I don't understand the distinction you're making, RN. — Landru Guide Us

I am saying that people regularly make category errors when speaking about morality, by ignoring the grammatical implications of a point of view. By saying that your life is worth living "to you", you are clarifying which grammatical point of view you are referring to. What you are failing to do, insofar as I can see, is justifying why that should be the primary or only point of view by which it is appropriate to consider whether your life is worth living. The fact that it is an existential question is both obvious and uninteresting to me. It's irrelevant to what I'm trying to ask you about.

That was what the serious part of my remarks were meant to say. I fear the atheist Stalinist and the dictatorial Pope, and I tend to feel close to the meditative religious person and the atheist with an aesthetic or spiritual sense. — mcdoodle

I don't really see that as the particular dichotomy. The reason I personally identify (or not, as the case may be) with people are vast, and religious views are only one aspect of a person, which doesn't even come close to defining them for the good or ill. I just believe that in any given case, it is better for anyone to believe what it true rather than what is false, and I believe that those claims made by religion are largely false. I think that there's plenty more complexity if one wants to dig down, but no more complexity than that is needed. Truth is better than falsehood. Moreover, I believe that I am morally obliged to, within reason and where is appropriate, speak the truth as I know it, including regarding religion.

Whether a life is worth living is not empirical. It always means is my life worth living to me. Thus it is an existential question, which can only be determined by me examining my life. Thus if my life is not examined by me, it is not worth living. — Landru Guide Us

I like the way you frame this, but I think that you make an obvious oversight here. It is not just an existential question, but more specifically it is an entirely subjective question, which is the only reason that the "to me" element matters. Can we not also ask from my point of view if your life is worth living? Or from the point of view of society in general? When Socrates said "an unexamined life is not worth living", I think that is rightly interpreted as a general statement, not a personal existential statement. Is it inherently false because of that?

Surely, according to most currently held western moral formulations, an individual should have a significant say in the value of their own life, but is there a particular reason that we should assume that their say should be absolute or necessary?

I believe you are on a fool's errand here. — mcdoodle

I don't understand why attempting to disabuse someone of what I believe to be a false and personally and socially unhealthy belief would be any more of a fool's errand than you trying to disabuse me of taking that course, as you are doing here. What's the difference?

In short, I think God or gods are a stand-in for a different underlying problem, and an atheist yelling emotively at religious people isn't going to help what matters to me. — mcdoodle

I dislike that characterization. I don't believe I am "yelling emotively" in the argument I presented. I think I am emotively appealing to people's senses of fairness and empathy. Their "better angels", if you will. If you want to be fatalistic, and think that no believer ever changes their minds (that's what I'm hearing here), that's a sort of sad way to go, but that's up to you. I don't understand why you would want to try to impose that bleak view on anyone else though.

Is god real? Like lint? No. Is god real like Apollo? Sure. — Bitter Crank

There. Not so mysterious after all. A simple answer to a simple question.

Should believers in possession of a "hollow faith" be dismissed as fools? — Bitter Crank

I'm not sure where this comes from. Was anyone suggesting dismissing believers as fools?

Faith is real. But in the matter of the gods and their natures, they need not be taken as reliable sources of information about gods. — Bitter Crank

This is where you are mistaken. We can either approach god as imaginary (personal) or mythological (cultural). In either case, we can ascribe authority to sources of information. For the individual believer, there is no greater authority on what they conceive god to be but themselves. These beliefs are derived from a larger cultural body of information, which does resist absolute statements (like the field of literary studies does), but that still can be studied with some rigor (which is what theolologists do, if I rightly understand their field). In this case, I am primarily concerned with the personal beliefs, to which the individual believer is without a doubt the authority in.

They will claim to know ("God wants us to...") but they can't. No one can know about the gods, so we need not argue about it. — Bitter Crank

So people can make religious claims and only because they are religious claims they are exempt from having those claims criticized? That seems like a bad idea to have a special group of claims that are deeply emotionally held, but are immune from rational criticism. It seems like it might be an ideal environment for emotionally disturbed people to work themselves into a state where they commit irrational antisocial acts, because as long as their emotional fervor and irrationality is about that particular subject, no one criticizes it. But that's just a theory. I'm sure nothing like that would happen in real life.

