If that should be the case, I still believe that a definition of ontological naturalism, must necessarily include causality explicitly.

This was your definition:

[...] naturalism is best understood as the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are [...] 'not essentially mental entities'. — Bartricks

One could say in addition that naturalism starts from only one ontological genus and excludes all other genus. This one genus would be nature. So there would be only species of the one nature. Corporeality would be one kind and mentality another. But in order to know this, namely that both are species of the genus nature, they must be able to mutually interact causally. Otherwise one of the elements, like the mental, would be extra-worldly, hence extra-natural.

And something is real for me if it can do something, that is, exercise causality. — spirit-salamander

I had forgotten to say here that it is not only about the exercise of causality, but also about the undergoing of causality. So to act and to be acted upon.

As my Oppy quote above shows, the concept of naturalism definitely has to do with causality. And this seems to be mainstream, which is not to say that your explanation is wrong.

You're not completely wrong, since, as I said, it's philosophically controversial. So, your point is certainly worth discussing.

"I think, therefore I am" Is a formal logical necessity — Qmeri

This is controversial in the philosophy debate. Descartes himself did not consider the "Therefore I am" as a logical conclusion.

@Herg @T Clark

I found something that everyone could be happy with:

"There is a widely accepted distinction between ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. Ontological naturalists maintain, roughly, that natural reality exhausts causal reality: there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal powers. Methodological naturalists maintain, roughly, that well-established science is our touchstone for identifying the denizens of causal reality: we have no reason to believe in causal entities and causal powers beyond those recognised by science." (Graham Oppy - Naturalism and Religion: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation)

This is not an absolute proof for the simple reason that we can't ever prove that we have understood our proofs correctly. — Qmeri

I think it is not so much a proof but rather the result of some reasoning steps.

ps. I trust logic and science very much, but I'm just criticizing the idea of an absolute proof — Qmeri

Since the "I think, therefore I am" is neither scientific nor merely logical, it is a philosophical realization or insight, which one either accepts or not with good reasons. Nietzsche, as is well known, criticized that the experience of thinking, which was also indubitable for him, does not necessarily have to presuppose a subject.

Here is a model of time that I find quite convincing, by the German philosopher Gerold Prauss from his paper The Problem of Time in Kant. In: Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck. Edited by Predrag Cicovacki. I hope the loose arrangement of the quotation snippets is understandable:

*Drawing as the sketching of a line is in fact nothing other than a certain extension of pigment. For the geometrician it is, nonetheless, the depiction of an ideal geometrical object in the sense that a line as an ideal geometrical object is different from extended pigment in the same way that an ideal geometrical point is different from a dot.*

*I assume this in order to construct or generate an ideal geometrical object that is an intermediate between point and line. If the dynamic generation or construction of an ideal geometrical line can, indeed, be depicted as an extension of an ideal geometrical point, then I pose the question: When I carry out this operation on a blackboard by means of a piece of chalk and a sponge, what does it lead to? With a piece of chalk in one hand, in one motion I undertake to do what I do when I draw an ideal geometrical line; with the sponge in the other hand I immediately follow behind the piece of chalk, so that all that remains is the drawing of an ideal geometrical point and that it never becomes a drawing of an ideal geometrical line.*

*The answer must come out to the following: what I thereby draw and depict is an ideal object, just as it is an ideal geometrical point or an ideal geometrical line that I generate or construct. But this ideal object is neither an ideal geometrical point nor an ideal geometrical line in the abovementioned sense. For this ideal object is neither a point in contradistinction to a line, nor a line in contradistinction to a point. As an intermediate between the two, it is in a sense both of them. As the process of its construction shows, this ideal object is nevertheless a possible object; as such, it is like an ideal point and an ideal line existent in the geometrical sense.*

*For a spatial onedimensional line cannot at all arise by these means. Furthermore, from this process no other possibility can arise but to pay attention to the drawing itself. And for this reason no other ability is required which one person has and others may not. This operationalization leads furthermore to an objectivization of precisely that which we actually gain as an ideal object when we only pay attention to the drawing itself, namely that ideal intermediate between point and line.*

*He for whom obtaining this model of time by means of a piece of chalk, a sponge, and a blackboard is not sufficiently precise, can generate it for himself in an absolute and exact way by means of a simple postulate. It involves no contradiction to posit the following: let us assume the dynamic generation of an ideal geometrical line in one motion by means of the dynamic extension of an ideal geometrical point. Such an extension would fix a direction of this extension as well as the direction opposite to it. Since such an extension is contingent, we can also allow the following assumption: let such an extension take place in one motion, so that—at the same time—precisely as much extension arises in one direction as vanishes in the opposite direction. This postulate leads absolutely and exactly to the same result of an ideal geometrical intermediate between point and line, as does the time-model discussed in the text.*

