Let's remember Seymour Hersh's "How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline" as the most serious piece of investigation over the Nordstream sabotage, according to the most serious poster in the this thread.

↪neomac
I meant civil claims. Or do you think Gasunie, Engie, BASF and E.ON wil not be concerned with losing their investments? The standard of proof is also lower so we could see judgments against, for instance, Ukraine that would not reach the level of proof required for criminal cases but will imply guilt. — Benkei

If the question is “which country was behind it”, I find it very much possible that Ukrainians were behind it, on their own initiative, not on Great Satan’s. But it seems unlikely they really did it all alone given that the attack started from within Germany and the infrastructure was of strategic relevance particularly to Germany, while other Western countries (like the US and Poland) were against Nordstream II.
I think that the economic reason of “losing their investments” is pretty compelling but not that compelling: Western investments were spread across different Western companies, damage to Nordstream II wasn’t beyond repair, private investments might have been somehow compensated (even having the Nordstream II functional but unused is still loss of ROI), and most of all, economic reasons can be overcome by security concerns.
What would be embarrassing for Western officials in the eyes of public opinion is if Western and Ukrainian officials were involved. That’s why we should expect they worked on plausible deniability, and will likely keep it as an inside conflict as long as needed in case there might be reason for disagreement. Actually there is something of a pattern here: indeed, how many Ukrainian operations which Western officials publicly disapproved of did already happen? Maybe Nordstream II was just among the first ones. And let’s not forget that Western officials are not only pressed by Western public opinions but also by the Russian escalatory logic (after all Nord Stream II was 51% Russian as you reported). So Westerners may be enabling or even just assenting to Ukrainians all along with these "controversial" operations while withholding the extent of their support from the public mostly to circumvent the Russian red line logic as long as needed.

↪neomac
It does matter. First off, Nordstream is a company owned by five energy companies, including Gazprom (51%) but the others were European. Classifying it as Russian infrastructure is incorrect. — Benkei

I welcome the clarification but it’s beside the point I was making. Notice that I didn’t write that Nordstream is Russian infrastructure, I just wrote “Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine”, the point being that if Russia owns 51% of Nordstream, namely an infrastructure that is meant to bypass Ukraine, benefit Russian business, and to hook Germany with Russia’s gas supply, then Nordstream may still be relevant target for Ukraine to hit, even more so if the US protector has protested so much and so clearly about it.

Second, this will result in claims and for most people it will affect their willingness to support Ukraine. If the US was involved (and Poland) then the claims will go there and it will deteriorate trust for future operations. — Benkei

To me that sounds more plausible for Germany than for other European countries. However German officials’ declarations do not seem to support your views: “The results of the investigation into the explosions of the Nord Stream and Nord Stream-2 gas pipelines do not yet change Germany's commitment to providing further support to Ukraine, German government spokesperson Wolfgang Buechner has told a news briefing in Berlin. He noted that the investigation into the acts of sabotage against the gas pipelines was being carried out in accordance with the applicable legal procedure. The investigation will have no effect on whether Germany will continue to support Ukraine in the future and, if so, to what extent. As Buechner recalled, the Prosecutor General's Office is in charge of the investigation with a "criminal component" and it "has nothing to do with the fact that, as the German Chancellor has repeatedly said, Germany will support Ukraine as long as necessary.” (https://tass.com/world/1829177)
Anyways, my conjecture is that the risk of alienating Germany’s support was all too obvious to ignore by those who planned the sabotage and if institutional figures were involved it’s unlikely they went for it without suitable alibis. You may very well remember how many people Zelensky has fired from his own entourage (including domestic and foreign intelligence officials), so I do wonder if among those, there might be conspirators of the Nordstream sabotage. I wouldn’t even discount the possibility that powerful interest groups like the Ukrainian gas industry oligarchs (who can even own private militia) may have played a significant role in this sabotage.
BTW it is also claimed the Ukrainian saboteurs left from Rostock (in Germany) so what if they also got some support from within Germany?

↪neomac
↪jorndoe
Still doesn't answer which country was behind it. Makes Ukraine likely but would it do it without conferring with the US? Or is this still a non-state operation? We're not really any step closer to figuring out who's behind it, only just figured out who did it. — Benkei

Does it really matter? Those who believe that the Great Satan is the main responsible for it all, no matter what the “official” version is, won’t be shaken by recent news. On the other side, if the US (or other countries like the UK and Poland) actually supported Ukrainian sabotage of Nordstream or were complicit in hiding the truth, the operation may have been conceived and executed in such a way to grant Western institutional figures plausible deniability.
What I think it would be honest to acknowledge at this point is that Ukrainians have means and motivation to hit Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine e.g. inside Russia, in the Black Sea, in Africa, in the Middle East without necessarily having the US consent given the problem of Russian red lines or even Ukrainian/Western moles.

