Distinguishing correlation and causation is pretty basic stuff. — Isaac

I didn't talk about causation. But since we are at it, tell me what would be the difference between causation and correlation in history and what would count as evidence of causality in history.

I didn't talk about causation. — neomac

Your claim was...

ex-soviet regimes have done so, by joining NATO or EU — neomac

X achieves Y by Z.

So how does Z bring Y about if Z doesn't cause Y?

what would be the difference between causation and correlation in history — neomac

Really? A cause is when some action leads to another, a correlation would be when two actions are related, but one may have resulted in the other or vice versa (the matter being unclear), or the two events are co-caused by a third.

In your example, the Baltic States may have developed more open democracies because they joined NATO/EU, or they may have done because of their own internal political movements and joined NATO/EU as a consequence.

what would count as evidence of causality in history. — neomac

One event preceding another would help. There being some plausible mechanism by which the former event brings about the latter would be good too. Some documents, speeches, photographs... The usual.

Yeah, It's a question of 'how scared do you want to be' that determines how deep you look.

The recent court filings from the Eric Schmitt lawsuit, reported in The Intercept make a particularly good horror story...

“Platforms have got to get comfortable with gov’t. It’s really interesting how hesitant they remain,” Microsoft executive Matt Masterson, a former DHS official, texted Jen Easterly, a DHS director, in February.

There is ... a formalized process for government officials to directly flag content on Facebook or Instagram and request that it be throttled or suppressed through a special Facebook portal that requires a government or law enforcement email to use.

Used to great effect with the Hunter Biden Laptop story suppression...

According to records filed in federal court, two previously unnamed FBI agents — Elvis Chan, an FBI special agent in the San Francisco field office, and Dehmlow, the section chief of the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force — were involved in high-level communications that allegedly “led to Facebook’s suppression” of the Post’s reporting.

But sure...nothing like that would happen with any of the important issues like war and global health...

DHS’s capstone report outlining the department’s strategy and priorities in the coming years, the department plans to target “inaccurate information” on a wide range of topics, including “the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, racial justice, U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the nature of U.S. support to Ukraine.”

Note here there's no concern whatsoever about disinformation relating to actual US cover-ups Guantanamo, Asange, NSA spying... Just the familiar stories we all know from the last few years...

But it's alright because it's the government intervening, and the government aren't going to lie are they...?

in a bid to influence voters prior to the election, according to former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge. U.S. officials have routinely lied about an array of issues, from the causes of its wars in Vietnam and Iraq to their more recent obfuscation around the role of the National Institutes of Health in funding the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s coronavirus research.

Oh fuck.

It's, in a way a natural evolution of traditional propaganda as developed in the early 20th century. We just so happened to develop the internet, and why wouldn't those power not use this to their advantage?

One of the saving graces for the internet is that, if you know how to use it, you can find very good information, which would otherwise be extremely difficult to obtain.

One must assume "they" (CIA, FB - all these government and corporations) have everything on you in terms of information, and will use that info according to how they see fit.

Wars such as this one provides just more example of such a system on controlled information works.

There might be differences, yet I’m not sure if they are enough to support your claim. The expression “Putinism” would be more insightful if it referred to distinctive/identifiable Putin’s ideological beliefs that he promotes and make a difference with his socio-cultural environment’s, but your claim that Putinism consists in “mining old tropes for ready appeal” doesn’t seem to support that, it simply suggests that Putin’s not an original ideologue. And even if, as you suggest, Putin’s motivations were cynical and not genuine by exploiting the nationalist/imperialist tropes, I wouldn’t qualify a regime “ideological” based on the honesty of its leader (and assumed it's clear what "ideological regime" is as opposed to "non-ideological regime"). — neomac

By "Putinism" I meant, for lack of a better term, the regime that has formed in Russia during Putin's rule. We don't really know what's in Putin's head, and ultimately, that's not what matters most (excepting Putin's biographers). What matters is the character of the regime, and that we can see without the benefit of mindreading.

.

I am genuinely curious to hear what people have to say about the following questions:

• What would be (or have been) the consequences to the Ukrainian people if the Ukrainian state ceded (or had ceded) territory to the Russian state?
• What would be (or have been) the consequences to the Russian people if the Russian state withdrew from occupied Ukrainian territory (or never invaded in the first place)?
• What would be (or have been) the long-term geopolitical consequences if the Ukrainian state ceded (or had ceded) territory to the Russian state?
• What would be (or have been) the long-term geopolitical consequences if the Russian state had withdrew from occupied Ukrainian territory (or never invaded in the first place)?