*The ideal object that has the structure of time exists only while I set the piece of chalk and the sponge in motion in the above-mentioned way and continuously keep them in motion; that is, it exists only while there is this sort of motion. If there is no such motion, there is also no ideal object as a model for time.*

*Only the chalk that is being continuously rubbed off belongs to the drawing of my model of time, and not the piece of chalk, or the sponge, or the blackboard. They are only the means for the depiction of this model of time. It can now even be imagined that we have a transparent blackboard, so that I can manage to depict this model of time from the opposite side. It can also be imagined that this blackboard is transparent only in the sense that the chalk being rubbed off is visible, and not the piece of chalk or the sponge. In that case, everyone who is not aware how this motion is produced, must take it for the relative external motion of a chalk-point; everyone must take it as something identical that is in motion across the blackboard and, with reference to this blackboard, as something moving, and vice versa.*

*Yet everyone who is properly informed can take this motion only for what it is: for the constant coming into existence and ceasing to exist of a continually new chalk-point. This point, however, is precisely not something identical in motion across the board and thereby also not something moving against that board. Nor is it the other way around: the blackboard is not moving against the point. It is exactly through this, however, that this motion continuously becomes a sign of the very peculiar motion of that ideal intermediate of point and line, or point and extension. If this very peculiar motion cannot be a relative external motion, this can in a positive sense only mean that it must be an absolute internal motion. It is that point which possesses extension only inside itself, and therewith this complete dynamism of something as motion.*

*What appears in this process is, again and again, just one single point and never a still further point, and thus also never yet another point. And nothing is changed by the fact that this point constantly has extension in itself, through that absolute inner motion of its auto-extension.*

Here is a short summary of Prauss' theory of time:

Inspired by Gerold Prauss, Cord Friebe speaks of time as “extended in a point”, however. I find this an intriguing notion, worthy of closer attention. On the one hand, it seems to capture an important truth. Take my drawing a line on the blackboard. The result is a line of chalk extended in space but with no visible temporality. Only during my action of drawing it is there a perceived time sequence, instantly becoming lost at each and every moment of its proceeding. (Truls Wyller - Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism)

It may solve the problem of consciousness theoretically but will it be true and how can that be demonstrated? — Tom Storm

It would be as you say merely theoretical, that is non-empirical, philosophical from almost pure concepts. The question is whether or not you are persuaded by it argumentatively. But I was only concerned here with the understanding of naturalistic. And this understanding could indeed be purely theoretical.

@Bartricks

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism. — Bartricks

Or do you mean that idealism is opposed to naturalism? Because the idealist sees himself as immaterialist, but the panpsychist sees himself as materialist and thus naturalist.

We seem to distinguish between things on the basis of their actualities rather than on the basis of their potentialities. Aquinas thought the other way around.

I find Plotinus more convincing than Aquinas.

God is pure potentiality for Plotinus. Pure actuality would be the Nous, which is nevertheless composed according to Plotinus criteria:

"Plotinus denies sentience, self-awareness or any other action (ergon) to the One (τὸ Ἕν, to En; V.6.6). Rather, if we insist on describing it further, we must call the One a sheer potentiality (dynamis) without which nothing could exist. (III.8.10) As Plotinus explains in both places and elsewhere (e.g. V.6.3), it is impossible for the One to be Being or a self-aware Creator God." (Wikipedia on Plotinus)

And:

"We turn from the One to the second element of the Plotinian trinity, Intellect (nous). Like Aristotle’s God, Intellect is pure activity, and cannot think of anything outside itself, since this would involve potentiality. [...] Despite the identity of the thinker and the thought, the multiplicity of the Ideas means that Intellect does not possess the total simplicity which belongs to the One. Indeed, it is this complexity of Intellect that convinced Plotinus that there must be something else prior to it and superior to it. For, he believed, every form of complexity must ultimately depend on something totally simple." (Anthony Kenny - Ancient Philosophy)

This is a good starting point. Because you can see from these definitions that they do not give a criterion for how I can distinguish the natural from the supernatural or unnatural. But that is what matters. One needs a precise criterion.

