I’m not assuming direct realism in order to know that there is error. What I’m rejecting is the assumption — which I take to be doing a lot of work in the IR picture — that error must be identified by comparing experience with either a mind-independent phenomenal property or an inner experiential surrogate. — Esse Quam Videri

Good charge, but I think misguided. In either theory there can be aberration - and generally, this would be represented by the exact 'error' you're pointing to - in perception precisely because it is indirect. Neither theory branches here - they both predict error with reference to shared experience - not external objects. That was what I took to be the claim for the DRist - error must be as held up to the "real world". Otherwise, we're not looking at error. We're just looking at disparate experience and error with this frame of reference is trivial. It seems you've given an IRist concept in support of rejecting IR. Perhaps not.

To me, the difference comes in where, for DR a mental event of perception could only be labeled an error for practical purposes - which is something I want to avoid. I want to actually know the relationship between my experience and the world - not other people's experiences. I just take it we can't know, or can't be certain. I don't see a problem with that conclusion unless its emotionally unsatisfying.

I think it might be worth dealing with a couple of common objections to IR that I think fail, and are being brought to bear here in complex discussion, instead of just stating them...probably because when stated just so, objection is easy.

Experiential transparency:
We must admit that the an anatomically indirect visual complex is at the base level of our descriptions (seems no one denies this part) and that we should not work backwards from psychological impressions to a theory. We need to work from the ground up to something which also fits our psychological impressions or we should adjust them. This is why experiential transparency is a red herring to me. It does literally nothing but say that humans tend to assume they are directly in touch with the world. So much is trivial. It doesn't help. Simply stating that it feels like that cat you see is "the cat out there" isn't anything so much as a lack of curiosity (or, ignorance).

Phenomenology of acquaintance:
There's no explanation of how this fixes the problems of content or accuracy. It just re-describes the above in a specific domain (felt sensation). It, also, seems to be a mere label in service of a couple other of the concepts below..

Disjunctivism:
In claiming that the object is constitutive of the veridical perception event, it accepts that there is a disjunct and cannot explain commonality in phenomena between minds without regression - which i find far less satisfying that "we can't know". Either way, its immensely underdeterminative and not supported by the neuroscience indicating common proximal causes of phenomenon. Also, what's the criteria for a disjunctive experience? Sort of begs the question..

Action-guidance:
IR predicts this just as well as DR. It seems to confused metaphysical structure with functionality/functional success. IR accepts the latter as well as DR.

Anti-skepticism:
Do I need to? LOL.

These seem to cover most motivations for clinging to DR:

- suspicion of representationalism or similar ruffle. The thing is, IR rejects antirealism, even if it accepts a basic framework from which it springs. Confusing these is poisoning the well I think;
- resistance to epistemic internalism and hte risks it presents;
- preference for ontological parsimony - not always the best answer. In fact, its only usually a good starting point, when we have conflicting data;
- desire to dissolve skepticism rather than answer it - fair, but again, about comfort not what's being argued.

Its just incredibly underdetermined. For me, far, far more questions arise from DR than IR. But more risk arises for IR than DR, epistemically. I understand that impulse, but it seems almost anti-philosophical.

The causal chain remains the same, but our attention(the blanket) can be placed in differing locations. So in one throw we can refer to your wife’s voice, in another to the electronically constructed reproduction, and so on. — Banno

You don't have access to your wife's voice. If you did, you wouldn't need a phone.

Think of your sensory nervous system as technology that allows that grey blob in your skull to gain information it wouldn't otherwise have access to.

You don't have access to your wife's voice. — frank

I'm not sure I know what that might mean; but I do hear my wife's voice, through the telephone. That's indirect, in comparison to when she is in the room, but perhaps more direct than listening to a recording...

I'm not sure I know what that might mean; but I do hear my wife's voice, through the telephone. — Banno

Telephony creates an illusion, and so does television. There's no tiny Donald Trump inside your TV.