I am responding to your comment in the Griffin thread in this one because it concerns the current discussion of how "matter" is to be understood in the works of Aristotle and Plotinus.

In the Gerson review of Johansen, Aristotle's treatment of the "receptacle of creation", introduced at Timaeus 49A, is said to be:

In the sixth chapter, Johansen turns to an analysis of the receptacle of creation, arguing that its function is to be understood in the light of Plato’s conception of what coming into being actually is. The receptacle constitutes space (or place) because Plato needs to postulate a condition for something’s coming into or going out of existence. These are construed as “a certain kind of movement in and out of space (122).” Consideration of such movement abstracts from the mathematical conceptualization of nature. Thus coming into existence and going out of existence are really cases of the locomotion of the solid triangles out of which bodies are constructed. This is in contrast to the pre- kosmos where the coming into and going out of existence of the phenomenal bodies does not involve the movement of triangles. Both in the pre- kosmos and in the kosmos itself, movement is intrinsic to the phenomenal bodies or elements and is only derivatively attributable to the receptacle. Johansen goes on to argue that, in addition to the receptacle’s representing space or place, Aristotle was basically correct to identify it with matter. So, “place and matter coincide in that both are to be understood as the product of abstracting the formal characteristics of a body (133).” Space or place becomes mere extension. The receptacle thus becomes the continuant in change, which in the context of Timaeus is essentially locomotion. By contrast, Aristotle wants to distinguish fundamentally locomotion from other types of change — especially generation and destruction — and so he makes a sharper distinction between space or place and matter than does Plato. — Gerson, review of Plato's Natural Philosophy

I don't know if this account corresponds to Johansen's text but it leaves out a critical context in the dialogue. The "receptacle" is introduced at the start of a new beginning:

Clearly we should now begin again, once we have called upon 48E the god, our saviour, at the very outset of our deliberations to see us safely out of an unusual and unaccustomed exposition, to the doctrine of things probable. In any case, our fresh start concerning the universe should be more elaborate than before, for we distinguished two entities then, but now we must present a third factor. Two were sufficient for our previous descriptions, one designated as a sort of a model discernible by Nous and ever the same, while the second was a copy of the model 49A involved in becoming and visible. We did not distinguish a third entity at the time as we thought it enough to have these two, but now the argument seems to compel us to try to manifest a difficult and obscure form in words. What should we understand its capacity and nature to be? This in particular: it is the receptacle of all coming into being, like its nurse. Now although the truth has been spoken, a clearer statement about it is still required but it is difficult to do so, particularly 49B because it is necessary for the sake of this to raise a preliminary problem about fire and its accompaniments. It is difficult in the case of each of these to state what sort should actually be called water rather than fire, and what sort should be referred to as anything in particular rather than as everything individually, in such a manner as to employ language which is trustworthy and certain. How then, may we speak about them in a likely manner and in what way, and what can we say about them when faced with this problem? — Plato, Timaeus, translated by Horan

I take Gerson's point that a "likely account" does not refer to its "probabilistic" sense. The difficulty described by Timaeus is that the language of correspondence does not serve us as readily as it did in the other two models. The other difficulty is that third entity is prior to the other entities as fundamental ground of natural being. The new beginning is in that sense a second sailing as taken in the Phaedo (to which Fooloso4 often refers to.

A scholar who takes that perspective seriously is John Sallis. He takes exception to how χώρα is referred to as "space" in the sense of extension in (as expressed in Gerson's review) and even greater exception to Aristotle equating χώρα with "place" (τόπος):

For, according to Aristotle, this is what Plato declared the receptacle to be: “a substratum [ύποκείμενον] prior to the so-called elements, just as gold is the substratum of works made of gold.” Though in this context Aristotle refers to one other image of the χώρα, that of nurse (τιθήνη), he forgoes drawing on the content of that image and, instead, moves immediately to identify the receptacle with “primary matter” (329a). Yet the passage that is, at once, both most decisive and most puzzling occurs in Book 4 of the Physics: “This is why Plato says in the Timaeus that matter and the χώρα are the same; for the receptive and the χώρα are one and the same. Although the manner in which he speaks about the receptive in the Timaeus differs from that in the so-called unwritten teachings, nevertheless he declares that place [τόπος] and the χώρα are the same” (209b).

