No, the galley is not conscious as a unit. — Patterner

I think it may be. There are (at least) two problems the panpsychist must tackle at some point:

1) What are the units supposed to be? (Searle's challenge)
2) Relatedly, how do subjects sum, if at all? (The combination problem)

Both these may be rebutted by the idea that every system whatever, no matter how arbitrarily defined (the galley is a good example), is conscious. It may not be conscious of very much, it may have extremely limited content to its experience, but nevertheless there is some kind of unitary experience. This makes a colossal number of subjects. The galley minus one of its lignin molecules would also be conscious. The galley plus one of the water molecules from the sea a mile away would be a separate conscious entity. Neither would experience much. So to rebut the challenges: (1) the units are whatever you can think of, and (2) they don't sum. Each one is its own unique identity, and you can have 'nests' of subjects, there is no 'pooling' of identity.

This is still vulnerable to @Banno's Blank Stare of Incredulity of course. We sacrifice intuitive appeal on the altar of metaphysical possibility. But who cares? I don't. The universe is weird. Philosophers should be willing to follow the logic, or at least entertain odd possibilities.

I view the objects and phenomena of pretty much all the special sciences (e.g. biology, ecology, psychology, economics, etc.) to be strongly emergent in relation with the the objects and phenomena of the material sciences such as physics or chemistry. Some, like our apokrisis argue (and I would agree) that even within physics, especially when the thermodynamics of non-equilibrium processes is involved, many phenomena are strongly emergent in the sense that they aren't intelligible merely in light of, or deducible from, the laws that govern their smaller components. — Pierre-Normand

Presumably you'd say that the relationships between micro-properties and emergent properties are lawlike. If so are some laws emergent then? Or have all laws always existed, even if they never have a chance at any point in the history of the universe to describe an actual natural event?

No, the galley is not conscious as a unit.
— Patterner

I think it may be. — bert1

I'll tell you why I think not. I believe I define consciousness, and interpret everything we see and everything within us, differently than anybody else here. However, I don't think that matters for this particular question. However consciousness works, however it's defined, you and I can do some pretty serious communicating. We can discuss an amazing variety of topics. Philosophy, mathematics, women, comedy, the nonsense science behind various science fiction books or TV shows, time travel, favorite colors, on and on and on and on. We can talk about these things in person, or write messages back-and-forth here, or use pictures and symbols instead of letters, or act out what we want to say like we're playing charades, or phrase everything so it sounds like sarcasm, or phrase everything so it sounds like jokes, on and on and on and on.

If the galley, all the people and all the parts, is one consciousness, it doesn't make sense to me that it would not be able to communicate with us. A consciousness that is made up of, among other things, a bunch of pretty competent communicators should be able to communicate at least as well as any of its independent parts. A human communicates far better than any if its parts can.

And how would such a consciousness act? If the slaves are all part of this consciousness, why does this consciousness still have slavery? Why not a new conscious entity that behaves as one entity, rather than one entity that still behaves like the multiple entities that comprise it, which are so very opposed to each other?

Why is the conscious galley only doing what the humans wanted to do when they crafted the boat? Why does it not have its own goals and needs?

For millennia, people have debated whether or not this or that animal is conscious. Often whether or not a given action is evidence of consciousness. I think a photon is conscious. But it is not subjectively aware of any kind of mental activity. It is not subjectively aware of anything that would allow it to act intentionally. I would expect a consciousness entity that is made up of many parts that can each act intentionally on their own, to act intentionally. But we see no sign of that from a galley.

If the galley, all the people and all the parts, is one consciousness, it doesn't make sense to me that it would not be able to communicate with us. A consciousness that is made up of, among other things, a bunch of pretty competent communicators should be able to communicate at least as well as any of its independent parts. A human communicates far better than any if it's parts can. — Patterner

That's interesting, thanks. I hadn't thought of that that way before. Yes it's a serious objection I think.

So that's a difference between (at least my) panpsychism and IIT. Zero consciousness does not exist. — Patterner

Maybe the Φ computation cannot yield zero for anything, so it's not necessarily a difference. After all, IIT seems to be one form of panpsychism, not an alternative to it.

