First, I have not forgotten your long post explaining this pick-a-hegemon position, which at least strives to resolve surface level contradictions. I will get to it when I have time.
But, in short, you are describing realpolitik and the justification for supporting the ally in the wrong is going to be ultimately a consequentialist argument that not-doing-so would lead to some worse outcome (losing a war to some fascist state, for example).
I do not mind this realpolitik approach, it is essentially my basic argument in this debate just I have different realpolitik conclusions:
1. That Ukraine very likely cannot win militarily.
2. That the war very likely strengthens, rather than weakens, Russia.
3. That most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Russia and don't give much of a crap what we Westerners think (most of the rest of the world is authoritarian, anti-gay, anti-trans, and have a long memory vis-a-vis Western colonialism and CIA interference); Russia is "standing up to the West" in this alternative view point.
4. That the war greatly harms the European economy and makes it structurally less competitive over the long term significantly decreasing Western leverage in general (and most ceding it to China).
5. That creating a global economic schism in which Russia is pioneering a totally different economic framework structurally decreases Western leverage over the long term.
So the war isn't good neither for Ukraine nor the West, and the idea that Ukraine is harming Russia is a dangerous myth.
Of the objectives the US achieves:
1. Destroying the EU as a competition to the Dollar.
2. Selling LNG to Europe.
3. Fully subordinating the (current) European political class.
4. Making mad bank in arms exports.
Are terrible for Europe (and I'm European) and I would also caution that they are in the "careful what you wish for" category even for the United States. — boethius
So, if Ukraine could win and Russia was actually an enemy (which I don't buy that it was) then there would be at least the realpolitik case for supporting Ukraine, even if it would be a double standard vis-a-vis plenty other causes as or more just. — boethius
To my understanding, the scenario which I find more compelling for European risk analysis is roughly the opposite of yours:
- If Ukraine can not “militarily win” (in some debatable sense), maybe neither can Russia “militarily win” (in some debatable sense) if the West keeps supporting Ukraine enough. While if the West stops supporting Ukraine, Russia can more likely “militarily win”.
- If the war very likely strengthens, rather than weakens, Russia. Surrender to Russia in Ukraine will strengthen Russia even more.
- The claim that “most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Russia and don't give much of a crap what we Westerners think”, could sound to Westerners as compelling as “most of the rest of the world is sympathetic to Palestinians and don't give much of a crap what Israelis think” to Israelis, if not less. Yet, the Israelis seem willing to handle it and far from being intimidated by it.
- Concerning the fourth and fifth point, letting Russia win (and indirectly China as its strategic ally), betraying the American leadership which is still (but hardly) policing international commercial routes with its military navies/air force and reasons to refrain from a more aggressive economic competition with Europeans as an ally, while leaving Europeans (in demographic declines) dependent for its input and output on a world contended by more equipped and aggressive powers, could not only destabilise the system of strategic alliances within the West (which NATO and EU are expression) from internal and external pressure, but make more likely democratic backsliding, social unrest and proxy wars inside Europe. And in this case, I deeply doubt that Europeans will be in a better position to compete with China in any meaningful sense.
- Concerning the US, if the US wants to keep its world dominance, it needs Europeans (and other allies) to reduce the burden of imperial overstretch, so plausibly a enough economically and military strong EU. Or give up on world dominance and leave Europe to be contended as Africa and Middle East by other hegemonic competitors (as anticipated in my previous comment
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/872479). In the latter case, the 4 benefits that a predatory US will earn at the expense of Europeans in your scenario, will simply be split among 3 predatory hegemonic competitors STILL at the expense of Europeans in my scenario:
