If you find bones in the forest you might ask if they are "human". Same for any isolated body part. No one however is claiming an amputated thumb has "consciousness" of the same order, degree, intensity, unified, self aware as that of the intact human organism (society if you will).Panpsychism from a materialist perspective is absurd, unless you consider an amputated thumb to be as human as the rest of the body. I — Gregory
If it might elicit a vote from you (because you weren't a panpsychist) I might ask you whether a snail poked with a sharp stick (and hardly lacking in responses quite rightly earning our sympathy) feels consciously. — bongo fury
My vote, FWIW... where human infants acquire competence in pointing symbols (including samples) at things, so that a red thing is perceived as an example of red things. — bongo fury
When I refer to "consciousness" as unified integrated experience with self knowledge it is to this kind of "society" I refer. It takes a certain kind of organizational structure to have such forms of experience. There are many different ways to describe the concept in language, I just prefer Whitehead because of some passing familiarity with his terminology and that because he creates his own terms they do not carry all the alternative meanings of some other descriptive terms. We have trouble defining mind, psyche, experience, awareness, consciousness, etc. much less indicating how we feel they differ from each other.Got it. People just don't like the idea of "drops" or "occassions" of experience. To them, brains are either online or offline. No brain, no online. No certain parts of the brain, no online. This raises a whole bunch of other problems, but they rather those problems than experience being primal. The main interesting point of Whitehead was the idea of "corpuscular societies" vs. "compound individuals. — schopenhauer1
This can get pretty far afield of the subject at hand. Are you aware of what happens to the human mind under conditions of "sensory deprivation"?Can you describe an act of introspection that is not accompanied by "sensations"? — Graeme M
Science deals with the empirical, the quantitative, the measurable, the observable, the physical. Believing in science does not entail accepting the metaphysical view of mechanistic determinism or eliminative materialism. A scientist can be religious, can be a neutral monist or even a panpsychist. Doing science does not entail a strictly materialist worldview. Science tells us important things about the world but not everything.Basically what this is amounts to is that science must posit some kind of monistic physicalism (there should not be any "spooky" things "emerging" that is not physical itself). However, experience itself, though completely correlated with physical processes, itself cannot be explained as to how it is one and the same as the physical, other than being correlated with it. It becomes an epiphenomena of magical dualistic "foam" that is called an "illusion" that appears on the scene (which itself cannot be accounted for). This explanatory gap that is committed to "illusion" status or have its premises assumed in the consequent and becomes something of a thorny issue. The only thing the scientist can do, is keep solving the easy problems. — schopenhauer1
This is the problem with “functionalism”. We can design computer programs (counselors, psychiatrists, etc.) that cannot be distinguished from conversing with a human under controlled conditions but do we think these systems are “conscious, intelligent, experiential”? We can only infer the consciousness of “others” based on similarity, observation and projection. We can reasonably infer some kind of “mind” or “experience” in at least some other creatures as well but why stop there?Try imagining something. Remember an event that happened. Feel sad. Feel joy. These are things that are mental states. P-Zombies presumably don't do that but somehow act as they do. — schopenhauer1
There is a one to one correspondence between certain “brain states” and certain “experiences”. There is IMHO no free floating “consciousness”, experience or mind, they are all bound to the physical even while being more than just physical or completely or satisfactorily described by their physical manifestations or counterparts. Human experience, human “consciousness” requires a human brain. It is the complex unified integrated structure of the brain which correlates with the unified integrated complex nature of human mind. Human experience is just one form of mind in nature perhaps the most self-reflective and self-aware but nature is never entirely reducible to its scientific description at any level.Qualia is brute sensation (e.g. seeing green, hearing noise, etc.). Although imagination, and memories probably rely on qualia, etc. they are not the same as qualia. My point was there are other internal states besides just qualia that one can have. And I don't understand why you would be deflating the issue. The very question regarding the Hard Question is to understand how/why internal states are equivalent to brain processes. Anything else is not the world we live in, but P-Zombie world. That is not ours though, so it is a big deal. — schopenhauer1
Panpsychism is said to have a “combination problem”. The combination problem does not require the mental to emerge from the physical. Nor does the combination problem require inert, passive, non-experiential matter to at some point become “experiential”. It is a proposed metaphysical (not scientific) solution to dualism or to emergence. It could be termed a dual aspect form of neutral monism. “The emergence of experience from the non-experiential would be sheer magic”It wouldn't be describable or measurable. It would only be inferred, like with other people's minds. The hard problem is one of subjectivity, which can' be scientifically measured or described. Panpsychism is trying to solve the irreducibility of conscious experience by spreading it out through everything so that it's a building block instead of just mysteriously emerging. — Marchesk
