Knowledge is true; facts are true. Where's the issue?

In what manner are facts true? As per the OP, if we assume that facts are subject to Gettier's justified true belief, then how are they justified, how are they true, and when are they subject to being 'beliefs'?

Is what is said above just as well the same as asking about when or how facts "truth-apt"?

I'd the above sounds flimsy then I might switch the question to asking how or when are facts truth apt?

There are no untrue facts.

How do you know that?

Being true is what a fact does. If you disagree, then you are on your own.

Being true is what a fact does. — Banno

I don't understand. What makes the above true?

What could a fact be, if not how things are? What could truth be, if not how things are?

It's how the game is played.

Well, yes. That is a given. I was about to ask you something quizzical about fact-hood.

Do you care to talk about what makes a statement a "fact"?

But knowledge isn't justified true belief, it can't be defined by a strict set of criteria.

A fact is deemed to be a fact, when it is recognized by the relevant people to be so: those involved in the affair, experts in a specific field, etc.

What could a fact be, if not how things are? What could truth be, if not how things are?

It's how the game is played. — Banno

You mention how the game is played...

Are there rules about when a statement can become a fact or attain the qualifier of "fact-hood"?

Do you care to talk about what makes a statement a "fact"? — Shawn

Nah. Gotta go build new beds for this year's spuds. They should already be in the ground.

There are no untrue facts. — Banno

On a similar vein, is this a synthetic a priori?

I'm glad for the good weather.

But knowledge isn't justified true belief, it can't be defined by a strict set of criteria. — Manuel

Yes it can. I see the cow on the field and assume it's a cow as long as I'm sane and sober.

N

A fact is deemed to be a fact, when it is recognized by the relevant people to be so: those involved in the affair, experts in a specific field, etc. — Manuel

Banno says that a fact is a true state of affairs if I'm inferring correctly. Do you agree?

Its definitionally true. A fact just is something that is true. Asking how we know facts are true is like asking how we know that bachelors are unmarried: its just what the term means.

And on the JTB story of knowledge, a fact becomes knowledge when A. it is believed B. it is true and C. justification is available (i.e. there are good and sufficient reasons for supposing it to be true).

When does a fact establish itself as knowledge? — Shawn

Facts become knowledge when they are needed. When they are used. You can't know whether or not a piece of information has been adequately justified until you know what it will be used for. Until you know the consequences of being wrong. At that point - when you are making a decision about a future action, you have to determine whether or not you can use that information. When you decide you can, it is knowledge.

Its definitionally true. A fact just is something that is true. Asking how we know facts are true is like asking how we know that bachelors are unmarried: its just what the term means. — Seppo

But surely facts aren't a priori true, but rather synthetically a priori true.

And on the JTB story of knowledge, a fact becomes knowledge when A. it is believed B. it is true and C. justification is available (i.e. there are good and sufficient reasons for supposing it to be true). — Seppo

What criteria does the justification adhere to for a fact to be "true"?

But surely facts aren't a priori true, but rather synthetically a priori true.

There's probably some terminological schemas where facts are defined as contingent, experiential (a posteriori) truths (and so, for instance, truths of mathematics and logic are not facts), but that's mostly semantics. But it is "a priori" or analytically true that facts are true, because again this is just truth by definition, a tautology.

What criteria does the justification adhere to for a fact to be "true"?

Again, this isn't really a sensical question- a fact is true of necessity, else it isn't a fact. An untrue fact is like a married bachelor: a contradiction in terms. But what constitutes truth, or epistemic justification, is a separate (and rather big/complex) question.

Yes it can. I see the cow on the field and assume it's a cow as long as I'm sane and sober. — Shawn

You can be sane and sober and mistake a cow for another animal. Sane and sober people can hallucinate too and often do, such as seeing water down the road.

If you want to think about knowledge in terms of justified true belief, you can. But I don't see how it helps.

Facts become knowledge when they are needed. When they are used. You can't know whether or not a piece of information has been adequately justified until you know what it will be used for. Until you know the consequences of being wrong. At that point - when you are making a decision about a future action, you have to determine whether or not you can use that information. When you decide you can, it is knowledge. — T Clark

This is something I'm unsure of. Many users already stated that they consider facts to be true based out of necessity. You seem to be saying that facts are contingent on circumstances or situations that allow them to be true, am I reading you correctly?

What criteria does the justification adhere to for a fact to be "true"?

