From this review. Note 'the distinction between reality and existence' - you won't find that in many places. — Wayfarer
Real numbers [and the like] don’t begin to exist by virtue of there being someone around who learns how to count. The mind evolves to the point where it is able to count, that is all. The same goes for ideas and universals, generally. They are the constituents of the ability to reason but they’re not the products of reason. — Wayfarer
I think the basic ground of contention between Plato and Aristotle revolves around the manner in which it can be said that universals exist. — Wayfarer
This seems the old debate between “nominalism” and universals, forms or eternal objects which seems to have been ongoing for at least the last 2000 years.When we think of any number, we're actually grasping what the tradition called an 'intelligible object', although again that is an imperfect expression, as numbers aren't actually 'objects' in any sense but by analogy — Wayfarer
Speaking for myself, I think time is basically change - in matter (color, texture, etc.) and space (location, size). Without change time would be, to say the least, meaningless. Imagine a world in which nothing changes. We wouldn't be able to distinguish the state of such a universe on the framework of time. Day 1 would be exactly the same as day 20 or day n resulting in us being unable to recognize whether time has stopped or is moving forwards or backwards.
So, change is a more fundamental concept to time. Change is the foundation of the idea of time. Since we can imagine a world without change (there is no contradiction) it implies that time is unique to world's like ours where change occurs.
Does this mean time is invented?
I find it difficult to say NO! — TheMadFool
Is that so? I have never read Kierkegaard beyond Encyclopedia entries on him. However the story of the significance of Isaac’s sacrifice is not one that I have encountered much in Internet discussions of philosophy of religion. — Wayfarer
"No duration" does not mean non-existent. Time can be defined as the number of events between two events. Events themselves have no duration — Magnus Anderson
(Not necessarily related to Whitehead. Personally, I would stay away from Whitehead and most of the so-called process philosophers since they do nothing but introduce noise.) — Magnus Anderson
So, modelling doesn't have a "feels like". In fact, it doesn't have a metaphysical anything in the "real world". It is all abstracted information, so that it can be quantified or simplified for epistemological reasons. Again, you are mixing the map for the territory. You are waffling between words. Is it the definition you sent me, or are you cramming other concepts into this word? — schopenhauer1
I'm not completely familiar with Whitehead's metaphysics, only from secondary sources, but I think he emphasizes the reality of the present, as the time when activity occurs. Each occasion would consist of a duration, and duration exists as a passage. You might call this the passage of time, I think he somewhere refers to it as the passage of nature. I think concrescence, as a concept is required to account for the apparent continuity of the passage of time, such that an event with temporal extension exhibits concrete existence. A present event with temporal extension into the past, would therefore have concrete existence. As far as I know, Whitehead doesn't offer a decisive way to distinguish present from past, as an event with temporal extension has concrete existence in the past, just as much as the passage, now, has concrete existence. So there is no proper principle to separate the past from the present as one is the continuity of the other.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Or think of it another way: for Whitehead in prehension would there not be what prehends, what is prehended and the act of prehension? — Janus
Whitehead necessarily challenges the founding assumption of modern scientific reason: that of a “split subject”(Lacan1978,138ff.),or a figure of Man as “empirico-transcendental doublet” (Foucault 1970, 318ff.). For Whitehead, the experimenter cannot be separated from the experiment, because they are both present in the world in the same manner
Therefore there can be neither phenomenology nor positivism, and neither cognitivism nor behaviorism
He writes without embarrassment of the “feelings” and“ satisfactions” of a plant, an inorganic object like Cleopatra’s Needle, or even an electron. Every event or entity has what he calls both “mental” and “physical” poles, and both a “private” and a “public” dimension. In the vast interconnections of the universe, everything both perceives and is perceived.
When Whitehead writes of the “mental pole”of an electron, or a monument, we must remember that “mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness ”;indeed, most often they happen entirely without consciousness (1929/1978, 85). Whitehead derives his terms from our ordinary language about human thought, feeling, and behavior; in this way ,he signals his distance from any sort of positivism, or from what more recently has come to be called “eliminative materialism.” But he also radically de-anthropomorphizes these terms, in order to distinguish his position from any simple privileging of the human, or from the “panpsychism” of which he is sometimes accused. It is not the case that we human beings have some special essence of “mentality,” while trees and rocks and electrons don’t. But neither is our sentience just an illusion. The difference is rather one of degree. The “mental pole” of an occasion contributing to the existence of a tree or a rock or an electron is never entirely absent, but it is so feeble as to be “negligible.” In contrast, the “mental pole” of an occasion that contributes to my consciousness, or to my identity, is intense, active, and largely dominant.
