Each word counts. And it is why I wonder at the change from 'Heedlessness' to 'Forgetfulness'. When it seems clear that the purpose of the drinking from the river is to forget, rather than to become 'careless'. — Amity

The two words, 'forgetting' and 'carelessness' are both clearly in the account. I fault the translations that fail to convey the difference between the two. I am curious why it is ignored by many translators. The water can have two properties at the same time. The 'lack of measure', displayed by many, is a kind of carelessness.

The convergence of the two properties makes sense as an observation of life. The oblivion of forgetting is like the not-remembering where you are that being thoughtless inculcates. The opposite of both properties is needed for 'seeking justice with intelligence' called for by Socrates in the final address to Glaucon. Departed souls don't get to do much seeking.

I wonder if Plato didn't include this as an option because he was arguing against the use of poetry? — Amity

I agree with @Fooloso4 view of the poetry being re-directed to Plato's ends to address the weakness of Homer and Hesiod discussed at the beginning of Book 10. What is included or not of the commonly told stories becomes a discussion amongst the stories.

We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b) — Fooloso4

:up: Where the image of the charioteer speaks of the reality beyond images..

The question of 'drinking too much' oblivion reminds me that the mythology of Hesiod and the Orphic mysteries have the role of Lethe set over against the role of Mnemosyne (or Memory).

Sipping the water of Mnemosyne is not given as one of the options in the Er account. That is interesting considering that Plato uses the mythos of Recollection (anamnesis) or call to mind, in different discussions of learning. That suggests to me that the role of recollection is principally the activity of the living soul.

The absence of Mnemosyne in Plato's account suggests to me that he is not concerned with remembering past 'life' of the soul in the way that interested Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists.

Just a quick note on the Greek: the place next to the river is called a plain: "τῆς Λήθης πεδίον"

πεδίον (pedion) is defined in the lexicon as: flat, level, on or of the plain. Jones and Preddy translate this word directly:

And then, without turning round, it went beneath the throne of Necessity, and after passing through it, when the rest had also passed through, they all made their way to the plain of Lethe through terrifying choking fire: for the place was empty of trees and anything else that grows in the earth. — ibid. 621a

Edit to add:
By way of description, there is mention of the 'river of carelessness': τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν.

Ἀμέλητα (amelta) is defined as neglectful, heedless, etcetera. I will look around for a translation that expresses this distinct usage. For now, it should be noted that two different words are in play here.

Edit #2 I found Horan makes the distinction:

From there it went, inexorably, beneath the throne of Necessity, 621A and when it had gone through, since the others had also gone through, they all proceeded to the Plain of Forgetfulness through terrible burning, stifling heat, for the place is devoid of trees or anything that springs from the earth. Evening was coming on by then, so they encamped beside the River of Heedlessness whose water no vessel can contain. Now it was necessary for all of them to drink a measure of the water, but some, who were not protected by wisdom, drank more than the measure, and as he drank, 621B each forgot everything. — translated by Horan

Excellent attempt at reframing the odd into the normative. Your job is secure until it does not matter.

Surprising to learn that his work wasn't well received while he was alive. — praxis

He freaked people out. Like hearing Hendrix in the beginning.

I agree with that interpretation. I also agree with your view of Odysseus as a 'repurposed' life.

The distinction between the choice and the "assignment" of fate also has the cosmological dimension of depicting the life we encounter. Just as the Timaeus does in your comment here.

Edited to add @Fooloso4:
The cosmological element is also what I was thinking about above when comparing the three daughters as depicted in Er and in Theogony. Like Homer, Hesiod is preserved and changed at the same time.

Yes, the choice of the soul does seem to be separated from the work of assignment by Lachesis.

I am not sure how it relates to your previous comment about virtue, but I read the role of 'assignment' in this passage as meaning that much more is required for our life to happen than the initial choice. Those requirements, however, do not allow us to "blame the gods" for our choice.

