the core mathematical idea and language with which it's communicated. For example, the Pythagorean Theorem was known and used in various forms long before the formalization of bottom-up number-based systems. And it will continue to hold value even if we move past bottom-up number-based systems to top-down continuum-based systems. I'm not proposing that any such mathematical idea is wrong.

    And even IF I'm right, it doesn't mean that bottom-up number-based systems are useless. They would remain useful in the same sense that Newtonian mechanics remains useful (it just cannot be used to describe our reality at a fundamental level). But yes, I agree that it is likely me who is the dummy. I am likely experiencing the Dunning–Kruger effect. But nevertheless ideas should be challenged on their merit, not on how unlikely it is for an important math idea to originate from an engineer on a chat forum.

    Abandoning the entire bundle argument? So the real line is no longer made of a countably infinite union of overlapping open intervals, each characterized by a particular computable number it contains? I thought that was a pretty good thing to achieve agreement on. You are abandoning this now?fishfry

    I had to abandon the bundle argument, in part because it seems to imply a structure that's not there. For example, I never proposed that the real line was made of a countably infinite union of overlapping open intervals. Rather, I proposed that a computer can begin to cut the line but it will never exhaust cutting such that the line is divided into infinitely many partitions.

    As far as gaps go, they're important. The completeness property, aka the Least Upper Bound property, aka Cauchy-completeness, is the defining characteristic of the real numbers. Accept no substitute! If someone tries to sell you a model of the real numbers, ask them if it's complete! Mathematical shopping advice.fishfry

    I agree that a number-based system that has gaps cannot be used for calculus. However, a continuum-based system begin with a continuous line, and if all we do is make cuts, there will never be a state of the system where gaps are present.

    Do you know the infinite complete binary tree?fishfry

    I agree that the SB-tree and the infinite complete binary tree capture the same information. In fact, the binary tree might be preferable since binary is the language of computers. However, I prefer the SB-tree since it places fractions at the nodes. As described in my post to both you and TonesInDeepFreeze, I see binary numbers as algorithms operating on fractions. Since paths down the binary tree can also be seen are algorithms operating on fractions, I feel that the distinction between a node and a path is less clear with the infinite complete binary tree.

    Ah, well that's like the active intelligence of intuitionism.fishfry

    Yes, I do think my view falls near the intuitionist camp.

    Well you are a long way from making that many cuts when you start by denying even countable infinity!! Isn't that a little inconsistent?fishfry

    Yeah, you're right. In my reformulated view (where I posted to you and TonesInDeepFreeze) I make no mention of uncountably many cuts.

    Very difficult to get a model of the real numbers while denying infinite sets. It's been tried, really.fishfry

    I think it's impossible to model a continuum using a finite set of indivisibles. However, I'm proposing that we model a continuum using an evolving finite set of divisibles.

    Jeezus. That ain't workin'. Maybe some control characters in there. And don't use ChatGPT, it rots your brain. Lot of foolishness floating about in the culture lately.fishfry

    Is the problem simply that I'm using Latex? And ChatGPT is imperfect but nevertheless awesome as a co-pilot.

    Ok. I get that you feel enthusiastic about this. I'm on your side. I hope you can work out your ideas. I do think they are a little half-baked at the moment. That's an honest assessment.fishfry

    I genuinely appreciate this sentiment. Given that my ideas continue to get reformulated throughout this discussion, I could only agree that they are in the baking process (and to be realistic, they are likely less than half-baked at this point). I also want to acknowledge that when the baking is complete the end product may not be anything anyone wants to eat!
  • Fall of Man Paradox
     

    I've further refined my thinking on numbers and algorithms so please allow me to start from scratch here without us bringing in any of the out-of-date baggage from my past few posts. 

    Fractions
    I would like the objects of computation to be fractions. I have an unorthodox view of fractions. I don't see them being constructed from other number systems (such as integers) or as elements of other number systems (such as real numbers) but rather as numbers in and of themselves. The structure of the fractions are captured by trees, my preference being the Stern-Brocot tree, which places fractions at the nodes and whose basic arithmetic can be performed by navigating the Stern-Brocot tree. But when I mention the SB-tree in the following post, I acknowledge that any equivalent structure (such as the infinite complete binary tree) can be used in its place.