You might find this intellectually lazy and slovenly too. so be it. I try to take religion and the gods as a serious cultural achievement of our species rather than a ridiculous hoax. i don't think god revealed himself to us, and then many believed. Man made god and then many believed. I used to believe in god, quite ardently. Getting from believer to dis-believer required a lot of effort--lots of long-standing beliefs had to be pitched overboard. — Bitter Crank

I do find it intellectually lazy, and I hope that as a part of a community that values intellectual rigor, that it matters to you. Don't take it personally. We're all intellectually lazy at times, and getting busted on it is what keeps us on our toes. I am also formally religious, and I didn't just wake up one day and say "this is bullshit!". I had a process where I moved from still having an emotional attachment to religion, then just the notion of spirituality, then to a more vague metaphysical conception of something absolute and mysterious, to where I am now, where I have shed those things. That process took decades, and I am not unsympathetic to the unpleasant cognitive dissonances that occur along the way, but I'm glad people pushed me at each step toward that dissonance, and I am happier today because of it.

I don't take religion to be either a cultural achievement, as that implies that it is a net positive,which I think it is not, nor to be a ridiculous hoax, which I think in only rare circumstances is this the case. I believe religion is a cultural extension of some of the intellectual and social limitations that are inherent in the human species, just as I believe that science is a cultural reaction to some of these same limitations.

I can't speak to the "average particle physicist's" degree of familiarity with philosophy. But I would not agree that our 'naive' beliefs about "trees falling in the forest" are merely cultural constructs. — John

I'm not sure how this distinction matters in the context of this particular subject. Do I have to once again protest that I am not a naive idealist? I'm really, really not, but I feel like the only reason to make this point is to disabuse me of such a position. Or are you trying to make some other point?

QM is not only science, it's one of our best scientific theories. Science is simply the social practice of using methodological naturalism to explain observed facts and to make useful predictions based on that explanation - an explanation better than the alternatives, not some perfect explanation. QM excels at both (though like all scientific theories it doesn't explain everything the weird properties of gravity for instance.)

QM has nothing to do with philosophy, though some of the facts that it explains, being the result of experiments peculiar to QM, potentially raise interesting philosophical questions about our experience of the world. But that would be the case whether we had the theory or not.

I'd go so far as to say that any philosophical claim that invokes QM is by definition askew and has fundamentally conflated science and philosophy. — Landru Guide Us

This comment seems off the mark to me. I am not proposing any philosophical claims that invoke QM, I am trying to discuss the relative merits of QM interpretations in terms of philosophy.

I would link such hubris to the industrialization of warfare and the impact this had upon the world, as well as the destruction of intellectual centers in Europe through the second world war and the appropriation of said intellect by an industrial power. — Moliere

To be fair, what sometimes passes for philosophy rightly gives philosophy a bad name, and I can't fault anyone who only has a passing knowledge of philosophy to believe it is all sophistry, mental masturbation and an attempt to get easy credits.

I wouldn't call a belief a bias -- but I would say that beliefs about what is are ontological beliefs. — Moliere

Then according to that formulation, I'm not referring to ontological beliefs, but to beliefs about ontology, which there is no indication that either of these people had, or that beliefs about ontology had any effect on their work. That's what I'm saying. One needn't have any particularly well thought out stance on the matter to have a motivation to make scientific discoveries, and I can't imagine a single reason why adopting a (to once again misappropriate Kant) deontological position should in any way effect those motivations.

I don't think of the "objective" as "a view from nowhere" but as an inter-subjective elimination of subjective (hypostatic) elements. Science ( ideally) reveals nature just as it appears to us when we suspend (as far as possible) our culturally received, pre-conceived notions of what it must be. — John

Aye, and there's the rub! With QM, the interaction between the observed and the observer are at least practically, and perhaps intrinsically, inextricable. I hope we can agree that to those without some footing in philosophy, the notion of objective reality (as it's historical and linguistic origins imply), refers not to a cultural construct, but to what happens to the tree falling in the forest, and that's the sort of belief that the average particle physicist is bring to the table? That's what they bring to QM, and that's how we get all of the interpretations that we do, that add claims and presuppositions about "objective reality" without questioning importance of the relationship between the observer and the observed.

