And the other thing is that Socrates himself mentions the word "belief" quite a few times, and not always in a negative sense. So, clearly, not all beliefs are "shameful".

That looks like degrees of knowledge, not of truth. — Banno

But truth depends on our knowledge of it. And the OP title says "understanding of reality." So it seems to imply knowledge or perception. Otherwise, how do we know it is there?

Plato says that 'in believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”' — Wayfarer

I think that to label all beliefs "shameful" is an unwarranted exaggeration. Surely, not all beliefs are equal in terms of objective validity, moral and practical value, etc.

Also, there is a very large number of things about which we know very little and about which we hold beliefs or opinions until we learn more about them.

In other words, holding beliefs is an unavoidable fact of life. Unexamined, irrational or morally questionable beliefs may indeed be "shameful", but certainly not beliefs in general?

Not so much a hierarchy of truth. Isn't something either true or false? — Banno

You could think of it this way. There is a truth in the sense of a set of, say, scientific or political facts.

Now the uneducated have some knowledge of that truth, the educated have more, and the highly educated have most of it.

But a small elite group of specialists or experts know all of it. The latter group hold the "absolute" truth.

This can also apply in terms of time and space. If a truth is truth over a larger area of time and space than all others then it would qualify as "absolute" in relation to them because it is less conditional upon time and space than other truths (or than other versions of itself).

So you are setting "absolute truth" up to mean things that are true at every given time, as opposed to things that are true only at given times, and things that are true by necessity? — Banno

Well, when we say "absolute" it presumably means more complete or less conditional.

So, if you were to take a hierarchy of truths that are less and less conditional and more and more complete in ascending order, then the "absolute" truth would be at the top.

But then the title also says "absolute, objective understanding of reality".

It seems a bit of a mystery to be honest. Unless he/she means the truth we perceive or hold after having a certain unspecified quantity of Absolute Vodka .... :smile:

Quite possibly, "absolute truth" is a "continuously held truth", i.e. a truth that is always held to be a truth.

The question is, how long do we need to hold that truth for it to become "absolute"?

We usually speak of right or wrong, rathe than true of false, actions. — Banno

Correct. But that would be in terms of moral value. Whereas the truth of an action would refer to the action taking place. That's why I said it depends on what @Cidat means by "truth".

I think it depends on what you mean by "truth". Truth tends to change if the relation between the factors that constitute the truth change.

For example, the truth of not robbing a bank may be valid today. But tomorrow, if you desperately need the money, then tomorrow's truth may override today's. And if the day after tomorrow you find yourself in jail, then that truth may override tomorrow's truth, and so on.

I think something similar applies to our understanding of objective reality.

Sure. That is where opinions diverge.

I agree that Plato's arguments are not particularly strong. However, according to scholars, his dialogues are simply dramatized discussions addressing certain philosophical issues that were addressed within the Academy. In which case, the arguments need not be watertight as their main function is to point to the issues discussed as a basis for further inquiry and discussion. Hence the impression of "aporia" one may get when reading the dialogues.

For example, in the Phaedo, Plato wishes to discuss or test his theories of Forms and Recollection and the arguments (and sub-arguments) and conclusions in the dialogue may not be final if the discussion of those topics within the Academy is intended to be ongoing.

It is for this reason that I believe we should not read too much into the dialogues. But nor should we ignore the Platonist tradition whose interpretation of the corpus does not seem to be entirely unfounded.

I don't have an infallible argument at all. In fact, it makes no difference to me either way.

I just think that when reading a dialogue we should try to understand its propositions, arguments, and conclusions within Plato's own framework.

Of course, dialogues may have several layers of meaning in which case it would seem indicated to start with the prima facie meaning and then look into other possibilities.

Presumably, Plato is trying to convey a message. If so, a working hypothesis assuming that everything he writes is just "myths" and "lies," would seem to undermine all efforts to extract anything meaningful from the text.

I tend to believe that some form of bias is natural, as @180 Proof says.

This may be (a) bias against the different and (b) bias against the unknown.

If so, then racism is possibly an extreme form of it, depending on how it is defined?

But I am a bit dubious about the claim that "evolution favors diversity" (@Cheshire).

Diversity may play a prominent role in the animal kingdom in general, but less so within a particular species.

