TonesInDeepFreeze
"but no" — Lionino
TonesInDeepFreeze
Saying A→B is "if A then B" does not provide a solution to the matter of unambiguously converting A→B to English. — Lionino
TonesInDeepFreeze
"If A then B" is understood differently by different people in different contexts.
So any ambiguity in "It is not the case that if A then B" stems from "If A then B".
So specify what you mean by "If A then B", then you will have specified what you mean by "It is not the case that if A then B".
— TonesInDeepFreeze
Of course. — Lionino
TonesInDeepFreeze
Leontiskos
Elaborate. — Lionino
The English has to do with a relation between P and Q that transcends their discrete truth values. One way to see this is to note that an English speaker will be chastised if they use the phrase to represent a correlation that is neither causative nor indicative, but in the logic of material implication there is nothing at all wrong with this. — Leontiskos
Passing to another kind? What kind? — Lionino
Further, I am of the opinion that speech about contradictions is always a form of metabasis eis allo genos. Even in English when we say, "If you make that claim you will be contradicting yourself," we are shifting between two different registers: first-order claims and second-order rules of discourse (i.e. Thou shalt not contradict thyself). — Leontiskos
javi2541997
It's acting as a tool to make clear what it is we are doing with our sentences. — Banno
Leontiskos
It's a mistake to think that there are laws of logic that have complete generality - and must be obeyed in all circumstances.
...
Logic sets up systems in which some things can be said and others are ruled out, but natural language is far broader than that, allowing for the breach of any such rule. — Banno
Tarskian
But for the natural speaker what is lacking is a relation between the two things. — Leontiskos
javi2541997
javi2541997
TonesInDeepFreeze
Banno
...if what Aristotle does in Metaphysics IV is correct, then there is a logical law that cannot be breached, namely the law of non-contradiction. — Leontiskos
Since Aristotle, the assumption that consistency is a requirement for truth, validity, meaning, and rationality, has gone largely unchallenged. Modern investigations into dialetheism, in pressing the possibility of inconsistent theories that are nevertheless meaningful, valid, rational, and true, call that assumption into question. If consistency does turn out to be a necessary condition for any of these notions, dialetheism prompts us to articulate why; just by pushing philosophers to find arguments for what previously were undisputed beliefs it renders a valuable service... And if consistency turns out not to be an essential requirement for all theories, then the way is open for the rational exploration of areas in philosophy and the sciences that have traditionally been closed off. — Dialetheism, SEP
TonesInDeepFreeze
TonesInDeepFreeze
TonesInDeepFreeze
TonesInDeepFreeze
After the semantic contention, a syntactic contention:
"If X, then Y" is incorrect.
"If X, Y" or "X, therefore Y", not both. — Lionino
TonesInDeepFreeze
That is actually the main difference between classical logic and mathematical logic. — Tarskian
javi2541997
Not following you here - there is more to clarity, and to logic, than just syntax. — Banno
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