One cannot but be struck by the lack of correspondence between this passage and the text of the Timaeus. The passage declares three identifications: that of the receptive (μεταληπτικόν) with the χώρα, that of matter (ύλη) with the χώρα, and that of place (τόπος) with the χώρα. Only the first of these identifications has any basis in the text of the Timaeus, and then only if one disregards any difference that might distinguish μεταληπτικόν from the Platonic words δεχόμενον and ύποδοχή.

For the identification of ύλη with the χώρα, there is no basis in the Timaeus. Plato never uses the word ύλη in Aristotle’s sense, a sense that, one suspects, comes to be constituted and delimited only in and through the work of Aristotle. When Plato does, on a few occasions, use the word, it has the common, everyday sense of building material such as wood, earth, or stone. Following Aristotle’s own strategy in On Generation and Corruption, one could refer to the image of the constantly remodeled gold as providing support for the identification. But reference to this image could be decisive only if one privileged it over most of the others, disregarding, for instance, the image of the nurse, which represents the relation between the χώρα and the sensible in a way quite irreducible to that between matter and the things formed from it. What is perhaps even more decisive is that all these are images of the χώρα, images declared in an είκώς λόγος (likely account}, which is to be distinguished from the bastardly discourse in which one would venture to say the χώρα. — John Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus

They provided different experiences from those on the unaltered menu.

The Timothey Leary and Casteneda versions were treating them as gates to realms not yet explored. I do not view that as negated by objections on the basis of limited functional consciousness seen in all addictions.

I like the way a friend put it. It is good to have windows but too many undermine the structure.

Exactly. We invented the concept of ‘same kind’ in order to count, but same kind doesn’t exist in nature. — Joshs

I get the argument that the concept serves a purpose in how we talk. The claims about what exists in nature seems to contradict the limits presented regarding such description. But how does that let us say what exists in nature?

Two eggs over easy with potatoes cooked in a medley of onions, peppers, and a bit of parsley.
A slice of Portuguese bread to sop up the yolk.

Thanks for that.

There are several matters in that review I would like to address that concern Plotinus but not Gerson. So I will put the comments in your Metaphysics thread when I can make a logos of them.

This is Gerson's thesis in a nutshell:

Here I briefly sketch a hypothetical reconstruction of what I shall call ‘Ur-Platonism’
(UP). This is the general philosophical position that arises from the conjunction of the negations
of the philosophical positions explicitly rejected in the dialogues, that is, the philosophical
positions on offer in the history of philosophy accessible to Plato himself. It is well known that
Plato in the dialogues engages with most of the philosophers who preceded him. Some of these,
like Parmenides and Protagoras, exercise his intellect more than others, including probably some unnamed ones as well as some unknown to us. All of these philosophers, with the exception of Socrates and Pythagoras, are represented as holding views that are firmly rejected in the dialogues either explicitly or implicitly. I am not claiming that anyone, including Plato, simply embraced UP. I am, however, claiming that Platonism in general can be seen to arise out of the matrix of UP, and that Plato’s philosophy is actually one version of Platonism, as odd as this may sound. So, in a manner of speaking, UP is a via negativa to Plato’s philosophy. To be a Platonist is, minimally, to have a commitment to UP. It is only a slight step further to recognize that this basic commitment is virtually always in fact conjoined with a commitment to discover the most consistent integrated positive metaphysical construct on the basis of UP. Disagreements among these same Platonists are, I believe, best explained by the fact that this systematic construct does not decisively determine the correct answer to many specific philosophical problems raised especially by opponents of Platonism. That is, UP is largely underdetermining for some specific philosophical doctrines or answers to specific philosophical questions.

