«Maybe ultimate goodness is a place and feeling we experience when we die, not some God out there watching us» So you are arguing that non-existence might be a perfection? What is your response to this part of the argument then?: Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. And therefore this assumption must be false (TheMadFool formalized the argument, there you can see clearly how this step works).

«It is said when talking about the "problem of pain" that God cannot create free creatures who can gain virtue without allowing them pain. However, since God was always happy, couldn't he create creatures more in his likeness (without having to allow pain)? God doesn't face struggle to find happiness. His act of existing is blissful I thought. So we have an infinite deity who loves infinitely but does so with bliss and necessity. And we have his creatures who have animal natures which earns its way in life through strain of their muscles and wits. Doesn't this seem strange to you?»

Like I responded to another user, yes, that might contradict God's omnibenevolence. But the opposing argument, let's take Leibniz', would argue thus: «One of the most characteristic features of that philosophy (Leibniz') is the doctrine of many possible worlds.  A world is "possible" if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of  possible worlds, all of which God contemplated before creating the actual world. Being good, God decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which  had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it  would not have been so good as the actual world. That is because some great goods are logically  bound up with certain evils. To take a trivial illustration, a drink of cold water when you are very  thirsty on a hot day may give you such great pleasure that you think the previous thirst, though  painful, was worth enduring, because without it the subsequent enjoyment could not have been so  great. For theology, it is not such illustrations that are important, but the connection of sin with  free will. Free will is a great good, but it was logically impossible for God to bestow free will and  at the same time decree that there should be no sin. God therefore decided to make man free,  although he foresaw that Adam would eat the apple, and although sin inevitably brought  punishment. The world that resulted, although it contains evil, has a greater surplus of good over  evil than any other possible world; it is therefore the best of all possible worlds, and the evil that it contains affords no argument against the goodness of God.» Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy.

Now, I don't say that things are just as Leibniz' says here, I am only saying that it is not logically impossible nor incoherent that they should be like that.

I'll be eagerly waiting for when you find what is off then. — Amalac

Food for thought...

Definition of "conceivable": capable of being imagined or grasped mentally.

If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.

To continue along the same trajectory, imagine god is inconceivable but if god is so then god would fall into the same category as contradictions and again there's something which is, in a sense, "equal" to god and that can't be because god is the "...greatest being..."

Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.

«If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.»

Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.

Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things in his image and likeness.

You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.

«Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.»

How is this not a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle?

Argument A

1. God is the greatest being [premise]

2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]

3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

4. God exists [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]

5. If God exists then God and I are equal in terms of existence [premise]

6. If God and I are equal in terms of existence then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [premise]

7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time. [5, 6 Modus ponens]

8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 6 Conjunction. Contradiction]

9. God doesn't exist [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]

Argument B

1. God is the greatest being [premise]

2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]

3. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and any time [1, 2 Modus Ponens]

4. God doesn't exist [assume for Reductio Ad Absurdum]

5. If God doesn't exist then God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist

6. If God and married bachelors are equal in that both don't exist then false that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time

7. False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [5, 6 Modus ponens]

8. Nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time AND False that nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [3, 7 Conjunction, Contradiction]

9. God exists [4 to 8 Reductio Ad Absurdum]


God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic and if that is something then God is even beyond that.

«First, we have to understand what is abstract concepts as "perfection" "limits" and "God" What if you never heard of these? Well welcome to extreme empiricism. It is just impossible to give characteristics to something or someone that we do not even know yet.»

Like you say, for those who are radical empiricists that follows. But I am not.

As for your point that we can't give characteristics to something or someone we don't yet know, it seems to me that sometimes scientists can deduce the existence of some things they don't yet know, and give characteristics to these hypotetical things, which sometimes turn out to exist.

I am not saying «God exists and God has this and that attribute», I am saying: «If God exists, then God might have this and that attribute».

«2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]» Why should I accept this premise? See my previous response again.

