Now, now. Accusing others of doing exactly what you are doing (Tu quoque) is unfair — Gnomon

Heh, hardly; I'm not the one deliberately misconstruing reasoned criticism or disagreement (criticism that went without rebuttal, I might add) as "reactionary outrage". And its pretty sad to see someone presumably over the age of 10 resorting to the good old "I know you are but what am I" anyways.

(btw, tu quoque is a fallacy, an invalid inference, not just you thinking someone did the same thing they accused you of doing... even if you weren't mistaken about that)

Of course it was a Roman practice. And of course it was reserved for criminals. It wouldn't have been reserved for law-abiding citizens, would it? But "criminals" included those that rebelled against Roman rule. It doesn't make sense for Jews to treat one of their own as a "despicable criminal" just because he was crucified by the Romans. — Apollodorus

I suppose that would depend on the crime. It was still a disgraceful way to die- left to rot and then thrown in a mass unmarked grave. And it was also still considered a curse by Jews. So... not good all-around.

And so either way, the suggestion that a crucified peasant was the messiah- the anointed king of Israel- would have struck most Jews as absurd, not just the religious authorities. It was a shocking, shocking claim that they were making, especially for Jews, and it was received as such.

Sure. But they still converted sufficient numbers to start a movement .... — Apollodorus

Sure, chiefly because they had great success converting pagans, and ultimately managed to become the official religion of the Roman Empire.

Yeah they're awesome, I'd love to see them live, I bet that was quite a show (I'm very jealous)

Yeah that is interesting. But I do wonder about the degree to which such influence and culture would have spread to rural areas, like where Jesus grew up and spent most of his ministry- probably not many theaters or stadiums in the small fishing villages and the like that Jesus frequented prior to his trip to Jerusalem.

Of course, maybe he was more widely travelled during the "lost years", or maybe the other Jewish sects he's speculated to have studied with during this years acted as a vehicle of such influence, but this is all very speculative.

1. It is not known to what extent all Jews had the same concept of "messiah". — Apollodorus

I mean, it sort of is: in the OT, the literal translation of the word "messiah" is "anointed one", and refers to the kings of Israel, who were anointed with oil by the high priest. So this would have been the common/general understanding of the term among Jews at the time, if not a universal one.

2. Jesus was not necessarily crucified "as a criminal" from a Jewish perspective. He could have been seen as a rebel against Roman rule as well as against sections of the religious establishment. — Apollodorus

Crucifiction was a Roman practice, not a Jewish one. But Jews under Roman occupation certainly knew its significance, that it was a shameful punishment reserved for criminals.

From the Jewish perspective, it actually might have been worse, since to be hung from a tree (including a wooden cross) was a terrible curse (Deut 21): this was such a problem that Paul had to come up with a neat theological explanation for why this happened and why its OK, actually (Galatians 3).

3. The Christian message was NOT that the crucifixion was the end, but that Jesus would return to reestablish the rule of divine righteousness, which did attribute a messianic role to him. — Apollodorus

Right, because they had to come up with some explanation for how this was all supposed to work, since the concept of a messiah who wasn't actually the anointed king of Israel was a total non-starter... But as Paul noted, this continued to be a problem for the Jewish audience, since the expectation was that the messiah, being the anointed King of Israel, would throw off the Roman occupation and re-establish the Davidic line in accordance with scripture. Jesus did the literal exact opposite of this: he was squashed like a bug by the Romans, and killed in a most shameful manner.

4. Most early Christians were Jews who formed a Jewish Christian community: — Apollodorus

Right, Jesus's closest disciples were Jews. The earliest Christians were those disciples, and their friends and family that they managed to convert... also mostly Jewish, probably. But I'm talking about the period where the Christian church went from a handful of Jewish radicals to a genuine religion; and, as Paul reports, they had trouble converting Jews, but more success converting pagans.

This is not true. — T Clark

As Gnomon just admitted, he doesn't care what is true, he's going to represent the things people have said to him as he sees fit, even if that involves deceit/gross misrepresentation.