For example, there seems to be no great diversity among elephants, lions, or wolves.

Also, it seems that more successful species, like humans, tend to wipe out less successful ones.

So, I could be wrong, but something doesn't seem right somewhere ....

Every part of that argument is wrong — Gregory

Well, you can always email Plato and suggest he write another dialogue. Ideally in 21st-century English or in Mandarin, as the case may be.

Perhaps he can also explain that there is no "shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'" :smile:

The passage in question says this:

Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonized?”
“I do not understand,” said Simmias.
“Would it not,” said Socrates, “be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonized and to a less extent?”
“Certainly.”
“Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?”
“Not in the least,” said he. (93a – b)

1. A harmony is by nature a harmony according to the degree to which it is harmonized.

2. If it is harmonized more fully and to a greater extent, it is more completely a harmony and a greater harmony, and if it is harmonized less fully and to a lesser extent, it is less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony.

3. But a soul cannot even in the slightest degree be either more or less completely, or to a greater or lesser extent, a soul than another.

4. It follows that a soul cannot be said to be like a harmony.

The other distinction is that whereas in the case of the harmony, the lyre precedes the harmony, in the case of the soul, the soul precedes the body.

In fact, the body cannot exist without the soul as the soul is said to be that which imparts life to the body:

“Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?”
“Certainly,” he said. (105d)

The harmony theory is refuted whereas the recollection theory implying the pre-existence and immortality of the soul, stands, i.e., it is accepted as valid in the dialogue.

It follows that the soul is immortal.

There is no need for the arguments in the dialogue to "hold up to rigorous logical examination".

If the arguments are accepted as valid in the dialogue, it is incorrect to claim that they are not.

Readers should not deliberately select imprecise or incorrect translations for the purpose of reading things into them.

Readers should subject their own claims to the same rigorous logical examination to which they subject the dialogue.

If the reading of a dialogue involves or leads to radical skepticism, nihilism, sophistry, evidence-free assumptions, text manipulation and misconstruction, and irrational speculation, then there must be something wrong with the reader.

The correct translation of 93b is:

Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D93b

The obvious point is that a soul cannot be more or less of a soul than another soul. Therefore a soul is not comparable to a harmony.

This is precisely why the harmony theory is rejected.

The Forms are obviously discussed in the dialogue, but Socrates and Simmias agree on the Forms.

What they disagree on is the nature of soul and whether Simmias' theory of harmony that compares the soul with a harmony is correct.

Socrates and Simmias agree that the theory is an unexamined one that has not been demonstrated and that the theory of recollection which implies that the soul is immortal, is the correct one.

Simmias says:

The argument about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. Because it was said [at 76e - 77a] I think that it is certain that our soul existed even before it entered a body as that there exists in its own right the being that bears the label "what it is". And I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both sufficient and correct grounds (92d e).

The discussion finally ends at 94e -95a:

Do you suppose that, when he [Homer] wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?”
“By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think.”

“Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves.”
“That is true,” said he.

They are not taking Homer as their authority but Homer AND themselves, i.e. the strength of their own argument.

And 94e does not say "the body's desire or anger" but the body's "conditions" or "affections" τα πᾰθήμᾰτᾰ τοῦ σώμᾰτος ta pathimata tou somatos. In other words, the soul is not led or ruled by the conditions undergone by the body.

For this reason, it is agreed (1) that the soul cannot be compared to a harmony, (2) that the theory of recollection is correct, and (3) that the soul is immortal.

The immortality of the soul is reaffirmed at 105e:

In that case, soul is immortal.
Yes, immortal.
Very well, he said. Should we say that this has been proved? What do you think?
Yes, and most sufficiently, Socrates.

And at 114d:

... since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so, it is both fitting and worth the risk - for fair is the risk - to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places [in the other world] ... Anyhow, these are the reasons why a man should be confident about his own soul ...

The discussion ends with the conclusion that the soul is immortal, is incapable of death and destruction, and "retreats" to the other world (Hades) at the death of the body.

Correct. I think humans are very ingenious creatures that are extremely good at setting rules and then constructing mechanisms that enable them to circumvent those rules with no feeling of guilt or wrongdoing whatsoever.

To be consistent, exceptions may be allowed when we have no choice, but when we do, we have a moral (and/or religious) duty to act responsibly and make the right choices.