The elements of UP according to my hypothesis are: anti-materialism, anti-mechanism,
anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. — Gerson, Platonism Versus Naturalism

The list of negatives is drawn up by his reading of Plato. What comprises what is "firmly rejected in the
dialogues either explicitly or implicitly", is a matter of contention, especially the "implicit" part.

Relegating differences between thinkers as participants in the proposed larger container of agreement to a secondary concern removes any of the testimony of others to be possible challenges to the existence of said container.

The thesis was developed as a response to modern expressions of "anti-Platonism" and modern views of nature. As a philosophy of history, it is claiming that the conditions Plato emerged from are the same as those we live in. This battle between the two Titans seems to take place outside of History, in some kind of eternal now.

The thesis certainly does not help illuminate how Plotinus emerged in his time.

When I look under the hood of Gerson's writing, he adopts the perspective of Plotinus in an uncritical fashion. In that regard, he is too inclusive and sees everything through the goggles of Plotinus. That is what I have been trying to address in the Metaphysics thread.

Take, for example, Gerson's essay on the agent intellect. The following statement appears in the conclusion:

A good deal of the obscurity in this chapter is owing ultimately to the difficulty in identifying the subject of cognitive activities on the basis of the previous hylomorphic account of the human being. Is it the composite that thinks or the soul or the intellect? In my view, the key to resolving this difficulty rests upon the principle that a person is essentially a self-reflexive thinker. When disembodied, that self-reflexivity is expressed in pure imageless thinking. When embodied, that self-reflexivity is variously expressed, for example, when one says, 'I am perspiring', 'I am walking', 'I am aware that I am walking', and 'I am thinking about the health benefits of my walking'. In the first case, one identifies oneself with a body; in the second, with the composite; in the third and fourth, with the soul. The identification consists in the awareness of oneself as diverse subjects. One could not identify oneself with any of these subjects unless one were essentially self-reflexive, that is, unless one were ideally an intellect — Gerson, The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima

This view of being "disembodied" is thinkable within Plotinus' model of the soul. From what I understand Aristotle to say about "particular individuals", being disembodied means you are dead.

One thing that bothers me about the Ur-Platonism idea, apart from the specific issues being discussed, is that there have been centuries of thinkers who have self-identified with belonging or not belonging to particular groups and here comes this bloke telling you where you belong.

I accept that there is a lot of nuances in how that gets expressed. When Aristotle refers to the 'Platonists', he may be that and something else at the same time.

It is tyrannical to have them all wearing the same neckerchief.

Are you saying that Gerson's interpretation of Plato is through his reading of Plotinus? That seems right to me. — Fooloso4

One thing that is verifiable is that Gerson's criticism of Aristotle is a repetition of Plotinus, almost verbatim:

In calling it an Unmoved Mover and characterizing it as ‘thinking about thinking’, he failed to see that thinking is essentially intentional and that for this reason alone his first principle could not escape the complexity found in thinking plus an object of thinking. In other words, the absolute simplicity of the first principle of all precluded thinking from being that principle. In addition, Aristotle erred in his hypothesis that the primary referent of ‘being’ is ousia. The main reason for this is that ousia or essence or ‘whatness’ is distinct from the existence of that essence, in which case complexity is once again introduced. So, Aristotle was in fact a dissident Platonist, but a Platonist after all. — Platonism Versus Naturalism, Lloyd P Gerson

If we look at the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Plato places Parmenides criticism of the Forms at an early stage of Socrates own philosophical education. This raises doubts as to whether Socrates own criticism of Forms should be explained away as the result of Plato having changed his mind in a later stage of his development. — Fooloso4

In view of that chronology, Plato seems to hold those cards close to his chest. Socrates is heard joining the criticism of Heraclitus but does not explain why he won't criticize Parmenides except to say he was wise.

Who are you quoting?

Your arguments about this issue are best illustrated by the dialogue of Theaetetus.