To avoid the anthropomorphic – or at least cognitive and rationalistic – connotations of words like “mentality” and “perception,” Whitehead invents the term prehension for the act by which one actual occasion takes up and responds to another. Clear and distinct human sense-perception, as it is conceived in the classical philosophical tradition from Descartes to the positivists of the twentieth century, is one sort of prehension. But it is far from the only one. Our lives are filled with experiences of “non-sensuous perception” (1933/1967, 180-181): from our awareness of the immediate past (181), to the feelings we have “that we see by our eyes, and taste by our palates”(1929/1978,122). In the same way, “a jellyfish advances and withdraws, and in so doing exhibits some perception of causal relationship with the world beyond itself; a plant grows downwards to the damp earth, and upwards to the light” (176). These are all prehensions. For that matter, the earth prehends the sun that gives it energy; the stone prehends the earth to which it falls. — Steven Shaviro
Whitehead’s philosophy is not anti science. As far as it goes scientific analysis and explanations are useful and pragmatic; it is just that such explanations are not total or complete. The “heroic feats of explaining away” occur when one tries to reduce say “ human mental experience” i.e. the warmth of the sun or the color red; as mere electrical impulses or the influence of neurotransmitter chemical s upon neural synapses. Such explanations are not so much wrong as they are partial, incomplete and unsatisfactory. It is in trying to reduce nature to the empirical, the objective “the real” versus the experience of color “the subjective or somehow” the unreal , not part of the “real world” that one commits a unnecessary “bifurcation of nature”. Everything that is experienced is real and is part of nature.Again, still no explanation of what non conscious experience is in this physicalist description of nature such that it makes a damn difference to anything consciously experienced as an observable. — apokrisis
Again I would say that the absolute separation of "reality" into subjective and objective is the artificial "bifurcation of nature" to which Whitehead takes strong objection.So Segall says Whitehead's intent is to collapse the abstract scientific account back to a subjective experiential account. And you say his intent is to separate those two accounts — apokrisis
But where does Whitehead leave room for the mediating thing of a sign in his scheme? He starts by rejecting that basic division into a world and its interpretation - a modelling relation. So the third thing of a mediating sign is hardly going to come into the story.
As the Whitehead expert, you can explain how it does, and why then prehension could be understood in terms of sign interpretation.
Prehend for Peirce would be the conceptual seizing or grasping of the perceptual sign as standing in a habitual pragmatic relation with the noumenal. But where is Whitehead making the same kind of claim? Can you cite anything that would clear this up and support your view? — apokrisis
I would say the physcialist description of “quantum particles or events” is incomplete. With the notion of quantum entanglement one is forced into either non causality or at least non locality. The measurement of a quantum position allows only certain discrete locations; there is nothing continuous about the quantum picture of nature. Despite the continuous nature of some of the quantum equations there is nothing continuous about allowed orbits, transitions between orbits or the measured values. So collapse is basically measurement or interaction to a specific value or location. Precisely how that happens is not something explained by either physics or metaphysics.I am responding to your characterisation here. You said they resembled quantum events. But there are no events without collapse. So there remains something missing in the metaphysical tale.That's fine. But that also hinges on collapse realism. Which is also fine. But now - like Whitehead - you owe an account of how collapse happens. — apokrisis
I don’t see that that follows. Quantum mechanics challenges the continuous view of space-time. Quantum mechanics does not challenge Whiteheads objection to the artificial bifurcation of nature.In my view, Whitehead goes astray from the off because he rejects the kind of bifurcation of nature that would distinguish between observers and observables. Physicalism has the problem of solving the collapse issue. And a semiotic approach - one that agrees to a semiotic bifurcation in terms of information and entropy - would be the one I would take. But you can't talk about a process approach "resembling quantum ontology" without addressing the fact that quantum mechanics really challenges Whitehead's basic assumption of "no bifurcation" - the basic theme of pan-psychic thinking. — apokrisis
Observers and observables have to be separated somehow. They can't be co-located as if there were no basic separation. The issue is then how to achieve that without lapsing into Cartesian dualism — apokrisis
So the bifurcation of nature is precisely the effort to separate the subjective from the objective or the observer from the observed or the object from its place in nature (relationships and interactions). Experience in various forms and degrees is as much a part of nature as are the physical or material aspects of nature and in trying to declare one “real” and the other an epiphenomena, one denies the unified character of the process of reality (nature).Instead of construing the task of science as that of overcoming subjective illusion in order to reach objective reality, as many modern thinkers have done, Whitehead takes the speculative risk of defining nature differently: nature becomes, quite simply, “what we are aware of in perception. “Everything perceived is in nature,” says Whitehead, “We may not pick and choose”.
the red glow of the sunset should be as much part of nature as are the molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the phenomenon.14 Whitehead
“If the abstractions [of science] are well-founded,” says Whitehead,
that is to say, if they do not abstract from everything that is important in experience, the scientific thought which confines itself to these abstractions will arrive at a variety of important truths relating to our experience of nature.20
The “photon,” for example, is not just an invention of the physicist, nor is it simply a fact of nature. The “photon” is what the physicist has come to be aware of in his perception of light as a result of certain replicable scientific practices, laboratory situations, theoretical images, and mathematical equations. The “photon,” as a scientific-object, is said to be abstract only in that it cannot be grasped in isolation from the “whole structure of events” or “field of activity” (i.e., the passage of nature) to which it belongs and through which it endures.21 From the perspective of Whitehead’s philosophy of science, the abstract will never be able to offer a satisfactory explanation for the concrete.22 The wavelength of a photon does not explain the perception of redness, nor does even a connectionist model of neurochemistry explain the artist’s encounter with a beautiful sunset. Whenever scientific materialists try to offer such heroic explanations, they succeed only in offering descriptive commentaries in terms of the scientific objects most fashionable in their time–commentaries that presuppose the very thing they pretend to have explained away: consciousness. The only valid method of explanation from Whitehead’s point of view is the reverse of the materialist’s, an explanation which traces the genesis of abstractions back to the concrete consciousness and perceptual presences from which they emerged.23 A science that seeks to explain the concrete by way of the abstract all too easily falls prey to a form of knowledge production whose adequacy is judged economically, i.e., in terms of its capacity to transform and control nature (usually for private profit), rather than ecologically, i.e., in terms of its capacity to understand and relate to nature (for the common good). — ”https://footnotes2plato.com/2012/10/16/rough-draft-thinking-with-whitehead-science-sunsets-and-the-bifurcation-of-nature/”