It definitely is not about universals at all. And another question (at 93b) is the fact that a harmony can be greater or lesser, whereas a soul cannot be any more or less soul than other souls. Which conclusively demolishes the harmony theory. But maybe Fooloso4 is reading a different translation.

Some of them wouldn't even kill a mosquito, but they have no problem with eating cows, pigs, chicken, etc. They believe they can buy meat at the supermarket, and that this way, they are in no way participating in the industry of killing animals and meat production. — baker

That's an interesting point. Apparently, according to the Dalai Lama,

Some Buddhist texts say that it is not permissible to eat any meat, but others, including the Abhidharma-Kosa, say it is permissible to eat meat on the condition that the animal was not slaughtered specifically for the person who eats it.

Is It Permissible For Buddhists To Eat Meat?

Obviously, when eating meat is unavoidable, there isn't much one can do. But I think that when your behavior affects human lives, the issue acquires a different perspective. If people and governments boycott say, Germany or South Africa for their state policies, I can see no reason why this shouldn't apply to China. It may well be the case that it isn't going to work, but from an ethical point of view, at least we try to do something to redress an unacceptable situation.

Much of Thomas Aquinas' writing is dialectical in form. The emphasis on 'salvation by faith alone' came with Protestant fideism. — Wayfarer

Correct. I think Aquinas is a very good example of how Christianity faithfully preserved Plato’s core teachings for many centuries. Although some seek to argue that Christianity represents a distortion of Plato (as well as of Judaism), this is contradicted by the objective examination of historical facts.

As Lloyd Gerson has pointed out, if you were to ask any moderately well-educated person in antiquity what the goal of life is according to the teachings of Plato, they would answer “to become godlike as far as possible”.

Becoming a godlike immortal had long been a feature of Greek mythology which abounded in the offspring of Gods and mortals. Among these we find Hercules, himself the son of Zeus, who had joined the Gods in Olympus after death.

Among philosophers like Pythagoras, this became the goal or telos of philosophical life. Plato and Socrates were merely prominent propagators of this tradition.

Thus Socrates says:

Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the Gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise (Theaetetus 176a – b).

That this was an actual Platonic teaching is suggested among other things by the fact that the desire to become godlike is found in King Phillip II of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great who had been instructed in philosophy by Plato’s pupil Aristotle. Phillip had already announced his wish to be treated as godlike or isotheos. Alexander himself followed in his father’s steps and declared himself a God: following his conquest of Egypt, he adopted the pharaonic title of “Son of God Re” and became “Son of Zeus” to the Greeks.

Aristotle’s political theory that regarded the ideal king as a paternal ruler likened to Father Zeus, blended with the metaphysical theory of the philosophers and became part of Greek and later Roman culture.

By the time of Jesus, the political concept of the ruler as a deity as well as the philosophical goal of the deification of man was well-established. Unsurprisingly, the latter appears as a central teaching of the Christian Gospels:

“But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God” (John 1:12).
“He called them gods, unto whom the word of God came” (John 10:35).
“The people who are right with God will shine like the sun in their Father's kingdom” (Matthew 13: 43).
“So try to be like God, because you are his own dear children” (Ephesians 5:1).

Christianity, especially in the east, preserved the political and administrative system of the Roman Empire and the emperor, though not a deity, remained a sacred representative of divine authority on earth. But Christianity also preserved Graeco-Roman culture with particular emphasis on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which represented the highest intellectual achievement of the classical era. Plato’s Academy at Athens continued to function till 529 CE and philosophy was taught at the Catechetical School of Alexandria and at the University of Constantinople (from 425 CE to 1453 CE).