A photon subjectively experiences

A photon, if it exists at all, does so for zero proper time. You must have an incredibly loose definition of 'experience' to suggest that the photon does/has it.
Then again, I wonder what Φ IIT might assign to one, and why.
They at least attempt to quantify it, rather than just hand-wave it.
Searle, with the unit challenge mentioned, seem to want to quantize it, not just quantify it. It is unclear if this is the case, but the term 'discreet units' suggests a quanta, a level of consciousness that can be expressed by a whole number, not requiring a real number.

I think a photon is conscious. But it is not subjectively aware of any kind of mental activity. It is not subjectively aware of anything that would allow it to act intentionally. — Patterner

In what way do you mean a photon to be conscious if it lacks all that? How would that be distinguished from a photon that isn't meaningfully conscious?

No, the galley is not conscious as a unit. Many information processing systems make it up. But they don't have to be a part of the galley. They can all go their separate ways, and function as individual units. — Patterner

This seems to contradict many things that you've already posted.
" Zero consciousness does not exist", but you appear to assign zero to the galley as a unit. I quite disagree. It reacts to its environment and makes decisions. Not all of its parts are a critical component of that decision making. All very similar to a human.
Human cells don't have to be part of the human. They can be separated without the human not being a human anymore. With care, they can become a new human, but point is, the human doesn't require any of those cells, each of which is doing all the protein information processing that you assert makes the unit more of an information processor than a non-biological thing doing the same process.
You seem to support (via the protein example) that this processing combines for a biological being, but it doesn't for the galley which is obviously doing far more information processing. This seems to be an utterly contradictory stance. Kindly clarify where I am misrepresenting your stance and how these contradictions are not there.

An entity that subjectively experiences as a unity can't do that. Like people.

It can and does. Parts of me fall off all the time. I have no critical cell, and I'm mostly made of cells. Any of them is free to go, but like the galley, if enough parts leave, it is no longer the 'unit' that it once was and is not likely to fare well in combat.

Which information system within you is a functioning, independent unit outside of you?

You asserted a cell, manipulating/creating proteins, as an example of an independent functioning information processing unit. You cited this cellular information processing as the reason a plant (anything biological) is more conscious than say an artificially created entity.'

However consciousness works, however it's defined, you and I can do some pretty serious communicating. We can discuss an amazing variety of topics. Philosophy, mathematics, women, comedy, the nonsense science behind various science fiction books or TV shows, time travel, favorite colors, on and on and on and on. — Patterner

It would seem that intelligence is needed to do all that, not necessarily more consciousness. An electronic device can also do all that, albeit still not at our level. AI is still a ways from matching us. It being very conscious or not seems to be irrelevant to its ability to do all that you list.

If the galley, all the people and all the parts, is one consciousness, it doesn't make sense to me that it would not be able to communicate with us.

Oh it communicates plenty, probably in its own language, but it's quite understood. Likewise, you don't speak the same language as the DNA in your cells. The cells make up the unit, but it isn't your indicated intra-cell information processing that makes the unit as conscious as it is. It is the inter-cell information processing that counts.
Likewise, the galley has inter-part information processing that makes the galley quite conscious. Is it first person? That a subject on its own, but I don't see how the galley, as a unit, is experienced by anything except itself.

A human communicates far better than any if it's parts can.

More than the combination of the parts, which at best produces a lot of protein, and in the end, knows how to build a person, something a person doesn't know how to do.

And how would such a consciousness act? If the slaves are all part of this consciousness, why does this consciousness still have slavery?

Slaves are the muscles. Why do you have muscles despite none of their cells volunteering for the task? It's a necessary component of the unit, despite having only a secondary role in the unit's ability to communicate. Your consciousness similarly could not act at all without the slave cells who usually do what they're told if they're treated well.

Why not a new conscious entity that behaves as one entity, rather than one entity that still behaves like the multiple entities that comprise it, which are so very opposed to each other?

Why is lack of opposition of parts necessary for the unit to behave as one entity? You don't know what the cells want. There might be plenty of opposition in a person, and a nasty police force to enforce discipline.

Why is the conscious galley only doing what the humans wanted to do when they crafted the boat?

Those humans probably didn't craft the boat. As for the rest, why do you only do what the mind wants you to do? The answer seems similar. Some parts make decisions. Others have other functions.

Why does it not have its own goals and needs?

