The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine.
You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.
If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that. — boethius
Here your assumptions seem that “legitimate security concerns” for one state is only about being “invaded” by foreign countries, and that the only relevant comparison over security concerns is between the US and Russia. But I deeply disagree with both.
1. As I argued elsewhere, “legitimate” is an ambiguous expression: it can be used to express “accuracy” of one’s judgement about perceived risks in terms of security. In that sense also nazis, terrorists, mobsters have legitimate security concerns, because certainly there historical circumstances that potentially harm nazis, terrorists, mobsters more than other circumstances. In another sense, “legitimate” is about other people’s recognition or acknowledgement about somebody’s rights to commit certain actions within an international legal order. So nazis, terrorists, mobsters violating this legal order can not appeal to “legitimate” security concerns to justify their violations, no right of violating the international legal order can be acknowledged by those who are committed to preserve such international legal order. An unprovoked aggressive war (the one Russia inflicted on Ukraine) is not justifiable by security concerns in light of the legal world order Westerners support, a provoked defensive war (the one by which Ukraine resists Russia) is. “Provoked” is not about hypothetical scenarios but actual offensive acts like actual territorial sovereignty violations (as in Russian actual territorial occupation of Ukraine).
I don’t mind you using the expression “legitimate security concerns” once the distinction of the 2 meanings is clearly stated and acknowledged because we should neither conflate the 2 meanings nor assume that one implies the other. Indeed, one can successfully claim that Russia has legitimate security concerns in the first sense, and yet deny the second after the invasion of Ukraine.
2. “invasions” are not the only object of State’s security concerns, destruction of its infrastructures, commercial routes, means of defence and sustenance, and strategic assets (like commodities and technology) can be considered a security threat. Also all factors that may socially destabilise a country beyond conventional wars: like support of terrorists, criminals, illegal immigration or independence movements within a state are security threats. So there are different forms of “security concern”: in previous posts, you yourself were talking about the possibility of putting offensive nuclear missiles in Ukraine as a security concern for Russia, and Tzeench was talking about the threat posed by NATO to the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, and the Black Sea fleet is used for power projection not just defense. Even if one wanted to circumscribe the usage of “security concern” to mere military capacity/equipments and operations, Russia has means and ways to hit the US militarily (see threats of nuclear escalation or “deploy conventional missiles within striking distance of the United States and its European allies”), so it’s not outlandish if the US wanted to increase deterrence against Russia for that reason only. But, at this point in history, I don’t think this the only reason or even the main one: the main reasons are more likely rooted in the security dilemmas for the US within a wider context of a multiplayer hegemonic competition, with China as the primary challenge. BTW something similar holds for Russia too: i.e. I don’t think Russia’s ambitions are primarily about defending itself from an hypothetical future invasion by the US or NATO from Ukraine, Russia’s ambitions are more maximalist, also declaredly so, they are seeking to establish a new world order in which they see themselves in some leading position, along with the US and China. Control over Ukraine contributes to increase Russia’s hegemonic status and power projection in Europe, in the mediterranean area and in the Middle East.
3. Talking about security threats from future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Ukraine which didn't join NATO yet what about about future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Finland joining NATO (apparently,
Russia's border with NATO more than doubles with Finland as a member)? Isn't that a more imminent threat to Russia security? And yet Putin has even withdrawn forces from there instead of bolster them (
https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report/)
4. The pertinence of comparing only Russia’s vs the US’s “security concerns” is also questionable. As I argued, Russia is a security threat to Europe with or without the US. Russia’s hegemonic ambitions are a non-negligible security threat at the very least for all neighbouring countries and countries in geographic proximity, like East European countries (including Ukraine). And Russian DOUBLE aggression of Ukraine confirms that is the case MORE EVIDENTLY than an hypothetical future scenario wereNATO forces invade Russia. The US is at the centre of a system of strategic alliance with European countries and the idea of an alliance like NATO is to share responsibilities on security matters to benefit all allies (including the US). And the US would clearly have a greater burden if it wants to lead the alliance. So the US can NOT ignore Russia’s power projection in Europe, if the US wants to preserve its hegemony in Europe.