The Platonic concept of deification or theosis remained central to the teachings of the Greek Orthodox Church as can be seen from the writings of lead theologians and scholars like Maximos the Confessor (580 – 662 CE):

The soul’s salvation is the consummation of faith (cf. 1 Pet. 1:9). This consummation is the revelation of what has been believed. Revelation is the inexpressible interpenetration of the believer with the object of belief and takes place according to each believer’s degree of faith (cf. Rom. 12:6). Through that interpenetration the believer finally returns to his origin. This return is the fulfilment of desire. Fulfilment of desire is ever-active repose in the object of desire. Such repose is eternal uninterrupted enjoyment of this object. Enjoyment of this kind entails participation in supra-natural divine realities. This participation consists in the participant becoming like that in which he participates. Such likeness involves, so far as this is possible, an identity with respect to energy between the participant and that in which he participates by virtue of the likeness. This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints. Deification, briefly, is the encompassing and fulfilment of all times and ages, and of all that exists in either. This encompassing and fulfilment is the union, in the person granted salvation, of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation. This union presupposes a transcending of all that by nature is essentially limited by an origin and a consummation. Such transcendence is effected by the almighty and more than powerful energy of god, acting in a direct and infinite manner in the person found worthy of this transcendence. The action of this divine energy bestows a more than ineffable pleasure and joy on him in whom the unutterable and unfathomable union with the divine is accomplished. This, in the nature of things, cannot be perceived, conceived or expressed.

– St Maximos the Confessor, Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice

What emerges from this is a process of faithful preservation of Platonic teachings rather than “distortion,” and Aquinas as a philosopher and theologian who accords great importance to the concept of deification, is a prime example and representative of this process.

If anything, the “distortion” is the work of Protestantism which has inspired and fuelled the anti-Platonist movement that emerged in the 1800’s and 1900’s.

By the way, Fraenkel sounds like an interesting author. “Philosophical Religion From Plato To Spinoza” would definitely be my kind of book. I think people tend to forget the close historical and intellectual links between religion and philosophy and regard them as mutually incompatible fields, which in my view is a mistake.

The dialectic is the intimation of the worth of time. — Gary M Washburn

The worth of time is highly important in more than one sense. In Ancient Greek tradition, the souls of the departed go to the other world which is ruled by Cronus, the God of Time. Whilst ordinary souls are reborn after some time, the perfected ones are divine and enjoy eternal life in paradise.

But Socrates demonstrates, by the argument we've been discussing, that this idea, "that the soul is a harmony" is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Simmias himself acknowledges that his theory, though "held by many", has not been demonstrated and he discards it in favor of recollection and immortality:

“Well,” said he, “there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?”

“The former, decidedly, Socrates,” he replied. “For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists (92c – d).

Plus, as already stated, the soul being a special case, no comparison is perfect. And, when making comparisons, we must consider not only similarities but differences:

When making comparisons it is useful to see not only similarities but differences. Socratic philosophy proceeds by rational inquiry, by the critical examination of opinion, that is, dialectic. — Fooloso4

And it should be obvious to everyone that there are more differences than similarities between the soul and the harmony of a musical instrument.

If, one day, we explain the mechanisms that make us perceive as "I", we won't have explained anything, because we will stll totally miss the exclusive experience of each of us that is impossible to communicate. — Angelo

But the fact that it is impossible to communicate does not necessarily mean that there is no common element in that experience that all conscious beings share.

You may have a point there, depending on how mediated or distorted the experience is, which is probably hard to tell in cases of severe psychological disorder. But my guess is that so long as an individual is conscious there must be a basic awareness of existing on the background of which all other experiences take place. And that basic awareness may help us find an answer to the question as to how we understand the self.

It's called leading by example, raising awareness and having consistent morals. — Benkei

Sounds like a good enough example to me. And, who knows, maybe with a bit of luck it will someday snowball into a proper movement, put pressure on governments, etc., and then we can see some action.

How about a "China Resistance Day" to mark the birth of the movement?

BTW, I think we shouldn't forget Tibetans. They have as much human rights as the Uighurs and it might motivate more people to join.

But, it does show that the self is not always in charge, and many forms of breakdown do show aspects of ego consciousness and the fragility of the self for some individuals. — Jack Cummins

However, even a "fragile" self is and therefore is still a self.

The self is grounded in the experience of being. The pure experience of being is always there.

The core of the self, the experience of being, is changeless and indestructible, and not "fragile" at all.

What changes is the stuff that is other than the experience of being, and that one identifies with like an actor identifying with the characters he impersonates in different plays.

The fragile bit is that part of us that is capable of change, in the same way the physical body may suffer an illness or even the loss of a limb without however this in any way affecting the core of who we are.