Again, the only question I really have, is why isn't there a Daniel Dennett for QM? Isn't that what philosophers are supposed to do?

I would say that we can ascertain a person's philosophical views in the same manner we ascertain a philosophers views -- by reading what they wrote and interpreting it. This is obviously not free of error and fallabalistic, but that's different from saying we can't do it at all. — Moliere

That's my point. Neither spoke specifically about ontology vs. epistemology to my knowledge. Anything else would be psychologizing. Just as you can't extrapolate that I have a theistic view if I say "bless you" when someone sneezes, you can't extrapolate if someone has an ontological bias because they say something is or isn't or exists. In both cases, it's just people correctly practicing a language tradition.

I don't think that Newtonian principles are everyday by any stretch of the imagination. If they were then they would have been found much sooner.

I think that Aristotle's physics actually gets close to a reasonable phenomenology of the everyday natural world, but I'd also hedge that and say I doubt that his is a universal phenomenology but is more culturally embedded. — Moliere

Sure, if that works better for you. It was an analogy, and because you can effectively criticize it, it shows that it worked insofar as you understand the analogy I was trying to make.

Also, on the latter -- what are epistemological stances about, to your mind? — Moliere

Whatever they're about. Epistemological stances about QM are about QM. Epistemological stances about rocks are about rocks. Either you take me for a naive idealist, which I most assuredly am not, or I don't understand your question.

To my mind one is committed to an ontology the moment they state how things are. There is something confusing in the question "How are things, really?" I'd agree. In specific, "are" seems to already denote existence -- which is a reasonable interpretation of "reality", clearly related to "really".

To speak of observations is to have something which is also observed -- there may be an interplay between the two, by all means, but that doesn't eliminate the observed. And, at a minimum, it seems that the world is at least populated by observations -- a bit abstruse, but a possibility -- which would mean that we're still committed to some kind of existence in speaking in this manner. — Moliere

Again, I'm not an idealist. It is very simple. Some explanations have the same predictive power as others. Adding unneeded ontological commitments to explanations lack parsimony. The more parsimonious the explanation, the more preferable. Ontological commitments are at best, a philosophical distraction.

Believed in or not, God is a great mystery and difficult to explain. But then, so are homo sapiens difficult to explain and mysterious. — Bitter Crank

Sorry Bitter Crank, but this is one of the most intellectually lazy sentences I've read in some time. Lint is a great mystery. Stuff is a great mystery. Life is a great mystery. You know why? Because through either laziness or an emotional attachment to the idea of mystery, which is a great intellectual leveling of the playing field, where morons are equal to geniuses, people refuse to speak clearly, ask clear questions or seek clarity in any form. Care to join me in the camp of seeking clarity?

Is the testimony of believers actually reliable in providing information about God? Why do non-believers assume that believers actually know something about God? Do you (nonbelievers) think that believers have a pipeline to the truth which you can not have? — Bitter Crank

Would the answers to these question be mysterious, or even mildly controversial, if the subject were bigfoot? If you claim to know enough to believe in a god, then you have reasons to hold those beliefs. They're either good reasons or they're not, right?

Believers have no more knowledge about God than non-believers. They think they do, because they have been on hand to hear all sorts of preaching. But, you know, it wasn't God who was doing the preaching. It was just one more devious homo sapiens who was doing the talking.

You don't like some, many, most, or all of the features which you have heard ascribed to God. Fine. What makes you think any of that is true? Jews, Christians, and Moslems know no more about God than you atheists do.

You are quite free to imagine God as you like. — Bitter Crank

You know that the notion of god didn't come from nowhere, right? So if we agree that all the religions have no special access to any divine knowledge or understanding (I think that's what you're saying, right?), but we can historically track that the notion of god is a cultural one that spreads only through cultural institutions like religions, then what do you think you believe in, and why would you call it god, which is a historically religious term?