In another thread, I said:

A person might prefer to live under a Ukrainian rather than a Russian government, but might also think that they would prefer to live in general; that both governments are bad and that the Ukrainian one is just the lesser evil; that whatever evils come with Russian dominion, that the real potential for torture and death out in the battlefield are worse, etc. — _db

This quote should give some context into why I am asking these questions. I'm not trying to troll here. Tons of people are getting injured and killed and I want to know why this needs to happen.

Your bullet points of questions refer to a Ukrainian state. A generous portion of the 11,300 comments on this thread concern whether it exists or not. It is lost or found between the interests of Russian and other nations.

When you speak of choosing between lesser or greater evils, the experience of actual war has superseded the calculation of peace bought at the cost of oppression.

How would an accurate response to your set of speculative questions provide a possible way to end the conflict?

It's, in a way a natural evolution of traditional propaganda as developed in the early 20th century. We just so happened to develop the internet, and why wouldn't those power not use this to their advantage? — Manuel

It is, yes, but there's this element of a polarising effect with social media too that I think classic propaganda had begun to lose. Opinions can get so rapidly built up into 'movements', with so many people relying on only one news source and lay readers being so involved in building stories without checking fact like a journalist might.

I think up to the late 50s newspapers might well have been able to play the role social media plays now, of presenting a relatively polarised narrative (complete with only one side being the 'sensible' one and the other the 'mob'), but in the 60s to 90s I think that position became untenable. We saw a growth of counter-culture movements with intellectual support that presented quite a wide field of options.

That was, in my view, progress against the strength of propaganda, which the rise of social media has reversed. We're now back to the pre-50s era of two opposing narratives on everything (again where one is the 'sensible' one and the other the 'mob'). That should worry us from an analytical perspective, but even without analysis, it should worry us simply on its face that we're back to the situation governments found favourable in the 50s, the height of McCarthyism and cold war nuclear brinkmanship.

Are you now saying that this war is just and must be fought, but it'd be nice if someone ALSO tried a little diplomacy?

Well then, we agree.

Your bullet points of questions refer to a Ukrainian state. A generous portion of the 11,300 comments on this thread concern whether it exists or not. It is lost or found between the interests of Russian and other nations. — Paine

In all four cases @_db refers to 'the state' as the decision-making body. No one is denying the existence of a decision-making body in Russia and Ukraine which has the power to make the unilateral decisions that are mentioned in the questions, nor is the existence of such bodies under any genuine threat on either side. The Ukrainian government definitely exists, no one is denying it and there's no credible threat to their continued existence as a legislative body (despite the individuals therein being under personal threat) that would prevent them from making the decisions in question. Likewise with Russia. So I don't see any difficulty the contention about Ukrainian national integrity would present in answering the questions.



I think my answers have been given already, but since you asked openly and no one else has replied...

What would be (or have been) the consequences to the Ukrainian people if the Ukrainian state ceded (or had ceded) territory to the Russian state? — _db

I think this is best answered by the various indices of human development, backed up by reports from the likes of Amnesty and Human Rights Watch. Political freedom would be substantially reduced, and most likely free elections would be curtailed. Relations with the EU obviously stopped (but it's unclear what meaningful effect this would have on the population). Belarus is close as example of a Russian puppet state. Other aspects of human rights - security, health, welfare - would have stayed much the same as the two countries are barely any different in those aspects (both pretty bad), and recent new EU members have seen their social welfare programs crushed by EU/ECB rules.

Additionally now, of course, you have to factor in reconstruction. Ceding territory, that's in the hands of the Russian states, not ceding, it's in the hands of the IMF and the US. The IMF hasn't a very good track record on social welfare in its vassal states, worse that Russia's (which is already bad). But Russia is now in a much worse economic situation, so less capable of splashing out on the kind of infrastructure improvements it put in place when, for example, annexing Crimea.

There's been talk of a Chechnya-like series of ethnic cleansings, but I think the likelihood of such atrocities would depend on the means by which the territory is ceded. If Russia win outright, it's possible (though I still think unlikely). If the territory were ceded as part of a negotiation with global parties involved (UN, US), then I think it's far less likely.

This uncertainty is measured against 1000 casualties every day the war continues and no realistic chance of that ending for at least a year or so, if it ever ends (there'll always be a border and Russia will always be the other side of it). Plus every additional day of war makes the decision about reconstruction costs even harder as Ukraine get into even more debt.