It does have them, but a galley tends to be a social creature and tends to work in cooperation with others of its kind, quite like bees in a hive, except the bees don't have a command hierarchy. No leader, although the queen does serve as a sort of temporary anchor of genetic identity, similar to a human zygote.

For millennia, people have debated whether or not this or that animal is conscious. — Patterner

That they have, which makes it sound like a binary thing: The thing is or it is not. None of this 'X more conscious than Y', which better reflects both of our thinking. Hence the question is improperly worded.

I would expect a consciousness entity that is made up of many parts that can each act intentionally on their own, to act intentionally. But we see no sign of that from a galley.

The galley, as a unit, seems to act very intentionally to me. How can you suggest otherwise? It's whole purpose is to do just that. Yes, it has a purpose, and that purpose is not its own. It's a slave, like any purposefully created thing.

... no matter how arbitrarily defined (the galley is a good example), is conscious. It may not be conscious of very much — bert1

I think the galley is more conscious than me, having more of everything: senses, information processing, etc. More redundant too. Kill the entity in command and the thing still functions. I for the most part can't do that, but that makes me more fragile, not necessarily less or more conscious.

The galley plus one of the water molecules from the sea a mile away would be a separate conscious entity.

Yes! The bounds of an entity is entirely arbitrary, lacking any objective basis. My 3rd most recent topic dealt specifically with this issue. This last issue is not specific to panpsychism.

Each one is its own unique identity, and you can have 'nests' of subjects, there is no 'pooling' of identity.

I find identity of anything (those 'subjects') to be pragmatic mental constructs with no physical basis. I can challenge pretty much any attempt to demonstrate otherwise.

We sacrifice intuitive appeal on the altar of metaphysical possibility. But who cares? I don't. The universe is weird. Philosophers should be willing to follow the logic, or at least entertain odd possibilities.

:100:

You need to think of a cup without trying to make a mental representation... — MoK

An idea IS a mental representation. — noAxioms

Yes, what I am stressing, though, is that it is irreducible. — MoK

1) Then why are you seemingly asking me to think of something without making a mental representation?
2) I deny your assertion that an idea is irreductible. Your inability to reduce it to smaller parts is not shared by me.

If mind can be an object for the cognitive sciences, what does this mean? How does the attitude or program of cognitive science allow an escape from what you call "the indubitable fact that we are that which we seek to know"? Perhaps the answer lies in a discrimination between 1st and 3rd person perspectives, but what do you think? When a scientist studies consciousness, what are they doing differently from our everyday experience of being conscious? — J

Going back to Chalmer's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, he makes the distinction between what he calls easy problems of consciousness and the hard problem. The 'easy problems' are a catalog of just those kind of mental phenomena which are the subject of cognitive science, for instance

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
• the integration of information by a cognitive system;
• the reportability of mental states; ...

(Partial list)

As is well known, he says the really hard problem is 'what it is like to be...' By that he means the experiential dimension of life, the 'subjective aspect' as he calls it. Which, I think, is really a roundabout way of describing 'being' as such. That is what cannot be described in objective terms - well, not really. I can say to you 'I feel sick', but you will only know what the means, because you yourself know 'what it is like.' The state, like sentient existence itself, is irreducibly first-person. But the first person is just what the objective sciences seeks to bracket out. There’s the issue in a nutshell. Phenomenology realizes this from the outset.

As for psychology, there’s a reason why it’s often called ‘soft science’. Cognitive perhaps less so, because many of its objects are objectively quantifiable.

That some awareness is an indubitable fact does not entail that it can't be explained in other terms. Yet you seem to imply that this must be so. Why? Aren't we confusing the experience, the phenomenology, with that which is experienced? — J

Simply because there has to be an observer, a subject to whom the experience occurs, for there to be anything to analyse! One of my stock quotes, from Routledge Phenomenology, is right on point here:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role.

Continental philosophy, generally, seems to understand this in a way that Anglo philosophy really struggles with. Perhaps physicalism functions as a kind of shield. By insisting that only what is scientifically observable really matters, it allows one to preserve that sense of separateness that science relies on in the first place. In that way the ‘egological’ perspective shelters behind it — a defensive move, more than a philosophical one. This is also why psychology is really existential rather than strictly scientific. Science begins from the standpoint of separation, the stance of standing outside or apart from. But psychology, at least when it’s true to its subject, has to begin from within: from the lived situation of the self. It can’t hide behind the shield of objectivity, because what it investigates is the very ground of experience itself. Hence, 'we are what we seek to know'.