As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.
For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States. — boethius
The assumption is questionable for several reasons.
1. EU and NATO are an economic/military alliance between Ukraine and European states too, not just between Ukraine and the US. Indeed, as we are seeing now, the EU is pressed into taking greater responsibility than the US in Ukraine. I also argued that even a fully European military alliance e.g. between France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Finland that could include Ukraine could still be perceived as a security concern by Russia AS LONG AS Russia has no part in it, EVEN MORE SO due to the geographic proximity of all involved parties and historical precedents (the US never invaded Russia, Europeans did, Eastern Europeans’ primary security concern is Russian imperialism, and American imperialism is compelled to focus on the Pacific).
2. Weaker countries may very much prefer to strategically ally for their own security with a superpower far away than with the closest superpower if this ensures greater political and economic freedom (beside Europe, also in the Pacific we have evidence of this logic since many Asian countries prefer to ally with the US not with China). Besides you persist in arbitrarily assuming that all countries are or should be like peace-maximizers, but that’s a historically questionable belief and, in principle, arguably not on you to establish.
3. Your argument looks self-defeating, because you want to claim at the same time that the US can invade Russia from Ukraine if it wanted (so it’s a “legitimate” security concern for Russia for that reason), and yet that the US wouldn’t want to invade Russia from Ukraine “precisely because you [Ukraine] are of no relevance to their actual security”.
4. My understanding is that Russia’s strategic reasoning could have been something like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of rushing into a full scale war against Ukraine to avert a possible American invasion of Russia from Ukraine, once Ukraine is in NATO?
Instead, Russia’s strategic reasoning was more like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of not grabbing the OPPORTUNITY to subdue Ukraine and reclaim a superpower status (at this point not only in the eyes of the US but also of China) when the West and its leader are now too weak to oppose, Russia is at its historical peak after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the alibi of a war provoked by the Great Satan is already so popular in the West? What’s the point of not violating a Western-lead World Order supported by a declining West to achieve invaluable strategic benefits when the chances of getting punished for it by the West are at so low ?
A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US. — boethius
That’s a questionable assumption on three grounds.
1. Smaller states can also ALLY with other countries against the common enemy as the Greek city states did against the Persian empire. And one weak state might reasonably prefer to military ally with stronger and powerful countries than weaker countries.
2. Defensive moves (like Ukraine inside NATO, which is a defensive military alliance) can be perceived as hostile, despite NATO/Ukraine’s declared intentions. Russia was repeatedly assured that Ukraine inside NATO wasn’t about threatening Russia’s sovereignty, but it didn’t matter, since Russia didn’t agree anyways. Unfortunately mistrust runs on both direction: since Russia’s assurances over Ukrainian sovereignty have been actually violated by Russia repeatedly, while neither the West nor Ukraine have attacked Russia prior to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. In any case, as long as Russia has no decision power over how Ukraine shapes its security strategy, Ukraine may raise security concerns to Russia, no matter if Ukraine joins NATO, or some other European military alliance, or it takes care for its own military security by itself (remember Mearsheimer’s argument for the Ukrainian nuclear deterrent?).
3. Russia wants Ukraine neutral, demilitarised, AND with a Russian Military Naval Base inside Ukraine, so what deterrence could Ukraine seriously achieve over Russia if these are Russian demands?
As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.
Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win.
A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win. — boethius
But I questioned numerous times this kind of arguments. And I’ll do it again.
1. Russia has been acknowledged no right to invade Ukraine to solve alleged “legitimate” security issues under international law (at least by the West). Russia security concerns were framed by Russia in terms of international law when Russia EXPRESSLY AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED security guarantees (for you, “ornamental” and “with no meaning” or not expressing a “metaphysically necessity”, remember?) which it didn’t obtain, not when it aggressed Ukraine. And if it is not rights according to international law as acknowledged by parties in an international world order, then what rights are you talking about?
