Okay, I might be a little out of my league in this discussion, but I have some thoughts upon this issue, nonetheless.
An unself-conscious and unaware organism that acts as if it's self-conscious and aware in a way that cannot be detected either physically or by observing its behavior is conscious and aware.
— T Clark — TheMadFool
The "p-zombie" is an obvious impossibility. An "
organism" cannot behave as if it is conscious and aware if it is not conscious and aware. Such a situation can only pertain to advanced computer architecture, that is, to AI.
The Turing Test
If a machine can fool a person into believing that it itself is a person, it must be considered as AI. — TheMadFool
Sure, okay...
In other words, AI is a person. — TheMadFool
Slow down, please. This, so long as the AI can be rendered, can be made to be,
sentient, that is, can be made able to experience rational thought (check), sensation (probably, in some senses), and feeling...emotion (this is doubtful to me). I doubt that AI can be made to experience emotion, but rather to experience the semblance of emotion. AI architecture can be made to replicate human neural, bioelectrical anatomy, and so produce rational thought in quite an efficient manner. The human experience of emotion, though, is more dependent upon brain chemistry than upon neural architecture, and I am doubtful that this can be replicated in AI. Without the experience of emotion, I am not sure if you can characterize any subject as "a person".
The premise underlying the Turing Test is:
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's the principle of the identity of indiscernibles which, unlike its converse, the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, is, last I checked, controversial.
The Turing Rule is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and it's the premise on which the Turing Test is based. — TheMadFool
This is where I have had several pertinent thoughts. As someone deeply interested in language, my first thought regarding these two principles, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, is that they do not represent conversive analogues of one another as they are herein stated in English. This is based upon a semantic distinction which I noticed immediately within the OP. This is because the nouns identity and indiscernibility are not directly analogous. The direct analogue to
indiscernibility, an abstract noun derived from the adjective
indiscernible would be
identicality or
identicalness, the abstract noun derived from the adjective
identical, which nouns, both meaning "bearing utter likeness", have a much narrower semantic field that does
identity which is ultimately an abstract noun derived from the Latin determiner
idem, meaning "the same". Note that "the same" can mean "bearing utter likeness (to another)" or can mean "not the other, but the same one", in other words, "selfsame...the same as itself". Since this is so, the two lemmas,
identicality and
identicalness are more specific in their meaning, and so are the proper terms to use as analogues of
indiscernibility. Of the two, I would choose to use
identicality because of the morphological uniformity which it presents within the argument. Despite all this, I note that
identity of indiscernibles is the terminology usually used for statement of the principle, and I only state my observation as an observation without demanding a change.
The symbolic representation of these two principles,
1. The indiscernibility of identicals: ∀x∀y[x=y→∀F(Fx↔Fy)]
For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the same properties.
2. The identity of indiscernibles: ∀x∀y[∀F(Fx↔Fy)→x=y]
For any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y. — TheMadFool
provides a more accurate means of stating the principles for a criticism thereof. Therefore, let the following obtain:
∀x∀y[x=y→∀F(Fx↔Fy)]
For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the same properties, or
if two objects are absolutely identical then they must be indistinguishable from one another with respect to all of their properties;
∀x∀y[∀F(Fx↔Fy)→x=y]
For any x and y, if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y, or
if two objects are indistinguishable from one another with respect to all of their properties then they are identical.
My thought is that x=y→∀F(Fx↔Fy) is a valid statement, while ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y is invalid. The argument ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y is dependent upon the premise that x and y can be found to be indistinguishable based upon ∀F. I contend that this premise is false. I say this because of the inability of the human being to fully discern ∀F, utter discernment of ∀F not appearing to be achievable within reality. While x=y→∀F(Fx↔Fy) holds as a matter of logic, ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y is utterly dependent upon the discernment of ∀F, which in actuality is impossible for the human being. In every case for which ∀F is not discernible, which I argue is every case in reality,
identity, or more properly
identicality is not discerned despite the appearence of indistinguishability. Beyond that, I believe that ∀F represents an ideal not to be found within the universe. I think that this is what Gary Washburn meant in stating that:
Identity is not an attribute. There is absolutely nothing it is "like" to conscious. Uniqueness is not a myth. — Gary M Washburn
since, therefore ∀F is not a reality, ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y can never hold in the universe, and so x can never be the equaivalent of y in reality.
These are my thoughts thus far on the subject of these two principles, to which I have only now been exposed. Maybe all that I have to say is nonsense...