Are you equivocating here?

Either we define physics in terms of its object (the physical), or vice versa, the question of what is physical has not been given any content. It remains vacuous. — Πετροκότσυφας

I think you're onto something interesting here. It is vacuous in a way. In a way not. I think the apparent circularity is between the empirical science (physics) and its empirical object (the physical). I think this is only apparent however. Maybe the science of physics and its physical objects aren't defined in terms of each other but each depend upon a prior ontological disclosure of the world as physical. This world disclosure is not empirical, but purely ontological.

Heidegger often points out that the various "ontic" sciences all presuppose an ontology. He said somewhere that Newton's laws didn't exist before Newton. A tricky thought. The above paragraph is what he meant, I suspect.

No way I don't think that. I think you and I agree. All I have been trying to do is to show that the Webster definition is not suggesting this, that race (which is more complex that simply genes) produces particular cultures.

Why do you feel like there must be a different word to separate the Maori culture from the Maori race. — guidance

I don't. You do because you say race is not related to culture and then you go and use race to describe a kind of culture. The Maori culture is related to the Maori race in the way that Bitter describes:

Culture doesn't derive from race, ethnicity, or genetics -- or race, ethnicity or genetics from culture, but they all have this much in common: they are passed down through time from parents to children. — Bitter Crank

The reason why it is Maori culture and not corporate culture is because race is significant in this instance. And this is what the definition is saying. I cannot believe you cannot see that

We disagree on material traits of racial groups. Can you explain to me what those words mean to you. What are material traits of racial groups if not physical distinctions? — guidance

'Trait' has different meanings. It is a distinguishing characteristic of some kind. A material trait as concerns culture refers to the style of the material cultural features. For example, different cultures have unique architecture, tools, churches, art etc. By material trait they cannot mean 'physical distinctions' since they are also claiming that religious and social groups also have material traits.

The Maori race is the genetic side. The Maori culture is the location, way of life, social norms etc witch people of various genetics can be apart of if allowed. — guidance

But why 'Maori Culture'? If race is not related to culture then why call it Maori culture???

Maybe it would be interesting if you gave your view of how we even speak of Maori culture if culture is not related to race? Maori is a race. Putting Maori before culture to get 'Maori Culture' is relating race and culture is it not?

The definition sates that culture is based on race among other things, not generally based on race and other points, the definitions says it is based on race and other factors. — guidance

You have it back to front. The definition is not saying that culture is based on race, only that distinct racial groups have a shared culture. Are you wanting to deny that there is a Maori culture? You do not have to be a Maori to share in Maori culture, and similarly some Maoris will be indifferent to their own race's culture. Being "genetically" Maori is neither necessary and nor is it sufficient for the culture. The definition does not even suggest or imply this.

Again the definition: Culture is "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group."

A particular Maori might not share their Maori people's customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits. They thus wouldn't share in Maori culture even though they are Maori. The Maori race is the Maori group of people not an individual Maori person. This is why it is general, because they are referring to a racial group e.g. the Maori people, and not somebody's individual genetics.

I don't have a problem with that definition of race...

The definition of culture has nothing to do with race. You just spoke about cultures that can have many different variations of genetics depending on who is born where the culture is practiced. A person born in the culture does not have to have the same genetics as everyone else to be completely tied to that culture being what they were raised around. — guidance

I think you need to distinguish between race and genetics Race is social, genetics is science. Moreover, the definition does not mention genetics once.

Craig Venter and Francis Collins of the National Institute of Health jointly made the announcement of the mapping of the human genome in 2000. Upon examining the data from the genome mapping, Venter realized that although the genetic variation within the human species is on the order of 1–3% (instead of the previously assumed 1%), the types of variations do not support notion of genetically defined races. Venter said, "Race is a social concept. It's not a scientific one. There are no bright lines (that would stand out), if we could compare all the sequenced genomes of everyone on the planet." "When we try to apply science to try to sort out these social differences, it all falls apart." — bloodninja

I still dont know what you mean. By "defined by" i take it that you mean determined by. But the definition doesn't say that race determines culture. You are misreading the definition. All it means is that, generally speaking, a group of people who share a race generally also share common customs, social practices and material traits. GENERALLY SPEAKING. In other words, people who share the same race generally also share a common culture.