The problem is that the emotional/conceptual distinction is a bit of a red-herring (the difference you are really talking about is between talking about God in terms of whether God exists or talking about God in terms of whether we ought to believe God exists). All the "emotional" arguments are conceptual in the sense that they make promises accusations on which danger and desire are dependent. Your argument there, for example, is working in the idea God is immoral and because of that, it immoral to worship God. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, there is a distinction between emotive arguments and intellectual arguments. I am not saying that it is immoral to worship an immoral god, I am saying that if god is as purported, he's an asshole, and it's fucked up to worship an asshole. I am not playing at objectivity, I'm trying to avoid it. I'm making it personal. That's the distinction between an emotive argument and an intellectual argument about emotions.

This doesn't prevent me from being a Christian, just from accepting orthodoxy. — Landru Guide Us

So do you believe in and worship a dickish god? Or do you reject all traditional claims about god exempting it's existence? Or is there a third option that I'm not seeing?

Can you reasonably mix appeals to 'fairness' with 'emotiveness'? — mcdoodle

Appeals to fairness are usually emotive. Try giving a candy to one 5 year old, but not to his twin brother, and I promise you, you will hear a very emotive appeal to fairness. Why are we outraged (an emotive response) about the rich "1%", or the lobbying power of corporations? We perceive their level of influence as unfair. "Those fuckers!" we think. Can you reasonably expect appeals to fairness not to be emotive?

I find most people do not critically examine the beliefs they purportedly hold, religious or otherwise. Much less are they even capable of stating clearly what said beliefs are. In other words, there is no weighing of evidence, whereby religious conviction appears as the caboose to a train of reasoning. People's beliefs rather hover about in their mental space like a fog, which makes it impossible to separate them out for logical scrutiny. The apologists who try to make arguments and debate with people are a very tiny minority of religious people and to the average believer serve merely as a tool to avoid critical thinking and to maintain the illusion of credibility. — Thorongil

This is exactly my point. I personally believe that I have a moral responsibility to conduct my discussion in a manner that is consistent with good logic, evidence and sound reasoning, so for that reason, it is not acceptable to intentionally present an argument that is solely emotive, like "going to church is boring and it sucks to follow someone else's rules", but if people, as a rule, aren't particularly rational, then it would be ludicrous to think that proposing a particular rational argument would be persuasive. That's the point of presenting an argument that isn't strictly rational, but that is still consistent with good reasoning.

To the extent that everyone worships something, everyone is religious, and there are two kinds of religious person in the world: the ietsist and the mystic. The masses, no matter their professed religion or lack thereof, belong to the former. — Thorongil

I don't know that everyone worships something to some extent, unless you want to use the term "worship" in an exceptionally flexible sense. I certainly don't worship anything in the traditional sense.

Believers will retort with a common appeal to ignorance: "God's way are not our ways." So what seems unfair to you may in fact not be in reality and in the grand scheme of God's plans. This, of course, immediately strikes one as a cop out and leaves a fairly bitter taste in one's mouth. — Thorongil

I'd rather discover what believers will say by hearing what believers actually have to say. I was hoping there might be a few around to chime in.

Is there actually a good reason to think that science does not deal with such an "objective reality"? — John

It depends on what you mean. The notion of objectivity is a useful fiction, where we imagine that there is such a thing as a point of view that doesn't have a point of view (or shares all imaginable points of view). The model that makes most sense to me is that when we speak about a shared observation, that there is something that causes that observation to be shared, consistent and coherent (what we often talk about as the thing in itself). Logically, all I can do though is refer to that as a model. Anything else is making assumptions without evidence, or creating entities that are of no explanatory value.

Einstein's work is the perfect example. It was built on thought experiments in addition to scientific arguments -- it drove at the nature of reality.

QM, for that matter, was also interested in the nature of reality -- in the physics of the atom and how it really behaved. It was not interested or motivated by a desire to have a set of useful tools for predicting observations.

The speed theory of heat vs. phlogiston was motivated by questions about the nature of reality.

Natural selection is similar.

