although my mother always said she believed there must be more to life than just this world, and she purchased a book from a book club entitled German Philosophy from Leibniz to Nietzsche — Janus

Interesting. My mum was a searcher and was especially interested in Jung, mysticism, and Gnosticism. She was friends with a close colleague of Carl Jung’s, so conversations often turned to what gnosis meant. I forget the answer. Like yours my mum always said there must be more to life than "this". But curiously, when she was dying, she ended up in a palliative care and when asked if she wanted to see the spiritual care worker, she responded, “No, that’s all bullshit.” At the point of death, she had no faith or interest in the spiritual realm, a break from her whole life. Having worked in palliative care, I have seen many religious folk, including nuns and priests lose their faith as death approaches, generally without distress. I’m not sure what this signifies, but it is the opposite of what people often think.

That certainly sounds like the opposite of what I would preference. — Tom Storm

I know. I'm gloomily aware that had I been a Buddhist monk I would have been chucked out decades ago (although I still maintain a Buddhist faith.)

I found the Soren Brier paper: Peircean cosmogony's symbolic agapistic self-organization as an example of the influence of eastern philosophy on western thinking (quite a mouthful).

Charles S. Peirce developed a process philosophy featuring a non-theistic agapistic evolution from nothingness. It is an Eastern inspired alternative to the Western mechanical ontology of classical science also inspired by the American transcendentalists. Advaitism and Buddhism are the two most important Eastern philosophical traditions that encompass scientific knowledge and the idea of spontaneous evolutionary development. This article attempts to show how Peirce's non-mechanistic triadic semiotic process theory is suited better to embrace the quantum field view than mechanistic and information based views are with regard to a theory of the emergence of consciousness. — Abstract (Excerpt)

I'm pointing it out because the synthesis of 'Eastern' (principally Vedanta and Buddhism) and systems science/biosemiotics/biology is emerging as an alernative to both 'atheistic' materialism and 'theistic' creationism (in Buddhist terms, nihilism and eternalism.) The hegelian idea he mentions:

The view of Cosmogony and evolution of living systems that we are beginning to approach here is neither a Neo-Darwinian ‘blind watchmaker’ materialism nor a theistic creationist view. If these two cosmogonies are seen as Hegelian thesis and antithesis the non-dual evolutionary ontology may be called an aufhebung to a new level of synthesis — Søren Brier

I found the Soren Brier paper: Peircean cosmogony's symbolic agapistic self-organization as an example of the influence of eastern philosophy on western thinking (quite a mouthful). — Wayfarer

Wow! As you say a fantastic title (in the Victorian sense of the word).

If I had my time again, I would read Peirce (very complicated).

Do you hold a particular view about the foundations of moral positions? I am assuming you might locate morality alongside our sense of the sacred? If so, say some more.

Interestingly I once corresponded with Kelly Ross, founder and owner of friesian.com . A profound and erudite philosopher. He mentioned that his dear other is a scholar of East Asian Buddhism, and that she had published a book on the centrality of bringing to mind the Pure Land at the moment of dying. In Buddhist lore, your thoughts at the moment of dying are profoundly inflluential on the form of one's re-birth. It is something I'm very mindful of. I'm a member of HongWanJi, which is a Shinran-soshu school, although I only visit once or twice a year.

If so, say some more. — Tom Storm

As I said above, you have to 'be it to see it'. (I'm not being holier-than-thou, I'm far from being holy). But the understanding has soaked in that it's necessary to develop insight into one's own psychodynamic processes - which encompass your circumstances, culture, proclivities, the totality of your being (psuche or soul). A lot of the conflict about morality and belief is obviously grounded in attachment to symbolic meanings and slogans, 'the writhings and thickets of views'. A philosophical mind has to see through that.

As I said above, you have to 'be it to see it'. (I'm not being holier-than-thou, I'm far from being holy). But the understanding has soaked in that it's necessary to develop insight into one's own psychodynamic processes - which encompass your circumstances, culture, proclivities, the totality of your being (psuche or soul). A lot of the conflict about morality and belief is obviously grounded in attachment to symbolic meanings and slogans, 'the writhings and thickets of views'. A philosophical mind has to see through that. — Wayfarer

So are you saying that morality is best understood beyond preconceptions, homilies and slogans, by looking inward through self-reflection?