«God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic.» While I understand that some, like Nicholas of Cusa, might adopt that view, if we adhere to the view that God can't do or be anything contrary to the laws of logic, then this plainly is a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle, according to which if the proposition «God exists» is false, then its negation «God does not exist» must be true and viceversa. The same applies to the proposition «God is conceivable».

Or perhaps I misunderstood you, and you are taking a view similar to Kant's, i.e. that it is an antinomy. Now what concerns me about that is that what is beyond words and logic would surely also be inconceivable, isn't that right?

At any rate, I don't see why I should accept the second premise of your argument A.

, I am saying: «If God exists, then God might have this and that attribute». — Amalac

Ok. Understandable. You put existence as the epitome of all attributes. Existence could be the most perfection or attribute you can put on somebody (God). But how can we know he exists?
Then, if he exists and we discover it which attributes we put on them? I guess previously someone had to taught the existence of God himself (empiricism again).
Here we have a base of beliefs and believing in something abstract like God. I guess again when you believe in something "higher" or "greatest" you want to put on it all the best attributes possible because we see it as it could be our purest form

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I don't understand why you're looking at from the law of the exluded middle angle and not getting right to the point - a contradiction follows from the notion of a greatest being. This contradiction has its roots in the obvious fact that a greatest being should lie outside all conceivable categories. God can't be, in a manner of speaking, in the same set as other things and both "things that exist" and "things that don't exist" classea have members, effectively shattering all hope of placing God in either because if we did God wouldn't even be great, forget about being greatest.

That said, I'm still not completely convinced by my own argument. Just wanted to throw it out there for you/someone to pick it apart if possible.

So why can't the greatest blank possible be the afterlife? Why put a person in there as the greatest blank. It's as hoc

Like I said, argument A is only valid if we accept premise 2. Why should we accept it?

If the propositions «God exists» and «God is conceivable» are neither true nor false, then they must be meaningless. Is that what you are saying? In that case, that's only true if argument A is valid, and I'm unsure it is.
If your argument A is not valid, then the conclusion «God does not exist» does not follow.

All I'm saying is that the concept of a greatest being leads to a contradiction - it's an illogical idea.

If God is the greatest being and God exists then God is like us in that respect, there being no difference between us and God which in different words means that God is no greater than us with respect to existence but that contradicts our basic assumption, the assumption that God is the greatest being.

And I already gave you my response, to which you have yet to respond:
Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.
Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things according to his image and likeness.

You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.

«it seems to me you make a fatal mistake in not distinguishing between a thing and the idea of a thing. Indeed I would agree that we can have an idea of perfection, even perfect perfection in any way conceivable, but those would be merely ideas of that perfection, and not in any way the perfection itself.

I can have ideas all day long of my perfect dream house, but dreaming doesn't make it so - except in dreams - nor can I live in an idea.»
Your argument then is in line with Gaunilo's argument of the perfect island, correct?

But there is an important difference: one may say, following the notion of existence of Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, that the «perfect island» or the «perfect dream house» have the predicate of non existence, but in said subjects that predicate is not a perfection, since subjects other than the subject of all perfections posses only some perfections, and therefore there is no logical contradiction arising from denying the existence of the «perfect island» or the «perfect house» outside the mind. We may say the «perfect island» has the predicate of non-existence, but that since its non existence is not a perfection it is limited, and thus it does not follow that said island must also not exist as an idea in the mind if it does not exist outside the mind.

And the argument I mentioned holds that if God did not exist, that would imply a logical contradiction. It is not argued that: «We have an idea of God as existing, therefore God exists», rather it is argued that: «If God (defined as the subject of all perfections) did not exist outside the mind, he would also not exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the fact that he does exist as an idea in the mind.»

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«Someday when after a hard day's work you have a earned for yourself a great appetite, you must visit and I'll serve you a wonderful logical and non-contradictory dinner! But i wonder if you might not arise from table hungrier than when you sat. Logic is the use of tools on things, itself neither the tools nor the things. With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve.»