    • When I say that 1/2 = 2/4, I mean that fractions 1/2 and 2/4 correspond to the same node on the SB-tree.
    • When I say that 0.99 = 9/10 + 9/100, I mean that 0.99 and 9/10 + 9/100 are both algorithms which output the same fraction when executed.
    • When I say that 0.99 ⥱ 99/100, I mean that the algorithm 0.99 outputs the fraction 99/100 when executed.
    • With this view, positional number systems (such as decimal) describe algorithms on fractions, not fractions themselves.
    • Only basic arithmetic is valid on fractions (specifically roots are excluded).
    • Any set of fractions is incomplete (i.e. has gaps) so cannot be used in isolation to construct a line.

    Reals
    • When I previously said that 4 - 4/3 + 4/5 - 4/7 + 4/9 - ... does not halt, I meant that when executed, that algorithm will endlessly compute as it works towards outputting the complete sum all in one go (hence, infinite precision). However, I accept that what Turing would do is reformulate the algorithm to essentially compute a partial sum of the infinite series, output the resulting fraction of arbitrarily fine precision, and halt. I like Turing's approach so moving forward I'll treat an infinite series as this type of algorithm which halts. I acknowledge that this is a departure from classical mathematics which doesn't equate the infinite series with such an algorithm.
    • It is meaningless to talk about the unique output of the algorithm 4 - 4/3 + 4/5 - 4/7 + 4/9 - ... because the output depends on the precision requirements.
    • Instead of working with the equivalence class of all possible outputs from such an algorithm, I propose that we work with the algorithm itself.
    • When I say that 9/10 + 9/100 + 9/1000 + ... !⥱ 1, I mean that that algorithm can never output the fraction 1.
    • When I say that 0.9 ≃  9/10 + 9/100 + 9/1000 + ...  ≃ 1+ 0/10 + 0/100 + 0/1000 + ... ≃ 1.0, I mean that all 4 algorithms are asymptotically equal (i.e. they share the same limit).
    • When I say that 9/10 + 9/100 + 9/1000 + ... is rational, I mean that that algorithm is asymptotically equal to a positional number algorithm whose fractional digits eventually end with repeating digits (namely, 0.9).
    • When I say that 9/10 + 9/100 + 9/1000 + ... is natural, I mean that that algorithm is asymptotically equal to a positional number algorithm whose fractional digits are repeating 0's (namely, 1.0).
    • When I say that an irrational has no positional number algorithm, I mean that it cannot be represented as a positional number algorithm whose fractional digits eventually end with repeating digits.
    • A computable irrational, such as π, is an algorithm based on more complex arithmetic of fractions, such as 4 - 4/3 + 4/5 - 4/7 + 4/9 - ..., nevertheless being entirely represented with finite characters.
    • I propose that non-computable irrationals are inaccessible and unnecessary, and that a real can only be a rational or a computable irrational.
    • Following from my proposition, any set of reals is necessarily incomplete (i.e. has gaps) so cannot be used in isolation to construct a line.