Seppo ; this is not addressed to you personally. Because you've made it clear that you are not listening. I'm just mulling over the possible reasons for our failure to communicate. I prefer not to adjust my philosophical argumentation, to "react" with political feuds, as you suggest. — Gnomon

In other words, you're going to ignore the things people actually say to you, and continue to lie/misconstrue about those responses- good to know... so that I don't waste any further time on you.

Jesus may have actually been a part of the pharisees, in a more liberal sect like Hillelites. He was also influenced by the John the Baptist movement, and consequently became more of an apocalyptic miracle-working teacher. — schopenhauer1

Yeah I've heard this suggestion before, that Jesus was involved with the Pharisees. Its certainly plausible and has some merit, the problem is the lack of positive evidence that this was indeed the case... as with so many other aspects of Jesus's life (hence my comment about how frustrating it is).

But the influence of John the Baptist on Jesus's ministry is difficult to doubt, and we can trace a line through John the Baptist as as sort of mentor figure at the beginning of Jesus's ministry, to the apocalypticism of early Christians like James and Paul, making this one of the few things we can know with a reasonable degree of confidence.

My intention was not to be provocative — Gnomon

In every single post you've made, you've explicitly told us the reactions you wish you were receiving: outrage, feeling threatened, being reactionary, and so on.

But like I said, sometimes we don't get what we want, and so you should probably adjust your rhetoric to the reactions you actually are getting.

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value. — Luke

No, not the lacking a truth-value part. There are no propositions that lack a truth-value, any more than there are triangles that lack three sides.

But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity).

So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy. — Luke

Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition)... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times. Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting). So the suggestion that a proposition cannot be doubted isn't the same as the suggestion that a proposition can lack a truth-value.

f we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other. — Luke

There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either. There are certainly unknowable propositions, and apparently indubitable ones, but there are no propositions that lack a truth-value. And hinge propositions differ from ordinary propositions in that they cannot be justified.

:fire: doesn't get much better than '70s fusion, imo

Another awesome band. My aesthetics professor in Montreal actually played in a band with some of the Godspeed members. Weird guy, but a good philosophy professor and an ace trumpet player.

I think we must look at James, Jesus' brother to see how the original group acted and thought — schopenhauer1

Also the older creeds and poems/hymns Paul occasionally mentions, as these represent probably the earliest Christian traditions that survive (quite possibly going back to the early-mid 30s CE). The lack of available/surviving information is still extremely frustrating.

No, the reactionary responses on this thread are defending a belief system that is threatened by investigation of its underlying values (e.g. Existentialism) and assumptions (e.g. Materialism). — Gnomon

Nope. Being critical isn't being reactionary, nor is distinguishing between speculation and empirically-established proposals. And if anything, its your interlocutors who are threatening your claims with investigation (to which you react with this over-the-top hyperbole about reactionaries).

So, sort of an amusing pot/kettle situation here.

You are the one who is creating a false image of myself, in order to avoid grappling with the ancient philosophical controversies of Teleology and Determinism. — Gnomon

You're only further proving my previous assessment with the silly comment above about reactionaries: you're quite invested in this notion of the bold truth-teller and the rigid dogmatists. The problem is that this has no basis in reality. There are no reactionaries in this thread, nor are you boldly telling any truths: you're pushing speculation and religious philosophy, and receiving criticism for it. And have, apparently, built up an entire personal mythology about the situation, and for what? Protecting your ego?

I'm sure the scandalized rabbis hurled similar dismissive labels against Spinoza as he modestly but resolutely pursued the truth behind their "dogmatic traditions". No, I'm not comparing myself with Spinoza — Gnomon

You literally just did, thereby adding yet further confirmation of this ridiculous delusion you've built up. Unfortunately, criticism still isn't victimization or dogmatism.

Excerpts from posts by outraged believers — Gnomon

:lol: Imaginary outrage. Disagreement isn't outrage, any more than criticism is.

I'm sorry you're not provoking the reaction you want, but sometimes we don't get what we want. You really should adjust your rhetorical strategy to the reaction you are getting (whining about imagined outrage from fictional "believers" makes you look the one who is feeling threatened here). You would do well to take some of your own advice.