But it was the US which sabotaged the Nordstream, ask Tzeench if you dare to doubt!

Kiev is not a victim. It made its choices, and carries the responsibility for the consequences. It chose poorly and is now paying the price. — Tzeentch

Neither is Russia, you piece of pro-Russian propaganda.

this is a philosophy forum and people here make a sport out of trying to 'win arguments', and that's what you're doing, and it's worth no one's time. You're even wasting your own. — Tzeentch

In a philosophy forum, that's a more fair and humble sport than spinning pro-Russian propaganda with a smug posture of expertise in everything that matters in this discussion. And that's what you're doing.

The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine.
You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.

If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that. — boethius

Here your assumptions seem that “legitimate security concerns” for one state is only about being “invaded” by foreign countries, and that the only relevant comparison over security concerns is between the US and Russia. But I deeply disagree with both.
1. As I argued elsewhere, “legitimate” is an ambiguous expression: it can be used to express “accuracy” of one’s judgement about perceived risks in terms of security. In that sense also nazis, terrorists, mobsters have legitimate security concerns, because certainly there historical circumstances that potentially harm nazis, terrorists, mobsters more than other circumstances. In another sense, “legitimate” is about other people’s recognition or acknowledgement about somebody’s rights to commit certain actions within an international legal order. So nazis, terrorists, mobsters violating this legal order can not appeal to “legitimate” security concerns to justify their violations, no right of violating the international legal order can be acknowledged by those who are committed to preserve such international legal order. An unprovoked aggressive war (the one Russia inflicted on Ukraine) is not justifiable by security concerns in light of the legal world order Westerners support, a provoked defensive war (the one by which Ukraine resists Russia) is. “Provoked” is not about hypothetical scenarios but actual offensive acts like actual territorial sovereignty violations (as in Russian actual territorial occupation of Ukraine).
I don’t mind you using the expression “legitimate security concerns” once the distinction of the 2 meanings is clearly stated and acknowledged because we should neither conflate the 2 meanings nor assume that one implies the other. Indeed, one can successfully claim that Russia has legitimate security concerns in the first sense, and yet deny the second after the invasion of Ukraine.
2. “invasions” are not the only object of State’s security concerns, destruction of its infrastructures, commercial routes, means of defence and sustenance, and strategic assets (like commodities and technology) can be considered a security threat. Also all factors that may socially destabilise a country beyond conventional wars: like support of terrorists, criminals, illegal immigration or independence movements within a state are security threats. So there are different forms of “security concern”: in previous posts, you yourself were talking about the possibility of putting offensive nuclear missiles in Ukraine as a security concern for Russia, and Tzeench was talking about the threat posed by NATO to the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, and the Black Sea fleet is used for power projection not just defense. Even if one wanted to circumscribe the usage of “security concern” to mere military capacity/equipments and operations, Russia has means and ways to hit the US militarily (see threats of nuclear escalation or “deploy conventional missiles within striking distance of the United States and its European allies”), so it’s not outlandish if the US wanted to increase deterrence against Russia for that reason only. But, at this point in history, I don’t think this the only reason or even the main one: the main reasons are more likely rooted in the security dilemmas for the US within a wider context of a multiplayer hegemonic competition, with China as the primary challenge. BTW something similar holds for Russia too: i.e. I don’t think Russia’s ambitions are primarily about defending itself from an hypothetical future invasion by the US or NATO from Ukraine, Russia’s ambitions are more maximalist, also declaredly so, they are seeking to establish a new world order in which they see themselves in some leading position, along with the US and China. Control over Ukraine contributes to increase Russia’s hegemonic status and power projection in Europe, in the mediterranean area and in the Middle East.
3. Talking about security threats from future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Ukraine which didn't join NATO yet what about about future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Finland joining NATO (apparently, Russia's border with NATO more than doubles with Finland as a member)? Isn't that a more imminent threat to Russia security? And yet Putin has even withdrawn forces from there instead of bolster them (https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report/)
4. The pertinence of comparing only Russia’s vs the US’s “security concerns” is also questionable. As I argued, Russia is a security threat to Europe with or without the US. Russia’s hegemonic ambitions are a non-negligible security threat at the very least for all neighbouring countries and countries in geographic proximity, like East European countries (including Ukraine). And Russian DOUBLE aggression of Ukraine confirms that is the case MORE EVIDENTLY than an hypothetical future scenario wereNATO forces invade Russia. The US is at the centre of a system of strategic alliance with European countries and the idea of an alliance like NATO is to share responsibilities on security matters to benefit all allies (including the US). And the US would clearly have a greater burden if it wants to lead the alliance. So the US can NOT ignore Russia’s power projection in Europe, if the US wants to preserve its hegemony in Europe.

As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.