(There is another mode of self-transcendence, the noetic rather than the scientific but can’t go into that here.)

As is well known, he says the really hard problem is 'what it is like to be...' By that he means the experiential dimension of life, the 'subjective aspect' as he calls it. — Wayfarer

No, that's not the hard problem. Chalmers says:

. . .even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? — Chalmers, Facing Up . . .

This is a different problem from "What is it like to be conscious?" The latter problem is associated with Nagel, not Chalmers.

The hard problem is a why and how problem: Why does consciousness arise from physical experience, and how does it do so? These are completely within the scope of cognitive science. "What is it like" is a different animal, and probably not amenable to scientific response.

The SEP article on consciousness puts it this way:

"The so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995) which is more or less that of giving an intelligible account that lets us see in an intuitively satisfying way how phenomenal or “what it's like” consciousness might arise from physical or neural processes in the brain."

Again, the problem is to say how "what it's like" consciousness arises from brain processes, not to give a description of consciousness itself.

The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role.

Sure. But why does that mean we can't seek an explanation for it? (Not, of course, a reductive explanation; that would be to beg the question in favor of physicalism.)

This is a different problem from "What is it like to be conscious?" The latter problem is associated with Nagel, not Chalmers. — J

No it isn’t. He quotes Nagel in support of his definition;

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to bea conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

Again, the problem is to say how "what it's like" consciousness arises from brain processes, not to give a description of consciousness itself. — J

The two are inseparable. You need to specify something if you are to describe it.

why does that mean we can't seek an explanation for it? — J

Because of recursion: you’re trying to explain that which is doing the explaining. ‘The eye cannot see itself’.

Because of recursion: you’re trying to explain that which is doing the explaining. ‘The eye cannot see itself’. — Wayfarer

That's not true. Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness.

(Not, of course, a reductive explanation; that would be to beg the question in favor of physicalism.) — J

Are not all explanations reductive? All explanations are given in causal terms, analysis is always in the form of attempting to establish the interactive relationships between parts, which always seems to end up being couched in terms of mechanism.

Perhaps it isn't possible to give such an explanation of consciousness because it doesn't seem to have any parts, it is thought of as just a general state or condition. So if we are going to explain consciousness it seems it would need to be in terms of an analysis of the neural processes which give rise to it, of how they give rise to it, of what is going on in the brain when consciousness is present.

There is also the problem of getting clear on just what we think consciousness is. We could hardly analyze the neural conditions that are necessary to give rise to consciousness if we don't know what consciousness is definitely enough to decide when it is present and when not. It doesn't seem to be as simple as we are conscious when awake and unconscious when asleep, for example.

How much of our days are spend being conscious? It seems to me that I, at least, am on 'autopilot' much of the time. I have no memory of what I perceived or thought during those times. Can I be said to be conscious when I am on 'autopilot'? Is it appropriate to say that quales exist only when I am self-reflectively aware of my moment to moment experience? Even in moments of self-awareness, it would seem there must be much going on of which I am not conscious.

I really can't tell from your post if you want to understand my position. If not, no worries.

If you are, you have a lot of it wrong. I'm not going to reply. I started, but it was too much. I figured easier to start over if you're interested. In case you are, here's a beginning.

I think a photon is conscious. But it is not subjectively aware of any kind of mental activity. It is not subjectively aware of anything that would allow it to act intentionally.
— Patterner
In what way do you mean a photon to be conscious if it lacks all that? — noAxioms

Consciousness is simply subjective experience. It doesn't have anything to do with thinking, or any mental activity. Mental activities are among our abilities, so we subjectively experience them. But, since they are the biggest part of us, what sets us apart from anything else we're aware of, and what we focus on, we came to think they are consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

This is good. He shouldn't have said "minds", though. Minds means mental activity. Thinking. Better to say;
Consciousness of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.
Of course they're memory-less, since atoms don't have memories. But the general ideas is there. There's nothing complex about it. Simple, "raw", experience.

Of course they're memory-less, since atoms don't have memories. — Patterner

The whole essence of anything organic is memory. It stores memories of what happened so as to better cope with what's coming up.