"Teen Town" ... Jaco Pastorius, 1977 — 180 Proof

:love:

(love the dual bass on this performance, such an iconic bassline)

Head Hunters, 1973
Herbie Hancock — 180 Proof

such a great album... :heart:

you ever get into any Return to Forever or Mahavishnu?

This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. — Luke

No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity.

So we could have an unknowable, indubitable, or unjustifiable proposition (and it doesn't take much imagination to think of examples of each of these)... but not a proposition lacking a truth-value.

I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either. — Luke

And again, that can't be the case, since a proposition without a truth-value is a contradiction in terms.

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms? — Luke

Right. Again, a proposition is a bearer of truth-value. And W explicitly refers to these as propositions. So they have a truth-value. He argues that Moore cannot say he knows these propositions, because these propositions cannot be justified, and justification is a condition for knowledge.

It follows that in addition to uneducated Jews (farmers and fishermen), there were educated Jews that would have been open to "unorthodox" ideas. — Apollodorus

But there is difference here between Jewish receptivity to the message of Jesus of Nazareth vs. Jewish receptivity to the Christian message. As already noted, Jesus was a Jew, who was preaching the Jewish faith, and an interpretation of the Jewish faith that wasn't unique or particularly radical at the time (we know of other Jewish apocalypticists at the time, including, notably, Jesus's mentor/associate John the Baptist). So no real problem there. The real problem, as far as theology goes, appears with Jesus's death and the distinctively Christian message of a crucified messiah: a concept that was antithetical to most Jewish understanding, for the reasons already mentioned.

Those who rejected Christianity out of hand would have been members of the clergy who felt that the new religion undermined their position of authority in Jewish society (and their income). — Apollodorus

No, not just the religious authorities, and not just because they were worried about protecting their positions or privileges: the concept of a crucified messiah was, to most Jews, a contradiction in terms. The messiah was, quite literally, the King of Israel. And under the geopolitical circumstances at that time, being the messiah meant throwing off the Roman occupation and re-establishing Israel as a sovereign nation under the Davidic kingship. Which Jesus not only failed to do, but worse, he was crucified- a particularly shameful way to die.

So there were plenty of ordinary Jews who dismissed Christianity out of hand simply because the Christian message was, to their mind, completely absurd: a crucified criminal could NOT be the messiah, simply as a matter of definition.

Yeah I find this all perplexing, it seems pretty straightforward to me: Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings.

Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value — Luke

No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then it must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value).

But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value — Luke

The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification).

But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways. — Luke

No, but he does refer to the claims in question as propositions. And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms. And the argument here is that hinge propositions cannot be doubted or known, not because they differ from ordinary propositions in lacking a truth-value, but because they differ from ordinary propositions in being unable to be justified.

Have you ever looked into models of reality that go beyond "established" (settled) opinion? — Gnomon

Yes, absolutely, that's one of the most interesting parts about contemporary cosmology (imo at least); eternal inflation, conformal cyclical cosmology, cosmological natural selection. Very cool and exciting. Heck, even string/superstring/M-theory is speculative in the sense that its never made testable predictions, let alone ones that have been observationally corroborated.

But looking into speculative proposals doesn't mean believing them, or conflating them with observationally well-established proposals.

Of course, not all hypothetical speculations are correct, but some may be the heralds of a new paradigm in science. — Gnomon

And that's a bridge we cross if/when we come to it, not before.

The responses that I'm getting on this thread, referring to "established" or "settled" Science, fall into the category that Thomas Kuhn called "conservative resistance" to a new worldview. — Gnomon

No, the responses you're getting in this thread are people distinguishing between pure speculation and things that are actually rooted in evidence. You seem to have a lot invested in this whole image of yourself as the bold truth-teller battling against the dogmatic traditionists... when that's simply not what's happening.

If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions. — Luke

I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value. — Luke

Well, most obviously, because hinge propositions are propositions. Propositions are the sorts of things that have a truth value. A proposition without a truth value would be a contradiction in terms. And I don't think W ever gives us reason to believe he doesn't think there is some fact of the matter as to whether e.g. "here is a hand" or whether "I've spent my entire life in close proximity to the Earth"- in other words, that these propositions have a truth-value. What he questions is whether Moore is correct to say he knows these propositions.

