False belief cannot possibly be true.
— creativesoul
Which I'm not questioning. Indeed also false statements cannot possibly be true. — neomac
...we can claim of a belief (or proposition) that is proven to be true (or false), that it could have been false (or true)... — neomac
Arriving at incoherence is a sign of self-contradiction and/or equivocation. — creativesoul
Where is the contradiction? Where is the equivocation? Can you exactly spell it out? First of all notice that the subjects are different: “false belief” and “belief” (qualified vs unqualified subject). Secondly, notice that also what is predicated is in different verb's mood (i.e. “cannot possibly be…” vs “could have been…”). But I get that some intellectual effort (which you are evidently incapable of) is necessary. So here are some additional hints (and if they are not enough I'll sharpen them at the next round): the claim that you apparently need so badly is “
False belief cannot possibly be true” but this is a misleading claim, because - among others - its truth conditions (
which you did not specify [1]) depend on the meaning of the word “true” and “false” (which are contradictory terms) not on the meaning of “belief”. In other words, reasoning in terms qualified subject (i.e. “False belief”) is ambiguous wrt what we can infer from "being a belief" or from "being false"). To avoid this ambiguity we can better render your claim (“
False belief cannot possibly be true”) as a bi-conditional:
If a belief B is false then B is not true and if a belief B is true then B is not false.
Notice that in this latter statement, the subject is unqualified. Of this unqualified subject we can claim at the same time without contradiction:
1. If a belief B is false then B is not true and if B is true then B is not false
2. B is actually true (or false) and B could have been false (or true)
And BTW the same holds for propositions/statements (i.e. “False propositions/statements cannot possibly be true”):
1. If a statement S is false then S is not true and if S is true then S is not false
2. S is actually true (or false) and S could have been false (or true)
3. If a proposition P is false then P is not true and if P is true then P is not false
4. P is actually true (or false) and P could have been false (or true)
Do you agree with these conclusions? If not, can you spell out exactly why not in substantial terms (i.e. meaning, truth conditions, logic implications or presuppositions)?
The structure was different. That is exactly what I pointed out. So, they are not just different except for that structure. — creativesoul
All right, I missed to properly address this part. I’ll do it now. The distinction of A and B as 2 variables ranging over values in 2 different domains respectively, serves your specific purpose of comparing propositions and beliefs. So what your objection is highlighting [2] is the logic structure of your comparison as such. That’s fine and since I didn't clarify well enough what I took to be the same or different in the logic structure of your 2 claims wrt my 4 claims, your objection is understandable. The point is that it's grounded on a misunderstanding due to my poor phrasing. Indeed my comments were pointing at some implicit assumptions embedded in the logic structure of your 2 claims (so that's relevant for your own theory), and that do not depend on the comparison between beliefs and propositions: namely the contrast between qualified and unqualified subjects (do you deny it? [3]). Now, my 4 claims - as I said - “made more evident” this aspect by using variables ranging in the same domain. Clarified the misunderstanding, the point is that the contrast between qualified and unqualified subjects (which holds for my 4 claims too) should be relevant also in guiding a proper comparison between beliefs and propositions. And, indeed, this is the ground for my objection to your
ignoratio elenchi fallacy (as discussed
here, see third point). So, despite your excusable misunderstanding, my objection still holds (along with all others I made, of course [4]) .
You can however try to deny the validity of my 4 claims, for example do you deny the following ones? If yes, can you exactly spell out why in substantial terms (i.e. meaning, truth conditions, logic implications or presuppositions)?
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and false beliefs cannot possibly be true, then beliefs are not equivalent to false beliefs.
If all beliefs can possibly be either true or false, and true beliefs cannot possibly be false, then beliefs are not equivalent to true beliefs.
How many strikes do we get again in your game before being counted out? — creativesoul
It's a bit late for that. In my game you lost a while ago. And there is no way to recover it. We are just reviewing how badly you lost. And we can continue as long as you enjoy it. Unless I get bored, of course.
[1]
you keep repeating the following claim without specifying anywhere its truth conditions:
when we know that an individual's belief is false, we can also know that it cannot possibly be true — creativesoul
What does the modal predicate "cannot possibly be" mean here? Are you saying if an individual's belief is false in the actual world, then it is not true in any possible world? In other words, if any individual's belief is false, then it is necessarily false, and if any individual's belief is true, then it is necessarily true, so there are no contingent true/false beliefs only necessary true/false beliefs? And if you do not mean that, what else do you mean exactly? Can you spell it out?
Besides do you also believe when we know that
an individual's statement is false, we can also know that
it cannot possibly be true? if not, why not?
[2]
If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and false A's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false A's.
If all A's can possibly be either true or false, and true A's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true A’s. — creativesoul
vs
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and false B's cannot possibly be true, then A's are not equivalent to false B's.
If all A's can possibly be true or false, and true B's cannot possibly be false, then A's are not equivalent to true B's. — creativesoul
[3] "all A's can possibly be either true or false" would be a contradiction in terms if "all A's" meant "all true A's and all false A's".
[4] Here is a list of entry points to my main objections to your preposterous claims and arguments:
- 1. Preposterous "CreativeSoul propositional calculi" (here)
- 2. Conflation between false beliefs and contradictory beliefs (here,here,here,here,here)
- 3. Fallacious presupposition of knowledge and truth-value assessment for proper belief report (here,here)
- 4. Irrelevance of "awareness" claims wrt "contradictory belief" claims (here)
- 5. Irrelevance of the “non-problematic understanding” argument (here)
- 6. Inadequacy of the “belief” notion (here)
- 7. Inadequacies of your “knowledge ascription” requirement (here,here,here,here)
- 8. Missing justification of your belief ascription practice wrt your definition of belief (here)
- 9. Non sequitur fallacy (here)
- 10. Ignoratio elenchi fallacy (here)