Beyond the role of the mid-wife taking precedence over that of recollection, Socrates is heard defending Parmenides who also criticizes the Forms (in that named Platonic dialogue).

Aristotle takes issue with both thinkers. Plotinus does so in turn.

Perhaps I should not have made my remark. I did not mean to hold Gerson to account as a matter of the 'minutiae' of citing specific schools of thought. Plotinus leaves the burden upon the one who would disagree with his argument. It is brilliant in that regard.

Although this inability to realize the Good seems apparent, I'm reluctant to admit it, because it seems defeatist, and I think this might be what you allude to when you say: "concern the expectations of the future, for all who live. — Janus

I think Kafka gave this some thought. In his Reflections, [a collection of aphorisms]. this one is an affirmation through negation of a sort:

There are questions which we could never get over if we were not delivered from them by the operation of nature. — Kafka, Reflections, 54

But perhaps the true antipode to the gnostics is Walt Whitman:

These are really the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands.
they are not original with me,
If they are not yours as much as mine they are nothing, or
next to nothing,
If they are not the riddle and the untying of the riddle they
are nothing,
If they are not just as close as they are distant they are nothing.
This is the grass that grows wherever the land is and the
water is,
This is the common air that bathes the globe. — Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, 17

Gerson's account is a fair description.

I wonder how he distinguishes "These Gnostics, mostly heretic Christians" from the other varieties. Many of Plotinus' objections could apply equally well to a certain 'Saul of Tarsus', who called for the end of tis kosmos.

Augustine placed Plotinus above Plato in The City of God. But I don't recall any reference to this part of the oeuvre.

He posits that Aristotle’s objections are directed at specific aspects of Plato’s formulations rather than at the underlying principles. — Dermot Griffin

Gerson's central focus, as a scholar, has been upon Plotinus and his contemporaries (broadly speaking).

Interpretations of both Plato and Aristotle are the medium of discourse where different opinions were expressed in Plotinus' time. In that context, Plotinus should be read as claiming what those "underlying principles" are. He is telling us what Plato means and quoting selectively to support his view.

Both Aristotle and Plotinus are alike in trying to establish an internal consistency to their theoria that differs from the language of Plato. This quality gets described as "systems" or "schools" but I think the difference in kind is too profound to delineate clearly.

This website has all of the Six Enneads translated by Stephen MacKenna and B. S. Page. The translation is a little clunky at times, but it beats typing out the passages.

The text concerning the Gnostics comprises all of the Second Ennead, Ninth Tractate.

The title given there speaks to your comments about McCarthy:

AGAINST THOSE THAT AFFIRM THE CREATOR OF THE KOSMOS AND THE KOSMOS ITSELF TO BE EVIL:
[GENERALLY QUOTED AS "AGAINST THE GNOSTICS"].

As I understand it, the basic drift is that he wouldn’t countenance their claim that matter was evil. — Wayfarer

But that is what Plotinus said:

We conclude that Matter's participation in Idea is not by way of modification within itself: the process is very different; it is a bare seeming. Perhaps we have here the solution of the difficulty as to how Matter, essentially evil, can be reaching towards The Good: there would be no such participation as would destroy its essential nature. Given this mode of pseudo-participation- in which Matter would, as we say, retain its nature, unchanged, always being what it has essentially been- there is no longer any reason to wonder as to how while essentially evil, it yet participates in Idea: for, by this mode, it does not abandon its own character: participation is the law, but it participates only just so far as its essence allows. Under a mode of participation which allows it to remain on its own footing, its essential nature stands none the less, whatsoever the Idea, within that limit, may communicate to it: it is by no means the less evil for remaining immutably in its own order. If it had authentic participation in The Good and were veritably changed, it would not be essentially evil. — ibid. III. 6. 11

I will provide tomorrow. I approach the end of today's period of being fully conscious.

The observations about McCarthy does address what I am thinking about. I will sit with them for a while.

Plotinus follows Plato, and, indeed, Aristotle, in identifying being, τὸ ὄν, that which is, as form. — Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p 119

I am not aware of any text from those three that supports this statement.