Now, at least on the standard account, we know a given proposition if the proposition is true, and if we are justified in our belief in that proposition. So if W is questioning whether Moore knows these propositions, he could either be questioning whether the proposition is true, or whether we can be justified in believing these propositions (or both). And so the idea is that W is attacking whether these propositions can be justified, and is ultimately arguing that they can't be justified (and therefore cannot be known) because they form the background against which we evaluate and justify propositions in general: they therefore cannot themselves be justified, upon pain of circularity.

If the majority of converts were non-Jews, it doesn't follow that all of them were non-Jews. — Apollodorus

Well sure, I never meant to imply otherwise- there's exceptions to just about everything, after all. So obviously there were Jewish converts (Paul himself being one). But overall or on average, Christians found Jews to be a tough audience, as Paul explicitly admits, and the Jews who weren't inclined towards the new Christian religion certainly wouldn't have seen it as a continuation or restoration of the Jewish faith.

So, they support their conclusion with a lot of technical data that was way over my head. If you are more into the math, maybe you can critique them on scientific facts instead of their unpopular interpretation. — Gnomon

I've already pointed out that the attribution of intentionality or purpose to the universe is not supported by any established empirical results or models- that it is a speculative proposal that some scientists evidently hold as a matter of personal theology or metaphysics.

And the problem with "the technical data" is the same problem I originally pointed out wrt the fine-tuning argument; we can construct models where the physical constants can take on arbitrary values, and we can even marvel at the improbability of them taking on a certain value out of an arbitrary range, but unless/until we actually know what ranges of values these constants can take, their conclusions simply don't follow.

But, until you read the book itself you have no grounds for concluding that I'm misrepresenting the meaning of a book on cutting-edge Cosmology. — Gnomon

Sure I do, its called charity; it would be extremely uncharitable of me to assume that the hot mess of an argument is a good representation of their views since, as scientists, they are far less likely to make those sorts of errors than a random layperson on an internet forum is.

The authors were physicists, and expanding Darwin's notion beyond its limited biological application up to a universal & cosmic scale. — Gnomon

Which would be problematic for the reasons already mentioned. But I'm hesitant to take your word for what their views and arguments actually are, because professional scientists aren't likely to be as incompetent as you're making them out to be.

What you say is "well-established" is what they intended to dis-establish. — Gnomon

Oh really, they intend to 'dis-establish" evolution via natural selection for biological organisms on the planet Earth? :lol:

I'm afraid the problem here is that you have no idea what you're talking about.

Your emotional reaction to blasphemy of revered Scientific Truth sounds similar to Muslim's outrage at any criticism of the Holy Koran. — Gnomon

I realize you really want me to have an "emotional reaction" or be defending "revered Scientific Truth" so you can pretend that you're a Bold Internet Truth-Speaker, but sometimes we don't get what we want and should adjust accordingly.

So, nice try, better luck next time, I guess?

SCIENCE IS NEVER SETTLED
The purpose of this non-profit organization Science Is Never Settled is to remind people of what all good scientists know, science is never settled. — Gnomon

Yep, science isn't ever settled. And cosmology is even less settled than most science. But that doesn't mean we need to uncritically accept any/all baselessly speculative proposals anyone dreams up.

Well, I did say "IF he was the son of God", etc. — Apollodorus

Right, and I'm pointing out that he probably didn't (these were later theological inventions, which not present in the earlier Gospel accounts)- I wasn't faulting you for the statement, just answering that "if".

Plus, even for the early Christians, Jews included, Christianity was not a "new" religion but the restoration of the eternal Law of God. — Apollodorus

From the perspective of those early Christians, absolutely. Jews appear to have taken a different view, even from the beginning; as Paul notes, the idea of a crucified messiah was always a tough pill for the Jewish audience to swallow, since a dead (let alone crucified) messiah was basically a contradiction in terms (the messiah, in Jewish thinking at the time, was to be a glorious political/military figure, the person who would defeat the Romans... not get squashed by them) and the early evangelists had more success converting pagans than Jews for precisely this reason.