No, it carves things up correctly, for if the ultimate constituents of reality are minds, then immaterialism is true - and that's not a form of naturalism. — Bartricks

I think the panpsychist would disagree with that. Because:

"Panpsychists believe that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. An increasing number of philosophers and even some neuroscientists are coming around to the idea that it may be our best hope for solving the problem of consciousness.
[...]
Firstly, panpsychists tend not to think that literally everything is conscious. They believe that the fundamental constituents of the physical world are conscious, but they need not believe that every random arrangement of conscious particles results in something that is conscious in its own right." (Philip Goff - Galileo’s Error)

Okay, you may be right in that I am taking something for granted that is not so the case in philosophy.

Nevertheless, I find your definition of naturalism also unsatisfactory, since the ultimate constituents of reality might be mental entities. Keyword panpsychism.

That can't be correct, for that would mean that immaterialism - a view that is as far from naturalism as it is possible to be - would turn out to be a form of naturalism (which makes a mockery of the term). — Bartricks

Maybe it's just a kind of definitional game, but I would distinguish materialism, physicalism, and naturalism, with naturalism being the most general view. That is, immaterialism is only in opposition to materialism, but not in one to physicalism and naturalism.

Naturalism is best understood as the view that the ultimate constituents of reality are extra-mental entities. — Bartricks

Especially the mental entities could be the real ones. Here I am inspired by Galen Strawson:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htZR7ryJEqE

Galen Strawson says that all that is real is the physical. I modify that to mean that everything that is real is the natural. And something is real for me if it can do something, that is, exercise causality.

Aquinas thinks it's self evident that material things are contingent and something necessary is needed and it must be spiritual and unextended — Gregory

Exactly

I guess I'll add that Aquinas held the idea of simplicity vs corporality very close to his heart. Without this distinction his arguments fails. — Gregory

Since Aquinas thinks neoplatonically, he excludes from the outset that something extended can exist in itself. Kant thinks in principle the same way (transcendental aesthetics). Trendelenburg argued that Kant's arguments in support of transcendental idealism ignored the possibility that space and time are both ideal and real. One could say something similar to Aquinas.

Monads, at least according to Kant's interpretation, are something extensionless with an extended effect. Therein I saw the similarity to the point particles.

He argued for God using the ontological arguments, which was best expressed by Descartes actually. — Gregory

Perhaps because of the nature of monads, he could not make a proof from motion, but had to resort to the ontological or modal-cosmological ones.

I described only extended particles towards the end of my original post, but there are also point-like particles in physics that have similarities to Leibnizian monads:

"A point particle (ideal particle or point-like particle, often spelled pointlike particle) is an idealization of particles heavily used in physics. Its defining feature is that it lacks spatial extension; being dimensionless, it does not take up space." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point_particle)

And:

"In summary, extended particles have a fixed size, although they may have a fuzzy edge; point-like particles are mathematical abstractions with zero size. But even zero-size particles have an extended effect, due to the effect of the field surrounding them." (https://www.fnal.gov/pub/today/archive/archive_2013/today13-02-15_NutshellReadMore.html)

So I would have to modify my conclusion like this:

The attempt to save Aquinas' proof by making it a composition argument fails. The supposed saviors want to say: parts compose (move) the whole and these parts are composed by further parts and this cannot go to infinity and must end with God. I say that this is refuted by holistic wholes or reductivistic fundamental particles or even point-like particles.

Here you can find the whole article
https://philpapers.org/archive/JONETO.pdf

Thanks for the tips. Most here seem somewhat "hostile" to the idea that consciousness or the mental might be related to a physical field in perhaps only a remote sense. To me, the connection of the two is forward-looking and promising.

I have found another paper on the subject here, from which I quote the abstract and the conclusion.

Mostyn W. Jones – Electromagnetic-Field Theories of Mind
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20, No. 11–12, 2013
Paper received October 2011; revised July 2013.



"Abstract: Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, and causality. They include Kohler, Libet, Popper, Lindahl, Arhem, Charman, Pockett, John, McFadden, Fingelkurts, Maxwell, and Jones. They’re classifiable as computationalist, reductionist, dualist, realist, interactionist, epiphenomenalist, globalist, and localist. However, they’ve never been analysed together as a whole, which hinders evaluations of them. This article tries to rectify this. It concludes that while field theories face challenges, they aren’t easily dismissed, for they draw on considerable evidence and may avoid serious problems in neuroscience concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, causality, and ontology."