    Continua
    • I propose that a line is a fundamental object, it is continuous breadthless length, and it is described by its endpoints. 
    • I propose that we redefine the term interval from describing the points that lie between endpoints to describing the line that lies between endpoints. For example, the interval (-5,5) describes the line that resides between points -5 and 5.
    • I propose that the only operation we can perform on lines (and continua in general) is to cut (or join) them AND I endeavor to argue that this operation is entirely sufficient. (Moving forward, as a matter of brevity, I won't mention joining).
    • I propose that in 1D a cut entails the partitioning of a line. 
    • A cut at a point entails cutting the line once, and labelling the midpoint that emerges with any fraction whose value is between the endpoints. For example, cutting (-5,5) by 2 results in (-5,2) U 2 U (2,5).
    • A cut at a line entails cutting the line at two points, and labelling the midline that emerges with an open fractional interval. For example, cutting (-5,5) by (1,2) results in (-5,1) U 1 (1,2) U 2 U (2,5).
    • To understand how reals fit into this picture, it is beneficial to see them as Cauchy sequences of fractional intervals, and the corresponding algorithm (when executed) outputs a fractional interval arbitrarily deep into the sequence, and halts.
    • For example: 0.9 ≃ 1.0 ≃ (9/10,11/10), (99/100,101/100), (999/1000,1001/1000), (9999/10000,10001/10000), ...
    • A cut of (-5,5) at 0.9 entails a cut at one of the intervals in the Cauchy sequence, which necessarily is a cut at a line.
    • Instead of selecting a specific interval in the Cauchy sequence, the cut of (-5,5) at 0.9 can be generalized as a cut by (1-ε, 1+ε), where we can replace ε with a small positive number and 1-ε and 1+ε are fractions. The resulting system can be generalized as (-5, 1-ε) U 1-ε U (1-ε, 1+ε) U 1+ε U (1+ε,5).
    • Any set of points is incomplete (i.e. has gaps) but the points are just one part of a continuum-based system. The system also includes lines, and as a whole the system is continuous.
    • I propose that calculus is the mathematics real cuts on continua.
  • Fall of Man Paradox


    I'm very keen to respond but there's a lot to reflect on and respond to and I'm completely overloaded with work and family responsibilities so I might not respond until next weekend. As always, I appreciate your comments and this dialogue.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    EDIT: In case you already read this post, I should mention that I made significant edits to it since it was originally posted.

    I'll slog on a little longer.fishfry

    Yay!! Thanks a tonne :)

    It would help if you'll engage with my key point tonight, which is that you've been misunderstanding the nature of halting with respect to computable numbers. Can you see that 1/3 = .333... is computable, because the program "print 3" halts in finitely many steps for an n, giving the n-th decimal digit of 1/3?fishfry

    • I agree that the program you describe halts, however, I'll focus on Turing's version, by agreeing that the program that computes 0.333... to an arbitrarily fine precision halts.
    • I agree that by definition that's what it means for a number to be a computable number, so by definition 0.333... is a computable number.
    • I agree that by that definition pi is a computable number.
    • I agree that no program can compute pi to infinitely fine precision.
    • You might even agree with me that no program can compute 0.333... to infinitely fine precision.

    My understanding is that a program halts if it reaches a point where it completes its execution and stops running. Do you actually disagree with this definition of halt?

    You are employing a straw man argument. I'm saying that the program that computes 0.333...to infinitely fine precision does not halt, and you are saying that the program that computes 0.333... to an arbitrarily fine precision does halt. I agree with you, but your argument doesn't address my point.

    I believe the term 'computable number' applies to a number which can be represented by an algorithm. Am I wrong? If so, it is a very misleading name because the definition makes no mention of computers, finite resources, or anything of the sort. I would much rather call them 'algorithmic numbers' but let's stick with the current terminology.

    I believe the term 'halt' applies to the execution of the algorithm. If it cannot be executed to completion then it does not halt.

    Your failure to see the above distinction relates to one of my central complaints about the current (bottom-up) view of mathematics: mathematicians too often obfuscate the program (the algorithm) with it's execution (the generation of output by the algorithm). And it doesn't help that we call both the program and it's output the same thing: numbers. This is where I'm trying to bring clarity to the situation by redefining terms (such as what it means to be a rational vs. a real), but it turns out that such efforts just makes you think I don't know what I'm talking about.

    After all, you say your top-down view starts with the real line. But I say, I don't know what the real line is. How do you know there is any such thing unless you construct it from first principles?fishfry

    Shouldn't the first principles be self-evident? We experience continua and finite numbers all the time in our physical reality. The same cannot be said about points and transfinite numbers. It is the points which must be constructed from first principles. It is infinity which must be derived, not axiomatized into existence.