An atom is organic? How is memory accomplished in an atom? How does an atom change what it does in a given set of circumstances the next time it encounters those same circumstances, in order to better cope?

I was contrasting organisms with atoms. I believe that only organisms are capable of experience, not atoms. So, no, an atom does none of those things.

Ah. I misunderstood how you meant it.

No it isn’t. He quotes Nagel in support of his definition; — Wayfarer

He's giving a description of what he means by consciousness, not a definition of the hard problem. It is, in fact, a pretty good description of what subjective experience entails: "visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations. . . " etc. Being able to describe this is not a hard problem at all; the problem is why and how it is possible.

But perhaps we're just placing different emphases on aspects of the problem. Would you agree that the hard problem is also a problem of how consciousness emerges, and why it does so? That is the standard version.

why does that mean we can't seek an explanation for it?
— J

Because of recursion: you’re trying to explain that which is doing the explaining. ‘The eye cannot see itself’. — Wayfarer

I know this seems obvious to you, but I don't understand it. The eye can see itself, actually, by using scientific technology -- in fact, such technology allows us to see, and explain, the eye much better than we can do as mere experiencers and observers. And it still involves using our eyes. Why wouldn't the same be true for consciousness? Again, I think there are rebuttals to this question, but simple recursion isn't one of them.

Are not all explanations reductive? — Janus

A deep question, certainly. I would say no. You say, "All explanations are given in causal terms," but you're thinking of a type of common physical/scientific explanation. Is the explanation of the Pythagorean theorem a causal one? Surely not. What about an explanation of how football is played? Does that reduce to an analysis of what the players do? A reductive explanation of consciousness would not only show how it comes to occur, but also why it is identical, in some significant sense, to its physical components, just as water reduces to H2O. I'm suggesting that explaining consciousness may not fit this model.

Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness. — Janus

That's an interesting move. Again, it seems to hinge on what the activity of explanation consists of.

It doesn't seem to be as simple as we are conscious when awake and unconscious when asleep, for example. — Janus

In a way, it is that simple -- for now. I suspect that when we get a biological explanation of consciousness, which I believe we will, in time, we'll discover that "conscious = awake" is too simple. But can we abandon, for purposes of investigation, the basic stance that to be conscious is to be awake and aware, and to be unconscious is to lack those attributes? I can't think of a better place to start, can you? I don't just mean scientifically -- when I discuss this subject with friends, that's certainly what they mean, and they understand quite well that some aspect of subjectivity or personhood can remain when the mind is asleep or sedated, so consciousness isn't the same as "being me" or "being alive."

1) Then why are you seemingly asking me to think of something without making a mental representation? — noAxioms

No, I am not asking that. I am asking you to think of a "cup" without making an image of it that has a shape.

2) I deny your assertion that an idea is irreductible. Your inability to reduce it to smaller parts is not shared by me. — noAxioms

You need to do what I said above.

A reductive explanation of consciousness would not only show how it comes to occur, but also why it is identical, in some significant sense, to its physical components, just as water reduces to H2O. I'm suggesting that explaining consciousness may not fit this model. — J

I agree.

That's not true. Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness. — Janus

That sounds right to me. I don't think reason and intellect are parts of consciousness, so it's not even a case of something examining itself. Which I don't think is impossible on principle, as J just noted. I think consciousness is not physical, so it's not going to be explained in physical terms. Reason, the discursive intellect might be a better approach.

Would you agree that the hard problem is also a problem of how consciousness emerges, and why it does so? — J

Even that has an implicit assumption - that consciousness is 'something that emerges', while 'emergence' is only one of several approaches.

The problem Chalmers describes is the relationship of third-person, objective descriptions of physical processes with first-person experience. It's the same problem as the explanatory gap problem - the physiology of pain does not capture the experience of pain. Of course, none of this is 'a problem' at all, except for those who try to insist that the third-person, objective account of experience leaves no explanatory gap. In that sense, the 'hard problem' is nearer to a rhetorical argument than a theory about physiology. It’s an argument against ‘scientism’.