Yes, “mary’s room” no familiarity with the scientific description of “red” (wavelengths, optics, neural paths, etc.) is a substitute for the actual experience “seeing red”. Scientific descriptions (verbal descriptions) are always incomplete in some sense and unsatisfactory substitutes for “the experience itself”. We can describe what happens in the “quantum world” we can even “predict in a stochastic probabilistic way” what is possible but we can’t explain it in any way that fits our “commonsense” notions of the world and reality.There are plenty of arguments for the hard problem. Basically, no amount of objective explanation gets you to subjectivity. They're incompatible. — Marchesk
Allright, let’s approach the problem from the other end. We have “consciousness” this integrated, unified, self-aware, self-reflective form of “experience” or “mind”. We could not do science or philosophy otherwise. At what point in the chain of being “existence” or “life” do you think this ability disappears working your way down. Do higher animals have experience? Ants? Bees? Flowers? And how would you or do you know? What physical test or quantitative measure do you have?Possibly, but the thing emerging is not complex and novel. The thing emerging is conciousness. The whole point of the hard problem is that conciousness itself is taken to be a familiar, obvious fact (otherwise we'd just be rid of the whole thing). It's the mechanism that's mysterious, and we're quite used to mysterious mechanisms. The whole history of science has been the gradual revelation of previously mysterious mechanisms. — Isaac
or the basic “stuff” or units of nature are both physical and experiential (neutral monism).Well, if the world contains both physical stuff and consciousness, but there doesn't seem to be a way for the physical stuff to produce consciousness, then an alternative would be that all physical stuff is conscious. — Marchesk
In the form of panpsychism I defend the fundamental units of nature are “quantum events occurring in space-time”. In Whitehead’s form of process philosophy “Process and Reality” the most fundamental units are “actual occasions” which invariably have both a mental aspect and physical aspect or pole. The mental or experiential pole has to do with incorporation of elements of the past and possibilities of the future as well as relations to other events (what Whitehead calls prehension). I have a read a lot of presentations of panpsychism and this is the form which I defend.First, the argument goes that all objects, presumably down to very small scales (atoms?) must have some kind of mind. . — Graeme M
Yes there are many different forms and kinds of mind but they are all of the same ontologic nature. There are many different forms of physicality but they are all the same ontologic nature. In fact the physical and the mental are dual aspects of the same fundamental unit of nature (neutral monism). I won’t defend any form of panpsychism other than a monistic variety. The kind of unified, integrated experience that we call “human consciousness” can only be present in a unified integrated structure like the brain. Physically damage the brain and you damage or lose “consciousness”. I won’t defend the statement “rocks are conscious”. I won’t defend the statement “electrons are conscious”. Consciousness in my mind is a relatively rare form of mind or experienceSecond, minds are expressed to varying degrees of sophistication according to the sophistication of the system (object), perhaps to the greatest sophistication in humans (in our experience, at least). . — Graeme M
Our “experience”, our “mind”, our “consciousness” cannot be adequately or satisfactorily explained in purely physical terms. No description of neural pathways, metabolic activity, neurotransmitters or brain waves entails the actual “experience” of the subject. This is sort of Mary’s and red, the scientific description versus the first person experience. One should also asks who or what is conducting science, asking the questions, doing the experiments, interpreting the results, you can not take the observer out of the science completely.Third, mind is not an actual physical substance (I use the term loosely and am aware it probably means something in philosophy different from my usage). That is, it isn't like say gravity or the electromagnetic force which can be measured and which have a direct causal relationship to the world. . — Graeme M
Mind (experience) and Matter (the physical) are inseparable aspects of the same fundamental basic neutral monistic ontology (events, occasions). Reality is a process not a “thing”, a becoming not a “being”. When we talk about particles with properties we are really talking about events with relations (to other events, to the past and to the future).Fourth, matter isn't a manifestation of mind but rather mind is a manifestation of matter. Minds emerge from, are caused by, or are separate from, matter, nonetheless minds are directly attributable to material events. — Graeme M
Time and math are arbitrary abstracts that humans discovered, and also helped develop. Both of which are discoveries and uncoveries of existence, as it were. The only assignment we can make to those is the 'subordination' of the two. — 3017amen
Pretty bloody good, by all accounts. And to drill it into you again: the point is not to get rid of work. It is to ensure fairly compensated work. — StreetlightX
I think you have to ask questions.Can you elaborate on this please? I'm pretty sure I agree with you but I can't know for sure. — Justin Peterson
Ah, the "myth of the noble savage" was not the kind of pastoral peace and cooperation you envisage, I think. There was plenty of trouble within groups and between groups just not the kind of weaponry and resources found in modern times. IMHOFunny, because around 90% of human history was cooperative hunter-gatherer societies, so I wonder what nature we are actually denying. — praxis