"9. Conclusions

Standard neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing works. But it has problems explaining the mind’s qualia, unity, privacy, and causality this way. For example, it isn’t clear about why colours and other qualia are processed so similarly yet experienced so differently, how colour and shape information unite in visual processing, and how abstract information, concrete brain activities, and private experiences are causally and ontologically related given their radical differences.
Field theories of mind try to avoid such problems by turning from neurons to their fields. Here minds typically get their unity from the continuous nature of the fields generated by discrete neurons, while different qualia arise from different structures in the fields. These qualia are private (not publicly accessible) either because they’re non-physical or because they’re the underlying nature of fields (hidden behind what instruments and reflected light show). Mind–brain causality is (in the simplest field theories) just field–brain causality. Field theories offer new ontological approaches to dualism’s problematic causality and reductionism’s explanatory gap. Field theories face their own problems, but they’re progressively improving upon each other (see Table 1). These theories can’t be easily dismissed, for they’re based on considerable evidence and they offer powerful ways of dealing with standard neuroscience’s deepest problems."

My problem with Aquinas or the Thomist school is that I do not find its synthesis of emanationistic or Neoplatonic pantheism, of Late Jewish/Early Christian Abrahamic monotheism, and of Aristotelian metaphysics (with the unmoved mover thinking only of himself, who moves only as the beloved moves the lover) convincing. All these three constituents are on their own more convincing than that Thomistic synthesis.
Moreover, at important theoretical points, the Thomists always remain with a mere word explanation instead of a factual explanation, so that one does not know where one stands.
Since you read my quote-rich critique of the first way, do you find it valid?
If you google "spirit-salamander" and "blogger" you'll find my more comprehensive criticism.
At the very least, not knowing about Thomism is somewhat naive philosophically because it has always been one of the major schools of thought. I think in the 19th century Kantianism and Thomism fought each other for dominance in the humanities.

@Gregory @Metaphysician Undercover

Potentiality and actuality are at least useful words to describe change. In themselves, they are mere empty words that still need to be given meaning through philosophical reflection.
And many possibilities of interpretation could arise, even some that are perhaps no longer Aristotelian or Thomistic.

Zev Bechler, whom I quote briefly in my op, does indeed assume two kinds of potentiality.

The German philosopher Trendelenburg dealt with this topic:

"There is a problem, it seems, in ascribing such importance to Aristotle’s influence on Trendelenburg. For when he does comment on Aristotle’s explicit definition of motion, Trendelenburg explicitly rejects it. In Physics III,1 Aristotle had defined motion as “The actualization of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially.” (201a) Trendelenburg took issue with this definition in the Logische Untersuchungen on the grounds that the concepts of actuality and potentiality are less primitive than motion itself, and indeed need to be defined through it (I, 153). Potentiality made no sense, for example, unless it was understood as a direction toward something, and so as a motion." (Frederick C. Beiser - Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze)

There is a also distinction between "energy" as "potential" and "kinetic" made by physics. With "potential energy" only the "rest energy" is meant in contrast to the "kinetic energy". However, both are essentially an "actual" energy. So the actual "potential" energy can also be actualized.

One could perhaps also simply put movement as an incomprehensible axiom, or describe it with other words than potency or actuality.

What other approach would you advise? — Isaac

I think that if one is in the role of a philosopher, one should refrain from judgment, at least as far as the theoretical of science is concerned. If you leave this role and become a private person, then you are allowed to have your personal opinion about everything and it would not be wrong for you to go along with the scientific zeitgeist from a social point of view because of the resulting social acceptance.

Philosophers of science may mainly discuss merely among themselves. The normal scientist does not know so much what is going on, except what is said in his textbook, such as a few remarks on Popper.

My point was generally about the philosopher as such.

I don't know how philosophers of science relate to the fringe sciences. Or what they say about evolutionary psychology or climate research. Or what they say at all about current purely scientific debates. Are they biased there? It would not only be unphilosophical but also unscientific to follow the mainstream simply because it is mainstream. After all, today's mainstream can be tomorrow's nonsense.

Exactly, Paul Feyerabend even said that the older a tradition (and still in use) is like acupuncture the more truth value it should be given over anything new.

Intelligent design is a science? — jgill

The representatives of ID see themselves as scientific. There is an interview between ID proponent Wendy Wright and Richard Dawkins, in which Dawkins lists the scientific reasons for evolution. Wendy Wright replied that these are the reasons for ID.

If a philosopher wishes to engage in scientific speculation (philosophizing) they should learn the science. — jgill

My point was that the philosopher does not simply face the one unmistakable science, but he only sees many sciences that at least claim to be scientific and fight each other. For example, there is an alternative to cosmology or astrophysics. That would be the plasma cosmology or the theory of the electric universe. The representatives of it consider the mainstream as nonsensical. To be mainstream should not be a reason or value also for the philosopher either.

So something like a referee function (role) for the scientific community. That would be reasonable.