They were interested in reality -- at the very least, if they believed otherwise, in the reality of nature if not the fundamental constituents of reality -- and not in merely developing statements which could predict observations. — Moliere

Well, I think you're making a leap to imagine that we can say anything about the philosophical leanings of Einstein or Darwin in terms of an ontological vs. epistemological debate (maybe Einstein said something that could reasonably be interpreted to be about the subject, but I'd bet dimes to donuts that Darwin didn't even come close).

It doesn't matter though. Just as most people think about the everyday physics of the world in terms of Newtonian principles, and no engineer would use quantum mechanics to design a bridge, when we speak normally, we take ontological stances rather than epistemological ones. It would be to cumbersome to say "according to the most current accepted understandings of gender, and to the best of my knowledge, I am a male", I can just skip all the things we take for granted and express it in an ontological way and say "I am a man". I assume that Darwin, et al speak, and largely think the same way as most people do, and ascribe to a not particularly well considered, but generally useful form of pragmatic ontology. The problem is, the same way that QM doesn't lend itself to building bridges, it also doesn't lend itself to being coherently spoken about using traditional ontological terms. So in a nutshell, I don't think that there's an inherent need for an ontological stance to have the same project as someone who says they want to know how thing "really are", you are just speaking more concisely if you say you are trying to find the most useful way to model our observations.

It would be interesting if philosophers were to write more about the ontology of QM, I must admit. But then, if I understand you correctly, that would cross the line that you're proposing -- since ontology should have no part in science. — Moliere

I don't think I'm proposing a strict line. I'm just pointing out the apparent lack of any philosophical voice making positive propositions in this area of QM interpretation, and saying that I'm a little troubled by it.

So it seems to me that if we are so strictly opposed to ontology, then much of what we consider scientific breakthroughs would have been denied before they got started. — Moliere

I can't imagine the possibility of even one, so I think you mean something different from me. Could you give me a "for instance", so I can see where we are diverging?

An emotional argument stems from emotions, not logic. — darthbarracuda

That's not how I'm using the term. I am using it to describe an argument who's primary appeal is emotional, regardless of the origins of the argument. Besides, there's no reason that an argument that stems from emotions can't be logically consistent. That's a false dichotomy.

To me it sounds like you're describing what has been playfully termed "Shut up and calculate" :) — Moliere

I guess sort of. I think what I am saying, to misappropriate Kant, is do "deontologize" science, and then take a step further, and quote Wittgenstien, but in reference to phil of sci, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.".

So you think your argument can convince a theist to become an atheist? Why do you think an argument can facilitate this conversion, as opposed to life experiences, etc.? — Agustino

People do change their minds. Arguments do persuade people. Why not this one on this subject?

Added on edit: I don't imagine that my argument will counter a lifetime of experiences. I imagine that most people with a lifetime of experiences will have discovered a number of things such as that there are cases where they previously believed something and found later that they were mistaken, or that the common wisdom on a matter ended up being false, or that things passed down from previous generations were not always of value, or that deeply held emotional beliefs can cause people to make bad decisions and act in ways that are destructive. I think that if people already recognize these things, and also are willing to enter an open discussion of how religion relates to these experiences, this might be one compelling argument.

I think that this problem straddles the line in a similar manner to consciousness. That's probably why people put the two together so frequently, even if they have nothing (so it seems to me) to do with one another. — Moliere

But on questions of consciousness, the most influential voices are Searle, Dennett and other philosophers. On quantum mechanics, it seems to be Niels Bohr, who gets granted the honor simply because he was the first to ascribe an interpretation (if my history is right). That's exactly the difference I'm taking about.

If what I am describing sounds like the Copenhagen interpretation, then either I drastically misunderstand the Copenhagen interpretation, or you misunderstand me. From Wikipedia:
"A wave function represents the state of the system".

This, to me at least, seems to imply an ontological stance. My point is that science has no business taking ontological stances, but should rather be engaged in offering the most useful explanations and explanatory models. In my formulation it would be "a wave function is the best description of our observations at a quantum level". Not quite as pithy, granted, but logically more concise.