What would be (or have been) the consequences to the Russian people if the Russian state withdrew from occupied Ukrainian territory (or never invaded in the first place)? — _db

Very little in the latter case (never invaded), but in the former, I'm guessing there'll be fallout in political terms - possibly a loss in Putin's power, which might be a good thing (but we don't know who's waiting in the wings).

What would be (or have been) the long-term geopolitical consequences if the Ukrainian state ceded (or had ceded) territory to the Russian state? — _db

I think this depends entirely on the method by which the territory is ceded. Had there been a referendum in Donbas, a declaration of independence (even if later leveraged by Russia to gain some degree of political control) and Crimea officially handed over then geopolitically I think the effect would have been negligible. There's been virtually no noticeable effect of Belarus's submission to Russian influence. No effect of the Ossetia, Moldova, Chechnya border disputes. Even the various regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan have made barely more than a dint in the general trend of global affairs.

If the territory were actually ceded directly to the Russian state I think there'd be more slightly more impact, especially if it were as a result of Ukrainian defeat (a more buoyant Russia might be a more dangerous one).

What would be (or have been) the long-term geopolitical consequences if the Russian state had withdrew from occupied Ukrainian territory (or never invaded in the first place)? — _db

Virtually nothing - status quo. Perhaps the defeat would topple Putin, but a leader toppled by humiliating defeat is unlikely to yield a more liberal, compromising one. If the only reason Putin goes is because he wasn't strong enough to carry off an invasion we don't even want to think about who's going to replace him.

---

By and large I think the answers all depend heavily on the manner by which the territory is ceded. Planned, negotiated settlement with preferably the involvement on the UN would be best, getting less promising the more we veer toward Russia simply winning it.

One issue of geopolitical impact is the result of either a win or a lose for Russia on destabilising a volatile region now flooded with weapons. Anyone concerned about things like Nuclear weapons in the hands of a dictator like Putin ought be tens times more concerned about the region breaking up Yugoslavia-style into a dozen, nuclear-armed warring regions.

The other thing I'd say that's probably more important, but is treated as a non-issue by the Hawks is the question of what happens next. War is not the only way to bring about regime change.

Are you now saying that this war is just and must be fought, but it'd be nice if someone ALSO tried a little diplomacy? — Olivier5

No. If you can't understand what I write, there's little point in explaining again.

One event preceding another would help. There being some plausible mechanism by which the former event brings about the latter would be good too. Some documents, speeches, photographs... — Isaac

Here is the problem: temporal correlation doesn't equate to causality (that's your initial objection, correlation is not causality), the concept of "mechanism" presupposes the notion of "causality" (so back to square one), some (how many?) documents, speeches, photographs can be considered causal factors only if one can prove that there is more than correlation between those factors and what ensued. So I'm asking you again: what would be the difference between causation and correlation in history and what would count as evidence of causality in history? Here is an example: NATO enlargement caused the war in Ukraine (you can choose any alternative example of historical causal explanation that you believe correct). Show me the evidence you have that there is causation and not just correlation. Until then for me you have no clue what you are talking about.

In your example, the Baltic States may have developed more open democracies because they joined NATO/EU, or they may have done because of their own internal political movements and joined NATO/EU as a consequence. — Isaac

In both cases they achieved that outside the sphere of Russian influence. Even in this scenario, it doesn't matter to me which is cause and which is consequence, the end status is still the same: those states estimated to benefit from joining the West more than from remaining under Russian influence.

If you cannot state your own opinion clearly, maybe it's because you have none.

So? Both were soviet systems. You said the system couldn't change. It did. — Isaac

Yes, if the leaders actually democratize, reform the system and not have the country lead by a dictator. The Baltic states did this. Russia didn't. Belarus didn't. And so on.

Right, so there's absolutely no justification behind neomac's claim about "generations" of abuse in future. Russian are perfectly capable and likely to change regime-type and approach to war. Other ex-soviet regimes have done so. There's therefore no reason whatsoever to assume that Donbas in Russian hands would yield "generations" of abuse. — Isaac

That regime change has to first happen. And that isn't easy. Otherwise, it doesn't look good. Do you know how long the insurgency lasted after WW2 in the Baltic States. And how long did the abuse afterwards of the Baltic people?

In a similar fashion there's no reason whatsoever to assume the North Koreans couldn't have a democracy and functioning society, just like the South Koreans as they all are Koreans. But for that to happen the regime in the north has to change. And so is in Russia. You simply cannot just treat Russia as totally similar to your own country. Putin Russia will not go down easily, but it surely is trying hard to go off a cliff.