It appears to be that if "ought" cannot be got from "is," then morality "is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason." — tim wood

Hume seems to be warning us not to look in the wrong place for something that is not there in any case. If anything more, someone will kindly point it out. — tim wood

It is said that only if there is at least one ought in the premises, then the ought in the conclusion is justified.
My point was, one can extend this. Namely, that there merely has to be a will in the premise in order to get an ought in the conclusion. Because an ought is just a will from a different perspective.

But if there is neither ought nor will in the premise, there can be no ought in the conclusion.

Just take a look at "Aristotle's Revenge" by Feser. Seldom is seen such a waste of paper by someone so famous — Gregory

There is a review of this book by a certain Daniel H. Chew that comes to a similar conclusion:

"In conclusion, while Feser has in fact written a great apology for Aristotelianism for the modern world, Feser has failed to actually prove the necessity of Aristotelianism in science or indeed anywhere else. Far from the revenge of Aristotle, what we see are the quivering spasms of Aristotle’s corpse."

Check this website, you will see what are you missing about, I learned a lot since the last month I currently visiting it: Aristotle Syllogisms (Rules) — javi2541997

Thank you for the reference.

But my question would be whether every logically structured argument must have an Aristotelian structure to be valid?

Else how do you avoid the conclusion that I must do or act in some way to achieve all of my wants. And I have lots of wants I have no intention of acting on. — tim wood

Okay, this would be another premise, that there needs to be a strong interest in what is wanted. It must be such that the absence of it would be a negative thing to be avoided at all costs.

An interesting angle but I can think of scenarios where someone who can’t help themselves do something wants you to do it, and yet the ought is not binding. If you work as a teacher’s assistant and a classmate asks you to steal the exam answers and share them is that a binding ought? The classmate can’t accomplish this task so it seems to fit the bill. There are countless other scenarios. — khaled

I guess you have to commit to cases where it's a matter of life and death. Thus, the ought always becomes binding when the other person will soon die without immediate assistance from others.

The problem is when the person in question needs you to commit an evil. — khaled

I think the injured person's claim cannot go beyond their own injury.

But you're right, there are certainly cases where there could be tension.

@javi2541997

(1) a must (necessary condition) do x for y to happen.
(2) That y happens is something a wants.
The conclusion is then:
(3) So a must (normatively) do x for something to happen that a wants.

The must from (1) expresses only a necessary relation: y happens only if x is given. To this must a normative component is added in the conclusion through (2). And it is exactly this relation of will that makes this must a normative must, a must that concerns a and that is connected with a pressure to act.

One can quote Walter Kaufmann on Aquinas' proof of God from movement or causation to what you have said:

"What at first seemed to be a simple proof is in fact a world view in miniature, an image of the world projected onto half a page. Is it a proof of God's existence which, taken by itself, compels assent, quite independent of what we may think of Thomas' metaphysics or the remainder of his System? Definitely not." (Walter Kaufmann - Critique of Religion and Philosophy)

My criticism consists in part in allowing certain Aristotelian understandings to hold and yet declaring the proof invalid.

Thanks for the advice. Actually, I've already left a lot out. I have, of course, detached the quotes from their context, but incorporated them into my context. I wanted to do a comprehensive overall critique, after all.

Here is an explanatory passage to the proof that I should have included at the beginning. Feser says that the series always goes into the smaller. Nerve and muscle cells, molecules, atoms, elementary particles. An Aquinas quote should follow here:

Aquinas adds: "this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover." And he concludes: "Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God." [edit: I have now incorporated this into the main text]

To the Aristotle quotation on an accidentally ordered causal series there is an alternate translation:

"When something has moved a portion of water or air, and this in turn has moved another, then even when the initial impulse has ceased, it results in a similar sort of movement continuing up to a certain point, although the original mover is not present." (Filip Radovic - Aristotle on Prevision through Dreams)

To the ANTOINE COTE quote, it reads in full:

"The failure of Lamont's attempt is explained by the fact that he makes the proof of God's existence into a deductively valid composition argument only by begging the question with respect to the fundamental issue, namely, that the sum of all effects is really a group in need of a singular cause different from the causes of any of the effects of which it is the aggregate."

There, the point is that one wanted to save Aquinas' Ways by making a compositional argument out of them: Parts compose the whole and these parts are composed by further parts and this cannot go to infinity. I say that this is refuted by holistic wholes or fundamental particles.

But do you think the proof works with or without the composition argument?

The point of my criticism is that you will always end up with mundane primary movers, never with a God.

@180 Proof

There you go.

So let's wait and see what future research reveals.

Maybe you are right.

However, if the law of conservation of energy is violated in the process, is it so bad that this law is violated? Is the law really inviolable?