The Philokalia tradition has an interesting history. Greek philosophy had long been the dominant philosophical system in Greece and, later, in the Roman Empire. Its prestige was such that all educated (and even some uneducated) men and women wanted to be associated with it. This went so far as for wealthy Roman citizens to have portraits or statues made of themselves wearing philosophers’ robes to enhance their status in the public eye.

Inevitably, unprincipled individuals styled themselves “philosophers” and purported to teach “secret doctrines” or “higher truths” in exchange for cash. To distinguish themselves from such individuals, Christian leaders, who incidentally also wore philosophers’ robes (as does Jesus in early iconography), decided to call their system “philokalia” (“love of the beautiful”) instead of the more traditional “philosophia” (“love of wisdom”).

This was in reference to the Christian aspiration to moral and spiritual perfection that was to be attained through the love of the beautiful as a revelation of Truth, in contradistinction to what was regarded as the more worldly wisdom of mainstream philosophy.

The Philokalia itself began as a collection of ascetic and mystical texts compiled in the 300’s AD and it became central to the contemplative tradition within Orthodox Christianity down the centuries.

When the secularizing tendencies of Western Europe began to penetrate the Orthodox space in the 1700’s, the leaders of the monastic orders of Mount Athos resolved to launch a counteroffensive by compiling and disseminating the various texts bequeathed by the spiritual masters of the tradition which by then amounted to many volumes. This compilation was published in 1782 under the title of “The Philokalia of the Neptic (Watchful) Saints by means of which the intellect (nous) is purified, illumined, and made perfect”.

In addition to its title, there are numerous references in the compiled texts to spiritual illumination or “enlightenment” which parallel those of the “Psalms of Illumination” or “Photagogica Hymns” of the modern Byzantine Rite and other prayers:

The more the heart becomes purified, the more the intellect becomes enlightened. The more the intellect is purified, the more the heart shines. Intellect and heart must unite and travel together on the road of the Jesus Prayer* (Philokalia Vol. 1, p. 196, #188).

The Prayer purifies the clouds and fog which wicked thoughts create. And when it is cleansed, the divine light of Jesus cannot but shine in it, unless we are puffed up with self-esteem and delusion, and so are deprived of Jesus’ help (p. 193, #175).

Truly blessed is the man whose mind and heart are as closely attached to the Jesus Prayer as air to the body and flame to the wax. The sun rising over the earth creates the daylight; and the venerable and holy name of Lord Jesus, shining continually in the mind, gives birth to countless intellections radiant as the sun (p. 197).

Enlighten my eyes, O Lord my God, lest I sleep the sleep of death; lest my enemies say: “I prevailed over him” (Ps. 13:3).

Send out, Lord, your light and your truth; let them lead me to your holy mountain, to the place where you dwell (Ps. 43:3).
For with you is the fountain of life; in your light we see light. For you are the fountain of life, the light by which we see (Ps. 36:9).

As the Gospel also says:

I am the light of the world. Whoever follows me will never walk in darkness, but will have the light (John 8:12)
Therefore, if your whole body is full of light, and no part of it dark, it will be just as full of light as when a lamp shines its light on you (Luke 11:36)
Believe in the light while you have the light, so that you may become children of light (John 12:36)

We can see that Christian spirituality is right here, in front of our own eyes, at least for those who, as the Gospel says, have “eyes to see and ears to hear”. And what can be easier to see than light?

These few passages are more than enough to reveal the core of a veritable spirituality of illumination based on the multiple function of light as a guide on the path, as an opener of eyes, as a purifying, darkness-dispelling, and enlightening force, and as the salvific and life-bestowing light of Truth which is the goal of all spiritual endeavour, all in one.

In all these cases, the force that performs these functions is consciousness or intelligence itself, the source of all knowledge and all truth. This is why in the Western tradition, intelligence or nous which is the soul’s faculty of intuition, insight, illumination, contemplation, and transcendence, plays a central role in the enlightenment process.

And because that intelligence (a) shares the nature of divine Intelligence, (b) is within us, and therefore (c) we literally are, “the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in us” (1 Cor. 3:16), there really is nowhere to go in search of light. It follows that the true, spiritual “East” as the source of light is not a geographical location, but a place outside time and space, where the Sun of Reality or “Light of the World” shines eternally, and that is at once in us and beyond us but never far from us “in some distant and exotic land”.

This I believe to be the inescapable conclusion that honest inquiry into comparative religion leads to. The individual who has genuinely found even a scintilla of light in the East cannot fail to see the light that he has left behind in the West and which he now knows to be shining always and everywhere. For if beauty is found everywhere, the light by which beauty is seen must be present everywhere even more. As for the source of that beauty and that light, what can we say that can be expressed in words, heard by the ear, or grasped by the mind? And who can understand except those who are able to understand?

On a different level, another thing which I believe to be important in understanding Eastern Christianity and the Philokalia tradition is to have some knowledge of its invaluable musical and artistic heritage. Without a personal visit to remote monasteries, hermitages and retreats, this small Bulgarian, Greek, Syriac, Armenian, and Russian sample cannot but convey some idea, at least as far as this is possible from sources in the public domain:

Megaloschemos II (Bulgarian Orthodox Hymn) - YouTube

Kabarnos - Agios O Theos (Greek) - YouTube

Aramaic rendition of Lord’s Prayer in honor of Pope Francis - YouTube

Komitas Vardapet: Patarag, Armenian Divine Liturgy - YouTube

Jesus Prayer (Russian) - Female Choir - YouTube

Byzantine chant - Δεύτε λαοί - YouTube

Though the music of the Eastern Church may at first seem to have an "alien" ring to it, it is essential to bear in mind that, as St Augustine says, the songs of the Western Church (as represented, for example, by Gregorian chants) originated in the East.

*The Jesus Prayer in English translation is "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me” which is repeated mentally as a device for disengaging the mind from other thoughts and focusing it on an higher reality. In Greek, this is often shortened to “Kyrie eleison” (“Lord have mercy”) and is used as such as a liturgical formula in the liturgy of all Christian denominations.

Again, it can be seen that spiritual content is present everywhere in Christianity, if we only know how to see it - and if we take the time to look. In any case, the spiritual progression in the tradition entails a “practical”, “natural”, and “theological” stage. The practical is the development of virtues (aretai), the natural is the attainment of detachment or dispassion (apatheia), and the theological is the attainment of knowledge (gnosis), all of which clearly follows a similar pattern to those of other enlightenment traditions.

So, though each tradition understandably likes to assert its own superiority over others, the reality is that, in practice, they tend to have much in common.

That’s a totally unacceptable misrepresentation of what Aristotle is saying.

He is NOT saying that it is a view held a long time ago. He says it is an ancient tradition that has come down from distant ancestors to his own day:

The common name, too, which has been handed down from our distant ancestors even to our own day, seems to show that they conceived of it in the fashion which we have been expressing (De Caelo 270b15-20)

It is a long-established and at the time still current view which agrees with his own as expressed a few lines previously:

If then there is, as there certainly is, anything divine, what we have just said about the primary bodily substance was well said. The mere evidence of the senses is enough to convince us of this, at least with human certainty (270b10-15).

Ether and its etymological derivation of which Aristotle approves, indisputably occur in Plato’s Cratylus:

The word ether (aither) I understand in this way: because it always runs and flows about the air (ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέον), it may properly be called “aeitheera” (Cratylus 410b).

And in the Epinomis:

The bodies, then, being five, we must name them as fire, water, and thirdly air, earth fourth, and ether fifth (Epinomis 981c).

This is precisely why Aristotle brings established view up, namely to justify his own view. This is entirely consistent with the method of establishing fact on the basis of the three means of knowledge: (1) experience (gnosis), (2) reason (episteme), and (3) established, authoritative opinion (orthe doxa).

He has said that the evidence of the senses (gnosis) is enough to prove his case, but has also presented a reasoned argument (episteme), and is now adducing the evidence of established or right opinion (orthe doxa). In other words, he has established his position.

Aristotle here is not concerned with the Gods, but with the divine (theion) as a principle the existence of which he regards as “certain” and beyond dispute:

If then there is, as there certainly is, anything divine …

Plato (or Socrates) may criticize the way the Olympian Deities are portrayed in popular mythology, but not the Cosmic Gods or the Creator-God, and even less the divine in general.

But we’ve been through this many times already and I’m not going to waste any more of my time.

Regards to your alter ego ….

In theory at least, if the unenlightened can pretend to be enlightened, the enlightened could equally pretend to be unenlightened …. :smile:

However, if it is difficult for the unenlightened to correctly identify the enlightened, it must be even more difficult for them to identify the enlightened pretending to be unenlightened, and they may end up losing their way in the more obscure recesses of their imagination (or in the cannabis smog, as the case may be).

So, the question is, why would the enlightened pretend to be unenlightened? After all, all the enlightened need to do is carry on with their physical life as before. There would be no need to “pretend” to be unenlightened in the same way there would be no need for them to shout from the rooftops that they are enlightened.

This is precisely why the idea of anyone declaring to be enlightened needs to be treated with a good amount of caution, no matter who they are. Thinking or believing, however reasonably, that someone is enlightened, is not the same as knowing that they are enlightened and even less knowing what their state of enlightenment actually is.

This means that what really matters to the genuine “seeker after enlightenment” is not whether someone is enlightened but whether and to what extent someone can assist him or her on the path to enlightenment.

So, the question of whether the Dalai Lama is or is not enlightened becomes irrelevant and even potentially misleading. What we can do, however, is take his advice and genuinely first make the best we can out of our own religion and culture before we even think of converting to other traditions.

As the saying goes, seek and you shall find. This is perfectly true in more than one sense and it obviously involves some personal effort. And this is where the difficulty lies, because if we want enlightenment to fall into our lap or to be served to us on a silver platter, then it is a different matter. In that case, even if we find the real thing, the attitude is counterproductive, placing us in the position of outsider so that we “have” the truth but we can’t access it, comparable to a relationship where you may be physically close to someone but you have no full access to their heart and mind.

If we think about it, the various spiritual traditions of the world have sufficient elements in common for truth to be discoverable in any of them, and this includes Western ones. But if we start from the premise that “Light comes from the East, and form there only”, then we are already on the wrong path and we are unlikely to find what we seek even though we might convince ourselves otherwise.

The seeker must constantly remember that it is he who has to achieve what he is seeking. Therefore, the first question must be, What can I, personally, achieve and how? And since it is the seeker who has to achieve it, he must start the journey with himself, making use of whatever guidance can be obtained closest to himself.