That seems a theme in the perennial philosophies, doesn't it? Although 'self reflection' is not the same as 'thinking about yourself' is it? I'm realising that this is actually what Husserl was getting at with the epochē, the suspension of judgement, the attentive awareness to what is.

That seems a theme in the perennial philosophies, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

To be honest morality seems less important there than metaphysics and experience.

But it's all of a piece! Think Socrates. He was by no means 'a moraliser', but the 'idea of the good' and personal authenticity were at the centre of his questioning. Nobility of character was pre-requisite in Plato's Academy.

Fair. Yes, I think it’s probably quite difficult not to hold any metaphysical presuppositions. — Tom Storm

I agree.

On this, I’d say we can organise human life in almost inexhaustible ways. My own preference (and the one I think makes most sense and should be promoted) is to promote harmony and wellbeing for as many people as possible. But I settle on this because it seems the most reasonable way to achieve a goal. I don’t consider it to be a fact independent of human contingencies. Do you think this is an important distinction or does this count as moral realism? — Tom Storm

I think it counts as moral realism, at least as long as the goal of harmony and well-being for the greatest number is held as normative. The difficulty comes with your third sentence here, "I settle on this because it seems the most reasonable way to achieve a goal." It is a difficulty because what you have done is defined a goal, not a means, and therefore it is not really about "the most reasonable way to achieve a goal." You are saying that the goal is "to promote harmony and wellbeing for as many people as possible," and as we have been saying, we must understand whether this goal is hypothetical or non-hypothetical.

So let me try to spell it out again. If we have a goal (end) then some things will be appropriate unto that end and some things will be inappropriate unto that end. Thus following my formula from above, you could rationally say, "If you share this goal then it is wrong for you to do X," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to do X [regardless of any ends]."

So on the means/ends (or means/goals) understanding of morality, how would one secure the possibility of culpability? How would one be justified in saying, "You are wrong to [hold slaves, say]"? Rather than blathering on, I will let you try to answer this question, but it would apparently have something to do with common ends/goals, no?

I don’t consider it to be a fact independent of human contingencies. — Tom Storm

Incidentally and as an aside, you are apparently arguing against Kantian morality with claims like this (cf. Simpson, Goodness and Nature, p. 128...). Kant effectively thought that morality could not be based on human contingencies, such as the Aristotelian notion of flourishing, because in his mind human contingencies are always bound up with selfishness. But I am in no way a Kantian. I am an Aristotelian who bases morality in human flourishing. I have argued against Kant's strange morality many times on TPF.

Cool. I'm with you on Aristotle over Kant.

So let me try to spell it out again. If we have a goal (end) then some things will be appropriate unto that end and some things will be inappropriate unto that end. Thus following my formula from above, you could rationally say, "If you share this goal then it is wrong for you to do X," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to do X [regardless of any ends]."

So on the means/ends (or means/goals) understanding of morality, how would one secure the possibility of culpability? How would one be justified in saying, "You are wrong to [hold slaves, say]"? Rather than blathering on, I will let you try to answer this question, but it would apparently have something to do with common ends/goals, no? — Leontiskos

Yes, I think you're correct on this.

If we think that the best goal for a society is to promote flourishing then there are better or worse ways to achieve this end. I think this is fair.

Is your sense of what counts as flourishing pure Aristotle or is it also built around some Christian commitment? I made the assumption, perhaps wrongly, that you were aligned with Thomism.

I would argue that most Western ethics (secular and identity politics) seem to be derived from Christian values (and I guess classical Greek), though I know some people might consider this anathema. But how could it not be the case after a couple of millennia?

I'm not much of a philosopher either, so I'm not that knowledgeable about the labels, but, well, I've pretty much always considered myself some kind of relativist. Meanwhile, I've never heard the term anti-foundationalism. My ad-hoc reaction, after reading your post, is this: there's significant overlap and minor differences, but ultimately the positions are mostly compatible.

A cultural relativist can assume culture as the foundation of morality (though it would obviously not be an "unchanging" foundation, as cutlures change), and that would through a spanner in the works here, but a relativist doesn't need to assume culture as the foundation of morality.