    Euclid's line is so simple -- breadthless length. It's hard for anyone to say that's not self-evident. And I can easily construct a point from that line - I cut it and the midpoint emerges. The bottom-up view is far less self-evident. Somehow combining sufficiently many objects of no length results in an object of length. And even though nobody has a good explanation of how this works we nevertheless proceed by saying that the continuum constructed in this fashion is paradoxically beautiful and only to be seriously discussed by the experts. Really?

    You expect a deeper structure to my line, such that, say, when I cut line (0,4) at point 2 that this involves identifying a pre-ordained point and isolating it by means of a cut. That's not what I'm proposing. My line has no deeper structure or additional properties beyond continuity and breadthless length.

    I've come to realize that I've been heading down the wrong path by saying that my line is a bundle of points. I ended up here because I was defending against your arguments that my line has gaps. It turns out that my defense has just made you expect a structure to these points. It is better for me to just claim as a first principle that the line is continuous. As such, I'd like to discard the 'bundle' argument.

    Instead, the structure you are looking for comes from the cutter, not the line. I can cut line (0,4) anywhere I want and label the midpoint that emerges '2'. In labelling that point '2' I am making an agreement with myself that any subsequent cut I make, I will label it to maintain the structure we have come to expect with numbers (as captured by the SB tree). For example, if I subsequently cut the line (2,4) I agree to label it with a number between 2 and 4.

    In the top-down view, the cutter/mathematician plays a central and active role in maintaining structure and, moreover, actualizing objects....not unlike the the observer in QM...hmmm....

    Ok. So far, after all this, what I understand of your idea is that the real line consists of a countably infinite set of overlapping open intervals, each containing a computable number. So far so good?fishfry

    There's nothing actually infinite about the line. What is infinite is the potential for the cutter to make cuts to the line. But since (1) an infinitely precise computable irrational cut requires the completion of a supertask, (2) non-computable irrational cuts cannot be algorithmically defined and (3) the cutter can only ever perform finitely many cuts, this potential can never be completely actualized. When working in 1D, the mathematician will forever be stuck working with a finite set of lines and points. However, because the mathematician can continue to make arbitrarily many more cuts (i.e. any natural number of cuts), that set can grow to be arbitrarily large (i.e. have any natural number of elements).

    You are delusional. Could it be that you are the one who's confused, and not mathematicians?fishfry

    Of course that's possible (and likely). After all, that's why these ideas are being discussed in this chat forum and not eternalized in the Annals of Mathematics. But since yelling 'I'm not crazy' only makes one sound crazier, I won't challenge this point further and hopefully the ideas will eventually speak for themselves.

    Cranky. Grandiose claims not backed by anything coherent.fishfry

    I know how it sounds, that's why I'm reluctant to talk about QM and paradoxes at this time. When I communicate the fundamentals, you ask for the implications. When I communicate the implications, you ask for the fundamentals. My only hope is that at some point the fundaments become coherent to you, after which the implications will naturally follow. I admire you for sticking with me for this long given that you think my ideas have so far been incoherent.

    What are you doing that, when I quote your numeric examples, the quote text comes out in a column?fishfry

    I ask ChatGPT to give me the Latex equivalent of an expression and I insert that Latex string with the math tag.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    What? You know, none of this makes any sense.fishfry

    I was trying to go along with your idea of engineering math. If the mention of an engineer and a mathematician working together doesn't help, then fine - we'll drop the idea of engineering math. But, I disagree with your statement that none of it makes sense.

    What? There's no difference with respect to algorithms. Consider 1/3 = .333...fishfry

    Consider the follow program which writes the specified fraction in the specified base (NOTE: You can skip over the code):

    def fraction_to_base(numerator, denominator, base):
        result = "0."
        remainder = numerator
    
        while remainder != 0:    
            remainder *= base
            digit, remainder = divmod(remainder, denominator)
            result += str(digit)
    
        return result
    

    For 1/3 in base 3, this program returns 0.1.
    For 1/3 in base 10, this program returns nothing because the program does not halt. After all, it's trying to compute the sum of an infinite series. Impossible.