The second question is, Does Christianity really have nothing to teach? Do Ancient Greek philosophers really have nothing to say? I believe that the honest inquirer is sure to find something of interest and as (1) he discovers the deeper truths behind the superficial exterior and acquaints himself with them, (2) he will begin to see where those truths are manifested, put into practice, and realized. And he will discover where advice and guidance can be found. But there are no shortcuts so step (1) must be made first.

As I said before, I see idea of “enlightenment” as a Western one. This is not to say that there are no parallels in the East. But the concept of the individual being illumined by the light of a higher reality and thereby elevated to a higher mode of experience is certainly found in the Western traditions of Platonism and Christianity.

Historically, the concept of intellectual or spiritual enlightenment (ellampsis) goes back to Ancient Greece and was adopted by Platonists like Plotinus and the early Church Fathers.

“Enlightenment” proper in the sense of “highest spiritual realization” is “henosis” (“unity” or “oneness”) in Platonism and “theosis” (“deification”) in Christianity. But the concept of enlightenment as a process of “illumination” is certainly central to both traditions.

In Christianity, the Philokalia, a collection of texts on spiritual practices, is described as the means by which the individual’s intelligence (nous) is “purified, enlightened, and made perfect”.

In the Greek Orthodox tradition the term “enlightenment” or “illumination” (photismos) is still in use. For example, you might hear it being said that if you follow the prescribed practices “your mind will become enlightened” (“tha photistei o nous sou”) the verb used being photizomai (“become enlightened”). Or someone might say “May God enlighten you”, etc.

So, the concept of spiritual illumination is very much part of (Orthodox) Christianity though, admittedly, this is not widely known to the general Western public. In addition, there is this false impression that Christianity is “against enlightenment”.

The truth, of course, is that Western "opposition to enlightenment" is a recent development and it has largely to do with the “enlightenment” traditions imported from the East in the 60’s and 70’s via the “hippie trail”. The reason it came to be associated by some with “evil” is that it often amounted to little more than an ego trip with no spiritual content in addition to displaying anti-Christian tendencies. It also involved drugs, etc., and it could literally do more harm than good.

So just as it is wrong to say that all Eastern enlightenment is “evil”, it is wrong to say that there are no enlightenment traditions in the West.

The Orthodox Philokalia tradition goes back to the early centuries of Christianity when there was a fusion of various contemplative schools, and is based on the practice of stilling and centering the mind through watchfulness or watchful attention (nepsis) and interior prayer (proseuche) leading to a state of stillness or hesychia, hence the term Hesychasm. This prepares the mind for spiritual experience and, eventually, spiritual realization or perfection.

Crucially, the practitioner of hesychast techniques is said to attain an experience of the divine as “uncreated light” (aktiston phos). This is said to go back to Jesus' transfiguration experience (metamorphosis) on the mountain and St Paul’s vision of a “blinding light” which, again, highlights the importance of spiritual illumination in the contemplative traditions of the West and clearly shows that the claim these traditions lay on being authentic enlightenment traditions is fully justified. In fact, it was never doubted until recently, when criticism of everything Western became a mandatory fashion accessory of the “politically-correct” and “progressive” classes who are in turn followed by the misinformed and miseducated masses.

In any case, the systematic observation, analysis, and control of psychological processes, concentration, etc., are sufficiently similar to the practices found in Eastern systems like Yoga and Buddhism. Arguably, the particular experience they lead to may not be identical in every respect, but the way I see it, once a higher mode of consciousness or experience has been attained, and one has “seen the light”, even in the distance, there will be greater clarity regarding the path one has to take in order to reach the desired goal. And this can’t be a bad start by any standard, on the contrary, I think it is preferable to seeing no light at all.

It isn’t “someone else’s principle” at all. He presents it as generally accepted tradition!

As Aristotle himself says, it is a tradition “handed down from our ancestors” and he agrees with the idea, with the name, and even with the derivation of the name which he got from his teacher Plato:

The word "ether" (aither) I understand in this way: because it always runs and flows about the air (ἀεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ῥέον), it may properly be called “aeitheera” (Cratylus 410b).

What Aristotle is saying is that unlike the other four elements, ether is a divine (= eternal) substance and it makes up the heaven which is divine, eternal, and revolves in an eternal circular motion.

In one sense, we apply the word ouranos to the substance of the outermost circumference of the world, or to the natural body which is at the outermost circumference of the world; for it is customary to give the name of “heaven” (ouranos) especially to the outermost and uppermost region, in which also we believe all divinity to have its seat (De Caelo 278b10-15).
In its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable. Its [the heaven’s] unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal (279a30-279b4).

Aristotle obviously uses current philosophical tradition to justify his own position. There is no confusion there except in the mind of the confused.

As I said, you can try fooling someone else, Mr Foolosopher ….

Of course none of us can guess at Madonna's motivations, but this all seems to be the typical trajectory of a restless showbiz type who constantly playacts with charged but superficial images and appearances in an endless quest, and by association with such images, to remain relevant and interesting. I wonder if it's all just surfaces for her and if there is any depth at all. — Tom Storm

I think it is doubtful that there can be much depth there. A lot of these pop culture celebrities tend to come from dysfunctional backgrounds and have little experience of relating to the world in a “normal” way which is why they often also have difficulties in forming proper relationships.

Their lifestyle also causes them to be pretty isolated and confined to a small circle of friends, so that they come to experience the world almost exclusively through their shows and through public reaction to them. If you add the high levels of professional stress plus alcohol and drugs, you get a situation in which it can be difficult to realistically develop a healthy and balanced personality.

And the reality is that once you have started on the path of “being daring” for the sake of attracting attention by any means conceivable, so that it has become a form of addiction, it is easy to go down a self-destructive slippery slope from where it is may be difficult to come back up again.

Madonna’s relationships do not seem to last very long, some of them being over after just a few months, while others like Lenny Kravitz, are mere flings. What is interesting is that many of her dates dumped her pretty fast. Dennis Rodman for wanting his baby, Tupac Shakur “for being white”, the Muslim Brahim Zaibat for her involvement with Kabbalah, etc., etc.

Again, if it is difficult for outsiders to tell what is publicity stunt and what is reality, this might be equally difficult for Madonna herself. In any case, though she’s got the “daring” and the cash, something seems to be missing somewhere. The age factor probably does play a role as some of her dates could have been her sons or grandsons, but this doesn’t explain everything.

If we consider Madonna’s apparent preference for black and Latino (i.e. non-white) boyfriends and children, we can see how she is applying the cultural-replacement tendency to all areas of her life. This seems to be consistent with a desire to obliterate and replace one’s original cultural and ethnic identity and clearly points to unresolved identity issues.

Obviously, Madonna is an extreme case, but I thought it is a good illustration of the point I was making. Even on the assumption that identity is a matter of personal choice, the question still remains of how that choice is made and why. What is certain is that it is not made in a cultural vacuum or independently of external influence.

Humans being imitative creatures, they tend to follow the example of others. Older stars like Madonna are followed by the younger ones like Britney Spears who are in turn followed by the next generation, and the whole lifestyle and the mindset that comes with it become quasi-institutionalized and assimilated as a matter of course both by the stars and by many of their fans.

Ultimately, the whole trend becomes like a new religion that merely replaces the old without bringing any significant benefit to the believers. “Being daring” by kissing someone of the same sex onstage, wearing a dress made of raw meat, using obscene language, etc. might give one an inner sense of satisfaction and “achievement”. But this is normally associated with teenage behavior and one would hope that in later years people have moved on and are ready to learn some new tricks. Unfortunately, this would not appear to be the case.

The perennial philosophy and the New Age movement were as popular as Netflix when I was young (I mixed in those circles for a few years) and it frequently seemed to be fuelled by a resentment of the Christianity of the West and often the West in general. I often think this is an outcome of the modernist mindset to go against the West's own presuppositions. — Tom Storm

It probably is. It also seems to be connected with a more general inclination, encouraged by the mass media, to uncritically discard the old and embrace the new just for the sake of it. If we take the case of Greece, for example, there is a growing trend to use English words and expressions, to wear t-shirts with English slogans, and even Greek music is being replaced with African American and Latin American genres. Another musical influence comes from the Mid-East, with many songs being basically Arabic or Turkish music with Greek lyrics.

Obviously, no culture is perfect and some self-critical analysis is necessary. But when criticism becomes a lifestyle and, like Marx we develop an attitude of “criticism of everything (Western)”, it can become counterproductive because a fixation with criticism of one’s own culture can easily turn into uncritical acceptance of other cultures.

And this can be a dangerous game as your adoptive culture will likely have its own faults that ought to be identified, exposed, and addressed instead of being covered up.

This is one of the reasons why there is often a higher level of fanaticism among new converts than among those who were born into a particular culture, arising from a need to reinforce their adopted beliefs to the exclusion of old ones, which results in the tendency to respond to criticism of their new culture or religion by (a) justifying what is being criticized, (b) denying the validity of the criticism or (c) attacking the critics’ own culture or religion.

In the final analysis it looks like the road to “enlightenment” can be a long and perilous one especially when it involves conversion, and I tend to agree with the Dalai Lama’s advice to Westerners not to convert to Buddhism easily, but to first make the best they can out of the religion and culture they were born into.

Though apparently not enlightened stricto sensu, the Dalai Lama seems to be more enlightened than those who claim to be enlightened ....

I'm afraid there is neither rhyme nor reason to what you are saying there.

Aristotle clearly refers to the principle beyond the four traditional elements as “ether” (aither) and correctly states that this is the name “handed down from our ancestors” (the philosophers and poets):

The common name, too, which has been handed down from our distant ancestors even to our own day, seems to show that they conceived of it in the fashion which we have been expressing. And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place a name of its own, aither, derived from the fact that it ‘runs always’ for an eternity of time (De Caelo 270b15-25)

As already stated, he says that the heaven is divine, eternal, and has a circular movement:

But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle ...

He also explains why he thinks the heaven is eternal:

(A). If circular movement is an instance of simple movement,
(B). And simple movement is (a) simple and (b) of a simple body,
(C). Then there must be some simple body which revolves naturally and in virtue of its own nature with a circular movement.
(D). Generation and decay subsist in contraries.
(E). There can be no contrary motion to the circular.
(F). The body that has circular motion has no contrary.
(G). Heaven has (natural) circular motion.
(H). Therefore it has no contrary.
(I). Therefore it is ungenerated and indestructible.

At no point does he even remotely refute or reject the idea that the heaven is divine, eternal, and revolving.

Anyway, now that you finally admit that your claim is your own and not Aristotle's and that you have zero evidence to back it up, it should be obvious even to you that you are wasting your time trying to sell it to anyone.

So, good luck with that, but I'm not buying it .... :smile:

Therefore we must conclude it is not eternal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, Mister “Metaphysician (Foolosopher) Undercover”, you keep recycling the same spurious claim under different guises and changing the goal posts every time.