2. Binding the notion of “justification” to that of military victory and defeat, or war and peace is questionable. Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds are evidence that people won’t renounce to defend what they perceive to be their land and people against foreign oppression because of the disparity of military means and costs for fighting foreign oppression. One doesn’t need to empathise with them, but if one’s reasoning is FACT based, one can’t reasonably discount the historical and anthropological fact that the pursuit of self-determination by some people can be a major driving force factor in war that overrides the disparity of military means or losses. Nor can one discount the FACT that these wars can be foundational of people’s national identity, in that sense the material and spiritual price to pay for that, it’s ultimately THEIR OWN choice to make in a very personal sense. So I do not need to dismiss your points nor the idea that Ukrainians might have been in better conditions now if they preferred compromise or surrender as soon as possible, actually I find such points even more compelling for Ukrainians after the rather disappointing support Ukrainians got from the West. Yet your points may not be the most personally compelling reasons to Ukrainians. Ukrainians, similarly to many other people rebelling against foreign oppression, may be no peace-maximisers. Their recurrent historical conflicts with Russia supports my belief (as acknowledged also by Mearsheimer in the article you too cited). So Ukrainians too may pursue self-determination against Russian oppression, as much as a political status which grants them greater political-economic freedom through Westernisation. And in order to achieve that they may be ready to pay related (sunk) costs despite being intolerable to peace-maximisers.
3. Ukraine is not fighting alone but with the support of Western allies, so the outcome of their conflict with Russia depends also on the Western allies contribution during and after the war. Both Europeans and the US may be very much compelled to not let Russia win (each of them for their own strategic reasons) as much as they are compelled to not let their alliance be perceived as weaker than the anti-Western strategic alliance.
My conclusion is that no, “likely winning” for a stronger state against a weaker state is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying aggressive or defensive wars.
That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians. — boethius
I don’t find your claim fully intelligible since “trying to do so” semantically refers to an action, but in that contest it’s used as an anaphoric reference to "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" which is not an action. Anyways, let’s charitably assume that you are kind of putting in other words what you just said: i.e. “a smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win” where “preemptive military action” refers to Ukraine joining NATO. I still find your argument misleading.
1. If one wants to reason according to international law, the right for Ukraine to join NATO depends EXCLUSIVELY on the conditions established by NATO and the approval of NATO members, so “being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians” don’t necessarily prevent Ukraine from satisfying the requirements of joining NATO, not exempt NATO members to recognise such a right to Ukraine, if Ukraine satisfies such requirements. Surely unresolved/persistent territorial conflicts are an hindrance to NATO accession taken into account in the accession requirements, but not territorial, demographic, infrastructural and economic losses, even when they are significative. The same goes with the Ukrainian right of self-defence against ACTUAL aggression (not hypothetical one): foreign violations of the Ukrainian territorial integrity put a legal burden on those states which acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty , including Russia. Therefore, talking about rights outside the international law or what has been acknowledged in terms of international order by relevant participants, if that’s what you are trying to do, looks rather unjustified to me.
2. If one wants to reason strategically over longer term objectives under evolving geopolitical conditions one can not discount NATIONAL interest as perceived by the concerned nation (Ukrainians and Russians, to begin with) nor discount how all other relevant players are reacting to such conflict. So defining necessary and sufficient conditions as a function of chances of winning or achieving peace as soon as possible (not even as long as possible?) based on current military capacity of the two direct belligerents, and independently from perceived national interest or other actors’ playing strategy, looks historically and strategically myopic to me.
At best, you may wish to persuade Ukrainians (not me) that it is not in their national interest to refuse to become Russian vassals. But I would be surprised if Ukrainians would find your arguments conclusive since their national identity is rooted in a historical opposition to Russian national identity and oppression. It would like to trying to convince them that the Ukrainian national interest is better served by being Russified.