The eye can see itself, actually, by using scientific technology -- in fact, such technology allows us to see, and explain, the eye much better than we can do as mere experiencers and observers. — J

I wear specs and of course the optometrist has instruments and expertise to examine my eyes and prescribe the necessary lenses. But she doesn’t see my seeing. She presents charts and asks me to describe what I see. And then, she has expertise to interpret those results, but even if I saw those results I wouldn’t have the expertise to interpret them. This is an exact analogy for the issue Chalmers describes.

There's a parallel there with what Heidegger called the "forgetfulness of being" - the way that Being itself (the fact that things are, rather than what they are) tends to remain hidden or taken for granted in our everyday engagement with the world.

In scientific analysis, we focus exclusively on properties, structures, functions, causal relations - but the sheer fact of being, existence as such, doesn't appear as an object of investigation. It's presupposed but never thematized. Similarly, in studying consciousness, we analyze neural correlates, cognitive functions, behavioral outputs - all the what of consciousness - but the that of experience, the bare fact that there's something it's like to be conscious, remains curiously absent from the scientific picture. And attempts to point it out are vigorously resisted, or dismissed as sophistry or confusion. I've seen that happen on this forum dozens of times.

This forgetfulness isn't a failure of science but perhaps an inevitable consequence of its method. The third-person stance that makes science so powerful necessarily brackets the first-person dimension - not just of human experience, but of existence itself. When we adopt the scientific attitude, we're looking at beings as objects of study rather than relating to them as fellow existents (although of course we can do both.) So the "hard problem" might be seen as a specific instance of this more fundamental forgetfulness - not just about consciousness, but about the being-dimension of reality that always already underlies any scientific investigation but never shows up within the objective data.

>See It is Never Known but Is the Knower (.pdf), Michel Bitbol

the bare fact that there's something it's like to be conscious, remains curiously absent from the scientific picture. — Wayfarer

But what does it do in your picture that is left out of the scientistic one?

That is the subject of the David Chalmers paper being discussed.

Speaking of whom, a very young Chalmers laying it out, in an interview I’m guessing in the first half of the 90’s.

https://youtube.com/shorts/-jEp6BqVOZ8?si=JQk66I3HXlbtXHtB

Notice the explicit Cartesian allusion in the first few sentences. Turns out that ‘know thyself’ is actually a lot harder than stellar chemistry! Who’d have thought?

The problem Chalmers describes is the relationship of third-person, objective descriptions of physical processes with first-person experience. — Wayfarer

Take a look at this video, especially starting at 3:40. Chalmers explains what the hard problem is. "What is the relationship" doesn't really get it -- Chalmers is asking why, not what.

I wear specs and of course the optometrist has instruments and expertise to examine my eyes and prescribe the necessary lenses. But she doesn’t see my seeing. — Wayfarer

This is exactly the point, and the difference. She can't see your seeing; that is a subjective experience. But you can also see what she sees, namely the eye itself. And thus for consciousness. I can't know what it's like to be someone else, but that is a different problem from what consciousness is.

I could put the question in terms of "life" rather than consciousness. Would you say that, because you are alive, you are unable to know what life is? That a biological study of life must always leave something out? If you say, "What it leaves out is the experience of being alive," then we agree. But if you say that we can never have a complete explanation of life because we ourselves are alive, I don't see it.

Now granted, this hinges on a particular understanding of what an explanation is, and what it must cover. I'm clear that a reductive physical explanation of consciousness is unlikely. But that is not the only possible way of explaining it. Part of what makes the hard problem so hard is that we don't yet understand the phenomenon of consciousness, so making a link with the "how and why" of it remains for the future. I think Chalmers makes all this pretty clear in the video. He says, "Ultimately it's a question for science, but it's a question which right now our scientific method doesn't have a very good handle on."

Chalmers is asking why, not what. — J

The what and why are all part of the same question.

Would you say that, because you are alive, you are unable to know what life is? . — J

Must the answer to the question ‘what is life?’ be only given in biological terms? For that matter, the question of the nature of life, even for biology, still eludes precise definition, even taking into account today’s vastly expanded knowledge of molecular biology. We know what living things are (although viruses are, of course, liminal examples), but there's no empirically verifiable answer to what life is, in the same way, and possibly for the same reasons, there's no clear-cut answer to what mind is.