I have no idea what you mean by this. «With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve». What do you mean by that? Could you be a bit more specific about what you mean when you say «that existence is no more substantial...»? What do you mean by substantial?

«if you think Anselm's proof provides it, then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely.»

First of all, I am not mentioning the original ontological argument as formulated by Anselm, but rather a different form of it. I already explained this in my previous reply to you.
Second, I never said I consider the argument I mentioned to be valid, nor invalid. I do not assert either claim, nor does it convince me that God exists (nor does any argument I have seen yet).

I mentioned it for purely logical and epistemological purposes, such as clarifying the errors (if any) that the argument has, because it seems to me that the answers to the argument I've seen thus far are not very convincing, except perhaps Kant's objection that existence is not a predicate, and Russell's theory of descriptions.

Third, you say: «then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely». Assuming I did affirm the argument is valid, am I supposed to believe that just because you say so?

Maybe God became God after a test. The ontological argument always presupposes Platonism, which is an assumption

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You have assumptions of the idea of "substance". They are undefended by you and and have no basis. Again, maybe the greatest good is where good people go (hence a place and a feeling) instead of a person. That place and feeling is more or less infinite and perfect. Whether there is a non-human in that state is a non-question. There could be, but it doesn't matter. The idea that there is a person who has all "perfections" has so many assumptions behind it that I think you'll have to do a lot of self-questioning to get out of this mess you got your mind into

Only if you hold the dogmatic view that yours is the «true» definition of omnipotence, does «but the word can no longer be used to characterise God» follow. — Amalac

No, it isn't dogmatic. A being who has more power than another, is more powerful, yes? Now, you can use 'omnipotent' to refer to the less powerful if you want, but now you're not talking about the most powerful being, are you?

You're just playing with words. It's easy to prove God if you do that. Here: I understand 'omnipotent' to mean 'able to do all the things one is able to do'. I am omnipotent according to that definition. It's a silly definition. But let's not be dogmatic.
I understand 'omniscient' as 'knowing all the things I know". Now I'm omniscient. Silly definition, but again, mustn't be dogmatic. I understand 'omnibenevolent' to be 'approved of by me'. And as I fully approve of myself, I am omnibenevolent. Silly, but don't be a dogmatist. Now it turns out that according to those definitions of the terms, I am God. And as I clearly exist, bingo - God has been proved.

That's what you're doing. You're using 'omnipotent' to denote a being who is less than all powerful. And then running an argument that would be unsound if God exists - an argument that, if it worked, would establish the non-existence of God.

And when it comes to perfection, you are using that word in no clear fashion. I have given you a definition of it that clearly makes sense: to be perfect is to be maximally good. But you're not using it to mean that - you're using it in an all-purpose way to plug gaps.

The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. — Amalac

This sentence has no verb. It is nonsensical.

But if that still bothers you, let's use this definition instead: a simple quality which is absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express. — Amalac

No, that's entirely unclear too. Like I say, you're just playing with words. Of course definitions have to come to an end, but they should come to an end with terms denoting concepts that can be grasped, not just hot air. I have literally no idea - none - what you mean when you talk about a 'perfection'.

Now I gave you a perfectly clear definition of what a perfection is: it is something that makes something good. And to be perfect is to be maximally good.

And I gave an argument demonstrating the plausibility of this definition: if something is perfect, it is incoherent to think of it as also being less than good. And if something is bad, one is confused if one also thinks it is perfect.

So, perfect means maximally good. And this is not a question-begging definition, for it facilitates a version of the ontological argument.

We have the concept of a morally perfect being, for how else do we recognise that others fall short of being such a being? Thus, we have the concept. And it is better if a morally perfect being exists than not. Thus, our concept of a morally perfect being is the concept of a being who exists. That is, the existence of such a being cannot be separated-out from the rest of the concept. And when a concept is like that, we are justified in concluding that reality contains something answering to the concept.

It is a point that Descartes made: when you can't separate existence out from the rest of the concept, then one can be certain that the concept has something answering to it in reality.