What do you mean by "related"? This is extremely ambiguous

If they did not then we couldn't speak of a Maori culture, or a Samoan culture for example. It would be unintelligible what we mean by these terms if they were not generally shared. Merely arguing that different Maoris partake in Maori culture to differing degrees or maybe not at all is just irrelevant. Is that your argument?

What do you mean by "not related to race"? It is time to get clear...

but the problem comes when someones race is connected to their culture, ideals, personality, or way of life. — guidance

The best way to sum up what I'm saying is learned behavior overrides any beliefs of genetic predisposition to living one way or another. — guidance

Did you think the definition that you mentioned was saying that race (or genetics as you understand it) somehow determines culture? I think you have slipped that idea in there on your own buddy.

The Webster definition reads that culture is "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group."

The definition does not say that culture has anything to do with a genetic predisposition, or more importantly, that race determines culture in some contradictory and weird genetic way (after all the definition EXPLICITLY suggests that culture is ONLY social and learned e.g.,"customary") . It is ONLY YOU who is adding to this definition that "genetics" somehow causes or determines culture. The definition does not say this at all. Race is but one example of a GROUP of people who happen to generally share similar social practices that are grounded in their shared history. Similarly religion is but one example of a GROUP, as are various other social forms examples of other GROUPS.

If you want to understand The Nothing watch The Never-ending Story. Abstract philosophical concepts are useless. We are the nothing.

if that is how morality is grounded then how is morality not completely accidental and arbitrary? But morality doesn't seem to be completely accidental and arbitrary...

Also, it's not a genealogical story about how morals came to be that I'm interested in. Rather, I'm asking about their grounding. In other words, what do our morals ultimately appeal to in order to receive their justification?

From Wikipedia:

Craig Venter and Francis Collins of the National Institute of Health jointly made the announcement of the mapping of the human genome in 2000. Upon examining the data from the genome mapping, Venter realized that although the genetic variation within the human species is on the order of 1–3% (instead of the previously assumed 1%), the types of variations do not support notion of genetically defined races. Venter said, "Race is a social concept. It's not a scientific one. There are no bright lines (that would stand out), if we could compare all the sequenced genomes of everyone on the planet." "When we try to apply science to try to sort out these social differences, it all falls apart."

race is not intrinsic to human beings but rather an identity created to establish meaning in a social context — Wayfarer

I agree with that. But given that race is not genetic, but is yet another socially constructed grouping like religion and "other social groupings" it does not seem politically incorrect to speak of a Samoan culture, Thai culture, Japanese culture. It's only if we reduce race to genetics that it would rightly be absurd, however, I don't think the definition is reducing race to genetics... or they would have used 'genetics' rather than race.

I think you may have misinterpreted the definition.

I think in your 2nd example, the customer is just nutty. So I don't think it has much to do with (in)authenticity.

It seems to me that meaning is grounded in our cultural background practices. I walk along the street and I am bombarded with meaning; its ubiquity sufocates me if I am in the right mood. Any "meaning to life" is also going to be grounded in our cultural background practices.

The seeing-of-the-how is critical, non-neutral. So conformity (immersion in its benefits and safety) is a big part of the cover of the how. — 0rff

I still feel confused about the how. Can you please repeat what you understand the how to mean?

Somehow making the possibility of death vivid as possibility is also a choosing of 'the essential guilt of Dasein itself.' How can we make sense of this? — 0rff

I think the only way to make guilt clear is to relate it to the care structure which is supposed to be an ontological characterization of how dasein exists. (Notice I used the word 'how' there. I think I read somewhere that 'the how' was eventually supplanted by the concept of 'care' in B&T. I think I must have read that in one of the many forewords in to the excerpts in his Basic Writings text I was skimming through recently.) So in B&T care is basically being ahead of itself (existence), being already in the world (facticity) as being alongside entities which we encounter within the world (falling). Guilt relates to facticity. He suggests that the only way that this purely formalised (i.e., formally indicated) existential concept is related to our everyday understanding of the same signifier is that both concepts share a 'lack' or a 'not' or a 'nullity'. Existential guilt has an existential nullity whereas everyday guilt has a present at hand or ready to hand nullity. He defines Guilty! or existential guilt in B&T as being the basis of a nullity. This existential nullity is specifically that we cannot get behind our thrownness. Or that we cannot choose the mattering into which we are thrown.