    Clearly, these are not the same outcomes. They're different because is a rational number, while is a real algorithm.

    If there is a difference between 1.0 and 1.00000... you are off on your own. I can't hold up my end of this. Nothing you write is correct.fishfry

    Take and literally. Here's what they mean:




    If I were to write a program for each of those computations, the former would halt and the latter wouldn't, similar to the 1/3 example above. I understand why you and everyone else think they're exactly the same, but, in the purest sense, they are algorithmically different. Do you not see that?

    It's not that I'm incorrect. It's that mathematicians have been so sloppy with the distinction between reals and rationals not realizing that this distinction truly matters, especially from a top-down perspective.

    Yes. I would like to distinguish between real numbers and real algorithms.
    — keystone

    Of course, because they are entirely different things, and there are a lot more real numbers than algorithms.
    fishfry

    Allow me to clarify: I want to distinguish between a real number and it's corresponding real algorithm. A real algorithm corresponding to π can be written perfectly with finite characters, such as:



    or better yet, let me take that infinite series and derive 'a sequence of intervals' version of π:



    Here is the algorithm for the infinite sequence of intervals:



    The real number π is the only number that lies in regardless of what N you choose. However, since no interval in the series has zero length, the real number π cannot be isolated. Numerically, π is the only number that lies in any interval described by π, and geometrically, π is the only point that lies in any line described by π.

    From the bottom-up view π is equivalent to π.
    From the top-down view π is not equivalent to π (any more that an algorithm is equivalent to it's output, or a line is equivalent to a point).

    You've just made all this terminology up.fishfry

    That's because when it comes to reals, mathematicians have been so sloppy with their terminology. I'm trying to make things more precise.

    Then you give me no reason to care. You are not going to "solve QM" with your line of discourse.fishfry

    First off, I'm only claiming to (at least partially) solve the issue of how to philosophically interpret QM. I'm certainly not claiming to have solved quantum gravity or anything like that. Are you saying you want me to jump right to the implications of the top-down view without even explaining the top-down view? I'm certain that without understanding my view you'll just think I'm injecting quantum woo into the top-down view. If you stick with it, what you'll see is that quantum intuitions follow from the top-down view. It is this way because QM is a top-down view of reality whereas classical mechanics (CM) is a bottom-up view of reality. Whether we're talking about mathematics or physics, the bottom-up view has been undoubtedly and demonstrably useful. It's just not correct at a foundational level. The reason why we struggle to interpret QM is because the mathematical top-down view has been neglected. Zeno was the first canary in the coal mine urging us to consider it.

    I think I am nearing the end here. You just are not making any sense...Not feelin' it tonight...I don't see where this is going. I might be doing you a disservice by encouraging you...Can we turn the page?fishfry

    You've been of great help to me so far and I greatly appreciate that. If you ever want to call it quits I will accept that, thank you for your help, and that will be the end of it. Of course, I reallllly hope that doesn't happen...
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    I look forward to a breakthrough in your quest. But I am very old and have multiple medical conditions, so I may not be around. Smooth sailing, fellow explorer.jgill

    Thank you! I wish you very many wonderful years ahead.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    For those in the profession who do not deal with transfinitisms and set theory or foundations it's likely they would agree. When I say that a sequence converges to a number as n goes to infinity I simply mean n gets larger without bound. I don't think I have ever spoken of infinity as a number of some sort, although in complex variable theory one does speak of "the point at infinity" in connection with the Riemann sphere. But I am old fashioned.jgill

    Well I'd say infinite sets are pretty pervasive in modern mathematics. The reason is that sets are very useful and finite sets are very restrictive - they're not a satisfactory alternative. What I'm proposing is nuanced - arbitrarily big sets. I want to replace 'infinity' with 'arbitrary'...at least most of the time. A sequence converges to a number as n gets arbitrarily big.

    I have no problem with the treatment of infinity on the Riemann sphere or in projective geometry.