Related to this - I have the sense that the One of Plotinus *is not* a concept. I think arriving at an understanding of it requires a kind of cognitive transformation although that too is very difficult to fathom. — Wayfarer

The inner experience is important in the thinking. What a 'concept is' is also considered. The work also makes a claim upon how the universe works just as other such claims do. Every component is located through the pattern drawn.

I tender Plotinus' objections to the Gnostics as evidence for this view. The conflict between views of a natural good and a flawed creation concern the expectations of the future, for all who live.

I was thinking more in the context of personal freedom. The view of private ownership being a product of an historical process is said to provide the context of what is possible as an individual in particular situations.
But I am also told that there is something about the results that will satisfy the need to violently oppose what is happening.
So, where does that differ from the view of community Plato put forward?

Without knowing all the parts, Occam would concentrate on the motivation to stop the certification of the election. The different elements set in motion, the fake elector scheme, putting pressure on the VP, Congress critters ready to seize opportunities, mobs upsetting all involved, etcetera. It is not a plan in the style of Napoleon or Lenin.

For Aristotle the specific matter in question must be receptive to the form it holds, and an undue emphasis on form will tend to neglect this thesis. Is it something like that? — Leontiskos

I don't quite understand how the quote from Plotinus fits in. Presumably it highlights a Platonic critique of Aristotle, in which the formal principle(s) is clearly seen to overpower the material principle(s)? That for the pure Platonist Aristotle's matter will not be sufficiently determinate or explanatory? — Leontiskos

I will start by noting that both Aristotle and Plotinus make use of Plato's text in ways that shape what a 'Platonist' is said to be. Plato did not have a chance to challenge their interpretations. A central train station of departures in these matters is the Timaeus, where many of the discussions began. The bit I quoted above is Plotinus comparing Metaphysics Book Lambda with the Timaeus account. Before comparing with Aristotle, let's listen to some of what Plotinus says about matter:

Mirrors and transparent objects, even more, offer a close parallel; they are quite unaffected by what is seen in or through them: material things are reflections, and the Matter on which they appear is further from being affected than is a mirror. Heat and cold are present in Matter, but the Matter itself suffers no change of temperature: growing hot and growing cold have to do only with quality; a quality enters and brings the impassible Substance under a new state- though, by the way, research into nature may show that cold is nothing positive but an absence, a mere negation. The qualities come together into Matter, but in most cases they can have no action upon each other; certainly there can be none between those of unlike scope: what effect, for example, could fragrance have on sweetness or the colour-quality on the quality of form, any quality on another of some unrelated order? The illustration of the mirror may well indicate to us that a given substratum may contain something quite distinct from itself- even something standing to it as a direct contrary- and yet remain entirely unaffected by what is thus present to it or merged into it. — Plotinus, III. 6. 9

Just as the Ideal Principles stand immutably in their essence- which consists precisely in their permanence- so, since the essence of Matter consists in its being Matter [the substratum to all material things] it must be permanent in this character; because it is Matter, it is immutable. In the Intellectual realm we have the immutable Idea; here we have Matter, itself similarly immutable. — ibid. III. 6. 10

We conclude that Matter's participation in Idea is not by way of modification within itself: the process is very different; it is a bare seeming. Perhaps we have here the solution of the difficulty as to how Matter, essentially evil, can be reaching towards The Good: there would be no such participation as would destroy its essential nature. Given this mode of pseudo-participation- in which Matter would, as we say, retain its nature, unchanged, always being what it has essentially been- there is no longer any reason to wonder as to how while essentially evil, it yet participates in Idea: for, by this mode, it does not abandon its own character: participation is the law, but it participates only just so far as its essence allows. Under a mode of participation which allows it to remain on its own footing, its essential nature stands none the less, whatsoever the Idea, within that limit, may communicate to it: it is by no means the less evil for remaining immutably in its own order. If it had authentic participation in The Good and were veritably changed, it would not be essentially evil. — ibid. III. 6. 11

Several conditions pop out immediately from these accounts.
The experience of a body is different from 'matter as itself' and so belongs within the 'intelligible realm'. That could be expressed, as you said, as "formal principle(s) clearly seen to overpower the material principle(s) but the more consequential difference is that the composition of a particular individual, joining υ̋λη and μορΦή, no longer represents a unity standing as the whole being from which to ascertain its parts.