So, the concept of a strawberry is one I can entertain without having to take strawberries to exist.

I can't do that with the concept of 'an existent strawberry', but nevertheless in that case I can separate out the concept of the strawberry from its being existent.

But when it comes to - Descartes' famous example - the concept of myself, I cannot separate out existence from it. To entertain the concept of myself, is to take myself to exist. And thus I can conclude that the concept of my self has something answering to it.

And this seems also to be the case with the concept of God. For God is morally perfect and an existent morally good being is better than a non-existent one. That is, an existent morally virtuous being is better than a non-existent one. And thus the concept of a morally perfect being includes existence. Conclusion: a morally perfect being exists.

Not endorsing that argument, just noting that it has something to it.

What you quoted is how Leibniz defines «perfection» in his Monadology.
I wrote:

Leibniz' definition of perfection is: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. "

I don't see how that's «nonsensical»

I stand corrected.

I think the following article, although lengthy, constitutes a direct response to your OP. Hope you enjoy it.

CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

That the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact that the necessity of His existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him.
Rene Descartes

The (ontological) argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.
Bertrand Russell

It is this author’s contention that Renee Descartes should have rejected the validity of all ontological arguments for the existence of God and that his philosophy would have provided him with a unique and sound rationale for explaining why such arguments had to be false. Descartes should have realized that his version of the ontological argument, as well as the version formulated before him by Anselm, was simply incompatible with the new philosophical methodology and criteria he established for determining indubitably certain existence.

It was not sufficient for Descartes and Anselm before him merely to present the individual with the idea, or definition, of a necessary being and then, by performing a detailed analysis of the idea, or definition, try to claim to have demonstrated successfully the necessary existence of such a being.

I submit that Descartes’ own well-defined methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence should have prompted him, instead, to explain (a) the difference between contingent thinking activity and necessary thinking activity, and (b) the corresponding difference between contingent personal existence and necessary personal existence. The specific definition of the terms contingent and necessary, as used in this paper, will be made clear during the following discussion.

In Meditation II, Descartes presented the reader with a detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum along with the method the reader could use to realize it. He claimed that a person attempting to doubt his own existence, even under the most extreme (hyperbolic) of scenarios (the dreaming doubt and the malicious demon doubt), would ultimately and inevitably realize or intuit, during his doubting activity, that his existence was an indubitably certain existence. A simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that not existing while doubting or thinking was impossible for the thinker. Or, phrasing it positively, a simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that existing while doubting or thinking was indubitably certain for the thinker. As Descartes put it: “I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think.”

However, Descartes did not say that his existence was necessary-in-itself. He said only if, and when, he doubted, only if, and when, he thought, only then, during the time of their occurrence, did he simultaneously intuit his existence to be indubitably certain. If he ceased to think for an instant of time, then Descartes claimed that he would have no ground for believing that he could have existed during that instant. As Descartes cautioned: “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”

So, then, according to Descartes, a person’s thinking activity is contingent in the specific sense that it is experienced by the person as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In other words, the Cogito portion of the Cogito Sum is experienced by the person, in the first person, present tense mode, to be contingent thinking activity (a contingent Cogito), since it is experienced as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence.

Search as one will, there is no separate or concomitant intuition available which would also assure the person, beyond all reasonable and hyperbolic doubt, that his doubting or thinking is an activity impervious to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. And the force of this realization would apply equally to all the many different modes of the person’s thinking activity such as perceiving, inferring, deducing, imagining, remembering, conceiving, speculating, calculating, hypothesizing, etc.

Descartes showed how the performance of a human Cogito Sum did, in fact, yield the intuition of an indubitably certain, yet contingent, personal existence (the contingent human Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the human person’s simultaneous experience of the occurrence of its contingent thinking activity (the contingent human Cogito). Or, stating it more succinctly, a person’s contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), during the time that it is experienced by the person, always provides the person with a simultaneous intuition of the indubitable certainty of that person’s contingent personal existence (the human Sum).