    Exploration is the soul the subject, but one does not explore the heart of Africa by strolling around city park. Sorry ↪keystonejgill

    Richard Feynman once said that "the chance is high that the truth lies in the fashionable direction. But, on the off-chance that it is in another direction — a direction obvious from an unfashionable view of field theory — who will find it? Only someone who has sacrificed himself by teaching himself quantum electrodynamics from a peculiar and unfashionable point of view; one that he may have to invent for himself."

    My ideas have no relation to field theory, they might not be true, and even if they're true, they might not be interesting. I accept that chances this goes nowhere is high. But you shouldn't discredit my view just because I choose to stroll through unfashionable parks.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    You are doing Engineering math.fishfry

    Yes and no.

    Yes - The person tasked to execute the cut is an engineer doing engineering math. He knows he'll never be able to cut the line exactly at π so he cuts an interval containing π to give him wiggle room - kind of like a safety factor.

    No - The person tasked to generalize all engineer actions is a mathematician. Instead of assuming any particular engineer, the mathematician aims to describe the actions of the 'arbitrary engineer'. Instead of saying that the interval width is any particular value, the mathematician just says that the interval width is ε2-ε1, where ε1 and ε2 can be any arbitrarily positive number.

    The cut of (-∞,+∞) at π is generalized as (-∞,π-ε1) U π-ε1 U (π-ε1,π+ε2) U π+ε2 U (π+ε2,+∞)

    Computable numbers, which have algorithms, or are identified with their algorithms, or are found by executing their algorithms. Not sure which of those you mean but they're all about the same.fishfry

    Computable reals are identified with their algorithms.
    Computable rationals are found by executing their algorithms.

    But each computable number is the number that WOULD be computed if you finished executing the algorithm, but you can't; so each computable number is a number inside a little interval. Have I got that right?fishfry

    Yes. I would like to distinguish between real numbers and real algorithms. A computable real number WOULD be computed if you finished executing the corresponding real algorithm, but you can't; so, the real algorithm only ever defines an interval within which the real number is inside. No real number can ever be isolated.

    • is a real algorithm.
    • is a real algorithm.
    • - = , which is a real algorithm.
    • is a rational number.

    That would give you a countable set of open intervals whose union is the real numbers, including the noncomputables. But you'd never have to "identify" a noncomputable. And in fact each of the endpoints (c \pm \frac{1}[n}(c \pm \frac{1}[n} are themselves computable.fishfry

    I want to avoid talk of the existence of an actually infinite set. We need to frame it in terms of the potential to create an arbitrarily large set. It is very important that the endpoints be rational, otherwise nothing is gained by defining π using intervals.

    But they are not in general doing me much good. What if the overabundance of diagrams was increasing the likelihood I'd quit? You can see that under that hypothesis, you are acting against your own interests by battering me with diagrams...just be judicious in how often you include them in posts.fishfry

    Point taken. I will be more judicious. SB-tree aside, I will grant that I didn't need to use a single diagram for the discussion so far. Interval notation would have been entirely sufficient. I was just hoping that you would warm up to 1D diagrams because when I go to 2D it will be very hard for me to describe what I'm thinking with words. I suppose I'll cross that bridge when we get there.

    So far I get that your system involves little intervals centered at the computable numbers.fishfry

    It almost sounds like you're suggesting that I'm saying that (-∞,+∞) is the union of infinite little intervals. It is not. With the top-down view, we don't construct (-∞,+∞), rather we start with it. Engineer1 may cut (-∞,+∞) five times. Engineer2 may cut (-∞,+∞) five million times. What the mathematician would say is that the 'arbitrary engineer' will make N cuts, where N is an arbitrary natural number. The is no 'privaledged engineer' who has a system that has been cut infinitely many times. Rather, each engineer must work within their own finite system.

    Are we on the same page here? I really feel that we are.fishfry

    I do feel like we're very close to being on the same page now!

    Russell's paradox and QM as well? Please, show me how this is supposed to work.fishfry

    Let's save the paradox discussion for later. I only mentioned it at this point because you asked why a mathematician would care.