1. Destroying Euro as a competitor to any hegemonic competitor’s currency.
2. Making European countries dependable on any hegemonic competitor’s commodities.
3. Fully subordinating the European political class to hegemonic competitors’ will.
4. Making mad bank in arms exports.
To make your assessment more compelling to me, you should seriously argue for why 3 hegemonic competitors (2 of which are consolidated AND, POSSIBLY, "VICTORIOUS" authoritarian regimes while the third at risk to become more authoritarian and more confrontational e.g. if Trump wins [1]) will give any chance to Europeans (= the ex-Great Satans which turned into the current Great Satan’s lapdogs) individually or, worse, collectively either to economically and democratically prosper in a peaceful limbo safe from power projections and security threats coming from these 3 hegemonic powers (to put it simple, because there is also Islamism that one can add to the scenario), or to grow as a military force capable of power projection (which, notice, may also require nuclear proliferation) and therefore support hegemonic ambitions in a contended world. Alternatively, you could argue in support of European politicians which will peacefully & safely make their countries economically and democratically prosper (and even militarily intimidating) DESPITE the external pressure of powerful and predatory hegemonic powers OUT OF SHEER WILL, MORAL SUPERIORITY, POLITICAL WISDOM, DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC SKILLS, HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, EGALITARIAN MISSION, EXEMPLAR PATRIOTISM after that an avalanche of WESTERN populist propaganda ALREADY ABUNDANTLY INFILTRATED, BRIBED, LOBBIED by hegemonic competitors kept SHITTING OVER AND OVER AND OVER Western democracies, media, economy, economic/political elites and leaders, EU and NATO ON WORLD STAGE FOR SEVERAL DECADES. And in this case, I’m just looking forward to hearing their names.
Until then, I’m fine with my understanding of the stakes. According to it, the LEAST benefit of the war in Ukraine for Europeans is to BUY TIME for European politicians to figure out their approach in a contended world in order to minimize the damage, and this may very much require greater investment in the Western system of strategic alliances (among European countries and with the US, Ukraine included) and greater effort to do more economically/militarily within greater international constraints (difficult but maybe not unfeasible). Anyways, given the predicament in which we are, I can't ignore that European populists will do their worst to screw that too, though.
[1]
Notice, I don't need to take Trump's words about NATO at face value. It's still arguable that Trump is very much interested in keeping NATO and the US in Europe and/or that the American establishment will make it hard for Trump to really disengage from Europe. Yet the future of the American support for the European security is getting dangerously uncertain while the threats are dangerously increasing.
As the RAND documents makes clear, escalating military conflict between Russia and Ukraine would likely result in Russia winning any such escalation and would significantly harm US prestige and strategic position if Russia were to win. — boethius
What RAND documents?
It's a simple question: had the Soviets some analogous ABM system to Cuba, the US would not (or at least should not have) reacted in anyway because such ABM bases are insignificant? — boethius
As the Multivac, I’d say “Insufficient data for meaningful answer”.
I’m far from being a military analyst, even at an amateurish level. So instead I would argue against the way you framed your question (
”my question is to imagine the situation analogous, it would follow that your position is the same if the situation was analogous”) because it looks grounded on either a non sequitur or a tautology. Indeed, I don’t see why I should assume that threat perception would be the same over similar factual/hypothetical military scenarios and, if the same, that the reaction would be the same. On the other hand, if the “analogous situation” already includes also threat perception and response, then of course the position would be analogous by definition. Not to mention that threat perception can be miscalculated or inflated for propaganda reasons.
Besides, as far as I’m concerned, there is no need to make such a convoluted thought experiment, because the Cuban Missile crisis readily offers a historical study case about threat perception and copying mechanism from the US that we can use for comparison. And what this study case suggests is that while the US chose diplomacy to an actual present threat, Russia chose aggression to a hypothetical future threat.
Not to mention that from a political point of view: 1. the US needs Ukraine neither to put its nuclear bases closer to Moscow because Baltic countries could be enough for that, nor to widen the front of nuclear threats since Finland could be enough for that. 2. While the US was the only country to use nukes against a rival which was aggressed by on mainland, the ONLY one which keeps threatening to use nukes, in the current crisis, is Russia after aggressing and annexing part of an acknowledged sovereign country. 3. The US has shown a concern toward perceived nuclear threats by Russia, in at least three significant occasions: Cuban missile crisis, not deploying further east offensive nuclear weapons, Budapest Memorandum in which the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was returned to Russia (with great disappointment of Mearsheimer himself, go figure).