Surprisingly, in none of his subsequent meditations did Descartes attempt to present the reader with a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum which would have paralleled nicely the detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum he offered in Meditation II.

Preoccupied as he was with the urgent need to provide a divine guarantee for his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth, in Meditation III Descartes decided to present the reader with a series of more, or less, traditional a posteriori arguments for the existence of God and, in Meditation V, he decided to present the reader with his a priori ontological argument for the existence of God based, curiously enough, upon his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth.

Nevertheless, had he intended to do so we suspect Descartes could have provided a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum along the following lines.

If one assumes the divinity thinks, then its thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would be necessary in the specific sense that it would be experienced by the divinity as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence and, as such, it would always provide the divinity with an intuition of its indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

In other words, he could have explained how the performance of a divine Cogito Sum would have provided an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the divine person’s experience of the occurrence of its necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). The divine person’s necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would provide the divine person with an intuition of the indubitable certainty of the divine person’s necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

He could have gone on to explain that if the human person were also able to experience the occurrence of such necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito), then the human person, too, would be able to experience it as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. But that since the human person is, in fact, simply not able to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) in the same way as the human person is able to experience the occurrence of contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), the human person is, therefore, prohibited from ever having direct access to an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

This Cartesian-based distinction between the impossibility of having a personal experience of necessary thinking activity and the possibility of having a personal experience of contingent thinking activity should not be confused with the traditional distinction between an essence that contains within itself the reason for its existence (necessary being) and an essence that does not contain within itself the reason for its existence (contingent being). The Cartesian-based distinction is grounded in, and can be verified through, a person’s experience, whereas the traditional distinction is grounded in a person’s abstract thinking but cannot be verified through a person’s experience.

From a Cartesian-based perspective, the central issue is the possibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can cease to occur and can go out of existence versus the impossibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence.

Human thinking activity is contingent being because the human person experiences his thinking activity can cease to occur and can go out of existence – nothing more, nothing less. The human person’s, alone, is the I think contingently, I exist contingently (Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter).
By contrast, divine thinking activity is necessary being because the divine person experiences that its thinking activity can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence - nothing more, nothing less. God’s, alone, is the I think necessarily, I exist necessarily (Cogito necessario, Sum necessario).
It is simply impossible for a human being to have a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence (the divine Cogito).

However, from a Cartesian perspective, it is precisely this impossible experience which is the indispensable prerequisite that would enable a human being to have a performative intuition of the indubitable certainty of necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), i.e., the existence of God.

But, unfortunately, all ontological arguments lack this indispensable experiential prerequisite.

And, in response to Russell, this is precisely where the fallacy of the ontological argument lies!

For whatever reasons, the preceding line of thought is what Descartes chose neither to pursue, nor to explain. Nevertheless, from a Cartesian point of view based upon a well-defined Cartesian methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence, I would submit (a) that the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) is precisely what a person would have to be able to experience in order to make a legitimate claim to having an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), and (b) that this Cartesian-based explanation of what would be required for a human person to successfully execute an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) is far superior to Descartes’ ontological argument and that of his predecessor, Anselm.

This Cartesian-based critique specifies precisely what is fallacious about Descartes’ ontological argument, Anselm’s ontological argument, and all other ontological arguments for the existence of God in a manner uniquely different than the critiques proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Gottlob Frege.

Ontological arguments, being conceptually abstract through and through and remaining completely detached and isolated from the empirical realm, lack the requisite foundation of a personal human experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). Only the possibility of having such a personal experience would also permit a human person to have an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

It is of interest to note, too, that all the critiques cited above are essentially as conceptually abstract as the ontological arguments they seek to contest. The total inability of a person to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity is never made the central issue of contention. For all these critics, the perennially unresolved central issue is simply the logical validity, or invalidity, of the abstract reasoning involved in the ontological arguments. Without exception, this is their exclusive, limited focus.