The fact is that this is YOUR conclusion, not Aristotle’s. That’s precisely why you say “we must conclude”. You can’t say “Aristotle concludes” as you have no evidence.

Saying “read the book, the evidence is there!” is mere evasion and not an acceptable argument in any philosophical or logical method that I am aware of. Anyone can say that.

Aristotle clearly says “eternal” (aidios) when referring to heaven and its circular movement.

The heaven is NOT "composed of matter and therefore not eternal". It is composed of ether which is a divine and eternal substance. Therefore it is ETERNAL by definition.

The movement of that which is divine must be eternal. But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle.
But the circular movement is natural, since otherwise it could not be eternal: for nothing unnatural is eternal. The unnatural is subsequent to the natural, being a derangement of the natural which occurs in the course of its generation. Earth then has to exist. But if earth must exist, so must fire.
But further, if fire and earth exist, the intermediate bodies [air and water] must exist also. With these four elements generation is clearly involved, since none of them can be eternal .… (286a-b)

Clearly, Aristotle is talking about the traditional four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, as being generated and therefore not eternal. This is precisely why he introduces ether as a fifth, divine and eternal element that has circular motion!

This enables him to argue that the heaven is a divine sphere consisting of ether and eternally moving in a circular orbit:

But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle ...

This is not my "prejudice" at all. It is elementary and generally accepted knowledge as can be seen from Wikipedia:

In his Book On the Heavens he introduced a new "first" element to the system of the classical elements of Ionian philosophy. He noted that the four terrestrial classical elements were subject to change and naturally moved linearly. The first element however, located in the celestial regions and heavenly bodies, moved circularly and had none of the qualities the terrestrial classical elements had. Aether naturally moved in circles, and had no contrary, or unnatural, motion. Aristotle also noted that celestial spheres made of aether held the stars and planets. The idea of aethereal spheres moving with natural circular motion led to Aristotle's explanation of the observed orbits of stars and planets in perfectly circular motion.

Aether (classical element) - Wikipedia

I think you really should ask for a refund on your “philosophy” course.

And while you are at it, you might as well return your "degrees", too. :smile:

Then he demonstrates that the principle is not true, it doesn't correspond with anything real — Metaphysician Undercover

He does NOT demonstrate that AT ALL and you have ZERO evidence that he does.

what is described is that one finite orbit completes. You might insist that it is followed by another, but the next is different from the first — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle uses the word "ETERNAL" (aidios) and as far as I am concerned he means just that, ETERNAL.

This is absolutely clear from his discussion in the De Caelo:

The total time is finite in which the heavens complete their circular orbit, and consequently the time subtracted from it, during which the one line in its motion cuts the other, is also finite. Therefore there will be a point at which ACE [a line infinite in the direction E that revolves on its center C, describing a circle] began for the first time to cut BB [a line infinite in both directions drawn within the circle]. This, however, is impossible. The infinite, then, cannot revolve in a circle; nor could the world, IF it were infinite …
Moreover, the heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time; so that they pass round the whole extent of any line within their orbit, such as the finite line AB. The revolving body, therefore, cannot be infinite …
Again, if the heaven is infinite and moves in a circle, we shall have to admit that in a finite time it has traversed the infinite. For suppose the fixed heaven infinite, and that which moves within it equal to it. It results that when the infinite body has completed its revolution, it has traversed an infinite equal to itself in a finite time. But that we know to be impossible (De Caelo 272a-273a).

Aristotle simply states that an infinite body cannot revolve in a circle. But he has ascertained that one revolution of the heavens occupies a limited time and uses this to prove the finitude of the orbit and, consequently, of the body of the heavens itself. A finite body like the heavens can move in a circle and according to him it does so eternally.

What he is saying is:

(A). The infinite cannot revolve in a circle.
(B). Nor could the world (or heaven), if it were infinite.
(C). But the world/heaven is finite.
(D). Therefore the world/heaven can revolve in a circle.
(E). And this revolution is eternal.

Though an orbit is completed in a finite time, its completion does not imply cessation of motion. The circular motion continues as the orbit is completed over and over again.

If you drive your car around in circles, you complete many rounds, you don’t stop after one round. Or think of athletes running around a stadium, a horse running circles in a field, etc. Completing one round is not the same as ceasing to move altogether. The first is necessarily finite as you will eventually return to the point of departure. The second isn’t. THIS is what Aristotle is talking about.

The circular movement of the heavens was a long-established view going back to the Babylonians. For Aristotle, the system is geocentric, and he thinks of the universe as a sphere revolving around the earth.

So everything is based on spheres and circles, these being said to be perfect geometric figures. Even in Plato, the universe is said to be created according to a perfect divine paradigm and therefore constitutes an image or reflection of divine perfection.

Aristotle is obviously arguing that the heavens are (a) divine, (b) eternal, and (c) possessing an eternal circular motion:

That the heaven as a whole neither came into being nor admits of destruction, as some assert, but is one and eternal, with no end or beginning of its total duration, containing and embracing in itself the infinity of time, we may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us in providing for its generation. If our view is a possible one, and the manner of generation which they assert is impossible, this fact will have great weight in convincing us of the immortality and eternity of the world. Hence it is well to persuade oneself of the truth of the ancient and truly traditional theories, that there is some immortal and divine thing which possesses movement such as has no limit and is rather itself the limit of all other movement … (De Caelo 283b26)
The ancients gave to the Gods the heaven or upper place, as being alone immortal; and our present argument testifies that it is indestructible and ungenerated. Further, it is unaffected by any mortal discomfort, and, in addition, effortless … (284a10)
The activity of God is immortality, i.e. eternal life. Therefore the movement of that which is divine must be eternal. But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle … (286a10)

If circular movement is natural to something, it must surely be some simple and primary body which is ordained to move with a natural circular motion … (269b5)
The reasons why the primary body is eternal and not subject to increase or diminution, but unaging and unalterable and unmodified, will be clear from what has been said to any one who believes in our assumptions. Our theory seems to confirm experience and to be confirmed by it. For all men have some conception of the nature of the Gods, and all who believe in the existence of the Gods at all, whether barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting the highest place to the deity, surely because they suppose that immortal is linked with immortal and regard any other supposition as inconceivable. If then there is, as there certainly is, anything divine, what we have just said about the primary bodily substance was well said. The mere evidence of the senses is enough to convince us of this, at least with human certainty. For in the whole range of time past, so far as our inherited records reach, no change appears to have taken place either in the whole scheme of the outermost heaven or in any of its proper parts … (270b1-15)
The shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical; for that is the shape most appropriate to its substance and also by nature primary … (286b10)

Clearly, this is NOT an argument Aristotle takes up for refutation, but one the facts of which he positively asserts and the truth of which he urges the reader to convince himself of.

Aristotle, De Caelo

If I were you, I would seriously consider requesting a refund on that course you did .... :grin:

The irony just goes on and on! — baker

It does, doesn't it? I for one can see nothing wrong with seeing the funny side of things. I certainly don’t see enlightenment as reason to be overly despondent and in a bad mood. Quite the opposite, actually.

To revert to the phenomenon of religious conversion and “pressure to decide which religion to choose”, I think the factors that lead to such a situation should not be ignored.

What seems to be the case is that some people start with adaptability issues and rebelliousness which expresses itself as rejection of parental authority, and progresses to rejection of one’s own (i.e., the parents’) religion, culture, and in extreme cases, even race.

The pop singer Madonna grew up in the 60’s and 70’s. Though she had been a Catholic for most of her life, she joined a “Kabbalah” sect in the 90’s and later took an interest in Indian religion before taking up the study of Islam as well as getting herself a Muslim boyfriend.

In one of her statements she says:

I am building schools for girls in Islamic countries and studying the Qur'an. I think it is important to study all the holy books. As my friend Yaman always tells me, a good Muslim is a good Jew, and a good Jew is a good Christian, and so forth. I couldn't agree more. To some people this is a very daring thought.

Madonna 2013 Interview – Harpers Bazaar

Of course, with characters like Madonna it’s difficult to tell if they are serious about something or they just do it for the publicity-driving “shock value” of their statements and actions. But I think it does illustrate how adaptability issues can play a role in people’s decision to reject their own religion in favor of some “exotic” substitute.

Identity issues also seem to be involved as religious conversion often entails some kind of identity crisis.

The fact that (a) the substitute has to be alien and (b) the conversion has to be seen as “daring” (i.e., challenging the norm) at all costs, is worthy of further investigation, but it does suggest that there is a close link between rebelliousness and identity issues as causes of conversion.

In Madonna’s own words:

I did the opposite of what all the other girls were doing, and I turned myself into a real man repeller. I dared people to like me and my nonconformity.
That didn't go very well. Most people thought I was strange. I didn't have many friends; I might not have had any friends. But it all turned out good in the end, because when you aren't popular and you don't have a social life, it gives you more time to focus on your future. And for me, that was going to New York to become a REAL artist. To be able to express myself in a city of nonconformists.

We can see that even one’s professional career and whole life can be used as an expression of underlying psychological issues so that the whole person and their life becomes little more than an expression of those issues.

In any case, a key motivating factor in conversion is the desire in the convert for a radical change in his or her life. And that desire is rooted in other issues connected with adaptability and identity.

Given people’s tendency to mythologize themselves, it is tempting (and easy) to put a “spiritual” spin on it, but the fact remains that if we take the time to look beneath the surface, it often boils down to psychology and ego. In some cases it’s pretty plain and obvious without further analysis.

Obviously, there is nothing wrong with “being daring”, but when it is done as a method of “self-expression” (i.e., ultimately, self-promotion), the whole thing may turn out to be little more than an ego-enhancing exercise.

Another aspect of the problem is that Western culture is currently under threat from external and internal developments. Without the support of its culture, the whole Western world is in danger of collapse. Some may argue that turning your back on your own people at this time is a sign of selfishness.

So, all facts considered, things are not necessarily quite as simple as they might appear to be, and a degree of critical analysis can’t be a bad thing. Unless we choose to not analyze the inconvenient bits that most people prefer to overlook or cover up.

See also:

Zinnbauer & Pargament, “Spiritual Conversion: A Study of Religious Change Among College Students”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(1), 1998, 161–180.

I think in the 21st century humanity ought to have left armed conflict far behind, but I agree that if there is a war the decision should be based on actual threat to the life and liberty of the country that goes to war.

But the idea seems to be that NATO and its allies are some kind of “united Western front against Russian aggression”. It is difficult to see how a Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens America or Britain, and even less “the West” in general. And yet Biden and Boris Johnson seem to be leading the anti-Russian camp.