So:

Relativism says that what’s true or right depends on culture, history, or personal perspective and there are no absolute standards. — Tom Storm

Mostly yes. I'm a bit unsure about "depends". Your moral decisions, for example, are part of the process of cutlure. They depend on what's gone before, so in that sense, the term's okay. But what you decide is going to ever so slightly influence what future moral decisions will depend upon. As such it's an iterative process.

This means that different people or societies can have different ideas of what is right or good

Yes, nothing much to add.

and none of them is objectively better than the others.

And this is where I start to differ. It's not that relativists don't say such things; I've heard them often enough. I just think it shoots past the problem. What I think a relativist should say instead is this:

"...and there is no non-situated position from which to judge one better than the others."

There are plenty situated positions, though, from which to make a judgement, and everyone who makes a judgement has a postion. What a relativist can't assume is that there is a shared postition from which an argument can be fruitfully held.

But such a position could be created, and maybe even survive beyond the specific positioned moral conflict. Because moral positions aren't fixed, this is possible. But it requires relativising your own position. And this in turn puts more responsibility on the individual for holding any position.

So when I look through your paragraph on anti-foundationalsim I notice the following:

"practical, changing frameworks": Like, say, culture?

So in the end criticism of relativism tends to come down to things like this:

We cannot say slavery is wrong if we subscribe to an anti-foundationalist perspective.

Slavery comes up because it was once practised within the arguing culture, and now no longer is. Slavery is brought up by the critic, because they know the relativist to be very likely to consider slavery wrong. And they think that's a gotcha, but by thinking that they demonstrate cultural relativism. The envisioned success of the rhetoric depends on the expected shared values. No?

Moral discourse is predictable to some degree. That is why you can always find some kind of "obviously wrong" thing to throw in the face of a relativist - to shut them up. These are the "attractors" that structure the discourse. It's, for example, why the criticism of capitalism comes up with terms like "wage slavery".

The ground-level conflict tends not to concern such core terms: it's not about "Slavery is (not) wrong", it's about "this is/isn't a kind of slavery". We see this more clearly in slogans like "piracy is theft" (about violation of intellectual property and copyright).

Moral decisions are hard, and we welcome whatever makes them easier. Moral rules are part of that. But since anyone can come up with them, we need legitimisations: authrority, rational arguments, whatever appeals to you. Uncertainty tolerance varies from person to person. Maybe your God tells you what's right, or maybe you think you're smart enough to figure it out for yourself. A culture, though, has people of all sorts. My personal brand of relativism skewers all the levels: moral conflict between groups, with groups, within a dithering person. Ultimately, culture always falls short. It never really tells you what to do with full reliability. You end up making your decisions, one way or another. But what culture does do is structure what you pay attention to, what you can expect from others around you, where you can talk with confidence, where you have to tread carefully. If the out-group calls you a hypocrite, that's fine; if the in-group calls you a hypocrite, that's a problem; if the reference-group calls you a hypocrite that's sad.

So a relativist can definitely hold moral positions. It's just not about whether the position is right or wrong. It's about who you expect to agree and who you expect to disagree, and how important the position is when measured against the trouble you're likely to run into. Whatever you decide is going to be influenced by culture, but it's also going to influence culture. You're part of the ongoing process of righting and wronging of human activity.

In short: laws don't determine what's right or wrong; they determine what sanctions you can expect. That certainly makes decisions easier.

Because the reference is Kant……

The matter of pure reason is interesting. — Tom Storm

For his relation to moral philosophy, care needs be taken for which pure reason matters.

I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. — Tom Storm

…entirely a priori, but not necessarily understanding.

I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning — Tom Storm

Experience is irrelevant, for to be entirely a priori simply means “not independently of this or that experience, but absolutely independently of all experience…” (B3). The role of affect holds, but not as the senses are affected because of real objects, but the internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.

…..a sound morality is a form of rationalism. — Tom Storm

“Sound” indicates a logical condition. Moral philosophy doesn’t incorporate logic in the same way as transcendental philosophy, these being distinct and altogether of far different origin and manifestation. It may be more appropriate to consider the form of rationalism for the latter as sound, but with respect to the former, it is properly considered “lawful”.