I submit that the Cartesian-based critique succeeds in altering this traditional focus since it offers a unique, experientially grounded explanation for why, ab initio, all ontological arguments for the existence of God must be false.

Certain assumptions shared by Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God, be the arguments a posteriori or a priori, are that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are ontologically prior to the ideas of the finite and the imperfect, and that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are innate to the human mind because they are implanted there by God.

For example, for Descartes my idea that I think contingently (which is my idea of a finite and imperfect activity) presupposes an ontologically prior, innate idea of what it means to think necessarily (which is my innate idea of an infinite and perfect activity). Or, to understand that I think contingently (a finite and imperfect activity) requires that I must have some ontologically prior, innate understanding of what it means to think necessarily (an infinite and perfect activity). However, as this line of reasoning relates to the central theme of this essay, I would submit, contrary to Descartes’ position, that my understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) is not innate to the human mind and is not implanted there by God.

Neither is the idea of my contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity) obtained, as Descartes would claim, by my limiting or bounding, in some way, the ontologically prior, innate idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity). Instead, my idea of necessary thinking activity is a direct result of my deliberate attempt to try to remove, albeit unsuccessfully, that characteristic from the idea of my contingent thinking activity which limits and constrains it; viz., its vulnerability to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. This, I submit, is the genuine way in which I arrive at an understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity).

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow, either from the former interpretation of Descartes or from the latter interpretation of this author, that I can have a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) in the same way as I do, in fact, have a direct personal experience of contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity).

As I see it, the central issue is not a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, an idea of perfect thinking activity or an idea of perfect being – be those ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious. Instead, the central issue is a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, a direct personal experience of that perfect thinking activity or of that perfect being.

Or, approaching it from a slightly different direction, doubts and desires may come from an understanding that I lack something, and that I would not be aware of that lack unless I was aware of a more perfect being that has those things which I lack. However, my ability to have an idea of, or conception of, or understanding of, or awareness of a more perfect, or infinite, being that possesses all those things which I lack (inclusive of necessary thinking activity), does not mean that I am also able to have a direct personal experience of that being and its necessary thinking activity in precisely the same way as I am able to have a direct personal experience of my being and my contingent thinking activity.

Certainly, I can postulate the existence of a being that thinks necessarily and exists necessarily, but I cannot have a direct personal experience of the necessary thinking activity which would simultaneously yield an intuition of the indubitably certain existence of such a necessary being.

Again, I can perform the “Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter,” but I cannot perform the “Cogito necessario, Sum necessario.”

Descartes’ a priori ontological argument for the existence of God is not an experientially grounded performative argument like the one he formulated that successfully and persuasively proved the existence of the human self. His ontological argument, lacking the crucial, indispensable experiential foundation of necessary thinking activity, is destined to fail from its very inception. It is a non-persuasive, quasi-intuitive argument espousing a so-called self-validating idea of God which is given in consciousness and which represents God as existing, but which, in fact, completely misses the mark.

In fact, one could assert even further that the ultimate test of the efficacy of any argument for the existence of God, be that argument a priori or a posteriori, does not consist in the ability of that argument to provide the meditator with a clear and distinct idea of God’s necessary personal existence. Instead, one could assert that the efficacy of any such argument is determined, first and foremost, by whether, or not, it can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). And even assuming such an argument can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity, then can it also engender in that meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum)?

However, in conclusion, this author knows of no traditional, professionally recognized, a priori or a posteriori argument for the existence of God that has succeeded in providing the meditator with the requisite foundation of a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) while also engendering in the meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

(Ignore accidental post, I don't know how to delete it)

I think the following article, although lengthy, constitutes a direct response to your OP.

No it doesn't. The argument does not rely on the «divine cogito» nor on the experience of «necessary thinking activity», nor on the idea that God gives us an idea of the infinite.
The user «TheMadFool» formalized the argument in premise-conclusion form, if you go back on the thread you can see it, and you'll see it's not like the argument that article criticises.