Moreover, especially if Jesus was the son of God and planned to establish a new religion — Apollodorus

There's no indication Jesus planned to establish a new religion (or saw himself as "the son of God"- this was probably a later theological development); Jesus was an observant Jew, who encouraged others to follow the (Jewish) Law. So far as we can tell what Jesus himself thought, Jesus saw his own role in terms of the fulfilment of the thoroughly Jewish expectation that God would overthrow the hated Romans and establish a good kingdom under the Davidic kingship of Israel in accordance with the Biblical covenant.

Transsexualism and transvestitism is an elaborate sexual masquerade--and certainly not the only sexual and non-sexual masquerade which humans perform. But let's stay honest: A man wearing a dress (even if an artificial vagina has been created) is still a masquerading man. A woman wearing a beard and a suit (even if an artificial penis has been created) is still a masquerading woman. — Bitter Crank

This isn't "being honest" so much as its being willfully ignorant. The mapping of gender roles onto the biological sexes (which is itself nowhere near so black and white as folks like you like to imagine) is itself an arbitrary social convention, its already a "masquerade" in the first place. Transsexualism (which is not the same as transvestitism) is no different in this regard, and pretending otherwise is just a post-hoc rationalization for personal prejudice. But points, I guess, for being open and honest about your own irrational prejudices; better an open bigot than a secret one, right?

this is sort of the key part of the article-

Modern mainstream Christian scholarship has generally rejected any travels by Jesus to India, Tibet or surrounding areas as without historical basis:

Jesus was a peasant from a tiny village in the backwaters of Roman Judea. He probably spent the "lost years" (the years of his life that are omitted from the Gospel narratives) doing the same sort of stuff peasants from rural Judea at the time tended to do. The most interesting thing he realistically could have gotten up to would have been studying with different Jewish sects, possibly the Essenes or Pharisees.

I don't know if Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and the several Roman Senators who considered themselves Stoics can be considered working men, or even Musonius Rufus for that matter. — Ciceronianus

Roman aristocrats tended to have a pretty dim view of anyone who worked for a living (rather than living off the profits from their estates) so I doubt it.

And you're probably right about Jesus and Greek influence; there's no indication Jesus could read or speak Greek, or had much of an education, and the rural backwaters of Galilee where he did most of his preaching were probably unlikely to be especially Romanized, or centers of culture or learning rather than just small fishing villages and so forth.

So there is probably very little direct influence in terms of Jesus himself (especially given Jesus's likely background coming from Nazareth), but there's no question that Greek philosophy (Plato in particular) tremendously influenced subsequent Christian church leaders and theologians in the decades and centuries that followed.

The strong anthropic principle is different. It states that the improbability of the conditions we find ourselves in here means that the universe must have been set up to promote the evolution of humans or someone like us. It's the fine tuning argument. — T Clark

Right, and as already noted its completely speculative and baseless, and the fine-tuning argument in particular rests on a claim about probability that can't be sustained. The only form of the anthropic principle that is credible is the so-called "weak" anthropic principle, which is more or less just a tautology.

Attributing purpose or intentionality to the universe is a personal matter of faith concerning theology and metaphysics, it has nothing to do with any established or accepted science.

Yes, really. — Gnomon

No, not really. The anthropic principle, at least in the form that is respectable/generally accepted, is basically just a tautology, stating the selection effect the fact that we exist has on our possible observations. It doesn't involve any purpose or intention on the part of the universe. And the "strong" anthropic principle proposed by people like Tipler is completely speculative (as they themselves admit) and not generally accepted or based on any actual empirical results.

The authors of the ACP book I quoted go beyond the mere evidence of a "selection effect" to imply that Darwin's aimless "Natural Selection" was found, on a cosmic scale, to be -- lawfully and seemingly intentionally -- directed toward the emergence of animated Life, and eventually of intentional Mind. — Gnomon

I'm hoping that you're misrepresenting them, because this is a mess. "Natural selection" was not found "on a cosmic scale" because natural selection in Darwin's sense, and in the sense that is actually well-established, pertains to a selection effect on biological organisms. Its not applicable to cosmology or the cosmos, except as an analogy or metaphor (as in Smolin's "Cosmological Natural Selection").