If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it. — boethius
If all you are saying when distinguishing arguments from “rights” and justification is that one should not conflate legal reasoning with strategic reasoning over security matters, I can agree. But then the one conflating the two is you, when you talk about Russia’s legitimate security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, or the “right to preemptive military action” if that refers to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or the genesis of this war as Western provocation. Here is why:
1. Russia may have security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, but such fact doesn’t commit Westerners to appease Russia’s security concerns in violation of the international world order they support. Russia has no acknowledged right to have its buffer states. While acknowledging Ukrainian sovereignty commits Westerners and Russia (since Russia too acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty) at least to refrain from pursuing unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, or from supporting or approving unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty by foreign powers (where “unprovoked” refers to ACTUAL aggressions of one country against another, not hypothetical ones).
2. On the other side, Ukraine can justify its patriotic war against Russia, INDEPENDENTLY from legal rights to defend itself as acknowledged by others, as a function of heir perceived national interest and a multiplayer evolving geopolitical environment. So Ukraine doesn’t need to appeal to the acknowledged rights of joining NATO to justify its patriotic war against Russia, and to tolerate related costs beyond what you find acceptable. Appeal to rights to join NATO are the reason but the consequence of Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination from Russia’s oppression.
3. Concerning the genesis of this war, again it is not reasonable to justify Russia’s aggression of Ukraine according to acknowledged rights within the Western-led international order, since Russia wasn’t actually aggressed by Ukraine or the US or NATO, there is no internationally acknowledged right for preventive wars. If there was one, Russia wouldn’t need to aspire to change the Western-led world order. It is not even justified to frame Russia’s strategic choice as a function of some “provocation” by the West since all competing geopolitical players, Russia and the US included, may be security maximisers (as Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism claims) and any increase in deterrence by one country can be considered hostile or done at the expense of other countries’ security. The only counterbalance to maximalist objectives by great powers is the risk of overstretching, not the acknowledgement of rivals’ “legitimate” security concerns. In other words, there is no acknowledged legal or strategic burden on the West to appease Russia’s claims over Ukraine or tolerate Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. It’s preposterous for boxers to call out as a “provocation” a punch in the face by their adversary as if they needed a justification to punch back the adversary, the whole point for boxers is to punch each other in the face, no matter who starts first. Similarly in a world where hegemonic powers act as competing security maximisers it's preposterous to talk about “provocation” as justification of their preventive defensive moves. And that's not all, the US approach to Russia and China wasn't even far from being as hostile as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda wants to depict it. Indeed, globalization was the US strategy to push potentially hostile authoritarian countries far from confrontational logic: letting the West do business with Russia (and China) in exchange for Westernization was the US gamble to curb hegemonic competition. DO UT DES, I'll give you wealth for decades, you'll give up on competing against the US on world hegemony. The US propaganda found also a common enemy: Islamic terrorism and climate change to re-direct security concerns. That's why Russia should not have been compelled to perceive talks about Ukraine inside NATO as an unbearable act of hostility. Returning the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal to Russia was an ACTUAL act of good will from the US more than the hypothetical future scenario of Ukraine joining NATO. Unfortunately, the more Russia and China grew richer the more they got ambitious in terms of power projection (while the US got weaker). US-led globalization EMPOWERED and BOLSTERED Russia (and China) wrt the US more than any talking about NATO expansion in Ukraine could ever do. If Russia could invade Ukraine is not because of the US provocation but thanks to the US globalization.
Your emphasis about “provocation” to explain Russia is rather myopic and comes from your confused and confusing understanding of Russia’s “rights” and “legitimate” security concerns.
To summarise, as far as legal reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is Russia’s violation of the international order as recognized by the West (which also Russia was committed to until it violated it in 2014). As far as strategic reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is in Russia’s attempt to exploit an opportunity window to change power balance in its favor at the expense of the US and its allies, given the perceived weakness of the West.
Looking forward to reading your counterarguments to each of my points (I even numbered them).