But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense. — Tom Storm

Agreed, and for me, the something that seems like common sense is in fact the intermingling of anthropology, ethics, or cultural normativity, with moral philosophy proper. The rather vast difference between the plurality of human engagements, and singularity of the human condition which determines the variety of responses to them, mistakes the effect for the cause.

I am also open to idealism, but I don't see how this is a particularly useful view. — Tom Storm

For that which belongs to a human for the simple reason it is irrevocably a necessary condition, any explanation for it must be a form of idealism, iff idealism is that by which the internal machinations of humans in general, whatever they may be, is susceptible to exposition in a rational doctrine. Still, a rational doctrine of what it is to be moral, which is always metaphysical, is not always reflected in its exhibitions, insofar as the mere behavior of the subject not always accords with his own metaphysical doctrine.

morality is best understood beyond preconceptions, homilies and slogans, by looking inward through self-reflection — Tom Storm

If morality is a necessary human condition, there’s no need to look for it. All the moral subject does with his philosophy, which just is the looking in some form or another, is come to grips with himself when he’s failed.

Anyway…..interesting topic, even if I got no interest in relativism or anti-foundationalism. I like to keep my -isms irreducible.

I would argue that most Western ethics (secular and identity politics) seem to be derived from Christian values (and I guess classical Greek), though I know some people might consider this anathema. But how could it not be the case after a couple of millennia? — Tom Storm

For Kant, the matter is not a derivation from Christian values but a focus on the concerns of the individual reflecting upon their condition as individuals. The source of the recognition of duty as imperative is said to come from reason itself but the expectation for an individual is a problem of hope and belief. Consider this account of the difference between Kant and Spinoza:

Suppose, then, that a person, partly because all the highly praised speculative arguments [for the existence of God] are so weak, and partly because he finds many irregularities both in nature and in the world of morals. became persuaded of the proposition: There is no God. Still, if because of this he regarded the laws of duty as merely imaginary, invalid, nonobligatory, and decided to violate them boldly, he would in his own eyes be a worthless human being. Indeed, even if such a person could later overcome his initial doubts and convince himself that there is a God after all, still with his way of thinking he would forever remain a worthless human being. For while he might fulfill his duty ever so punctiliously as far as effects are concerned. he would be doing so from fear, or for reward, rather than with an attitude of reverence for duty. Conversely, if he believed [in the existence of God J and complied with his duty sincerely and unselfishly according to his conscience, and yet immediately considered himself free from all moral obligation every time he experimentally posited that he might some day become convinced that there is no God, his inner moral attitude would indeed have to be in bad shape.

Therefore, let us consider the case of a righteous man (Spinoza, for example) who actively reveres the moral law [but] who remains firmly persuaded that there is no God and (since, as far as [achieving] the
object of morality is concerned, the consequence is the same) that there is also no future life: How will he judge his own inner destination to a purpose, [imposed] by the moral law? He does not require that complying with that law should bring him an advantage, either in this world or in another; rather, he is unselfish and wants only to bring about the good to which that sacred law directs all his forces. Yet his effort [encounters] limits: For while he can expect that nature will now and then cooperate contingently with the purpose of his that he feels so obligated and impelled to achieve, he can never expect nature to harmonize with it in a way governed by laws and permanent rules (such as his inner maxims are and must be). Deceit, violence, and envy will always be rife around him, even though he himself is honest, peaceable, and benevolent. Moreover, as concerns the other righteous people he meets: no matter how worthy of happiness they may be, nature, which pays no attention to that, will still subject them to all the evils of deprivation, disease, and untimely death, just like all the other animals on the earth. And they will stay subjected to these evils always, until one vast tomb engulfs them one and all (honest or not, that makes no difference here) and hurls them, who managed to believe they were the final purpose of creation, back into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter from which they were taken. And so this well-meaning person would indeed have to give up as impossible the purpose that the moral laws obligated him to have before his eyes, and that in compliance with them he did have before his eyes. Alternatively, suppose that, regarding this [purpose I too, he wants to continue to adhere to the call of his inner moral vocation, and that he does not want his respect for the moral law, by which this law directly inspires him to obey it, to be weakened, as would result from the nullity of the one ideal final purpose that is adequate to this respect's high demand (such weakening of his respect would inevitably impair his moral attitude): In that case he must-from a practical point of view, i.e., so that he can at least form a concept of the possibility of [achieving] the final purpose that is morally prescribed to him-assume
the existence of a moral author of the world, i.e., the existence of a God; and he can indeed make this assumption, since it is at least not intrinsically contradictory. — Kant, Critique of Judgement, page 451

One big difference between this and Aristotle is the focus on the inhospitality of nature concerning the life of a person. Is that Camus in the background, firing up a Gauloises?