And the stuff about "seemingly intentionally" and "directed towards the emergence of.. life and eventually intentional mind" is also completely baseless and speculative. I don't doubt that some scientists hold such beliefs as a personal matter of faith, but that's all it is- a personal belief about theology or metaphysics, not an established scientific result or model. More theology than science.

But. don't blame me --- if your settled worldview is threatened by positive Evolution. I'm just the reporter of good news for the future of the living & thinking Cosmos. — Gnomon

Ah yes, I reel in terror from the daring and heroic Internet Truth-Speaker, wreaking havok on our "settled worldviews" with his speculative religious philosophy and pseudoscience... :lol:

At any rate, in the context of the discussion, I believe that aphorism is entirely appropriate. — Wayfarer

In other words, you're completely disregarding Banno's explanation of the context from which the quote was taken, and how it differs from the one in which you attempted to use it (a good and correct explanation, I should add).

The Anthropic Cosmological Principle implies that the evolution of the cosmos is teleological.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle — Gnomon

No, not really. The anthropic principle merely tells us that there is a selection effect on any observations we can make, in virtue of the fact that we exist in the first place to make those observations.

Another anti-realityist down the tubes. And here I thought this was a philosophy forum... — Garrett Travers

Wayfarer is good at complaining about "materialism" and parroting the same handful of quotes over and over. Actually arguing anything, otoh... that's not really what he does here. But that's more of a personal issue, there are anti-realists here and elsewhere who can (and do) actually argue their position.

And as you'll notice from the article, teleology in biology remains controversial, and even its proponents are quite explicit that they're talking about something different from teleology as e.g. Aristotle would have understood it (chiefly, in jettisoning the theological/metaphysical elements in favor of a naturalistic approach).

The precise definition of physicalism is, of course, a matter of controversy, and there are issues involving circularity, Hempel's dilemma, and so on.

But that's all sort of beside the point I was making, which was that Wayfarer was equivocating between "materialism" in its historical sense (as the position that everything is made of matter, a view virtually no one has held in a very long time) and "materialism" in the contemporary sense (which is just synonymous/interchangeable with "physicalism"), a consistent theme in his silly, dogmatic crusade against any traditions/positions that are critical of his preferred flavor of supernaturalist/spiritualist/mysterian woo.

The current thinking is as I stated, that we have no idea whether they can take on any values other than what they are, because we've only ever observed one universe with one set of values, and do not understand what physical mechanisms determine them- they must be measured, they are not predicted by any theory. It is hypothesized, in various speculative models (theories which have not been corroborated or established), that these constants can take on other values, but this is speculative and not routed in any observations or well-established theory.

So the point remains: the fine-tuning proponent has not and cannot establish that there is any improbability of the constants taking on values suitable for life. For all we know, the probability of those values is 100%. Or not. We simply do not know at present, which utterly shipwrecks the fine-tuning argument, at least any fine-tuning argument premised on a purported improbability.

Maybe someday we will discover whether the physical constants can take on other values, and we can/will revisit the issue then, but at present this version of the teleological argument is dead in the water.

It states that we have good reason to affirm theism because our universe exhibits evidence of very precise fine-tuning that would be very improbable under single-universe atheis — SwampMan

One of the main problems with the fine-tuning argument is that it has not, and probably cannot, establish this central claim about probability.

The notion that the physical constants taking on values that allow for life is somehow improbable is reached by assuming that these constants can take on arbitrary values; if they can take on arbitrary values, then surely the values landing in those small ranges that allow for life and structure is improbable, right?

The problem is, we have no idea whether they can take on arbitrary values, or indeed whether they can even take on any values other than the observed ones. We've only ever observed one universe, and one set of values, and we currently lack any established theory that predicts these values (they must be measured) or posits the mechanisms by which they are determined.

So for all we know, no other values are possible. Or maybe a small range of values is possible. Or maybe a large range. We simply don't know. But the proponent of the fine-tuning argument requires that we do know, enough to meaningfully assign any probabilities here- but we don't, and so we can't, and so the fine-tuning argument cannot proceed to its conclusion.