    Ok. So as far as I get this: The real numbers are made up of a bunch of open intervals centered at the computable reals. Is that right? And FWIW I think your truncated algorithm idea will give the same reals as my plus/minus 1/n intervals.fishfry

    The real number is interior to the interval defined by the corresponding real algorithm. However, it doesn't necessarily have to be at the center. ε1 and ε2 don't have to be equal. I do think your 1/n values for epsilon works, but I'm not sure if we need to constrain the values of epsilon as such. If we're cutting (-∞,+∞) then it seems to me we should be as general as possible and say that epsilon can be any positive number - even 5 billion.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    Given a line segment, points in this object are purely potential, non-existent until a device is used to "isolate" them. Is that about it? If so I doubt any practicing mathematician would be interested. But math philosophers might be. A lot depends upon where you go from here. Just my opinion.jgill

    At the heart of my view is a simple idea: that infinity is a potential, not an actual. This idea leads to many consequences, one being that points are potential until isolated, as you have noted. However, I hope to show that there are far more interesting consequences to this small idea.

    Sometimes a small idea can have huge consequences. For example, at the heart of relativity is the simple idea that the laws of physics are the same for all observers, regardless of their relative motion. The importance of relativity speaks for itself.

    And no, I'm not comparing myself to Einstein. I'm just saying that even significant consequences can follow from simple ideas.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    You don't believe in the real numbers, how can you manipulate them?fishfry

    I believe the following:

    1) The following two algorithms (written with a finite number of characters as infinite series) correspond to e and pi:




    2) It is possible to compute the partial sums to a finite precision (e.g. π can approximately be represented as 3.14).
    3) It is impossible to compute the complete sums to infinite precision (i.e. π cannot be represented as an infinite decimal number).
    4) The algorithm itself does not apply any restrictions on the precision (.e. imprecision is only introduced during computation).
    5) To prevent imprecision from being introduced, one should work with the algorithm and delay the computation for as long as possible.
    6) There are algorithms for performing arithmetic on infinite series (i.e. algorithms on algorithms).
    7) It is possible to compute the partial sum corresponding to π+e to a finite precision (e.g. π+e can approximately be represented as
    )
    8) It is impossible to compute the complete sum corresponding to π+e to infinite precision (i.e. π+e cannot be represented as an infinite decimal number).
    9) Such arithmetic algorithms itself do not apply any restrictions on the precision (i.e. imprecision is only introduced during computation).
    10) To prevent imprecision from being introduced, one should work with the arithmetic algorithm and delay the computation for as long as possible.
    11) One can avoid computation altogether and just speak in terms of algorithms.

    But if your approximation only needs to be to the minimum distance in a system of computer arithmetic, then you're doing computer arithmetic.fishfry

    I'm taking (11) seriously and avoiding computation. By doing so, I'm not approximating anything; By sticking to the algorithms I'm working with perfect precision. While computers can work with algorithms, I'm not talking about the finite arithmetic you are referring to.

    You think every real number can be arbitrarily approximated by an algorithm. That's false.fishfry

    This is false. I think that non-computable real numbers exist but only within intervals. They do not exist as isolated objects. Since numbers are isolated by cuts and cuts are described with algorithm, we cannot even describe how to isolate non-computable real numbers.

    What if none of your figures make sense to me?fishfry

    Then I'll keep trying until you quit. It may be impossible to convince you to adopt my view, but I'll be fully satisfied if, by the end of this discussion, you can at least argue my position, even if you don't accept it.

    Your latest uses these epsilon quantities, which you've defined as the minimum possible length in a given physical computer. So you are doing computer arithmetic. Not that there's anything wrong with that! But it seems to me that's what you're doing.fishfry

    As described above, I care about the algorithms, not the numbers - plans, not the computations. The figure with epsilons illustrates the algorithm defining the cut corresponding to π. As I said earlier, it illustrates the plan, not the execution of the plan. To execute the plan then I need computer arithmetic, but I'm only interested in the plan.