In B&T he says "How is dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet , as existing, it must take over being-a-basis..."

Hmm... similarly to how the different senses of guilt have differing ontological modes of nullity maybe the same is true of death. Perhaps biological perishing has a present at hand nullity? Demise, perhaps a case could be made that demise is intelligible only on the basis of a ready to hand nullity, maybe? Which leaves the existential nullity, death? As existential it is the future that will never arrive. Does that make sense? I mean maybe if we understand death purely existentially, then maybe death is the originary future, so to speak.

I think Heidegger's concept of wholeness too cannot be present at hand, nor ready to hand, but can only be an existential wholeness. As a contrast, an existentially unwhole existence would be loosing yourself in the cares and concerns of everydayness and the chatter of the they. Instead of loosing yourself, wholenesss would be winning yourself. As you quoted above:

The certainty of this possibility [of death] is seized when every other possible can-be of mine is set apart from it, that is, when the resoluteness toward itself is such that it is the source of the possibility of this or that action. — Heidegger

It has been a while since I read Brave New World. Do the test tube humans never get old because they undergo a tranquilised sedated demise as one does just because it's what one does? If so it is an absolutely ingenious example to use as a contrast to what Heidegger must mean by death. For those 'humans' in BNW (I'm not sure what they call themselves) Heideggerian death would be impossible. Would those beings in BMW even be dasein? Hardly... I should reread the book.

Hursthouse talks about v-rules. She means that the virtues already contain normative rules within them. E.g. "Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable". Even if one lacks the virtue of honesty, one would still be normatively bound by the v-rules me thinks.

Humans use language because, unlike other animals, we have self-consciousness. — Zoneofnonbeing

I wonder whether the reverse of this is truer.

I think that end note is written by Farin, not Heidegger, and so at best, it can only be taken as an interpretation of what Heidegger was trying to get across in using 'pastness'. I might be wrong, but to me the Farin interpretation in that endnote cannot be right. He seems to be interpreting pastness from an understanding of time as an endless succession of nows yet to come when he says: "at some point one's dasein will be over, a thing of the past. But of course its past status is yet to come. It lies in the future so to speak."

In the text itself, the sentences following endnote 29 read: "[In anticipating death...] There is no remaining in the world of concerned engagement.... [others] disappear when the world fades into the background." And in the next paragraph he writes: "So being-in is directed to a state in which it finds that 'nothing whatsoever' can affect it, that is, its being before nothing. This nothing, as that which dasein is faced with, throws dasein's being back solely on to itself. This ownmost 'in-itself' will no longer be 'there' in the world. This 'pastness', which is in each case one's own, pulls dasein back from its lostness in the 'one'."

From what I've quoted above, Heidegger seems to be talking about attunement/being-in. And he seems to be more or less equating this with pastness, to me. Do you read him differently?

This Farin translation is a great text! I plan to read it properly, but I have been quite busy the past few days. It was very interesting what you said above regarding ironism. It's actually the first time I have come across that term. Rorty is definitely on my reading list!

This for-the-sake-of-which is the "fundamental pose" or self-interpretation. So the for-sake-of-which explains the in-order-to which explains nature time and world time? — t0m

I think that is roughly how it unfolds in B&T

Why do humans bother to structure time as they do? Our use of time as a sequence of nows is part of a how that is more primordial than these nows. Not it from bit, but now from how? — t0m

Because nobody would understand what the time was otherwise haha. But I think Blattner/Heidegger argue that originary temporality is more or less the framework that makes sense of, or structures, world time. So world time, I think, or perhaps the temporality of circumspective concern, is the "making present" within the non-successive, finite future/past of originary temporality. In other words world time is contained within originary temporality. I think Blattner mentioned that in the article, he calls it the "world-time embeddedness thesis".

I do find it hard to ignore something like the "ideal" having a deep place in Dasein. What I have in mind is the role that one is identified with, the "for-the-sake-of." Why, for instance, are we interpreting Heidegger? How does that fit into our big plan for ourselves or into our individual understandings of being? — t0m

Doesn't the ideal in the sense you are using it imply a conscious awareness of it? I'm not so sure that is the level at which Heidegger is doing his phenomenology. I'm not denying that we don't all have ideals.

Just a thought... Maybe death just is this existential unattainability?

That Blattner article is great!