I will stop here before saying more.

It is difficult to approach the matter. As a war between classes, the singularity of Hegel's account is not definitive. But the value of that individual life is lauded in other parts of Marx's text.
Where does one logic begin and the other end?

But maybe in a sentence or two you can clarify.

How will the "pursual by interpretation of evidence" ever be independent of specific methods of interpreting ancient texts?
— Paine — tim wood

Take, for example, the debates over how Plato understood the ontology of Forms. I (and others) have challenged Cornford's interpretation that there is a monolithic Theory of Forms that is higher and prior to texts that do not fit into that view.

Some of those references are to Cornford's opinions and others are to his translations. I propose that they are integrally connected.

I used three sentences.

I think it would be along the lines that the fight-to-the-death or submit scenario, that appears during the pursuit of recognition, changes both sides where the 'powerful', as such, confers power to the slave in spite of itself.

How will the "pursual by interpretation of evidence" ever be independent of specific methods of interpreting ancient texts? This is a particularly pertinent question when the matter is the 'lost wisdom' topic Wayfinder puts forward. The idea of replication seems out of the question.

Yes.
Or at least we do not have a method that does not rely heavily upon self-identified methods of interpretation. I favor some over others, but I cannot argue for an authority beyond that.

It looks like we will have to agree to disagree. For the time being, anyway.

Thank you for considering the argument.

It will take me several days to respond to your questions. They present challenges I do not want to minimize or treat off the cuff.

Do you accept that a claim of ancient wisdom is largely dependent upon a description of what those old people were saying?

Good posts. I agree with what you say about Aristotle in them. I would have to go back to see what you've said about Plotinus. — Leontiskos

Since it relates to the topic of the OP (regarding the Unmoved Mover), I will take make my argument from the horse's mouth:

Aristotle says that the first existence is separated from sense objects and is an intelligible existence. But when he says that "it thinks itself," he takes the first rank away from it. He also asserts the existence of a plurality of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, so that each of them might have its principle of motion. About the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a doctrine different from that of Plato, and as he has no good reason for this change, he brings in necessity.
Even if he had good reason, one might well object that it seems more reasonable to suppose that the spheres as they are coordinated in a single system are directed towards the one end, the supreme existence. The question also might be raised whether for Aristotle the intelligible entities from one originating principle or whether there are several originating principles for the intelligible entities. If the intelligible entities proceed form on principle, their condition will be analogous to that of the sense spheres where each contains and dominates all the others. In this case, the first existence will contain all the intelligible entities and be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres in the world of senses are not empty, - for the first is full of stars and each of the others has its stars,- so their movers in the intelligible world will contain many entities, being that are more real than sense things. On the other hand, if each of the movers is an independent principle, their interrelation will be subject to chance. How then will they unite their actions and agree in producing that single effect which is the harmony of the heaven? What also is the reason for the assertion that the sense objects that are in heaven equal in number their intelligible movers? Further, why is there a plurality of movers since they are incorporeal, and no matter separates them from on another?
Thus those among the ancient philosophers who faithfully followed the doctrines of Pythagoras, of disciples, and of Pherecydes, have maintained the existence of the intelligible world. — Plotinus, Ennead V, i, 9, translated by Katz

The mention of Pythagoras is important because that is a pivot for Aristotle regarding how souls are embodied:

[9] There is another absurdity, however, that follows both from this account and from most of the ones concerning the soul, since in fact they attach the soul to a body, and place it in a body, without |407b15| further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about or the condition of the body required for it. Yet this would seem to be necessary. For it is because of their association that the one acts, whereas the other is acted upon, and the one is moved, whereas the other moves it. None of these relations, though, holds between things taken at random. These people, however, merely undertake to say what sort of thing the soul is, but about the |407b20| sort of body that is receptive of it they determine nothing further, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean stories, for any random soul to be inserted into any random body, whereas it seems that in fact each body has its own special form and shape.96 But what they say is somewhat like saying that the craft of {13} carpentry could be inserted into flutes, whereas in fact the |407b25| craft must use its instruments, and the soul its body. — De Anima, 407b10, translated by C.D.C Reeve

The issue of the receptivity of matter raises the question of how there can be "natural" beings in a world where necessary events occur in conjunction with accidental ones. The view leads to an argument about the nature of actuality and potentiality (as I refer to upthread). What I have seen in Gerson overlooks the importance of the 'material' in Aristotle's pursuit of the natural.

Coincidentally, it is interesting that Plotinus chides Aristotle as a poor Platonist when the role of Necessity is an important part of the Timaeus.

Edited to remove unnecessary meta-afterword.

I take your point that generation is the counter example of the productive arts.

But you were making a claim about when beings actually existed 'materially'.

I do not understand this "tangential" relationship you describe. For my part, people say stuff and other people say other stuff. Your stuff is one of the things described.

I guess my challenges are meaningless in that context.

To wit: There are these ideas and they are what they are because that is what said of them.

That is not the anti-Protagoras view argued continuously throughout the book.

For me, no object which does not yet have material existence is ever acted on. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you point to some place in the text where this is claimed? Where do beings move from the not-material to the material?

I think the matter belongs to a discussion of what Aristotle intended. Folding his efforts into an omlette of other ideas is what I am challenging.

On that point, the 'forgotten wisdom' idea was central to Plato's Statesman, where the idea of time moving backwards or forwards moved us closer or further from the true stuff.

I have been thinking a lot about how the components making up a 'philosophy of history' relate to statements about existing conditions. For instance, Plotinus' view of what is happening in his moment is pretty darn ahistorical. As it was, is now, and forever shall be.

Hegel's view, by contrast, argues we cannot know what is happening outside of the process of human changes we have undergone.

The advantage of the ahistorical approach is that we are who we are, including our past experiences. The disadvantage of it is that we pop up out of nowhere.

The advantage of the historical approach is that a view of genealogy is possible. The disadvantage is that the past becomes the servant of the narrative of what is changing.

I accept that many series of events led to me thinking what I think now and it was different in the past. But there is a 'paradise lost' aspect to your versions of the history of ideas that I do not subscribe to. The view is entangled with how to read specific texts in the past.

I agree with your reading that passion is a compliment of action. I also agree that Aristotle uses grammar to illustrate the condition.

But I also think Aristotle is trying to introduce some views of causality that are counter intuitive. What makes the 'crushable' crushable belongs to the being as something that could happen anytime when it is in close proximity with the active being. The being-acted-upon is made actual as a result of its given potential together with the other being's potential to act. This leads to Aristotle arguing for a view he expresses as reached as a matter of no recourse, perhaps even reluctantly.

But the cause of this is that the potentiality of which it is the activation is incomplete.1234 And because of this it is difficult to grasp what movement is, since it must be posited either as a lack or as a potentiality or as an activity that is unconditionally such. But evidently none of these is possible. And so the remaining option is that it must be what we said, both an activity and not an activity |1066a25| in the way stated, which, though difficult to visualize, can exist. — ibid. 1066a20

I read this passage as completing the journey began in Theta 3:

There are some people—for example, the Megarians—who say that a thing is capable of something only when actively doing it, and that when not actively doing it, it is not capable. For example, someone |1046b30| who is not building is not capable of building, but someone who is building is capable if and when he is building, and similarly in the other cases. But it is not difficult to see that the consequences of this are absurd. — ibid. 1046b28

Getting from dispensing with one view out of hand to replacing it with a better one turned out to be a lot of work.