Plato’s concept of necessity differs from ours. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. Necessary causes can act contrary to intelligible causes. — Fooloso4

I wonder if the language of Hesiod plays a part in this:

Thus it is not possible to deceive or elude the mind of Zeus. For not even Iapetus’ son, guileful34 Prometheus, escaped his heavy wrath, but by necessity a great bond holds him down, shrewd though he be. — Hesiod, Theogony, 613, translated by Glenn W. Most

Each soul chooses a daimon and also a pattern of life. (617e) The daimon is the guardian of that life. (620d) Nothing is said about choosing a daimon, on what basis it is chosen, or how closely it reflects the soul that chooses it. — Fooloso4

The relationship between the choosing and the daimon seems to be an assignment by a daughter of Necessity:

“So when all the souls had chosen their lives, according to the draw they approached Lachesis in order and she gave each the spirit (daimon) they had chosen to escort them as protector through their lives and as fulfiller of their choices. — ibid. 620d

The daimon impels a movement forward as well as enforcing the consequences of the choice.

Comparing the myth of Er with Hesiod's Theogony, shows the Fates literally having a darker story in the latter version:

Night bore loathsome Doom and black Fate and Death, and she bore Sleep, and she gave birth to the tribe of Dreams. Second, then, gloomy Night bore Blame and painful Distress, although she had slept with none of the gods, and the Hesperides, who care for the golden, beautiful apples beyond glorious Ocean and the trees bearing this fruit. And she bore (a) Destinies and (b) pitilessly punishing Fates, (a) Clotho (Spinner) and Lachesis (Portion) and Atropos (Inflexible), who give to mortals when they are born both good and evil to have, and (b) who hold fast to the transgressions of both men and gods; and the goddesses never cease from their terrible wrath until they give evil punishment to whoever commits a crime. Deadly Night gave birth to Nemesis (Indignation) too, a woe for mortal human beings; and after her she bore Deceit and Fondness and baneful Old Age, and she bore hard-hearted Strife. — ibid. 211

The role of the daimon emerges as a dynamic belonging to an individual life.

As depicted in the story, the options are listed as what the lottery offers. Some are left scrabbling for the last bits.

I recognize how the Aristotle view is a part of the conversation.

Presumably, the impetus of 'willing x makes it so' is either a tilt at a windmill or a collapse of all willing. The idea of a Supreme Being can play either side.

:up:
The level of detail in the composition blows my mind.

I am going to be slow to respond to the other parts of the Er story because I am a slow reader. I will check out your sources. This is an interesting part of the dialogue that I have skimped over in the past.

Just wanted to say I respect C.D.C Reeve's translations. I prefer others for different reasons, but he is very consistent in his use of phrases.

The description of the spindle whorls is hard to visualize on the cosmological scale. I went searching for information that could give me a leg up from the statement: "The nature of the whorl is as follows: its shape is like the ones we use...." The most succinct explanation I could find is on this site where the section, Process of Ancient Spinning and Weaving can be found.

Here is another, Picturing Homeric Weaving, that has helpful references to the process as a part of the whole art of producing fabric.

Here is a single image of the whorls shown together in the first website.

The are some seemingly impossible features of the subsequent descriptions of the whorls within other whorls I won't try to wrap my brain around right now. Maybe in the coming week. I will end with two observations:

The humble beginning of this elaborate image connects this process with the techne emphasized at the beginning of Book 10, where the carpenter makes usable beds and chairs.

When the souls are choosing their future habitations, Epeius selects:

After her he saw the soul of Panopeus’ son Epeius entering the nature of a female craftworker. — ibid. 620c

The footnote provided: "Epeius built the wooden horse of Troy; also distinguished himself at Achilles’ funeral games as a champion boxer (Hom.Il. 23.664ff.).

Thank you for the friendly response. I want to make it clear that I am not arguing on the basis of any authority. There are plenty of scholars who disagree with me for many different reasons. Maybe I could find common ground with Taylor on other statements. That 'radical' feminism is in collision with Plato's view of society must somehow be the case.

What I specifically challenge in the Taylor passage is this (emphasis mine):

The modern feminists’ quarrel with Plato is not that their ideals are totally alien to him, but that he is wrong to think that those ideals are attainable within his preferred form of political organisation, and even more radically wrong to think that they require that organisation. In that objection they find many allies outside their own ranks. — The Role of Women in Plato's Republic - C. C. W. Taylor

I read Book 5 as describing a city where the complete separation of public and private works and interests has been established. They are not proposed as a means to an end. Plato recognizes that anything like this result runs strongly against the way polity actually has formed and changed over time. Book 8 focuses on this process:

“

Then do you know,” I asked, “there must be as many kinds of human beings as there are constitutions? Or do you think constitutions grow somewhere ‘from oak’ or ‘from stone,’ but not from the practices of those who live in states which as it were tip the scales and drag everything with them?”