One might think also of inertia or momentum. If existence is what it understands itself to be and it understands itself to be an ideal how or "future," then the other part of this structure is the "rest of the train." The future or the how is the "head" of the snake, the cutting edge. Remember the tubes in Donnie Darko? — t0m

I'm not so sure about this... Heidegger does describe a 'temporality of circumspective concern', which is more closely related to world time than primordial temporality, and the Donnie Darko tubes are probably a nice illustration of this. Regarding primordial temporality, which is what Blattner is discussing here, I don't think the metaphor of a train will really work. This is because the train metaphor and the Donnie Darko tubes imply a temporal succession and primordial temporality is not successive. By "drag" I think Battner is only illustrating the thrownness that structures our projection into an existentially unattainable for-the-sake-of-which. This thrownness is our existential determinateness, or in a word, mattering. Maybe "drag" was not the best choice of word for him to use...

I was thinking about the 'how' issue you raised above. I would disagree that the 'how' is anything ideal, it is rather existential. Perhaps one way to think about it is that normal successive time is characterised as a 'what', whereas non-successive primordial temporality is characterised by the 'how'. Or rather, perhaps non-successive primordial temporality and the 'how' are the same thing. Perhaps in that early lecture he was still grasping for his original conception of primordial temporality, and the 'how' was a temporary placeholder for it? In the Concept of Time he says:

"...the fundamental character of this entity is its 'how'." (pg. 13) Or in other words, Dasein is primordial temporality, in B&T language.

We wish to repeat temporally the question of what time is. Time is the 'how'. If we inquire into what time is, then one may not cling prematurely to an answer (time is such and such), for this always means a 'what'.

Let us disregard the answer and repeat the question. What happened to the question? It has transformed itself. What is time? became the question: Who is the time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable. — Heidegger

Hey Tom, sorry I haven't had much time to engage in this discussion. But what do you think Heidegger means by pastness in The Concept of Time?

Running ahead toward the ultimate possibility reveals the pastness of being-in-the-world, the possible 'no-longer-there'. — Heidegger

By 'the possible no-longer-there' I take him to mean no longer 'in' the world. As he says in B&T being-in is largely determined by our moods/disposedness/attunements (or 'state-of-mind' in the M&R translation). The attunement in which one is no longer there in the world, and where the world becomes backgrounded, is angst. Is the past in the sense that he is getting at simply angst?

Try replacing 'pastness' with 'angst' in the below quotations. In my opinion it brings great clarity:

'Pastness' reveals the ultimate possiblity that Dasein is handed over to itself, in other words it becomes manifest that, if it wants to be what it is authentically, Dasein must exist of its own accord. — Heidegger

This ownmost 'in itself' will no longer be 'there' in the world. This 'pastness' which is in each case one's own, pulls Dasein back from its lostness in the public averageness of 'one. — Heidegger

Morals can be viewed as a thing much larger than us puny humans. — BlueBanana

How so? Morality is only human. God is dead.

Sentience isn't complex? The most conventional view is that morals only apply to sentient beings, and therefor it's quite logical to say that morals are a property of sentient beings or their sentience. — BlueBanana

Sentience is absolutely irrelevant as far as the grounding of morality is concerned. I think you are also misusing the concept "property". How can morals be a property? Do you understand what morality is? Morality is not a property.

Randomly picking humans from the group of anything imaginable seems biased as we are humans. I'd rather take a rock or something into consideration. — BlueBanana

Sorry I don't understand, can you please explain more what you meant here?

Why? Because animals shouldn't be treated well or because of reasons related to discussing the subject? — BlueBanana

No because the idea of sentience grounding morality can't be taken seriously. Morality is far too complex to be grounded in sentience.