Exactly. You're claiming with Azov that it can (and did) change it's attitudes within the space of a few years, yet you're claiming with the Russian army that the attitudes are systemic and unlikely to change. That's just hypocrisy. — Isaac

Hypocrisy?

A small battalion of volunteers that then were rearranged to a bigger unit with other units, which then was overrun and surrendered to Russians? And then this poster children of the media (thanks to Russia's nazi arguments) you compare to a whole armed forces organization?

That's simply ludicrous.

You have to understand that basically Russia is an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. Some countries, like Switzerland, can make it quite well as having ethnic minorities, but Russia is basically a country that has conquered these lands and people. And is desperately trying to do that now.

For this reason there has to be a huge regime change in Russia. What basically could do that is a disastrous war. That can lead in the best option for Russia to change. But then a lot should change.

You have to understand that basically Russia is an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. Some countries, like Switzerland, can make it quite well as having ethnic minorities, but Russia is basically a country that has conquered these lands and people. And is desperately trying to do that now. — ssu

I don't "have to understand" your preferred interpretation at all. You may desperately need me to, but that's your problem, not mine.

The way things seem to you to be is not the same as the way things actually are. That's why discussion platforms like this exist.

I'm pointing out the flaws in your position (the one opposing mine). If you don't want to hear them, or refine your arguments in response to them, then don't post your opinion on a public discussion forum expressly designed for that purpose. Write a blog.

Very interesting article in the NYT, linking Putin's support to Trump's fraudulous election ('Russiagate') to his goals in Ukraine.

... Putin’s assault on Ukraine and his attack on American democracy have until now been treated largely as two distinct story lines. Across the intervening years, Russia’s election meddling has been viewed essentially as a closed chapter in America’s political history — a perilous moment in which a foreign leader sought to set the United States against itself by exploiting and exacerbating its political divides.

Yet those two narratives came together that summer night at the Grand Havana Room. And the lesson of that meeting is that Putin’s American adventure might be best understood as advance payment for a geopolitical grail closer to home: a vassal Ukrainian state. ...

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/02/magazine/russiagate-paul-manafort-ukraine-war.html

So Trump was just another tool, another Putinista.

Add to that https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump%E2%80%93Ukraine_scandal

I'm just trying to show how ludicrous your ideas are. Of course that doesn't go through to you, but others might benefit.

I'm just trying to show how ludicrous your ideas are. Of course that doesn't go through to you, but others might benefit. — ssu

So you're trying to show how ludicrous my ideas are by insisting I "understand" yours? How's that work exactly?

Let me give it a try...

You have to understand that basically Russia isn't really an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. Some countries, like Switzerland, can make it quite well as having ethnic minorities, and although Russia is basically a country that has conquered these lands and people, it's not particularly desperate to do that now.

Hope that's helped everyone.

Oh, I nearly forgot. Here's a random image


So that's that settled.

When thinking about the Trump administration, one has to remember that:

a) There was Trump
b) There were the "Trump"-people,
c) There were others, that had nothing to do with Trumpism, but Trump picked them...and they stayed for a while, far longer than the pro-Russians like

(Not all in the Trump administration favoured Russia:)


Hence the influence of Paul Manafort (and others) was very brief.

Your just a troll, Isaac.

Trump didn't get away with everything he wanted, let's put it this way. He was still a Putin lapdog.

The Ukrainian government definitely exists, no one is denying it and there's no credible threat to their continued existence as a legislative body (despite the individuals therein being under personal threat) that would prevent them from making the decisions in question. — Isaac

Perhaps I should have underlined the word "Ukranian." You do not regard that government to be legitimate agents of those people or that they even exist. You say:

There's no such entity as 'the Ukrainians' to even ask. — Isaac

Whatever agreements made by that government would have to be accompanied by an acceptance by Russia that such a state exists. That is going to take far more than the grudging acceptance of Minsk II because invading the entire country put an end on Ukraine having sovereignty. It is absurd to think one could recognize a government but "fix" their leadership with "denazification."

You have to understand that basically Russia isn't really an imperialist nation trying to cling on to it's old colonies and conquered countries. — Isaac

Claiming this is the case is a form of denying the existence of the Ukranian state. When discussing Chechnya, you said this about their attempt at independence:

Is Russia entitled to any land at all? Or are we just going to say anything more than a shed outside Moscow is just rampant empire building? — Isaac

After adding up this subtraction of Ukranian identity to the views put forward by many here that the Ukranian state is merely a proxy for NATO powers, I resubmit the proposal that the thousands of comments on this thread mostly concern whether Ukraine is a nation represented by its present government.