Johnson has openly announced that “the UK is leading the global response to Russian aggression”.

The reality is that what tends to happen is that certain interest groups in America or Britain decide to label someone “enemy”, after which they mobilize NATO and scores of smaller countries that depend on the bigger guys for military “protection” or financial assistance.

From what I can see, Ukraine has got nothing to do with the North Atlantic or with NATO, which raises the possibility (or probability) that the real motives lie elsewhere.

The fact is that the whole concept of Atlanticism and NATO itself were introduced by oil interests. And oil and gas do seem to play a major role in the current controversy.

Interestingly, some are now talking of “regime change” in Russia. I bet US oil corporations and their British associates will move in the minute that happens, as they always do.

And, of course, Biden and Johnson could use a nice war (or prospect of war) to boost their ratings in the polls.

So it seems to boil down to the usual alliance of corporate and political interests that has little to do with democracy.

this is a common procedure in philosophy. One proposes a principle (like eternal circular motion for example), which may be widely accepted in certain circles of society, then proceeds to demonstrate the falsity of that proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is not "common procedures in philosophy" at all. It is what Aristotle does or does not say in his treatises. He does NOT say that eternal circular motion is "unacceptable" anywhere in the corpus.

Even in logical terms he couldn't say such a thing since he repeatedly says (a) that there is eternal circular motion and (b) that he has proved it:

there are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in our physical treatises) … (Metaphysics 1073a)

Of course Aristotle says that "the heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time", as this is what he believes the heavens do. But he doesn't say that once the orbit is completed the heavens stop in their tracks and disappear. According to him the revolving motion continues eternally.

The idea is that the ordered structure and movement of the universe which is "perfect", "eternal", and "divine" enables man to elevate his thought above material reality and grasp the intelligible, noetic world by means of that in him which is eternal and divine, i.e., the nous.

Very simple and easy to understand, IMO.

Your claim can only stand if you insist that Aristotle "didn't write Metaphysics" and dismiss half of the corpus as mere "oversight" and "mistake".

If you follow your own method, you could equally discard your claim as "oversight" and "mistake" and let
the rest of the corpus stand as it is, which would be more logical, especially in view of the fact that Aristotle does not say what you are claiming he does .... :smile:

Reminds me of the 20% (forgot the actual figure) rule in hypertension: Only 20% of hypertensives are diagnosed. Of them, only 20% are actually treated. Of those treated, only in 20% is the hypertension actually cured. — Agent Smith

Good point. And if one wanted to, one may add the crucial difference that in this case the evidence of cure seems to be absent ... :smile:

You both want to monopolize what is being discussed. — Paine

I don’t think anyone is “monopolizing” anything. There wasn’t much of a discussion anyway.

And if you follow the thread you will see that Metaphysician Undercover started by claiming that Aristotle proposed the principle of “eternal circular motion” (page 6) after which he said that this principle is unacceptable and ought to be rejected (page 9) and ended up claiming that Aristotle himself describes the “unacceptability” of the same principle!

Aristotle proposed a first principle of physical (material) existence. This was the eternal circular motion. Motion in a perfect circle can have no beginning nor end. And the orbits of the planets were supposed to be those eternal circular motions. — Metaphysician Undercover

When an author whom a person respects to a great level, proposes unacceptable principles, like eternal circular motions for example, then one must dig deep within that author's work to uncover the reasons for that mistake … — Metaphysician Undercover

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, — Metaphysician Undercover

You pointed that out yourself:

You seem to be invested in claiming Aristotle is saying X. But you also are arguing against claims made by Aristotle when they do not support your interpretation of X. — Paine

An eternal circular motion is clearly defined as without beginning or ending. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what Aristotle is saying!

As clearly stated in De Caelo, the universe is spherical and it consists of concentric spheres representing the five primary elements. The earth which is at the center, is surrounded by the spheres of water, fire, air, and ether.

While the first four elements have a vertical (or radial) motion, the fifth, ether, has a circular motion which is without beginning or end, perfect, eternal, and divine. The heavenly bodies themselves are spherical, made of ether, and moving in a circle like the ethereal heaven where they are located, etc.

It should be obvious that Aristotle’s cosmology depends on eternal circular motion and that he cannot possibly describe “the unacceptability of eternal circular motion” as this would cause his entire system to collapse.

Aristotle’s main intention is to present a picture of the universe as a perfect, eternal, and divinely ordered reality the contemplation of which enables man to elevate himself to the higher realms of pure intelligence.

But you deny that this is possible, hence your insistence on putting a materialist spin on it as well as claiming that Metaphysics was not written by Aristotle and dismissing every passage that contradicts your spurious "interpretations".

As I said, you can believe anything you want. But if you expect people to believe what you say, that’s a different matter. Anyway, you seem to be talking to yourself, so good luck with that …. :smile:

While I disagree with many parts of Metaphysician Undercover's reading of Aristotle, I also disagree with your penchant to decide what the different interpretations lead to. — Paine

Great. We all disagree then! :grin:

Absolutely not.

Aristotle states very clearly that, though finite, the whole universe is spherical and consists of spherical bodies revolving in circles with an eternal motion:

The movement of that which is divine must be eternal. Such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle (De Caelo 286a).

He also explains why:

Circular motion is necessarily primary. For the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, and the circle is a perfect thing … Our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle, and by argument also we have determined that there is something to which circular movement belongs … The infinite cannot revolve in a circle; nor could the world, if it were infinite … The heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time … Nor could the body whose movement is circular be infinite, since it is impossible for the infinite to move in a circle. This, indeed, would be as good as saying that the heavens are infinite, which we have shown to be impossible … The motion of the heaven is the measure of all movements whatever in virtue of being alone continuous and regular and eternal … Nothing which concerns the eternal can be a matter of chance or spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal … The body which revolves with a circular movement must be spherical … Since the whole revolves in a circle, and since it has been shown that outside the farthest circumference there is neither void nor place, it will follow necessarily that the heaven is spherical … If the world had some other figure with unequal radii, for instance it were lentiform, or oviform, we should have to admit space and void outside the moving body … (De Caelo 269a-291b ff.)

Aristotle's whole approach has to do with his (and Plato’s) idea of perfection and of lower, imperfect levels of reality being a reflection of higher, perfect and divine ones.

Like Plato’s philosophy, Aristotle’s system has a political, ethical, and spiritual dimension, the spiritual one being the highest and the goal of human existence (as well as of philosophy itself).

Your failure to understand this prevents you from correctly understanding Aristotle (and Plato) and you get bogged down in unfounded and futile "interpretations" that can only lead to materialism in the best case and to psychological issues in the worst …. :smile:

But just moving people out of the ghetto to dilute the demographics of both the ghetto and the suburb probably doesn't accomplish much. — Bitter Crank

I think the term "ghetto" can be misleading as it evokes the image of people being forced by the state to live exclusively in a designated area.

"Ghettos" do not always emerge under state pressure. In most cases, they seem to develop naturally, as a result of people of the same ethnic or religious background tending to live in areas inhabited by people from the same background, especially where there are places of worship, schools, stores, restaurants, etc. that facilitate cultural and ethnic continuation.

Diversity can also give rise to tensions and these tensions can be exploited by political groups and foreign powers for their own divisive agendas.

In fact, it is not unheard-of for minorities living in a particular area to demand a degree of autonomy or even independence from the host society.

If diversity causes or contributes to the fragmentation of society, it cannot be claimed that there are only positive aspects to it.

Plato wasn't talking literally about the circles of the heavens, in Timaeus, but metaphorically, and Aristotle took it literally in his rejection of it? — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to confuse the heavens with soul, the circular motion of soul with eternal circular motion, circular motion in an infinite body with circular motion in a finite body, etc., etc.

Plato says that the heaven moves in a circular motion and so does Aristotle.

As explained in The Laws, soul is said to have a circular motion metaphorically, circular motion being the most ordered form of motion that symbolizes the ordered activities of reason.

As indicated by the title, Aristotle’s De Anima/Peri Psyches (“On the Soul”) is about the soul.

Aristotle argues that soul is not a self-moving entity.

As part of his discussion of different views, he briefly addresses the claim that the soul of the universe has a circular motion.

He concludes that soul cannot revolve in a circle and is incapable of self-motion.

However, this has NOTHING to do with eternal circular motion. He says that he proved it in his treatises on physics, and so he has if you take the time to read the many statements to that effect that I quoted above.

This is the claim that you have been making:

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact is that Aristotle describes no such thing. He merely argues that the soul has no circular motion. The SOUL, not the heaven.

You admit Aristotle's eternal circular movement in your own statements!

The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly Aristotle's view that he says he has proved:

The heaven is a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle (De Caelo 286a).

Therefore, the heaven moves in a circle (Physics 212b)

Etc., etc. ....

People like to group themselves by similarity of race, class, culture, politics, sexual preference... — Bitter Crank

Correct. Not every preference of association is an "act of discrimination". Otherwise, every time people associate with others of the same race, class, culture, religion, etc., they could be accused of committing a "crime".

By that logic, your church group would have to either (a) invite equal numbers of atheists, Muslims, Hare Krishnas, etc., or (b) disband and disperse ....

Why do you think Aristotle made humanity too dependent on magnanimous men from-which one would derive some privileged status over your brothers and sisters — Shawn

Good question. And aptly phrased.

However, before we ask why someone did something, I think we should first try to establish that they actually did what they are being accused of.

The funny thing is that the people who demonize Plato and Aristotle are often the very same people who glorify real dictators like Lenin and Stalin. In his The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, Russell writes:

I believe that Communism is necessary to the world … Regarded as a splendid attempt, without which ultimate success would have been very improbable, Bolshevism deserves the gratitude and admiration of all the progressive part of mankind ...

Moreover, what self-styled modern “progressives” conveniently forget is that Ancient Greece was arguably far more democratic than the despotic systems of other cultures of the time like Egypt, Persia, and India.

And, of course, without Plato and Aristotle, there wouldn’t be philosophers like Bertrand Russell to criticize them .... :smile:

Notice, that Aristotle is saying that if it is true that the soul moves in this way, then the reason why God caused the soul to move "can only have been that movement was better for it", yet those (Platonists) who claim this, do not even assert "that it is better that soul should be so moved". So absolutely nothing supports that assumption, no logic, nor proposed good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. The soul. Aristotle does NOT reject eternal circular movement. He rejects the notion that the soul moves in a circle as part of his wider argument that the soul does not move itself but is caused to move by God.

He is clearly talking about the soul, which is why the whole book is called “De Anima” or “Peri Psyches”, i.e., “On the Soul”:

In the first place, it is not right to call the soul a magnitude … From what has been said it is clear that the soul cannot be a harmony and cannot revolve in a circle … From the foregoing it is clear that the soul is incapable of motion … (De Anima 407a21-408b15).