Chalmers explains what the hard problem is. "What is the relationship" doesn't really get it -- Chalmers is asking why, not what. — J

The link doesn’t work, but I’ve already provided the reference and the passage, where Chalmers says that the problem is that no objective, third person account of the workings of the mind capture the lived nature of experience. He says it, black and white.

Chalmers has, of course, gone on to write an enormous amount in consciousness studies, he’s one of the pivotal figures in it, but the conceptions of what a scientific account of consciousness must be has changed tremendously in the period since that original paper came out. The avenue I’m pursuing is phenomenology of life and mind, through Evan Thompson’s books.

On the theme of the difficulty science has in accounting for the first-person nature of consciousness, another of his books (co-authored) is highly relevant to this discussion, namely, the Blind Spot of Science and the Neglect of Lived Experience. It says

“Despite the amazing, nonstop advances in physics, biology, and neuroscience, no fundamental progress on bridging the chasm between consciousness and physical models has been made in science since the bifurcation of nature that began with the rise of modern science. Although physical and biological models are increasingly sophisticated and informed by increasing amounts of data, the chasm remains. The problem that Huxley and Tyndall highlighted in the nineteenth century is the same one that philosophers Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers identified in the twentieth century and persists today.33 Indeed, it is hard to see how any advance in understanding physical processes, described in completely objective terms at whatever scale or level, will allow us to bridge this chasm. This situation should lead us to suspect that the hard problem of consciousness is built into blind-spot metaphysics, and not solvable in its terms.

... [the blind spot] arises when we mistake a method for the intrinsic structure of reality. We devise a powerful explanatory method that abstracts away consciousness while forgetting that the method remains fundamentally dependent on consciousness. — The Blind Spot - Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

But you can also see what she sees, namely the eye itself. And thus for consciousness. — J

But that's precisely the problem. I can see an image of the eye, but I cannot see the act of seeing the image. That is the whole point, which I can't help but feel you're missing. And there's even robust scientific validation of this. This is the neural binding problem - the fact that no neural system has been identified which accounts for the subjective unity of experience. See this reference.

What if there is more than one description? More than one coherent set of properties?

This is a disk with a diameter of 23.60 mm and a thickness of 2.00 mm made from 75% copper, 25% nickel.

It's also a ten-cent coin.

Being a ten cent coin isn't an emergent property...

The only available properties are the properties of parts though. — MoK

...maybe not.

But who cares? I don't. — bert1

Yeah, we can always just make shit up.

You say, "All explanations are given in causal terms," but you're thinking of a type of common physical/scientific explanation. Is the explanation of the Pythagorean theorem a causal one? Surely not. What about an explanation of how football is played? — J

Yes, I was referring specifically to scientific and physical explanation. If course we have explanations of behavior couched in terms of reasons, and as to geometry and football, in terms of rules. I guess what I meant is that all explanations are reductive in the they tell one story, where others might also be told, analyze things in terms of their components (causal processes, reasons or rules) and none of them go anywhere near to capturing the whole picture or covering all the bases.

A reductive explanation of consciousness would not only show how it comes to occur, but also why it is identical, in some significant sense, to its physical components, just as water reduces to H2O. I'm suggesting that explaining consciousness may not fit this model. — J

I cannot imagine what any other non-reductive kind of explanation could possibly look like. Could not a reductive explanation of consciousness possibly show why (if such were the case) it is not identical to its physical components. For that matter are there any explanations at all which are not given in terms of components? Would understanding consciousness even conceivably be possible if it could not be analyzed in terms of components?

Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness.
— Janus

That's an interesting move. Again, it seems to hinge on what the activity of explanation consists of. — J

If we are undertaking an investigation into consciousness, what could we be doing if not looking at behavior and neural activity (anything else you can think of?) using observation and reasoned analysis? I say consciousness, while obviously involved in observation and reasoned analysis, is not identical with those processes. Consciousness is an umbrella under which many different processes can be possible that arguably would not otherwise be possible.

In a way, it is that simple -- for now — J

I think it is generally understood that we are conscious during REM sleep. We may remember dreams, which suggests that they have entered conscious attention, while at the end of a day, we may be able to recall only those things which have impressed us sufficiently to become part of memory.