Is that Camus in the background, firing up a Gauloises? — Paine

“…. One must imagine Sisyphus happy….”

Thanks.

Do you believe there’s such a thing as pure reason? I’m not really a science guy but don’t many cognitive scientists view reason as contingent upon how human brains work? Human habits rather than universal necessities. Big and intractable subject.

If morality is a necessary human condition, there’s no need to look for it. All the moral subject does with his philosophy, which just is the looking in some form or another, is come to grips with himself when he’s failed. — Mww

That's a tantalising comment. I'll need to think over it for a bit before I know if I agree.

he role of affect holds, but not as the senses are affected because of real objects, but the internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself. — Mww

I'm not sure I understand this sentence.


I can’t follow or even get through that Kant passage, it’s too dense and complex. Something about duty and God and atheism? I’ve never understood deontology. I think Kant would consider me morally rotten.

I’ve never understood deontology. I think Kant would consider me morally rotten. — Tom Storm

I love it. You’re absolutely right. From the vantage of the OP Kant is the enemy.

Cool. I'm with you on Aristotle over Kant. — Tom Storm

Okay great. I see I've opened up a can of worms with Kant, but maybe that's okay if he is really playing the role that I think he is.

Is your sense of what counts as flourishing pure Aristotle or is it also built around some Christian commitment? I made the assumption, perhaps wrongly, that you were aligned with Thomism. — Tom Storm

Quickly, I am a Christian but not technically a Thomist, although I do have a lot of respect for Thomism. My personal understanding of flourishing is influenced by Christianity, but in discussions such as these I restrict myself to arguments and concepts that are readily available to the non-Christian (and therefore the "flourishing" that I have been referring to here is not based in revealed doctrines of religion).

I would argue that most Western ethics (secular and identity politics) seem to be derived from Christian values (and I guess classical Greek), though I know some people might consider this anathema. But how could it not be the case after a couple of millennia? — Tom Storm

Good, I agree. Still, I think my points about moral realism and relativism can be made independent of Christian (revealed) premises.

Yes, I think you're correct on this.

If we think that the best goal for a society is to promote flourishing then there are better or worse ways to achieve this end. I think this is fair. — Tom Storm

Okay, so what is required if we are to be able to say something like, "Slavery is wrong (for everyone)"? Given the means/ends notion of morality that we have been considering, apparently it must be the case that everyone has the same end which slavery does violence to.

First I should make a terminological point. The word "goal" presupposes intention or volition. The word "end" does not, although it does not exclude intention and volition. So every goal is an end but not every end is a goal. Hopefully the import of this will become more obvious as we proceed.

So let's take two utterances, and let's suppose that they are being made to a random slave holder:

• 1. "Slavery is wrong (whether you think so or not)"
• 2. "Slavery is wrong (only if you think so)"

Let's also suppose, for the sake of argument, that the end/goal which makes slavery wrong is the equality of all humans.

Taking (2) first, it conceives of wrongness as being predicated on our interlocutor consenting to the goal of the equality of all humans. If he consents to the goal of the equality of all humans, then his act is wrong. If he does not consent to that goal, then his act is not wrong. This means that if our encounter is truly random, then we are only justified in telling the random slave-holder that he is wrong to hold slaves if we know that he holds to the goal of human equality; and (because the encounter is random), this can only be true if we know that everyone holds to the goal of human equality.

Now moving to (1), given the idea of "whether you think so or not," we must move from talking about goals to talking explicitly about ends, because in this case the endpoint of human equality need not be consciously/intentionally/volitionally recognized by the slave-holder. In this case instead of saying something like, "You should abstain from lying if you think telling the truth is an ultimate goal," we are saying something like, "You should feed your infant because you are a human being."