Moreover, I think you should notice that Plato explains exactly how the activity of soul is related to "circular motion":

Which kind of soul, then, shall we say is in control of Heaven and earth and the whole circle? That which is wise and full of goodness, or that which has neither quality?

If we are to assert that the whole course and motion of Heaven and of all it contains have a motion like to the motion and revolution and reckonings of reason, and proceed in a kindred manner, then clearly we must assert that the best soul regulates the whole cosmos and drives it on its course.

What is the nature of the motion of reason? Here, my friends, we come to a question that is difficult to answer wisely. In making our answer let us not bring on night, as it were, at midday, by looking right in the eye of the sun, as though with mortal eyes we could ever behold reason and know it fully; the safer way to behold the object with which our question is concerned is by looking at an image of it.

Let us take as an image that one of the ten motions which reason resembles.

The motion which moves in one place must necessarily move always round some center, being a copy of the turned wheels; and this has the nearest possible kinship and similarity to the revolution of reason.

If we described them both as moving regularly and uniformly in the same spot, round the same things and in relation to the same things, according to one rule and system—reason, namely, and the motion that spins in one place (likened to the spinning of a turned globe),—we should never be in danger of being deemed unskillful in the construction of fair images by speech.

On the other hand, the motion that is never uniform or regular or in the same place or around or in relation to the same things, not moving in one spot nor in any order or system or rule—this motion will be akin to absolute unreason.

So now there is no longer any difficulty in stating expressly that, inasmuch as soul is what we find driving everything round, we must affirm that this circumference of Heaven is of necessity driven round under the care and ordering of the best soul .... (Laws 897a-d).

Obviously, “circular motion” here is meant as a metaphorical image (eikon) which is said to most resemble or evoke the ordered activity of soul or reason.

It follows that Aristotle's criticism is directed at those who take Plato's metaphor literally.

In any case, it does not amount to "describing the unacceptability of eternal circular motion" by any stretch of imagination.

As I said, you are free to believe that Aristotle “describes the unacceptability of eternal circular motion”. But the rest of us are equally free to disbelieve that. And since you have provided zero evidence for your spurious claim, there can be only one conclusion ….

This is why, for us in interpretation, it is of the utmost importance to determine inconsistency. Inconsistency is an indication that truth is not there, something is amiss. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what I'm saying. Your comments seem to be one straw man after another, with little evidence of "truth" given that they are inconsistent with Aristotle's statements .... :smile:

This is your own claim that you have repeatedly made here:

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course I have access to the texts and I have read them many times over. Contrary to your claim, it is absolutely clear and well-known that Aristotle holds the first principle and primary reality to be eternal and immovable and to cause eternal circular motion in the universe.

He even says that he has proved that the planets have eternal circular motion:

The first principle and primary reality is immovable, both essentially and accidentally, but it excites the primary form of motion, which is one and eternal. Now since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the prime mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be excited by something eternal, and one motion by some one thing; and since we can see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universe (which we hold to be excited by the primary immovable substance) there are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in our physical treatises) … (Metaphysics 1073a)

The passages from the treatises cited include Physics 212b (“Therefore, the heaven moves in a circle”), De Caelo 277b, 286a, 287a-b, 293a, De Generatione et Corruptione 338a-b, etc.:

A consideration of these points, then, gives adequate assurance of the truth of our contentions. The same could also be shown with the aid of the discussions which fall under First Philosophy, as well as from the nature of the circular movement, which must be eternal both here and in the other worlds. It is plain, too, from the following considerations that the universe must be one. (De Caelo 277b).

The reason [of why there is more than one motion] must be sought in the following facts. Everything which has a function exists for its function. The activity of God is immortality, i.e. eternal life. Therefore the movement of that which is divine must be eternal. But such is the heaven, viz. a divine body, and for that reason to it is given the circular body whose nature it is to move always in a circle (De Caelo 286a).

Since the whole revolves, palpably and by assumption in a circle, it will follow necessarily that the heaven is spherical … Therefore, if the heaven moves in a circle and moves more swiftly than anything else, it must necessarily be spherical … It is plain from the foregoing that the universe is spherical … Now there are two ways of moving along a circle, and we have already explained that these movements are not contrary to one another. But nothing which concerns the eternal can be a matter of chance or spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular motion are eternal (De Caelo 287a-b).

The characteristics of the stars which move with a circular motion, in respect of substance and shape, movement and order, have now been sufficiently explained (De Caelo 293a).

It is in circular movement, therefore, and in cyclical coming-to-be that the ‘absolutely necessary’ is to be found … The result we have reached is logically concordant with the eternity of circular motion, i.e. the eternity of the revolution of the heavens … For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion, the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. Thus, from the being of the ‘upper revolution’ it follows that the sun revolves in this determinate manner …. (De Generatione et Corruptione 338a-b).

You admit this much yourself:

The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle certainly does not postulate "elliptical orbits" or discuss Copernicus. And far from rejecting eternal circular motion, he says in his own words that he demonstrates it!

If so, nirvana can only be arrived at by accident and not deliberately. We have to stumble upon it via random walks instead of arriving at it with the aid of a well laid out strategem. The level of mindfulness (recommended buddhist practice) required to pull this off is clearly too great for description. It would require complete awareness (self/other) 24/7 — Agent Smith

I don't know about "nirvana" but I tend to doubt that enlightenment can be arrived at "by accident". The enlightened person must have gone through a process of inner transformation for the final "enlightenment moment" to happen.

This transformation must in turn be the result of an effort, conscious or subconscious, on the part of the individual in question.

A conscious intention that initiates this effort or process seems to be necessary as most people who are said to have attained enlightenment (or some form of spiritual realization) seem to have started from a deliberate effort to attain this.

If we start from the assumption that there is a higher reality behind the world of appearances or phenomena, then the initial intention is an intention to see behind and beyond this world.

This is why Plato says that discovering the source of knowledge and truth, i.e the source of ordinary reality, is the highest thing to learn. As the faculty of optic perception plays a dominant role in the experience humans have of reality, he recommends tracing the source of beauty, for example, to arrive at Beauty itself which stands, as it were, at the threshold of a higher level of reality.

Following Plato, Plotinus says:

If someone, seeing beauty well-represented in a face, is transported into the intelligible region, would such a person be so sluggish and immobile of mind that when he sees all the beauties of the sensible world, he will fail to say 'What things are these and whence are they?' (Ennead 2.9(33)16, 49).

The process of discovering reality, then, is a process of "purification" (katharsis) of individual consciousness which trains itself to increasingly remove unreality from its field of perception by looking behind and beyond appearances until the "light of reality" dawns on it in an act of "illumination" (ellampsis) that reveals not only "objective reality" but also the true identity of the "subject":

Consider it by removing, or rather let the one who is removing see himself and he will feel confident that he is immortal, when he beholds himself as one who has come to be in the intelligible and the pure. For he will see an intellect (nous), which sees no sensible thing nor any of these mortal things, but which grasps the eternal by the eternal, and all the things in the intelligible world, having become himself an intelligible universe and shining, illuminated by the truth from the Good [a.k.a. "the One", the source of all knowledge and truth], which makes truth shine upon all the intelligibles (Enn. 4.7.10.30-37).

Obviously, the vast majority of mankind just want to get on with their daily life and have no time for anything of this sort. And even from among the small minority who take an interest in these things and try their best to have a realization of them, very few actually succeed.

But the main confusion arises from a lack of understanding of what "enlightenment" actually is, which is not surprising given that many definitions or descriptions are offered, often by individuals who have no personal experience of what they are defining or describing, and is compounded by the general attitude of consumerism prevalent in modern society based on the belief that everything is (a) personally achievable and (b) achievable on command, which belief is often little more than an expression of the desire to gratify one's ego and tends to lead in a direction that is contrary to the one leading to anything resembling enlightenment ....

circular motion is neither implied by the soul nor by the body. We ought to conclude therefore that it is unjustified, and likely, a mistaken idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, it is obvious that you have it backward, and I'm beginning to think you are doing it on purpose.

Aristotle in De Caelo simply states that there is no circular motion of an infinite body. Finite bodies like the universe can and do have circular (or apparently circular) motion as Aristotle himself says!

The real issue is who or what moves something that has circular motion or motion in general. In the case of the heaven, it is God a.k.a. the Unmoved Mover who causes that movement.

De Anima is a separate discussion about the view that the soul is a self-moving entity. Aristotle takes up the definition of soul as “the primary actuality of a natural body with organs” and argues that this contradicts the claim that the soul is (a) a magnitude and (b) self-moving.

It is in this context that Aristotle mentions the creation account in the Timaeus, according to which the ensouled universe is given a revolving motion by God:

He spun it round uniformly in the same spot and within itself and made it move revolving in a circle .... And in the midst thereof He set Soul, which He stretched throughout the whole of it, and therewith He enveloped also the exterior of its body; and as a Circle revolving in a circle He established one sole and solitary Heaven … (Timaeus 34a-b).

Aristotle himself concludes that “it is the soul (of the universe) which causes the motion of the body (of the universe)” and that “the reason why God made the soul (of the universe) revolve in a circle is that this form of movement is better than any other” (407b 21).

This is entirely consistent with the point Aristotle has been making which is that the soul does not move but imparts movement to the body and is in turn caused to move by God a.k.a. the Unmoved Mover.

Basically, (a) you didn’t provide the quote you said you did, because it doesn’t exist, (b) you are distorting the text, (c) you are confusing one thing with the other, and (d) you are using Copernicus and modern astronomy as a straw man to cover up your misinterpretation of Aristotle.

Is this why you call yourself “undercover”? :smile:

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile:

The truth of the matter is that Aristotle says that the heavens have an eternal and circular motion because circular motion is the only perfect and eternal one, as it has no beginning or end. What he objects to is (a) circular movement in an infinite body and (b) circular movement in soul.

In the De Caelo (Peri Ouranou) he says:

Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle, and by argument also we have determined that there is something to which circular movement belongs … an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body (De Caelo 272a5, 272b20)

Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else.

What Aristotle does in De Anima is to criticize the idea that the motion is a property of the soul. He mentions the creation account in Plato’s Timaeus in which the Creator imposes circular motion on the universe “that it might move in harmonic revolutions”.

It is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):

It is not clear [from the Timaeus account] why the heaven revolves in a circle; seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of soul [of the universe] nor due to body [of the universe]: on the contrary it is rather the soul which causes the motion of the body ... (De Anima 407b)

This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe ....