Trump didn't get away with everything he wanted, let's put it this way. He was still a Putin lapdog. — Olivier5

This is one of those very peculiar and strange things in international politics and really interesting to find out what history will say about this.

At first Trump genuinely seemed like some kind of a sycophant to Putin. That obviously poised the question what the Russians had on Trump. But then again, this is Trump, the most bizarre US President there ever has been, who genuinely was a fanboy of leaders with dictatorial aspirations. Yet the ineptitude of Trump meant that this didn't have any kind of effect on the policies the Trump administration actually did. This ineptitude is forgotten: Trump's lack of genuine leadership skills meant that he was unable to create a cabal that would have gone through for example with an autocoup.

So for example, in the Helsinki-meeting between Trump and Putin Trump suggested a joint-venture to tackle cyberattacks (!), a proposal that was dead immediately. Not to forget the humiliation of Trump say he believed Putin more than his own intelligence services.

Yet Michael Flynn, the ex-national security advisor who urged Trump to use the military to seize ballot machines, was as the advisor for Trump only for 24 days. And this is the norm: the openly pro-Russia people in the Trump sphere were kicked off quite quickly.

Hence Trump basically gave only a scare to NATO, just as the Capitol attack and Trump's actions then did for Democrats.

Yet Trump still does matter. Even today in the war:

(Politico, Oct 11th 2022) The person who can end the war in Ukraine is Donald Trump, according to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking at a panel event in Berlin, Orbán said that peace talks should not be conducted between Ukraine and Russia, but between the U.S. and Russia, with Trump leading the negotiations on the American side.

Orbán said “the Ukrainians have endless resources because they get all that from the Americans,” arguing that only U.S. military support will allow Ukraine to continue to fight.

You do not regard that government to be legitimate agents of those people — Paine

Where have I said anything of that nature?

You say:

There's no such entity as 'the Ukrainians' to even ask. — Paine

That's right. There's no entity which one could justifiably ask about the 'right' apportionment of territory. One might as well ask hat-wearers, or Arsenal fans, or redheads... All perfectly identifiable groupings of people, none of whom (like 'Ukrainians') have any naturally occurring claim to some particular territory.

Whatever agreements made by that government would have to be accompanied by an acceptance by Russia that such a state exists. That is going to take far more than the grudging acceptance of Minsk II — Paine

Yes, considerably more.

invading the entire country put an end on Ukraine having sovereignty. — Paine

So invading Afghanistan, invading Iraq, invading Kosovo...these actions all put an end to the sovereignty of those places?

It is absurd to think one could recognize a government but "fix" their leadership with "denazification." — Paine

Why?

Claiming this is the case is a form of denying the existence of the Ukranian state. — Paine

What? Claiming Russia isn't imperialist is denying the existence of Ukraine? What the fuck are you on about?

After adding up this subtraction of Ukranian identity to the views put forward by many here that the Ukranian state is merely a proxy for NATO powers, I resubmit the proposal that the thousands of comments on this thread mostly concern whether Ukraine is a nation represented by its present government. — Paine

You can resubmit it all you like, it isn't a substitute for an actual argument. A Ukrainian government exists which is capable of making unilateral decisions about Ukrainian military action and diplomatic agreements. If you want to deny that, or claim others deny that, you're going to have to do a lot more than vague hand-waiving at some "adding up".

Isaac Your just a troll, Isaac. — ssu

That is a very insensitive thing to say you fucking biggot... the proper term is internet provocateur (provocateuse for females)

Ahhh shit... this whole Russai-Ukraine thing is getting old fast. I say let Europe burn.

A Ukrainian government exists which is capable of making unilateral decisions about Ukrainian military action and diplomatic agreements — Isaac

Yes, and the point I was making is that you and Russia don't consider it representative of the people who live there.

Putin's Russia went regressive, downhill.
Not really the best; all those nukes and Kinzhal don't help either, and at the fingertips of a creepy autocrat?
Having gone down that trajectory matters — we take it into consideration when making assessments, important people use it when making decisions.
All the bombing killing destroying shamming re-culturating really doesn't help.
I guess some don't want to get dragged along downhill, and some don't want to implicitly or explicitly assent to (reinforce/encourage/support) the regress.
Why would anyone jump onto a degenerative path/trend (toward an unknown future)?