    What do you think is wrong with the current philosophical foundation? And why would a mathematician care?fishfry

    The current philosophical foundation is riddled with actual infinities and paradoxes. Mathematicians have elegant ways of sweeping these paradoxes under the rug (like Russell's Paradox, Riemann's Rearrangement Theorem, the Dartboard Paradox, Zeno's Paradoxes, etc.), but they're still there. However, if you believe there's nothing under the rug, it becomes harder to convince you to care. I see a paradigm shift towards a top-down view having significant consequences across philosophy, especially in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Such a statement might not seem 'beefy', but let me just say that truth has a history of being useful, even if its utility isn't immediately apparent when it's uncovered.

    Do you understand that this is the first time that you've told me what you're doing?fishfry

    I said things like...

    • "I'm familiar with these methods [of building reals from the empty set]. I believe there is a bottom-up and a top-down interpretation of them. I'm not satisfied with the orthodox bottom-up interpretation of them"
    • "Pi is just as important in the top-down view as it is in the bottom-up view. However, as with many other things, it just needs a little reinterpretation to fit into the top-down picture."
    • "Considering epsilon's role in calculus, let me just say that with some reinterpretation, calculus can be elegantly integrated into the top-down perspective without the need for infinitesimals."

    ...but I should have explicitly said that I'm trying to patch up the philosophical basis of the real numbers.

    But the real numbers are categorical. Any two models are isomorphic. So you are not going to be able to produce a "better" model of the real numbers. One representation, construction, or description gives you exactly the same set of real numbers as any other.fishfry

    Numbers are the objects of computation, while algorithms are the objects of plans. I aim to shift the concept of reals from numbers to algorithms, from computations to plans. As such, I'm not proposing an alternate number model of the reals. I'm proposing an algorithmic model of reals. This model is structured very different. For one, while the real numbers are used to construct/define the real line, the real algorithms are used to deconstruct/cut the real line. However, I endeavor to show that switching to the top-down view has absolutely no impact on applied mathematicians, even those working with calculus.
  • Fall of Man Paradox
    What about computer arithmetic, fixed and floating point representations, smallest and largest possible values?...So you are doing normal math except within the limits of a finite computational space. If not fixed/floating point, something else. But computer arithmetic regardless.fishfry

    I'm sure you can appreciate the problem of substituting rational number approximations of irrational numbers too early in a computation. The best approach is to do all the manipulation first and only perform the substitution at the very end when the computation is required. I would rephrase this as follows:

    • Step 1: Manipulation of real numbers
    • Step 2: Computation based on rational numbers (approximations)

    This is analogous to the 2-step cutting process I outlined in my previous post. In both cases, step 2 is crude and done using computer arithmetic. It's the realm of applied mathematicians and not of interest here. I'm solely concerned with step 1.

    You cannot telescope down to pi on computer-limited representations of numbers. If you mean that your number pi is actually a little interval around pi with approximation bounds given by the limitations of your computer representation, I'm fine with that.fishfry

    That's pretty much what I'm saying! But instead of talking about any particular computer (which only becomes relevant to step 2), I want to remain in step 1 and talk in general terms. As such, would you allow me to say that π is (π-ε1,π+ε2), and that the value of ε1 and ε2 only need to be determined in step 2? And the following figure is simply saying that π is somewhere between 0 and 4.

    TQOT11q.png

    Don't see the point though.fishfry

    If you say that the above figure makes sense to you, then I can show you a 2D figure, and the benefits and consequences of my perspective will hopefully become clear.

    If you reject the noncomputable reals, what you have is the constructive real numbers, and the calculus based on them is called constructive real analysis.fishfry

    If the noncomputables reals can describe continua it is because below the surface they rest upon a more fundamental scaffolding which can describe continua in and of itself. So no, I'm not interested in constructive real analysis. I'm interested in good ol' real analysis. I just want to place it on a stronger philosophical foundation. I think my perspective will become clearer to you when explained in 2D.

    I'm genuinely sorry I can't be of more help.fishfry

    From the outside, it may seem like this conversation isn't progressing, but your reluctance to accept my informal ideas has highlighted areas where I need to strengthen my arguments. So, you are indeed helping me a lot.