Can we say, very concisely, that the Platonic forms were sought on Earth, by Aristotle, instead of in out-wordly "mathematical heaven" where Plato positioned them? — Raymond

Briefly put, Aristotle’s arguments are as follows:

(A). Time and motion are imperishable.
(B). Therefore, they must have an imperishable cause.
(C). This cause is the Prime Unmoved Mover.
(D). To be a cause of imperishable motion, the Prime Unmoved Mover must be eternally in actuality and immaterial.
(E). That which is immaterial is incomposite.
(F). Therefore, the substance of the Prime Unmoved Mover is incomposite actuality or activity.
(G). That activity is thinking (noesis), i.e., the activity of an Intelligence or Intellect (nous).
(H). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover is an Intelligence or Intellect or “thinking thinking about thinking”.
(I). That Intelligence thinks according to participation in the intelligible.
(J). Therefore, it also thinks about all intelligibles.
(K). Its activity is life.
(L ). Therefore, it is life and life belongs to it.
(M). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover, which is Intelligence, is God and the first principle (arche) upon which the heavens, nature, and all other things depend.

If we consider the fact that Aristotle uses “intelligibles” (noeta) and “Forms” or “Ideas” (eide) synonymously, we can see that his “Unmoved Mover” is identical with Plato’s Creator-God (Demiurge) or Divine Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) whose content are Forms and which generates the universe using Forms as paradigms to give shape to matter. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement to the effect that intellect is determined by the essences that are its objects (Metaphysics 1072b22).

Aristotle’s argument that (A) God is thinking what is best, (B) God is best, (C) therefore God is thinking himself, does not mean that God is thinking only of himself. He is also thinking of intelligible objects (= Ideas or Forms).

Both Plato and Aristotle describe God (Demiurge/Unmoved Mover) as “good” or “most good”. And what Aristotle means by “prime” is that the Unmoved Mover is prior to sensible substance, i.e., it is the absolutely primary substance.

All we need to do now is to add Plato’s One or Good which is “above substance” (and thus above the Unmoved Mover or Creator God) and we obtain the same ontological hierarchy as that found in Plato:

(1). The Ineffable One (the Good).
(2). Creative Intellect (Unmoved Mover) containing Ideas or Forms.
(3). Ensouled Universe.

This is all the more the case if we recall that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics says:

If our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends, it is clear that this must be the good, that is, the supreme good … Some, however, have held the view that over and above these particular goods there is another which is Good in itself and the cause of whatever goodness there is in all these others (Nicomachean Ethics. 1094a15-1095a30)

Obviously, Aristotle is fully aware that his metaphysical framework is largely identical with that of his teacher Plato. The apparent disagreement between them and resulting confusion is caused (1) by what Gerson calls “Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts” and (2) by Aristotle’s criticism of views held within the Academy that are thought to be Plato’s but in reality (as Gerson shows) are often those of Speusippus, the Pythagoreans, and others.

To return to Forms. In Plato, Forms are immaterial “paradigms” used by the Divine Creative Intelligence to generate the material world (Timaeus 28a7). This Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) is a form of consciousness, which is why Aristotle himself refers to it as "nous" and as "thinking" (noesis).

Though they are referred to as "objects of (divine) thought", the Forms, as @Wayfarer says, are NOT "objects" in the ordinary sense of the word, nor could they be as no such "objects" exist in the Divine Intellect.

This is why Forms can be grasped only intuitively, in an act of intuition or insight (noesis) which is different from the discursive thought (dianoesis) whose objects are, say, ideal geometrical shapes such as triangle.

The Form "Triangularity" is the principle that enables discursive thought to form the abstract concept of ideal triangle. The Form of "Triangularity" itself is grasped by the faculty of intuition or insight (nous) while the ideal triangle is conceived by the faculty of reason (logos or dianoia).

If we bear in mind the literal meaning of Greek eidos as "that which is seen (as a shape or form)" we can see that the Form or Idea is inextricably linked with the way in which what would otherwise be an indeterminate mass is shaped by the cognizing consciousness into objects of determinate cognition. The patterns according to which this "shaping" or "forming" occurs are the Forms.

So, essentially, Forms are principles of order which the Divine or Universal Consciousness uses to organize itself in order to generate determinate cognition and "project" the world into existence.

As determinate cognition exists, consciousness cannot remain in an indeterminate state.

Nor can it generate determinate cognition without organizing itself for the purpose.

And the principles according to which it organizes itself are Forms.

Aristotle need not define or describe Forms in every detail exactly as Plato does. But I think it is clear that their views are largely in harmony with one another.

Yep. Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years so there must have been some influence. Gerson argues that Aristotle was essentially a Platonist:

Francis Cornford famously wrote about the theory of Forms and the immortality of soul as the “twin-pillars of Platonism” … With the appropriate qualifications made, I think it is fair to conclude that the “twin pillars” also support Aristotle’s Platonism.
Is Aristotle just a Platonist? Certainly not. In this regard, I would not wish to underestimate the importance of the dispositional differences between Aristotle and Plato.
This dispositional difference is in part reflected in Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts. In working through the Aristotelian corpus with a mind open to the Neoplatonic assumption of harmony, I have found time and again that Aristotle was, it turns out, actually analyzing the Platonic position or making it more precise, not refuting it.
In addition, I do not discount in this regard the fundamental thesis, advanced by Harold Cherniss, that Aristotle is often criticizing philosophers other than Plato or deviant versions of Platonism. It is not a trivial fact that most of Aristotle’s writings came after Plato’s death and after Plato’s mantle as head of the Academy had passed to Speusippus and then to Xenocrates.
In my view, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that Aristotle in not au fond a Platonist. Even when Aristotle is criticizing Plato, as he does in De Anima, he is led, perhaps malgré lui to draw conclusions based on Platonic assumptions.
The main conclusion I draw from this long and involved study is that if one rigorously and honestly sought to remove these assumptions, the ‘Aristotelianism’ that would remain would be indefensible and incoherent. A comprehensive and scientifically grounded anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is, I suspect, a chimera (Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp. 289-290).

Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion? — Raymond

Well, Aristotle argues that time and motion are imperishable. And since any motion other than circular would have a beginning and end, imperishable motion must be circular and the cause of that motion must be some immaterial principle such as an “unmoved mover”.

Obviously, there are many ways Aristotle can be interpreted (and misinterpreted). But here is a good article that elucidates some of the points involved:

Aristotle's Circular Movement as a Logos Doctrine – JSTOR

Or, if you have the time and inclination for a broader perspective, you can try Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists.

Aristotle was ahead of his time! He already contemplated the perfect clock, present in the state of the universe before inflation. — Raymond

Well, I think the ancients were definitely far more knowledgeable than is nowadays assumed. It's just that we moderns like to believe that it was us who invented the wheel. And the clock. :smile:

I appeal to what has been written by respected authors, to justify my interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aside from being an ad populum argument, that does not constitute evidence that your "interpretation" is correct.

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only shows that you got it all backward, which explains why you think that everyone else got it backward! :smile:

If you really were consistent in your criticism, you would also be critical of Aquinas. But you have this fixation with Aristotle’s “circular motion” to divert attention away from Aquinas’ – and your own – inconsistencies.

The fact is that the whole purpose of Aristotle’s writings is to present a unified vision of reality in which man belongs to the moving order of the universe.

By definition, the observable universe or cosmos (from Greek kosmeo, “to order, or arrange”) is an order. Another observable fact is the circular or cyclical motion of heavenly bodies - which are themselves spherical in shape, hence “harmony of spheres” - that forms the basis of the cosmic order.

This circular motion of the cosmic order may also be seen as analogous to the self-reflexive activity of intelligence or consciousness, both human and divine, which in turn is at the root of cognitive processes and ethical considerations alike. This is entirely in line with the Ancient Greek conception of the universe as “ruled by Intelligence”:

There is in the universe a by no means feeble Cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called Wisdom (sophia) and Intelligence (nous) … Now do not imagine that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that Intelligence (nous) always rules the universe (Philebus 30c-d).

Clearly, far from being “inconsistent”, Aristotle is perfectly consistent on this point throughout his writings as well as being consistent with Platonic and pre-Platonic (or Ur-Platonic) views which he does a very good job in harmonizing with his own.

In the final analysis, philosophy in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition serves a spiritual, ethical, and political purpose. In particular, what Plato and Aristotle are saying is that man can, and should, aim to attain higher knowledge or a higher state of consciousness on the basis of which he can have a better understanding of reality and of his role in the wider scheme of things.

In contrast, you are claiming that this is impossible and should not even be tried. Here is your own statement from page 6:

I do not seriously belief that man can, or ought to try, to elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was exactly Fooloso4’s position and the reason he went to extraordinary lengths to dismiss Plato, Aristotle, and anyone that had any views that deviated from materialism. And if, as suggested by @Wayfarer, you have been doing this since 2011, then I think it is fair to assume that you are doing it on purpose.

Anyway, IMO so long as Classical philosophy serves its stated purpose it is consistent with its own logic. There is no need for it to be absolutely consistent with strict logic.

If we were to apply strict logic to all philosophical systems, very few, if any, would be found to be without flaws. In fact, if we were to go by strict or pure logic alone, we would not get very far at all as not everything that is “logical” is also necessarily true, and vice versa.

This is precisely why we need science, philosophy, and even religion in addition to logic. And it is why Aristotle himself in Posterior Analytics clearly says that not every truth can be demonstrated. Some fundamental truths need to be grasped intuitively, with philosophy serving as nothing more than a pointer to those truths:

No other kind of knowledge (episteme) except intuition (nous) is more accurate than scientific knowledge. Also first principles are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge involves reason. It follows that there can be no scientific knowledge of the first principles; and since nothing can be more infallible than scientific knowledge except intuition, it must be intuition that apprehends the first principles.
This is evident not only from the foregoing considerations but also because the starting-point of demonstration is not itself demonstration, and so the starting-point of scientific knowledge is not itself scientific knowledge.
Therefore, since we possess no other infallible faculty besides scientific knowledge, the source from which knowledge starts must be intuition (nous). Thus it will be the primary source of scientific knowledge [i.e., nous] that apprehends the first principles, while scientific knowledge as a whole is similarly related to the whole world of facts (An. Post. 100b17)

It follows that the fault does not lie with Aristotle’s logic, but with those who lack the ability or willingness to apprehend its true meaning ....

The fact that I back up my so-called "spurious interpretation' with reference to other well respected philosophers, and you do not, indicates that it is more likely that your interpretation is faulty, rather than that mine is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly the kind of argument that Fooloso4 would come up with. Apparently, we had to accept everything he said because he had "the degrees to show that he was right". :smile:

You have backed up your interpretation with nothing but more of your own baseless interpretations and opinions which, as others have noted, are pretty incoherent and make no sense.