To summarize, if we want to say that slavery is universally wrong, then if we are utilizing a consent-based morality we must know that everyone holds the same goal (of human equality), and if we are utilizing a "natural telos"-based morality, then we will be able to say that slavery is universally wrong regardless of whether everyone holds the same goal (in a conscious, intentional, volitional way).

Because this post is getting long and potentially confusing, I will leave it there for now. The question obviously arises, "How do we ground moral truths that are not based in consent?," but I will leave that for later. First let's just ask if any of this makes sense as a groundwork.

Thanks, good clear explanations.

I see your point that for morality to have any universal clout, it would useful to be able to point to a natural telos, since this grounds moral claims in what something is rather than in what people merely happen to agree to. If, as you say, a person does not accept that all people deserve freedom and equal status, then it's not really possible to use that as a justification for why slavery is wrong. Such is the limitation of consensus made principles.

Now by inclination and temperament, I am unlikely to accept that everything has a built in purpose or end towards which it naturally develops. I am not sure I have any sophisticated reasoning for this at my fingertips but I will consider this over the next few days. And we may come to an impasse over this one. Nevertheless I would accept your argument that telos might be a critical concept for a universal ethics.

Just out of interest, do you think there’s a risk of an is–ought fallacy if we accept telos? Isn’t there still a problem in deriving an ought from a natural fact, or would you say that the notion of “inherent purpose” overrides this because it’s built into the concept itself? It's definitional or analytic.

Great post. For the sake of convenience let's call the position which says that humans have at least one universal and natural telos "teleological naturalism." Now I do think the teleological naturalist must deal with arguments from moral non-naturalists (such as the is/ought distinction, which originally flows from Kant), but let's delay that discussion for just a moment.

Nevertheless I would accept your argument that telos might be a critical concept for a universal ethics. — Tom Storm

I want to dwell for a moment on this question of whether there is any alternative to teleological naturalism for the person who holds to at least some universal moral truths. The primary alternative on offer is Kant. Beyond that, someone might say that consequentialism is an alternative, but I'm not really convinced that consequentialism departs from teleological naturalism construed broadly. For example, the hedonist seems to hold that humans are intrinsically ordered to pleasure, and therefore I would see hedonism as falling into this same category of teleological naturalism (construed broadly).

The alternative I've already outlined is one which is consent-based but thinks that it will be able to achieve universal consent. Kant is one example of this, although "consent" is not quite accurate in his case, as he is more autonomy-based.

Anyway, what do you think? Do you think there are viable alternatives to teleological naturalism for those who hold to at least some universal moral truths? A fairly easy example of teleological naturalism is the hedonist who says, "Humans are pleasure-loving creatures by nature, therefore we do seek pleasure," and this is seen as a ground for a pleasure-based ethic.

Anyway, what do you think? Do you think there are viable alternatives to teleological naturalism for those who hold to at least some universal moral truths? A fairly easy example of teleological naturalism is the hedonist who says, "Humans are pleasure-loving creatures by nature, therefore we do seek pleasure," and this is seen as a ground for a pleasure-based ethic. — Leontiskos

I don’t think I have any firm commitments here but I do lean a bit towards consequentialism. I'm not a big fan of the notion of human nature. I’ve always assumed that morality is either grounded in God (more along the lines of classical theology): something is good because it reflects or participates in God’s being of perfect goodness. Or we make it up as we go and retrofit reasoning to justify it. I’ve tended to be in the latter camp, but I respect well developed ideas even if I don't share them. I also recognise that my intermittent glibness can get me into trouble.

But more importantly, perhaps, I have never had to struggle with ethical choices in life. I just know what I am going to do in almost any situation. I never want to be cruel or cause suffering. I assume I inherit this from culture and upbringing and understand that not everyone shares such a perspective or sees cruelty or suffering in the same way. I also don't claim to be "good" whatever that may be.

I have read and heard of deontology as the contrary to consequentialism. In those terms, I suppose Kant is more of the former than the latter. He definitely does not subscribe to an ethics of outcomes. On the other hand, Kant does see how an increase of human freedom would make a less terrible world.