I'm not sure if that's possible. — darthbarracuda

Care to elaborate on that? Clearly I think it's possible, which is why I made the argument. What specifically would make it impossible? Are you suggesting that it is not conceptually possible? If so, on what grounds? Or is it that it's just such a herculean task as to be unlikely to be accomplished? If so, describe how my attempt fails, so that I may try to better my attempt.

I just sought to make the point that most atheists are atheists due to emotional motives, so they don't really need an "emotional argument", which is what you seek to provide :) — Agustino

Why would I try to argue atheism to atheists? The argument is directed at theists, and more specifically, as darthbarracuda rightly points to, at the modern western theists one is likely to encounter either on the internet on in north america.

I am such an atheist Reformed Nihilist. But I despise atheists generally, because intellectually they are very shallow, just like S. Harris, R. Dawkins, etc. — Agustino

You're welcome to your opinions on those guys, but I don't see what it has to do with my thread. I never mentioned Harris, Dawkins, nor any specific intellectual pro-athiest arguments. It sounds like you have an axe to grind, but maybe you want to create your own thread describing your problems with New Atheism to express your problems with it.

In which case, so what? So what if the commonly-accepted form of god is showing him as benevolent? That doesn't change the fact that this god would be malignant! — darthbarracuda

All my atheism is, in practice, is a critical analytical response to the commonly held and culturally prevalent espousal of gods. If there's someone that wants to espouse on the existence and benefits of worshiping a dickish god, you are correct that this argument doesn't address their claims. Should they weigh in, my response will be different. My project here isn't to make a logical argument disproving the possibility of any god, it is to make an emotive argument, that doesn't suffer from logical inconsistencies, that might be persuasive.

He was clearly a kind man, and that is one of the highest compliments that I know to pay. He made a difference to me, and I feel sorrow for those who were closest to him.

Not to mention that this does not actually argue against the existence of god, it just shows that this god would be a dick. — darthbarracuda

It does actually argue against the the most commonly espoused modern notions of god, which ascribe god as benevolent. I agree that it doesn't address the ancient notions of capricious gods like the Greeks or Norse, but I don't find myself proselytized to by those believers. If they want in on this discussion, I'll address that when it occurs.

Is there anything immoral with saying that my happiness is more important than your happiness? — darthbarracuda

The question presupposes objective morality. I see morality as inter-subjective and negotiated. Given that, the answer is that I can't see anything wrong with you feeling that your happiness is more important to you than mine is (and vice versa), so long as we can both agree upon guidelines by which to resolve conflicts that occur when your desires are at odds with mine. You know, things like "do unto others", "sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me", or more formally like constitutions and legislation.

No need to do this. Most atheists already disbelieve God for emotional reasons, which are merely masked under elaborative arguments, which, however, ultimately lack rigour. — Agustino

I'm not quite sure at how you would justify the generalization about "most atheists" (I'm unaware of any studies indicating this), but I'll assume you meant "most atheists I've encountered". Given that, I would ask that you take me at my word that I don't believe religious claims because they don't make sense to me, and that the only "emotional" reason is that I have an emotional preference for believing things that make sense to me. Fair enough?

Nope, most of them already had the conclusions prior to seeing the things; that's the sad and unfortunate aspect of it. — Agustino

Again, I don't know how you suppose to be an expert on the hidden motivations of most atheists, but can you imagine that it's possible that at least one atheist on this planet can believe something different than you concerning the existence of a god, and that they, or more specifically, I, arrive at that conclusion in good faith? Do you not believe that reasonable and rational people can arrive at contradictory conclusions in good faith?

No - you will, if you are like most atheists, have believed something because you didn't want God to exist, not because you had ample evidence that he didn't. — Agustino

Again, if you can grant me the courtesy of assuming I am not lying about my motives or beliefs, the point stands even if I am the only atheist in existence that honestly believes that it makes most sense to believe that there are no gods or supernaturality.

It doesn't even matter, because even if I were to grant that my belief were irrational and emotive (which I only grant for argument's sake), I would have been created as an emotive and irrational creature, thereby still arriving at my conclusions emotively , irrationally, but still honestly and in good faith, as emotive and irrational would be my "god-given" nature.