So, it is all a question of who or what one identifies with. I think this is what Jung meant when he was talking about mandalas as a device for refocusing or re-centering your psychological system and reintegrating it with that inner awareness of being as the core of your self. And, presumably, some forms of meditation work in a similar way.

There is an expression in Plato's dialogues which I read of recently, but I can't recall what it is or bring it to mind. It's an expression about the status of sensable things - that they neither truly are, nor are not, but are a kind of mixture of being and becoming. Do you happen to recall that term? — Wayfarer

Do you mean "expression" or "term"? The Republic has τὰ διπλάσια ta diplasia, “the double or ambiguous things” from διπλάσιος diplasios, “twofold” (Rep 479b - d).

The fact that the sensibles partake of opposite properties including being and not-being makes them imperfect appearances as opposed to the perfect Forms.

I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena. — Wayfarer

The Republic says:

… but their very existence (to einai) and essence (ousia) is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence (ousia) in dignity and surpassing power (509b)

The text has ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας epekeina tes ousias “beyond essence”. The later Platonist term is ὑπερούσιος hyperousios “above being”.

I don't think that the Good is not essence/being in the literal sense. It may be that the Good is the only true essence because all essences are just specific determinations of the Good, in the same way particulars are specific manifestations of the Forms to which the properties or attributes of the particulars properly belong.

The main idea is that the Good transcends all other essences. The later Platonist term ὑπερούσιος hyperousios “above being”, is used in precisely this sense, not “not being” in the sense of “non-existent”. What is meant to be expressed by the term is the transcendence of the Good or God: the Good or God is "above and beyond" everything else.

The saints neither know the whole of God’s purpose with regard to every object or scriptural text, nor on the other hand do they write down once and for all everything that they do know. This is because in the first place God is beyond comprehension, and His wisdom is not limited in such a way that an angel or man can grasp it in its entirety. As St John Chrysostom says with regard to a certain point of scriptural exegesis, we say about it as much as should be said at the moment, but God, in addition to what we say, knows other unfathomable meanings as well. And, in the second place, because of men’s incapacity and weakness it is not good for even the saints themselves to say all that they know, for they might speak at too great a length, thus making themselves offensive or unintelligible because of the confusion in their reader’s mind.

- St Peter of Damaskos, Book II, Twenty-Four Discourses, XXIII, Holy Scripture

Again, no Christian would infer from the unknowability of God's purpose with regard to every object that God's purpose (or God himself) doesn't exist and that the question whether we are acting prudently cannot be answered.

Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework. — Wayfarer

St Gregory Palamas writes:

God’s essence is entirely unnameable since it is also completely incomprehensible. Therefore we name it on the basis of all its energies, although with respect to the essence itself none of those names means anything different from any other. For by each name and in all names together nothing other is named except that which is hidden and whose real identity is unknown to all

– St Gregory Palamas, Topics of Natural and Theological Science and on the Moral and Ascetic Life: One Hundred And Fifty Texts

But this not the same as what is being implied here about the Good.

The claim that is being made is that:

1. According to Socrates, "in order to act prudently, one must see the Good. But the Good is not seen, not knowable, and is not. Therefore, whether one is acting prudently, remains an open question that cannot be answered."

2. "The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher."

But, obviously, we cannot live an “examined life” when neither the Gods, nor the Forms, nor even the Good or any other standards of reference exist, or are otherwise "not knowable and not seen", and when "the question of whether one is acting prudently cannot be answered."

In contrast, though Platonists and Christians refer to God or the One as "unnameable" and "incomprehensible" or "unknowable," they do know whether they do or do not act prudently.

This is why the immaterial soul is prior to the material body. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is made crystal clear by the text and ought to be beyond dispute.

Unfortunately, Fooloso4 has a long history of making claims for which either (1) he presents no evidence or (2) which are positively contradicted by the evidence. Which is not surprising as he is a self-declared follower of Leo Strauss whose musings about Plato are pseudo-scientific gobbledygook.

When pressed, he offers two kinds of answer, either (1) that the evidence is there but only “careful” readers like himself can see it or (2) that the issue “has already been discussed or addressed” and there is nothing further to say.