But by that measure, Aristotle also holds that virtues are a natural telos for a human. Whatever the design of nature makes that the case does not change the context of an individual "doing those things for their own sake."

I brought in the Critique of Judgment quote to emphasize how the years of "Christian" discourse has put a focus on the "person" not expressed the same way in Aristotle.

nihilism, on the one side (under which materialism falls) — Wayfarer

Do you believe that "materialism" entails "nihilism" or vice verse? If not, why group them together?

On this view if you see a slaveholder you could rationally engage them by saying, "If you agree that freedom is an ultimate value then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would not be rational to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." On such a view there can be hypothetical imperatives but not non-hypothetical imperatives. — Leontiskos

:up: :up:

I’m interested in how members view the role of foundational knowledge or principles in the justification of moral claims. — Tom Storm

As a moral naturalist: insofar as needless harm – whatever causes every individual human to gratuitously suffer (as well as other kinds of fauna & flora) – is "foundational" such that we cannot not know this about ourselves (or living beings), "moral claims" – non-instrumental / non-transactional norms, conduct or relationships – are "justified" to the extent they assert imperatives which when executed reliably reduce harms more than cause or exacerbate harms.

natural telos — Tom Storm

Spinoza's conatus. Fwiw, my 'conatic' interpretation: it is performatively self-contradictory for an unimpaired agent not to strive to grow, flourish, optimize agency (i.e. pragmatic capabilities, or adaptive habits, for ... optimizing (i.e. countering suboptimal) ... agency); and, in particular, moral agency is optimized by reflectively forming habits of harm-reduction (& injustice-resistance) aka "virtues".

Do you believe there’s such a thing as pure reason? — Tom Storm

Ehhhhh…..I’m sure there’s an abundance of abstraction, from the physical mechanisms of the brain to those conditions which facilitate an explanation for something every human ever, is only seeming to do. If it were ever to occur to me the goings-on between my ears wasn’t a general range of mental constructs, I wouldn’t be able to say a damn thing about what is going on.

I mean….even if I had a completely determined physical explanation for my abject hatred for the taste of Lima beans, isn’t it still me that hates that taste? What kind of explanation is really worth entertaining, that says neural pathways, or ion potentials, hate Lima beans?

So, yes, there is that which is called pure reason, even if only within a speculative non-physical explanation for physical conditions. And the kind of pure reason it is, depends on the domain of the philosophy that uses it. For experience it is pure theoretical reason; for which experience is impossible it is pure speculative reason; for moral philosophy having to do with the will it is pure practical reason.

The critical human is going to explain things to himself, whether or not there’s sufficient proofs for what he claims. It’s just what he does.
————-

….internal affect on a moral subject’s condition because of himself.
— Mww

I'm not sure I understand this sentence. — Tom Storm

It’s the simple representation of how a subject feels about that stuff of which he is the sole determinant factor. Which is the irreducible condition of Kantian moral philosophy: the proper moral agent will do what he’s already determined must be done, whether he feels good about doing it or not. That’s the subject’s condition because of himself: he feels like shit for what he did at the same time it’s he alone, that determined what was to be done. Or he feels great, depends…..

Do you believe that "materialism" entails "nihilism" or vice verse? — 180 Proof

Notice that was given in the context of Buddhist ethics. There, materialism is designated nihilistic because it denies the efficacy of karma. But I feel that nihilism is widespread in today’s culture. It doesn’t necessarily presents as a dramatic, “sturm und drang” view of life but can manifest as ennui or anomie.

As a moral naturalist: insofar as needless harm – whatever causes every individual human to gratuitously suffer (as well as other kinds of fauna & flora) – is "foundational" such that we cannot not know this about ourselves (or living beings), "moral claims" – non-instrumental / non-transactional norms, conduct or relationships – are "justified" to the extent they assert imperatives which when executed reliably reduce harms more than cause or exacerbate harms. — 180 Proof

:up:

I’ve always assumed that morality is either grounded in God [...] Or we make it up as we go and retrofit reasoning to justify it. — Tom Storm

As an aside, @180 Proof's approach is especially helpful insofar as he is a moral naturalist (and moral realist) who is not religiously motivated, and he holds a principled view. This helps show that there are principled approaches to morality that are not religious in nature. I will come back to the rest of your post.