Again, this isn't really a sensical question- a fact is true of necessity, else it isn't a fact. An untrue fact is like a married bachelor: a contradiction in terms. But what constitutes truth, or epistemic justification, is a separate (and rather big/complex) question. — Seppo

I think that's the working question I have in regards to the truth of the matter, as to how facts are true based on the working criteria one has.

This is just another way of asking, "How or when are facts truth apt?"

But again this is just a matter of definition- facts are not only always truth-apt, they're always true. We might ask when or how, say, utterances are truth-apt (because utterances are not definitionally truth-apt whereas facts are), or we might ask when or how we know whether something is true or is a fact... but asking whether something is a fact is usually just to ask whether its true, and so we always know, trivially, that facts are true because that's just how the term "fact" is typically used.

Sorry to bother you; but, when does an utterance become a fact, then?

No bother. It would be a fact... when its true. So probably the more central question you're driving at is: what does it take for something to be true or be a fact, and how do we know when it is? And like I said, that's quite.. the... can... of... worms....

Are we talking about facts or facts? So far as I can tell, facts are the things we putatively make statements about and then judge such statements true when they stand in the right relationship to those facts or facts are the sorts of things from which we understand “true” in a particular language in-so-far as the way use true is in reference to facts.

In either case, facts simply are and we assess in which circumstance we rightly say “are true.” Facts don’t establish themselves and have no agency to do so, nor are they evaluating truth. We establish something as a “fact” in our language and murmur “are true” in relation thereto, but the state-of-affairs that we may be (or may not be) making reference to when we discuss facts is entirely independent of our reference.

This is something I'm unsure of. Many users already stated that they consider facts to be true based out of necessity. You seem to be saying that facts are contingent on circumstances or situations that allow them to be true, am I reading you correctly? — Shawn

It is undeniable that there is uncertainty in everything we call a fact. No matter how well-established it is, it might turn out not to be true. I'm not talking about radical Cartesian uncertainty. I'm talking about common, regular old uncertainty. We always have to make our decisions based on imperfect knowledge. Which is the fundamental problem with JTB - justified true belief is talking about perfect knowledge, which doesn't exist. In every aspect of our lives we have to make decisions based on imperfect, uncertain knowledge.

Taking a somewhat different tack, here is one of my favorite quotes from Stephen Jay Gould:

In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.'

Knowledge can only ever be provisional.

I'm not sure if that answers your question.

what does it take for something to be true or be a fact, and how do we know when it is? And like I said, that's quite.. the... can... of... worms.... — Seppo

Yes, I think it leads us to the assertion that it's a criterion consisting of being able to verify whether a statement is instantiated as being a truth or a fact. Im not sure how else to express this.

...facts are the things we putatively make statements about and then judge such statements true when they stand in the right relationship ... — Ennui Elucidator

How would you characterize this relationship?

Unfortunately, I am a nihilist so….

On the upside, I like T Clark’s recent quote.

In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' — T Clark

So I’d say something is true when it would be counterproductive to say it is false, i.e. so contrary to the expected social/linguistic norm that denying the gold seal of my affirmation that a fact “is true” undermines my relationships. My problem is that I think my assent (provisional or otherwise) adds nothing to the conversation of “is true” because the state-of-affairs is what it is regardless. Do I believe “a fact is true”? Why invest so much emotion or mental energy? I’d go with, “Does acting as if appear to further my agenda more than acting as if not?” Indeed, I am known to say things like, “I know that Australia exists and it is true that Australia exists, but I don’t believe it.” (Sorry Banno). Like I get it, in our language game and bandying about of epistemic criteria, Australia makes the cut for all purposes but some perverse skeptical doubt. Never-the-less, I have no vested interest in the truth of Australia’s existence and until it matters, my actual assent is neither here nor there.

Or if we are to cut to the chase, I might very well end up saying that I subscribe to the deflationary theory of truth in so far as I am going to make sense of all of this truth talk. Appending “is true” to something is more like an amplifier/social cue than conveying any new semantic content. Simply asserting the proposition “X” is sufficient for my analysis.

So where are we left with your JTB on my view? Not in a very good place. Facts don’t matter, truth is meaningless, and belief is an aside. You may not wish to get me started on justification.

Facts are truths about something, an event, an object, people, so on. When they're discovered, they become knowledge. Facts are independent of a knower, knowledge, on the other hand, is not.

I'm not sure if that answers your question. — T Clark

I don't hold the opinion that facts can be used pragmatically when needed, in case they are needed, and how they are needed. This simply seems to arrive at counterproductive opinions that there are things like alternate facts or meanings of dispositions towards facts.

Does that sound off to you, as it does to me?