I think we have seen where his theories lead to. He fails to understand that to say (a) “the sirens sing or chant to Odysseus in order to charm, spellbind or put a spell on him” as in Xenophon (Mem. 2.6.11), is totally different from saying (b) “the mother sings or chants to her child in order to soothe it” or, as in the Phaedo, “one must sing or chant to oneself in order to soothe or comfort oneself (with knowledge of the immortality of soul and afterlife).”

The same applies to statements like "the argument that the soul is a harmony means that the fate of a particular soul is tied to the fate of a particular body."

Among other things, this totally ignores the fact that the soul is "tied to the fate of a particular body" only so long as the soul inhabits the body, after which it returns to the world of the Forms with which the soul has much more in common than with physical bodies.

The dialogue clearly states, and scholars have long acknowledged, that the soul here is a special case for the simple reason that it is a life-imparting thing that necessarily participates in the Form of Life (cf. 79b) and that therefore any analogy with snow or anything else apart from soul itself is necessarily an imperfect analogy.

But, of course, when people latch on to irrelevant or imagined details to which they accord disproportionate importance, then we enter the realm of never-ending labyrinths from where there is no easy way out ... :smile:

Is it really an "idea" though? I'd say that in most cases it is more like a sense, feeling, or experience.

Of course, the "self" can be conceptualized and philosophized about but it is the experience of identity, of what we are and what belongs to us, that is at the bottom of it.

Would you happen to know if any of these women wrote about the importance of family and childcare and community? — Athena

Well, the family unit was regarded as absolutely central to Ancient Greek society, and women philosophers were no exception.

“The central images in Diotima’s teachings on love are pregnancy and birth. She tells us, according to Socrates, that love is a longing for immortality and that this longing is expressed through a desire to pro create. Those whose desire to procreate is of the body take a woman as the object of their love and raise a family to gain immortality.”

Among women engaged in philosophy, it appears that most were married.

“That women actually participated in philosophic activity comes as a surprise to many. But Gilles Menage (1984, 3) in the eighteenth century names sixty-five women philosophers in the Hellenistic age alone.”

In “Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle,” Kathleen Wider “examines women philosophers in the Greek world primarily from the sixth through the third centuries B.C., with a focus on women philosophers during the late pre-Classical period of Greek history (sixth century), the Classical period (fifth-fourth centuries), and during the early stages of the Hellenistic world (late fourth-third centuries).”

“Although precise dates for the women Pythagoreans are unknown, we do know that some of them flourished in the sixth and early fifth centuries B.C. These include Theano, believed to be the wife of Pythagoras and the most famous of these women, as well as Myia, Damo, and Arignote who were probably daughters of Theano and Pythagoras.

Arete was the head of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy after her father Aristippus died in 350. Hipparchia flourished around 328 and is known for the fact that she abandoned a life of wealth and ease to marry Crates and live the simple life of a Cynic. Little is known about Pamphile except that she was a disciple of Theophrastus who headed the Lyceum after Aristotle.”

“The Pythagoreans saw the family as well as the city as a microcosm of the universe and the order and harmony of the universe was to be reflected in the city and family. Women were given an important place in Pythagorean thought and society because they were an important part of the family and were a necessary component in achieving order and harmony within it. Each person within the family was to perform her/his role well and keep her/his place assign ed by nature. The place of woman turns out to be the traditional one of wife and mother, subordinate to and submissive to her husband, but a woman can perform this role well only if her intelligence is developed.”

“Plato had women disciples and Socrates refers to his women teachers … The Stoic Diodorus Cronus who was active about 315-284 had five daughters who were logicians: Menexene, Argeia, Theognis, Artemisia, and Pantacleia.”

Women Philosophers in the Ancient Greek World: Donning the Mantle - JSTOR

Maybe it wouldn't be too bad an idea to start a thread on the subject?

I tend to be kind of dubious about the system serving as an incentive for producing "better" posts. There must be other ways of doing that. And if the poll has only collected 30 votes, this may indicate that there is no great interest in it anyway (unless there isn't a great deal of active members :smile:). So, I would vote to turn it off.

Determining "what kind of Platonist you are" seems to be part of the problem.

According to some, Socrates had his own "philosophy" that is to be carefully distinguished from that of Plato who, apparently, somehow "distorted" Socrates' teachings and whose own teachings were in turn "distorted" by later Platonists, etc.