“In my view they come from nowhere but the place you just mentioned,” he said.“Then do you know,” I asked, “there must be as many kinds of human beings as there are constitutions? Or do you think constitutions grow somewhere ‘from oak’ or ‘from stone,’ but not from the practices of those who live in states which as it were tip the scales and drag everything with them?”

“In my view they come from nowhere but the place you just mentioned,” he said.“So if there are five kinds of state then, there would also be five types of soul among the citizens?”

“Certainly.”

“Indeed, we’ve already discussed the man who shares the characteristics of the aristocratic state whom we rightly said was good and just.”

“We have.”

“Are we then to go through the next stage and look at those who are inferior, the contentious and ambitious type corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and again look at the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical type so we can identify the most unjust and set him against the most just; and our examination will be complete when we discover how perfect justice stands in relation to pure injustice in the matter of the possession of happiness and misery, so that we can either heed Thrasymachus and pursue injustice, or, the way our discussion is now developing, justice?” — Book 8, 345e, translated by Jones and Preddy

While looking at each of these 'regimes', the relationship between husband and wife and the raising of children is examined as a part of the 'psychological' examination of the best life we can aim for in the 'less perfect' cities. It is not clear how this evaluation relates to the 'ideal' described in Book 5. In the language of Book 10, how does the craftsman make this in the way a chair becomes something we can sit upon?

I agree.
Taylor treats the 'ideal' city as a kind of governance in the way being discussed in Book 8. The focus there is that particular kinds of people predominate in particular kinds of Cities. In those accounts, there are many discussions of the roles of men and women and children. The metric of the 'city of words' is used to measure what changes in the field.

One thing that strikes me about the myth of Er is that the reassignment of souls requires a level of election by the self where a man could become a woman, a human an animal, and vice versa. An equality of all possible fates.

Likewise, or 'back at you' as an American might say.

I have been reading Republic Book 10 for the sake of the Fooloso4 thread and came across a positively Dantean passage that does not belong being quoted over there (at least so far). This is a near death experience that Er reports:

“He said that his soul left him and made its way with many others and they came to a sacred spot where there were two openings in the ground next to each other, and two others opposite them in the sky above. Between them sat judges who, when they had passed sentence, ordered the just to make their way to the opening on the right leading up through the sky, and they fixed placards on the front of their bodies indicating their judgments, while the unjust were sent to the left-hand downward path and they also had indications of all they had done attached to their backs. But when he himself came forward, they said that he must become the messenger to mankind of what was happening there, and they ordered him to listen to and observe everything in that place.

“In this way, then, he said he saw the souls, when judgment had been passed, leaving by one of the openings in the sky and one in the ground, while by the other two, out of the one coming up from the ground, were souls covered in filth and dust, and down from the other one from the sky came others purified. — Plato, Republic, 614c, translated by Jones and Preddy

In Dante, of course, there is no return. The location of the placards on the front or back sends a chill down my spine.

Book 10 concentrates on different ways a soul might get what is their due, in this life or afterwards. Plato placing tradition in continuum with previous challenges puts the immediate discussion in a broader context. The traditions Socrates is found questioning in many of the Dialogues involve a collision with a code of silence of sorts.

For example, when Socrates challenges Antyus in Meno, the talk about learning virtue is seen by Antyus as an assault upon his honor. There is a vivid Homeric logic to what might happen next.

Euthyphro provides another point of contrast but without the threat of violence pointed to in Meno and Republic Book 1.

I find the specificity of Socrates' letter to Homer interesting. Here is the continuation after your quote:

What state gives you the credit of having been a good lawgiver and having benefited it? Italy and Sicily would claim Charondas, we would claim Solon. Who would claim you?’ Will he be able to answer?”

“I don’t think so,” said Glaucon. “Nothing is said on the matter even by the Homeridae themselves.”

“There again, what war is on record as being well fought in Homer’s time under his leadership or on his advice?”

“None.”

“Or again, as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man, are there many ingenious inventions and clever contrivances in crafts or any other activities that are mentioned, as they are with the Milesian Thales and the Scythian Anacharsis?”

“Nothing of that sort at all.”

