So it is not relevant to morality that morality is made of a god's values and prescriptions? I don't even know what being 'relevant to morality' means, incidentally, as morality - being a collection of prescriptions and values - is not something that has interests. But meh. Like I say, I think you just dislike my conclusion, for you've yet to address my argument. You've just told me I'm playing with a toy theory. I don't even know what a toy theory is, either.

Perhaps it doesn't interest you - perhaps you find rigorous defences of metaethical theories boring. Okay, go put up a shelf then.

If you say that moral values are so as such regardless of anyone's judgement you are an absolutist. The only way you could be considered to be a relativist would be to say that the absoluteness of moral values are relative to the absolute valuations of an absolute subject. — Janus

Are you being sponsored by Mistakes-R-Us or something? I have argued - argued, not just blankly stated - that moral values are the valuings of a subject. Not an 'absolute subject' whatever one of those is (and I have no idea at all).

So, that doesn't mean that something is morally valuable regardless of anyone's attitudes, does it - for 'anyone' includes Reason herself. No, something is morally valuable if Reason values it. Now, because I am not Reason, then if something is morally valuable it is not valuable because I value, but irrespective of whether I do.

I am a relativist about morality in the sense that I think that the truth of a moral proposition is contingent, not necessary. And so I think the truth of a moral statement is relative to when (and possibly even where) it is made.

So it is not relevant to morality that morality is made of a god's values and prescriptions? — Bartricks

Hence the Euthyphro.

How would you address it?

Well, because 'Euthyphro' is used by most people to express no very clear objection, do you accept my attempt to clarify what the objection is? For I am not going to kick at a moving goal or at a cloud. Here, then:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

That is the argument I can address, but if you have something else in mind then I need to hear it before I can address it.

think moral values are demonstrably subjective. Here is my simple argument:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

Doesn't this argument end up disallowing objective information altogether? Or did you already address that?

What is 'objective information'?

Statements that are taken to be objectively true or false.

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary. — Bartricks

Mmm. Not sure why you found it important to introduce the modal element.

I was thinking more along the lines of, if morality is made of a god's values and prescriptions, then it is moral to act in a certain way because god prescribes it. Is that right?

How does 'objectively true' differ from 'true'?

No, because that doesn't describe an apparent problem, it just describes the theory.

:grin:

Presumably you divide truths into objective truths and subjective truths?

What?

You can't refute a theory by describing it.

No, I don't divide truths at all. There's what's true and there's what's false.

truth itself, of course, is subjective. But that's another matter.

How does 'objectively true' differ from 'true'? — Bartricks

"The handle is on the left." This statement is apt to be subjectively true or false, but not objectively either.

I don't understand. If the handle is on the left, it is true - yes. What does adding the word 'subjectively' do?

I'll start again.

morality is made of a god's values and prescriptions — Bartricks

So what is moral is what god prescribes.

Now, is it moral because god prescribes it, or does god prescribe it because it is moral?

Seems you want to say that it is good because it is proscribed by god. Have I understood you aright?

I don't understand. If the handle is on the left, it is true - yes. What does adding the word 'subjectively' do? — Bartricks

It's on the left for me, but not for you. That's what it does.

You can field that one, @frank

Yes, that's my theory - the theory described in the conclusion of the argument I gave.

Moral prescriptions are the prescriptions of a subject, Reason. And so if the subject prescribes it, then it is right.

Again, that's the theory, not a problem.

I described the problem - and most would agree that the problem I described is a huge one and that I wasn't replacing the hard problem with a softer one - but by all means describe a harder problem if you can, for I don't know what it would be.

That means it is true when you utter it, but not me. And that makes its truth relative, not subjective.
You're misusing terms - I defined subjective in the opening post. Truth is a property of propositions. But to say that something is 'subjective' is to say something about what it is made of.

so - to borrow your own example - if God were to prescribe rape, that would make it moral?

I didn't mention God. You need to address my theory not another one. So, if Reason were to prescribe rape, that would make it moral.

She doesn't, obviously.

But if she did, it would be.

And that's a problem - yes. Why? Well, because moral truths are necessary and not contingent.

morality is made of a god's values and prescriptions — Bartricks

I didn't mention God. — Bartricks

Odd. I will leave that here, for you to consider. Something went astray.

Doesn't this argument end up disallowing objective information altogether? — frank

I believe it does, and the OP can't address that problem.

So you see that the 'problem' has to do with the apparent necessity that moral truths have. Yes?

The problem, note, is not that it is likely that rape is right. For clearly rape is wrong and there's not a shadow of a doubt about that. And that remains the case regardless of whether you agree with me that the disvaluer of rape is a subject or, well, whatever.

So the problem has nothing to do with how sure we can be about the actual rightness or wrongness of anything.

The problem has to do with the fact that if my theory is true, then the wrongness of rape is contingent, not necessary.

Yes? That is the problem. And I am not softening it for my own purposes. I'll deal with it - but you need ot confirm that you and I are dealing with the same challenge.

I have not mentioned God at any point - apart from occasions like this where I correct people's misreading of my view.

God is not mentioned in any premise in my argument.
God is not mentioned in the conclusion.

The subject - Reason - whose prescriptions and values constitute moral prescriptions and values is a god. A god, not God (well, she might be God -not ruling it out). And she's one of those simply because her prescriptions and values are moral prescriptions and values.

If Reason were to prescribe rape, that would make it moral — Bartricks

@Janus - this is what I meant by incongruence. Is this 'wrong', an error in reasoning? One wants to say - reason departed long ago. This is a different game.