At the same time, we cannot know for certain what Socrates taught aside from the patent fact that he asked questions and that, apparently, "he knew that he knew nothing" - which, admittedly, isn't much help.

Even the question as to whether Plato himself was a Platonist has been raised in some quarters.

This being so, it seems advisable to read the dialogues not as "Platonists" or "anti-Platonists" but as impartial and objective observers after which, each reader can draw out his own conclusions or construct his own dialogue as the case may be. And at that point, the dialectic ends and monologue takes over ....

How can we explain the existence and development of life at all? — Jack Cummins

Good question. I think that intelligence might be the key to the answer. Living beings distinguish themselves from inanimate objects through the fact that they possess intelligence, and humans distinguish themselves from other living beings through possessing a higher intelligence than others.

The existence of a hierarchy of intelligences from the most rudimentary to the most advanced not only raises the possibility that there are intelligences that are higher than ours, but also that the universe is designed to either create intelligence or to manifest intelligence, in other words the universe and what we call life may have an intelligent cause.

I think that, as intelligent beings, our first and foremost belief should be in intelligence, that is, in that within us that defines us as intelligent beings. However, because, as stated above, there is a possibility if not probability that the universe has an intelligent cause, it stands to reason for us as intelligences to try to find out what that cause is. This is what scientific research already does in its own way and there is no reason why we shouldn’t do our own research into intelligence, i.e., into who or what we are.

Intelligence goes hand in hand with knowledge or information. Restricting knowledge or information would amount to restricting intelligence, i.e., restricting ourselves, which would be contrary to what we are as intelligent beings. Therefore, there should be no limit to acquiring knowledge or expanding our intelligence and this is why there should be no limit to philosophical inquiry into metaphysical realities or the ultimate cause of all things.

Being “too curious” may well be a symptom of psychological disorder or lead to one. And there is no doubt that certain conditions involve excessive curiosity, trying to see or read meaning into everything, etc. But this is exactly why we are equipped with reason. Reason is our safety cord that keeps us attached to reality so that we don’t lose our way on our intellectual and spiritual journeys and that prevents us from ending up somewhere from where there is no return to reality, or where we don't want to be.

Therefore, intelligence should be subject to no restrictions other than itself in the form of reason, which is also the filter through which we assess information and determine which direction the expansion of our intelligence should take.

I think dialectic is a strange and elusive thing that can mean different things to different people. Sometimes it may be difficult to agree on a definition of it, let alone on the terms on which it is to be conducted. Participants may or may not play a straight bat, etc.

What ought to be certain, though, is that as a minimum requirement when considering the dialogues two rules should be observed, viz. (1) to keep as close to the original text as possible (and in this case it is possible if there is a will to do so) and not insert things that are not there, and (2) to read Plato within his own framework.

For example, if we say, “Yes, the immortality of the soul has been proved and accepted as fact in the dialogue but we don’t need to accept that,” then we abandon Plato’s work and construct our own. In which case we might as well write a dialogue from scratch and not concern ourselves with Plato.
So, I think it all depends on what the "dialectic" is supposed to achieve. Are we discussing what a dialogue is saying, or what we would like it to say?

:grin: Well, life and human psychology can be complex at times. There isn't much we can do about it.

We exported Marxism to Russia and the Russians exported it to China.

Russian Marxism failed and the Russians had to revert to capitalism.

China learned the lesson from Russia and introduced state capitalism controlled by the Marxist leadership and built on Western cash and technology.

Now China is rising and the West declining.

What lessons will the West learn and when? This is the question!

The key concept is μέθεξις methexis, participation or sharing in the Forms:

Things exist by virtue of their participating in their distinctive being or Form (Phaedo 101c).

The soul being that which imparts life to the body (105c), it necessarily participates in the Form of Life.

The soul necessarily participating in the Form of Life, it is necessarily deathless.

Being necessarily deathless, the soul cannot die, it must retreat or be destroyed.

Being necessarily deathless and therefore indestructible, the soul cannot be destroyed, it can only retreat.

Ergo, the soul retreats away from the body and to the other world (Hades).

This is the inescapable conclusion.

Likewise, there is a very clear need to assume that there is something which causes an organism to be organized. That's the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. The soul is that which imparts life to the body in the first place (105c - d). Without the soul there would be no body.