“And yet again, if not in public life, in private life is Homer himself said to have been a leading educator in his own lifetime for some who delighted in his company and passed on a kind of Homeric way of life to their successors, as Pythagoras himself was particularly loved for this, and even today his successors seem to be distinguished among the rest for a way of life they call Pythagorean?” — Republic, 599e, translated by Jones and Preddy

This places Plato's effort in a continuum which is rarely expressed so directly in the Dialogues. It also points to a negative space where people can assemble. A way of life that does not talk about itself. That points back to the question of what Simonides meant to say in Book 1

There is plenty for the reader of today. I was mostly thinking how sure Dante sounded when claiming to know what the coming judgement of some of his contemporaries was going to be. This life and the afterlife are woven together.

I will think about what Mandelstam is saying and try to dip into the Cantos again. It has been a while.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood.

it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage in question is not claiming that result.

Your introduction of how well the eggs can be understood through time prompted me to think about how different a book the Inferno by Dante was for the generations closest to it.

The double standard involved with discussing cruelty is there. As a matter of public discourse, the language of complete vindication is different than what the U.S. should do as a polity.

Your choice to not choose between possible administrations ignores the extreme rhetoric from the Trump side that has been going on for years. As citizens, these differences appear in outcomes in our communities. Don't gnash your teeth in self-imposed silence.

Since you are compelled to undermine my reputation as a scholar, I will give the matter one last go:

The original translation I quoted from CDC Reeve agrees with HG Apostle, and Hugh Tredennick, who I quoted above from the Loeb Edition. Tredennick is also the translator of the English version at Perseus where I got the Greek text from.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present:

“Actuality “means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by “potentially.” We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, from potentiality. because it can be separated from it: and as we call even a man who is not studying “a scholar” if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually. What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. — ibid. 1048a30, emphasis mine

The antithesis is what will have to be applied analogically. The precise terms of actuality and potentiality are supplied in the text as ratios. That statement is not saying:

So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so.

Edit to Add for Aquinas Fans:

1825. Now actuality (769).

Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.

1826. What we mean (770).

Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.

1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.

And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are. — Aquinas, Commentaries on Metaphysics, LESSON 5 Actuality and Its Various Meanings ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1048a 25-1048b 36

Now, that will be my last word. I leave your Church of the Only Aristotle. It is nice outside.

The negative feedback from both sources tortured Edgar Allen Poe while inspiring him at the same time.

We will have to agree to disagree. In any case, I will say no more here.

You have the same resources I have on the site. Use them if you are genuinely curious about past interchanges.

I could do that sort of thing, given what you have said in the past.
Your lack of interest in supporting any of that stuff for the sake of forcing me to repeat it is not the mark of a gentleman.

That is not what I said. You have said the state is an illusion..

Your often repeated idea of the "state" is that it is a shared misconception rather that an existing thing. You are now asking that illusion to perform better.

How do these problems fit into your libertarian vibe that nothing can be done by the state?

It won't mean much to the Trump pooper scooper but here is an update:

FEMA deploys to rough terrain after Helene as it faces criticism, fights misinformation.

Your link failed.

With the "not wanting to spare anybody from thinking", there is introduced an element which my teachers of Wittgenstein emphasized. The benefit from the way out is only helpful for those who sincerely have the problems, If we can stand outside of the circle and express superiority over the poor fucks who suffer that sort of thing, then that would be a kind of psychology.

The Trump team plays both sides of that:

Trump FEMA Claim Debunked: Agency Not Running Out Of Money Because Of Migrants.

In the report:

Congress determines how much money goes to FEMA’s disaster fund, and the fund faces issues after lawmakers declined to allocate additional funding for FEMA’s efforts in the stopgap funding bill it passed last month, only extending FEMA’s existing funding level and allowing it to draw from $20 billion in funds more quickly.

It was the MAGA minions, of course, who pushed for that.

False. It was taken up as a slogan by a rather detrimental portion of the male populace of the USA for a short period. — AmadeusD

I had no idea. I must be using the wrong locker rooms.

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is:

καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — Theta 1048a35

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10:

But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. — Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Edition

Not being able to define actuality and potentiality more precisely echoes Aristotle wanting to move past Empedocles in Delta:

Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but a name given to these by men. — ibid. 1015a1

Hence as regards those things which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they have not their nature yet unless they have their form and shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e. the end of the process of generation. Indeed from this sense of “nature,” by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called “nature,” because the nature of anything is a kind of essence.

From what has been said, then, the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually. — ibid 1015a6, emphasis mine

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6.

Revealing comment.