Or we make it up as we go and retrofit reasoning to justify it. I’ve tended to be in the latter camp, — Tom Storm

The first thing I would want to say here is that "retrofit reasoning" must itself be either teleological, deontological, consequentialist, realist, non-realist, et al. Given that all of the same questions remain, this doesn't really answer any of them. Even the religious approach that you reference could be a form of "retrofit reasoning" (although I understand why you separate it out).

I don’t think I have any firm commitments here but I do lean a bit towards consequentialism.

...

I never want to be cruel or cause suffering. I assume I inherit this from culture and upbringing and understand that not everyone shares such a perspective or sees cruelty or suffering in the same way. — Tom Storm

Then let's take a test case. You want to never be cruel, but you understand not everyone shares this perspective and sees cruelty in the same way. Suppose you see someone acting in a cruel way. Would you try to get them to stop, or not? For me, this is the question where the rubber hits the road. If someone tries to get other people to stop acting cruelly, then I would say that they believe in a moral norm that applies to everyone and not just themselves, even if they say that they "understand that not everyone shares my perspective." Either you will not intervene when you witness cruelty, or you will intervene. Either you allow others to pursue their goals which require cruelty, or else you take steps to bring about your own moral goal of non-cruelty, even where others do not share your perspective. I don't see any middle ground which would allow you to do both, or which would allow you to avoid the question posed.

So a relativist can definitely hold moral positions. It's just not about whether the position is right or wrong. It's about who you expect to agree and who you expect to disagree, and how important the position is when measured against the trouble you're likely to run into. Whatever you decide is going to be influenced by culture, but it's also going to influence culture. You're part of the ongoing process of righting and wronging of human activity. — Dawnstorm

I like what you say here. What do you think about relativism with respect to science? There is a kind of morality associated with it, not just in the sense that the proper application of science can be debated, but that the notion of scientific truth rests on valuative criteria. Some argue in the same breath that morals are culturally contingent and relative but that scientific objectivity is not. They can thus claim that some of Hitler’s views can at the same time be judged as morally relative but empirically incorrect.

Forgive my ignorance - but isn’t a mature version of relativism just a context aware perspective? It’s a modus operandi and a process more than a truth table. Just because things are relative to each other in the current context, doesn’t mean that you cannot hold opinions. In that light- not being a relativist would be fairly dark no? Depending on the context everyone to no one is a relativist. It’s already been said here of course…. There are may fun rabbit holes, but Alice is only down one of them

If someone tries to get other people to stop acting cruelly, then I would say that they believe in a moral norm that applies to everyone and not just themselves, even if they say that they "understand that not everyone shares my perspective." — Leontiskos

They might try to stop people acting cruelly because they feel the victim's pain and see the propensity for cruelty as a mental illness (not being able to empathize, feel another's pain).

I mean….even if I had a completely determined physical explanation for my abject hatred for the taste of Lima beans, isn’t it still me that hates that taste? What kind of explanation is really worth entertaining, that says neural pathways, or ion potentials, hate Lima beans? — Mww

I like it. Nice way of putting it.

It’s the simple representation of how a subject feels about that stuff of which he is the sole determinant factor. Which is the irreducible condition of Kantian moral philosophy: the proper moral agent will do what he’s already determined must be done, whether he feels good about doing it or not. That’s the subject’s condition because of himself: he feels like shit for what he did at the same time it’s he alone, that determined what was to be done. Or he feels great, depends….. — Mww

Thanks for clarifying.

As a moral naturalist: insofar as needless harm – whatever causes every individual human to gratuitously suffer (as well as other kinds of fauna & flora) – is "foundational" such that we cannot not know this about ourselves (or living beings), "moral claims" – non-instrumental / non-transactional norms, conduct or relationships – are "justified" to the extent they assert imperatives which when — 180 Proof

Not sure I fully understand this - are you saying that we all have an inbuilt awareness that needless harm and suffering are bad, and this functions as a basic starting point for morality? And that moral claims are justified when they express obligations that flow from that fact and when they guide us toward reducing needless harm?