As I already pointed out a few pages back (page 6), there is no reason why Aristotle’s “eternal circular motion” should be deemed less acceptable than the Christian idea of God as “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”, for example:

Some people claim that God is an old man sitting on a throne in the sky. How exactly is that any better or more logical?! — Apollodorus

You chose not to answer my point (and many others) for the obvious reason that an honest and objective answer would have instantly demolished your untenable position.

The fact is that if Aristotle’s principles are “unacceptable” from a Thomist perspective, Aquinas’ principles may be equally unacceptable from other perspectives, e.g., of modern science, Marxism, or Islam.

If your argument is that Aquinas is scientifically acceptable but Plato and Aristotle are not, your argument or claim proves absolutely nothing except your own personal bias. You may call it “educated interpretation”, but I think objective observers can see it for what it is, namely anti-Platonist and anti-Aristotelian disinformation and propaganda.

problems typically occur when someone tries to take on more than they can carry, tries to make a bigger step than they have the capacity to make. For example, when a person feels enormous pressure to decide about whether a particular religion is the right one and to resolve the matter within a month. — baker

Being under "enormous pressure" to decide whether a particular religion is the right one "within a month", doesn't sound like a typical situation to me at all.

The vast majority of people opt for sticking with the religion they were born into. So the "problems" occur in a small minority only. And this may well be rooted in identity issues, insecurity, and other psychological factors that cannot be resolved by converting to another religion.

An interesting case is that of Irish singer Sinéad O'Connor who has been struggling with mental health issues in addition to being a heavy cannabis smoker for decades. She was born a Catholic, became a priest, and eventually converted to Islam, without this solving any of her issues.

What is particularly interesting is that it seems to have started from an attitude of rebellion against her parents and tradition in general, and ended in hatred of Christianity and white people.

In a comment on Twitter, she wrote:

What I'm about to say is something so racist I never thought my soul could ever feel it. But truly I never wanna spend time with white people again (if that's what non-muslims are called). Not for one moment, for any reason. They are disgusting.

So we can see how something as "trivial" as rebellion against parental authority (which may itself be a manifestation of an inability to assimilate and adapt) can lead to other issues that seldom solve the original problem and can even aggravate it ....

Hey, that's philosophy. When an author states unacceptable principles, we reject them, regardless of how revered the person is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you can twist it as much as you want. :smile:

The fact is I wasn't talking about "unacceptable principles". I was talking about your admitted method of dismissing passages from one author because they are "inconsistent" with your spurious interpretation of other passages from the same author, while disregarding the very real possibility that the cause of the "inconsistency" may lie in your faulty interpretation.

Gerson shows how such misinterpretations can arise and how they can lead to passages or chapters being dismissed by those who misinterpret them. This has nothing to do with "philosophy" but with an inability (or unwillingness, in some cases) to correctly understand the authors in question.

More generally, you are using Aristotle to attack Plato, Aquinas to attack Plato and Aristotle, etc. This is a pattern we’ve seen before and I think we know where it is coming from ....

And you live in 2022. Why should I listen to anything you say about these ancient writers then? — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said you should listen to what I say. What I did say is that the original texts should be read as they are:

It is simply a matter of reading the original texts as they are, without putting a spin on them or dismissing whole chapters for being "inconsistent" with the reader's preconceived ideas. — Apollodorus

By your own admission, you are dismissing everything in the texts that is inconvenient to your preconceived opinion:

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said already, these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

Etc., etc.

IMO it is simply wrong to dismiss whole passages and chapters as "mistakes" and to call the author "misguided".

A more logical approach is to look into whether the passages you are choosing to dismiss can be read in a way that makes them consistent with the rest of the text. This is what Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus are doing and so do scholars like Gerson (see Aristotle and Other Platonists).

Unfortunately, you are unable to do that because you are committed to an "interpretation" of the text that requires dismissing too many parts of the text. This is why you aren't convincing anyone.

So, frankly, I think you are flogging a dead horse there. But, as I said, feel free to carry on. I’ve got other things to do …. :smile:

I think he solves a problem (the two intellects versus one) that was never a problem if one understood identification of causes as Aristotle intended. — Paine

The assumption that there are "two intellects" occurs about as frequently as the assumption that there are "two (or more) kinds of knowledge" or "three parts of the soul", etc. Gerson does indeed debunk many of these misconceptions.

On the "two intellects", he says:

The general point of this chapter [De Anima, Gamma 5)] is frequently represented as the introduction of two intellects: the passive (παθητικός) intellect and the productive or active or agent (νοιητικός) intellect. But as has been often noted, Aristotle does not use the latter term and the former is used only here, predicatively ... Aristotle's general account of intellect leads him to distinguish the actuality of cognition that is the presence of an intelligible form in the intellect and the further actuality that is the awareness of the presence of that form. And as we have also seen, this twofold actuality belongs to a unified intellect (Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp.153-4).

You, Appolodorus have opted for the belief that the intellect , or "mind" is an immaterial power .... — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't about me "opting" for anything. The nous is described as immaterial by Plato and Aristotle, and as having the powers mentioned in my comment.

You have admitted that intellect is immaterial and that it has the power of knowledge:

immaterial intellect, (a divine intellect), has a superior knowledge which is completely different from the knowledge of the human intellect, which is tainted by the human intellect's dependence on the material body. — Metaphysician Undercover

And you are contradicting yourself by denying that the intellect has those powers:

What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features. — Metaphysician Undercover

As for your dogmatic insistence on reading Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, what can I say? Plato lived from 428 to 348 BC. Aquinas lived from 1225 to 1274 AD, i.e., more than a millennium and a half after Plato. It is absurd to claim that ancient readers of Plato and Aristotle were ignorant of what they were reading and had to wait more than fifteen centuries for Aquinas to tell them!

It is evident from Plato’s Timaeus (30a ff.) that Intellect (in the form of Creator-God) possesses the powers of consciousness, happiness, will, knowledge, and action.

1. It has consciousness as it is aware of the pre-cosmic chaos.
2. Will-power as it makes a conscious and purposeful decision to impose order on the chaos and create the universe.
3. Knowledge of the divine model on which he creates the universe.
4. Power of action which it uses to create the universe.
5. Power of happiness as it rejoices at its own creation.

Incidentally, the Creator-God’s divine model is often described in translations as an “intelligible animal”, “intelligible creature” or "living animal". However, the fact is that the word “zoon” here does not mean animal at all but model, this being the term normally used for an artist’s real-life model. The artist himself in Greek is called “zographos” (zoos-graphos), literally, one who paints or draws from real life (as opposed to one who draws from imagination). Therefore, the correct translation of noeton zoon (30c) is “(real) intelligible model”.

In any case, it is obviously incorrect to say that the immaterial and eternal has none of the powers that even embodied intelligence (nous) has.

Aristotle himself says that the Intellect’s activity is the cause of the universe (Physics 198a10-13), that the activity of the Gods which is supremely happy is a form of contemplation (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20), etc., etc., all of which clearly indicates that intelligence has those powers, indeed, it is those powers.

As Aristotle puts it:

It is this intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity … It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal (De Anima 430a23).

As I said, remove those powers from disembodied intelligence and you succumb to materialism. That’s where your “interpretation” of Plato and Aristotle takes you to. But do carry on, by all means .... :grin:

Aquinas offers what I believe to be by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, and possibly Plato as well, with comparison to numerous other ancient philosophers. He makes Gerson appear to be speaking from an introductory level of education. I'm sorry for being blunt, but it's rather obvious, and your comment implies that you do not notice this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course you believe Aquinas to be "by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle and Plato". Hardly anyone here could have failed to notice your uncritical commitment to everything that Aquinas says.

However, something doesn't become fact just because you believe it. That's why Plato draws a clear distinction between belief and knowledge.

And it's got nothing to do with Gerson. It is simply a matter of reading the original texts as they are, without putting a spin on them or dismissing whole chapters for being "inconsistent" with the reader's preconceived ideas.

Your comments seem to imply that you are denying some basic and generally acknowledged facts. A person’s power of optic perception or sight, for example, may operate differently in different surroundings. In a prison cell, one might see some light through a small window, but outside the cell one will see the direct sun light and even its source (the sun) itself, together with all the objects it illuminates: the sky, the earth, the sea, and everything else under the sun.

Hence Plato’s Analogy of the Cave. The power of sight does not become a different power. What changes is its range and the object of sight which is seen “truly”, i.e., as it is in the real world outside the cave.

The same applies to the power of knowledge. The human nous according to Plato begins by having power of knowledge by means of which it has knowledge of higher realities such as Ideas or Forms. Next, it assumes embodied form which restricts its power of knowledge and range of things it knows. Finally, on escaping embodied existence, it can deploy its natural powers to their full extent. Hence Plato’s Recollection Argument and the tomb or prison analogy:

The mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine … every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities … Now in the earthly copies of Justice and Temperance and the other Ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw Beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company—we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other God—they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell … (Phaedrus 249c-250c).

Obviously, if the soul or nous has knowledge prior to embodied existence, it must also have consciousness of that knowledge, otherwise it could have no recollection of it.

It follows that the powers of consciousness, knowledge, etc. are features of the nous whether embodied or not, exactly as described by Plato. Bringing Aquinas into it doesn't change anything about what the text says. Not only that, but if you deny to disembodied nous basic powers like consciousness and knowledge, you deny its very existence and your position becomes no better than that of the materialists.

Well, you seem to have some kind of fixation with Aquinas. The reality, of course, is that Aquinas is a Christian who is trying hard to put his own spin on Classical authors. Plato and Aristotle are not Christians. There may be similarities, but their systems are NOT the same as Christianity. IMO it is delusional and dishonest to claim otherwise.

And no, there is no inconsistency in saying that the powers of disembodied nous are the same as those of embodied nous.

As you can see for yourself, the powers I was referring to are consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action:

we need to start from the stated assumption that this immaterial and immortal self, the nous, is a form of intelligence that has certain capacities or powers, such as consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action. — Apollodorus

It is absurd to claim that embodied nous does not have these powers and only acquires them on becoming disembodied. If this were the case, (1) man wouldn't be human and not even alive, and (2) the analogy of the entombed or imprisoned soul would be nonsense and no one would speak of "release" and "liberation" as there would be nothing to release or liberate .... :smile:

Putting the matter that way means that Aristotle is not invested in naming every instance of the shortcomings of other thinkers. He is very interested in the borders of the eternal and mortal but demands that a particular order of logic and a lived experience of the world be brought into the discussion. — Paine

Sure. My point though was that he does not seem to reject the idea of reincarnation as such. Reincarnation was not a minor detail in the philosophical discourse of the time and it was closely linked to Plato's theories of immortality and the Forms expounded in the dialogues that were being discussed in the Academy. Had Aristotle rejected it, he would have done so explicitly.