Your interpretation, as far as I can tell... — BlueBanana

Here is my interpretation:

The difference between possessing an innate nature and not is that if the former is true then we can ground our moral claims and give them strong normative force. If the latter is true, and there is no innate human nature, then it appears that we have nothing to ground our moral claims in so they have weak normative force; we would be a social construction just like the socially constructed moral claims. Morality would be completely meaningless and arbitrary. To the question why be good? there would be no sufficient answer. — bloodninja

Yet it seems vague — t0m

I agree. It does seem vague. I'm no expert either but I think the reason it looks vague to us is that we perhaps don't have a complete understanding of the phenomenon that Heidegger is getting at. Whereas he probably did. At the start of Div 2 he claims that our interpretation of the meaning of being will only be as good as our interpretation of dasein; the latter interpretation is supposed to function as the basis for the former interpretation. His claim is that for any interpretation to be accurate and not arbitrary, the phenomenon to be interpreted needs to be grasped as a whole. He then denies that we have the whole phenomenon (of dasein) in our grasp due to Div 1's focus on everydayness. How can we get the whole phenomenon in our grasp? This question instinctively leads to a discussion of death, which, it turns out, does not constitute dasein's wholeness on its own; this is the same as saying that authenticity is not constituted by death, or our response to it, alone.

I think the kind of wholeness he is grasping for through discussing death, guilt, etc. is the finite temporal unity of past and future in originary temporality. This is super complex and I don't have a sound understanding of originary temporality yet. But this is the path of his phenomenology in Being and Time as I see it. I doubt we can understand what he's getting at with death until we understand what he means by the primordially finite existential future/past of originary temporality. I may be wrong. But this how I'm currently thinking.

That one dies one's own death seems at least as central. — t0m

I agree absolutely. I also liked Carman's apt description of biological perishing and biographical demise.

I suspect the 'existential wholeness' aspect of death is what is most important, and that the mineness of death you mention receives its importance due to the centrality of this 'wholeness' aspect. Heidegger eventually says something like that it is through anticipatory resoluteness that dasein gains its existentiell wholeness; or that the ontology of death finds its existentiell attestation in anticipatory resoluteness. So regarding dasein's wholeness, which is what he is primarily questioning at this point in the book, and how he introduces the chapter, existential death (anticipation) is but one part it seems... Does this make sense?

That Carol White forward written by Dreyfus that you linked above is brilliant and extremely comprehensive! I would HIGHLY recommend that everyone who is interested in this discussion's topic read it! Here it is again:

http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/189_s08/pdf/Carol%20White%20forward.pdf

I was quietly thinking to myself that the gradual closing down of possibilities cannot be what Heidegger meant by death. Dreyfus's criticism of Carman's interpretation is spot on and devastating in my opinion.

To give some examples:
God
Well-being (of anything)
Well-being of any sentient beings
Culture
Nothing — BlueBanana

1. God. Which god? Jesus? Allah? Shiva? Buddha? Brahma? Ganesha? Mahavira? etc. etc...
2. Well-being. Okay but how would one know what would count as well-being to begin with? Only by having an idea of the nature of the being in question? For example, The well-being of the human would depend on what it means for a human to live well, which in turn requires something like a description of human nature. It's only upon the basis of some conception of human nature that the idea of "well-being" or flourishing makes sense.
3. Well-being of any sentient beings. No comment.
4. Culture. Well this is EXACTLY my view. And it means that Morality with a capital M is groundless.
5. Nothing. Interesting... What do you mean? Do you mean: we just do what one does because it's what one does, and it's ultimately meaningless?

↪Rich Well if there is no universal moral code then how do we know what is moral and what isn't. I mean I could just one day decide that it's wrong to do anything and that would be a moral code. — Matthew Gould

That there is no universal moral code does not entail that morality is as arbitrary as you portray it!

I really liked learning and reading Schopenhauer at Uni. It was so different to everything else that I had encountered at that point. All I was meaning is that, as you know, he was trying to find the metaphysical knowledge that Kant said was impossible since the human subject is structured by a transcendental limitation, you might say. However, I feel like we are now living in a post-metaphysical world, both culturally and philosophically. Or in other words, that God is Dead, as Nietzsche said. Maybe I'm cynical. Maybe don't listen to me.

Is this "two-aspect" theory consistent with an ontological dependence relationship? there is an ontological dependence of things in the empirical world representational world) on the will? or is it a mutual/reciprocal ontological dependence? — jancanc

I like his use of the word 'manifest' to describe his view that the will is one. It's interesting, his view was that by denying the will to live through asceticism, we could reduce suffering. Didn't he also think that we are ultimately responsible for causing the suffering in the world? This is because we are the Kantian transcendentally ideal subjects, and thus we are the conditions of possibility (e.g. space, time, etc) for the one will to 'individuate' and feed upon itself. From this it seems suffering is not reciprocal at all but requires the Kantian subject in order to be.