That sounds right to me. I don't think reason and intellect are parts of consciousness, so it's not even a case of something examining itself. Which I don't think is impossible on principle, as J just noted. I think consciousness is not physical, so it's not going to be explained in physical terms. Reason, the discursive intellect might be a better approach. — Patterner

What evidence can the discursive intellect alone give us? What do you mean by saying that consciousness is not physical? What if discursive reasoning just is a certain kind of neural activity, and consciousness is also a kind of master neural process, a condition, that is necessary (or perhaps not?) in order that discursive reasoning be able to occur?

no objective, third person account of the workings of the mind capture the lived nature of experience. — Wayfarer

Can any account of anything capture the actuality of the thing?

What evidence can the discursive intellect alone give us? — Janus

I don't know. I'm wracking my brain.

What do mean by saying that consciousness is not physical? — Janus

It is not measurable or detectable in any way. There is nothing about any or all of the physical properties of the universe that is in any way similar to consciousness, or that anyone can point to, and say, "There it is. X is the mechanism of consciousness. Because..."

What if discursive reasoning just is a certain kind of neural activity, and consciousness is also a kind if master neural network, a condition, that is necessary (or perhaps not?) in order that discursive reasoning be able to occur? — Janus

What if? What if it's not? As I said, this is what I think. When someone gives any kind of physicalist explanation, I'll check it out. Maybe I'll change my mind. Until such time, I'm concentrating on this idea. Everyone concentrates on the idea that makes sense to them until someone gives a reason to think it doesn't make sense, or shows why another reason makes sense.

I don't know. I'm wracking my brain. — Patterner

You said the discursive intellect might be a better approach. I presumed you meant the discursive intellect alone. But does it ever work alone? Can it generate its own material to analyze or are experiences and empirical data not required to provide the material?

It is not measurable or detectable in any way. — Patterner

Perhaps not measurable, but not detectable....? Can we not tell when people are conscious of something by observing their behavior or asking them? Can we not make a person conscious of something by drawing their attention to it?

What if? What if it's not? — Patterner

Well, it seems most plausible to me that it is, but of course one person's plausibility may be another's incredulity.

I can see an image of the eye, but I cannot see the act of seeing the image. That is the whole point, which I can't help but feel you're missing. — Wayfarer

No, I think we both grasp the point, but are coming at it from different analyses. The "eye" metaphor arose from your quote, "The eye cannot see itself." I took this literally, and disputed it. But I think what you meant was, "The eye cannot see itself seeing itself," and this is a different matter, and quite true.

The difference is important, both philosophically and methodologically. We can investigate a subject using (roughly) scientific methods, and "see" (know) it in ways that are impossible to the naked eye of phenomenology. But by the same token, what phenomenology allows us is a way to understand experience that isn't available to science. I think we both agree with this. You encapsulate it nicely in the quote above.

When it comes to consciousness, we may have a special case -- and I think that's the deeper subject of this discussion. Is there something about consciousness, and about being conscious, that calls into question this division between knowing and experiencing? We need consciousness to do any sort of seeing or knowing, including the strictest of scientific projects. A blind person can understand how the eye works, because understanding is not a true visual seeing, but a way of grasping intellectually. But can the blind person (from birth, we'd have to stipulate) know what the experience of seeing is? Probably not.

So we might be in a similar position with regard to consciousness. Does consciousness always entail being conscious, such that it cannot become an object for the conscious subject? I don't think so, but it is certainly an open question.

We could also phrase it in terms of the "Blind Spot" quote:

We devise a powerful explanatory method that abstracts away consciousness while forgetting that the method remains fundamentally dependent on consciousness. — The Blind Spot - Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

Is this in fact a flaw? Does this dependence vitiate whatever explanation may result? Again, I don't think so, but my degree of confidence in this judgment isn't high, because many good philosophers see it differently.

Does any of this make sense so far?

You said the discursive intellect might be a better approach. I presumed you meant the discursive intellect alone. But does it ever work alone? — Janus

I don't see any reason it must work alone.

Can it generate its own material to analyze or are experiences and empirical data not required to provide the material? — Janus

I can examine things wherever it finds them. My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are.

Perhaps not measurable, but not detectable....? Can we not tell when people are conscious of something by observing their behavior or asking them? Can we not make a person conscious of something by drawing their attention to it? — Janus

Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness.

but of course one person's plausibility may be another's incredulity. — Janus

Indeed. Maybe we'll get definitive proof one day. But I doubt any time soon.