This is inconsistent. If only a disembodied soul can obtain "true" knowledge, then the knowledge which a human being, with a material body, has, is distinctly different from the knowledge of a disembodied soul. So it's inconsistent to say that the embodied powers are " the same powers that define it once death has separated it". — Metaphysician Undercover

The stated powers the nous has in the embodied state are the same powers it has in the disembodied state. The difference consists in the wider range those same powers can find application in the disembodied state, resulting in more accurate or "true" knowledge.

This is precisely why the body-mind compound is referred to as a "prison" or "tomb", as it prevents the nous from utilizing its powers to their full potential. For the same reason, separation from body-mind is referred to as "release" or "liberation" - which obviously implies release and liberation of the power to know and other powers already belonging to the released or liberated nous:

The lovers of knowledge perceive that when philosophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision (Phaedo 82d-e).

Otherwise said, once the power to know has been released from the restrictions or prison of embodied existence, it is able to know truly.

There is no "inconsistency" in this at all.

Augustine forged a third product from the legacies of the Greek and Jewish world, claiming ascendency over both. The City of God is a masterpiece of appropriation. — Paine

Correct. We mustn't forget that the Jewish world itself did not remain uninfluenced by Greek thought, culture, and language, which is why the OT was translated into Greek for Greek-speaking Jews and the NT was written in Greek for everyone who spoke Greek (i.e., the majority) in the eastern parts of the Roman Empire.

Gerson is a scholar whose focus has long been on Plotinus and your description of 'Platonism' is very close to his view. Gerson used the expression "disembodied self." There is source for that expression in Plotinus. I am not aware of a source for that language about self in Plato. Perhaps Gerson throws some light upon that topic somewhere. — Paine

Gerson doesn't focus just on Plotinus, though he does refer extensively to him. This is (1) because Plotinus was the first to attempt to systematize Plato and (2) because Plotinus, like other Platonists, sometimes uses Aristotle to interpret Plato - and for very good reasons given that Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years!

As shown in my previous post, Aristotle's framework is largely Platonic, which refutes the modern scholarly perception of Aristotle as an "anti-Platonist". I am quoting Gerson because he does a good job in exposing the flaws in the consensus perception and because I believe that any objective inquiry into the authentic teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient authors ought to begin by first eliminating the propaganda and disinformation.

Plato may not have a technical term for "disembodied self" but he does use phrases like "soul itself by itself", Aristotle speaks of "separable nous", etc. And since that soul (psyche) or (nous) – the terms are often used interchangeably - is said to be man's "true self", both by Plato and Aristotle, I think it is legitimate to refer to it as "disembodied self".

Gerson attempts to answer questions such as whether the surviving element is personal or impersonal, etc. in Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato.

To begin with, what is certain is that both Plato and Aristotle posit an immaterial, eternal entity that (1) forms part of embodied man’s person, (2) is man’s true self, and (3) survives the death of the physical body.

Among questions that still need to be settled is (1) how impersonal this surviving self is and (2) what is its exact relation to other such selves.

In other words, (1) does the surviving self retain any traces of “personality” such as memory and emotion, and (2) does it continue to exist as a separate unit or does it merge with other such selves or with a higher principle or entity?

In order to throw some light on this, we need to start from the stated assumption that this immaterial and immortal self, the nous, is a form of intelligence that has certain capacities or powers, such as consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action.

At the very least, as a live entity, the nous has the capacities to know and to act. Certainly, for Plato true knowledge is possible only in a disembodied state. This makes the disembodied nous a knower by definition.

As Gerson says:

Though idiosyncratic subjective content does appear in his [Plato’s] treatment of embodied subjectivity, it does not belong in the disembodied ideal. But then we must naturally ask in what sense there is truly identity between the embodied person and that person’s disembodied ideal state. Once again, Plato’s answer is to be found in his account of knowledge as constitutive of that ideal state … For Plato the ideal person is a knower, the subject of the highest form of cognition. That this form of cognition is apparently attributable only to disembodied persons is of the utmost importance. For from this it follows that the achievement of any embodied person is bound to fall short of the ideal (Knowing Persons, pp. 10-11).

This seems to be Aristotle’s position too. Not only because Aristotle’s framework is largely Platonic, but also if we consider the prevalent view at the time.

The general view in Ancient Greek religion was that part of a person’s embodied soul did indeed survive death, but that there was a big difference between different souls’ postmortem existence. Whilst ordinary souls lived a shadowy life in the darker recesses of the underworld (Hades), those who had distinguished themselves through extraordinary actions or knowledge, such as heroes and wise men led a happy and bright existence in the sunlit Isles of the Blessed (or Elysian Fields).

Knowledge and action, the very powers of the embodied self that determine its fate, are the same powers that define it once death has separated it from the physical body. Plato defines death as the separation of soul (nous) from body (Phaedo 67d ff). And at the level of separation from body, i.e., disembodied, intelligible existence, knowledge is a form of action and action is a form of knowledge.

Knowledge is the key to happiness both in this life and the next. Hence the emphasis both Plato and Aristotle place on knowledge and, in particular, self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one’s true identity as self-conscious (self-aware or self-reflexive) intelligence endowed with the powers of knowledge, action, and the rest.

As Gerson says, for Plato “self-knowledge consists in the recognition of one’s true identity as a subject of thought” and “even while embodied, our lives are all about being knowers”.

Obviously, those who have attained a state of self-knowledge, self-recognition, or self-realization, will experience a state not only of knowledge, but also of supreme happiness as unhappiness is merely the awareness of not being oneself. This is why Plato describes death for the self-realized philosopher not only as separation from body but also as a state of “release” (lysis). Indeed, he defines the practice of philosophy itself as “release and parting of soul from body”:

Socrates: And doesn’t purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently talking about in our discussion [at 64d-66a], namely parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to living alone by itself as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters?
Simmias: Certainly.
Socrates: So is it this that is named “death”: release and parting of soul from body?
Simmias: Yes, entirely so.
Socrates: Right, and it is those who really love wisdom who are always particularly eager – or rather, who alone are always eager – to release it, and philosophers’ practice is just that, release and parting of soul from body.
Simmias: It seems so.
Socrates: In that case, Simmias, those who truly love wisdom are in reality practicing dying, and being dead is least fearful to them of all people (Phaedo 67c-e).

As Gerson observes, Plato here uses the ambiguity between metaphorical and literal dying to make a point that is central to his teaching:

How would someone come to be persuaded that literal dying is the separation of the soul and the body in the way that the argument [Socrates’ Cyclical Argument] assumes? Perhaps by the discovery of the identity of the soul and person that is metaphorically dying to the body. Even if it is not Plato’s main intention that the logos presented to the reader serves that discovery by leading him to reflect on his own identity, it does function in that way. For the belief that the death of my body is not the death of me is substantially the same as the belief that my body, though it be mine, is not me either (pp. 64-65).

Being oneself and being free from unhappiness are inextricably connected as is suggested, for example, by the happiness experienced in the state of deep sleep when the subject is completely free from worries and thoughts related to things other than itself.

Another way of testing this is to identify ourselves in thought with that in us that is “immortal, eternal, unaffected, perfect (i.e., not lacking anything), divine, and free”. The mere thought of it tends to result in a state of enhanced peace and happiness. Clearly, if this is the case when our consciousness is still overwhelmingly dominated by the physical surroundings, body, emotions, and thoughts, it will be even more the case when our consciousness is dominated by an actual awareness of ourselves as the immortal, unaffected, perfect, divine, and free intelligence or nous that is our true self.

But what happens in the case of those who fail to attain self-knowledge or correct self-identification?

Gerson says:

One way Plato answers this question is with a doctrine of punitive reincarnation. It is, in a universe ruled by a good Demiurge, too grotesque to suppose that the wicked are ultimately no worse off than the just. But another way suggests itself too. If there is no knowing without self-reflexivity – if one cannot know without knowing that one knows – then the status of one who did not self-reflexively know would be like a non-conscious repository of knowledge. He would be a non-person, roughly analogous to the way that someone in a chronic vegetative state might be characterized as a non-person, though he be alive, none the less (p. 279)

In sum, as in embodied life, everything in disembodied life, including happiness, revolves on the degree of self-identification with one’s true or ideal self. While this leads to higher states of experience, self-identification with things other than one’s true self lead to the opposite result and may involve repeated embodied life.

Aristotle criticizes the Pythagorean claim that a soul can transmigrate into random bodies, but it is far from clear that he rejects reincarnation itself, stating only that “as a craft must employ the right tools, so the soul must employ the right body” (De Anima 407b23). As reincarnation was a fairly widespread belief in philosophical circles at the time (which is why it appears in Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato), it seems likely that he accepted (or at least was not opposed to) some forms of the theory.

A question that might be considered is whether 'survival' and 'transcendence' entail the same kind of state. 'Survival' seems to imply persistence of some elements, whereas 'transcendence' might imply an aspect of the self that is not subject to the vicissitudes of being born and dying. That latter interpretation is something found widely in various forms of the perennial philosophies. — Wayfarer

Correct. And if an element has the capacity to survive, the same element might also have the capacity to transcend. The only difference being that ‘survival’ comes naturally, while ‘transcendence’ is something that needs to be learned or recognized. Plato refers to this when he emphasizes the need to detach oneself not only from the physical body, but also from sense-perceptions, desires, and feelings, and avoid attributing reality to them:

Now the soul of the true philosopher is not opposed to its release and that is why it refrains from pleasures, desires, pains and fears as much as it can: it reckons that when someone experiences intense pleasure, pain, fear or desire, they do not only inflict on him minor injuries, for example, falling ill or wasting money because of his desires, but that they inflict on him the greatest and most extreme of all evils, without it even appearing in his reckoning, namely that the soul, when it experiences intense pleasure or pain at something, is forced to believe at that moment that whatever particularly gives rise to that feeling is most self-evidently real, when it is not so (Phaedo 83b-c).

Though Plato here uses the word ‘soul’ (psyche), it is clear that when the self has detached itself from body, sense-perception, desires, and feelings, what is left is the rational ‘intellect’ or nous.

In any case, should a certain degree of detachment or ‘transcendence’ be not achieved, on the model of a just universe, this might render repeated embodied existence necessary. And if the transcendence process leads the self further and further away from what is not self, it is entirely conceivable that the final stage consists in some form of unity or union with a Higher Intelligence in which the individual self is itself transcended to give way to Ultimate Reality.