For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States. — boethius

The assumption is questionable for several reasons.
1. EU and NATO are an economic/military alliance between Ukraine and European states too, not just between Ukraine and the US. Indeed, as we are seeing now, the EU is pressed into taking greater responsibility than the US in Ukraine. I also argued that even a fully European military alliance e.g. between France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Finland that could include Ukraine could still be perceived as a security concern by Russia AS LONG AS Russia has no part in it, EVEN MORE SO due to the geographic proximity of all involved parties and historical precedents (the US never invaded Russia, Europeans did, Eastern Europeans’ primary security concern is Russian imperialism, and American imperialism is compelled to focus on the Pacific).
2. Weaker countries may very much prefer to strategically ally for their own security with a superpower far away than with the closest superpower if this ensures greater political and economic freedom (beside Europe, also in the Pacific we have evidence of this logic since many Asian countries prefer to ally with the US not with China). Besides you persist in arbitrarily assuming that all countries are or should be like peace-maximizers, but that’s a historically questionable belief and, in principle, arguably not on you to establish.
3. Your argument looks self-defeating, because you want to claim at the same time that the US can invade Russia from Ukraine if it wanted (so it’s a “legitimate” security concern for Russia for that reason), and yet that the US wouldn’t want to invade Russia from Ukraine “precisely because you [Ukraine] are of no relevance to their actual security”.
4. My understanding is that Russia’s strategic reasoning could have been something like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of rushing into a full scale war against Ukraine to avert a possible American invasion of Russia from Ukraine, once Ukraine is in NATO?
Instead, Russia’s strategic reasoning was more like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of not grabbing the OPPORTUNITY to subdue Ukraine and reclaim a superpower status (at this point not only in the eyes of the US but also of China) when the West and its leader are now too weak to oppose, Russia is at its historical peak after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the alibi of a war provoked by the Great Satan is already so popular in the West? What’s the point of not violating a Western-lead World Order supported by a declining West to achieve invaluable strategic benefits when the chances of getting punished for it by the West are at so low ?

A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US. — boethius

That’s a questionable assumption on three grounds.
1. Smaller states can also ALLY with other countries against the common enemy as the Greek city states did against the Persian empire. And one weak state might reasonably prefer to military ally with stronger and powerful countries than weaker countries.
2. Defensive moves (like Ukraine inside NATO, which is a defensive military alliance) can be perceived as hostile, despite NATO/Ukraine’s declared intentions. Russia was repeatedly assured that Ukraine inside NATO wasn’t about threatening Russia’s sovereignty, but it didn’t matter, since Russia didn’t agree anyways. Unfortunately mistrust runs on both direction: since Russia’s assurances over Ukrainian sovereignty have been actually violated by Russia repeatedly, while neither the West nor Ukraine have attacked Russia prior to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. In any case, as long as Russia has no decision power over how Ukraine shapes its security strategy, Ukraine may raise security concerns to Russia, no matter if Ukraine joins NATO, or some other European military alliance, or it takes care for its own military security by itself (remember Mearsheimer’s argument for the Ukrainian nuclear deterrent?).
3. Russia wants Ukraine neutral, demilitarised, AND with a Russian Military Naval Base inside Ukraine, so what deterrence could Ukraine seriously achieve over Russia if these are Russian demands?

As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.

Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win.
A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win. — boethius

But I questioned numerous times this kind of arguments. And I’ll do it again.
1. Russia has been acknowledged no right to invade Ukraine to solve alleged “legitimate” security issues under international law (at least by the West). Russia security concerns were framed by Russia in terms of international law when Russia EXPRESSLY AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED security guarantees (for you, “ornamental” and “with no meaning” or not expressing a “metaphysically necessity”, remember?) which it didn’t obtain, not when it aggressed Ukraine. And if it is not rights according to international law as acknowledged by parties in an international world order, then what rights are you talking about?
2. Binding the notion of “justification” to that of military victory and defeat, or war and peace is questionable. Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds are evidence that people won’t renounce to defend what they perceive to be their land and people against foreign oppression because of the disparity of military means and costs for fighting foreign oppression. One doesn’t need to empathise with them, but if one’s reasoning is FACT based, one can’t reasonably discount the historical and anthropological fact that the pursuit of self-determination by some people can be a major driving force factor in war that overrides the disparity of military means or losses. Nor can one discount the FACT that these wars can be foundational of people’s national identity, in that sense the material and spiritual price to pay for that, it’s ultimately THEIR OWN choice to make in a very personal sense. So I do not need to dismiss your points nor the idea that Ukrainians might have been in better conditions now if they preferred compromise or surrender as soon as possible, actually I find such points even more compelling for Ukrainians after the rather disappointing support Ukrainians got from the West. Yet your points may not be the most personally compelling reasons to Ukrainians. Ukrainians, similarly to many other people rebelling against foreign oppression, may be no peace-maximisers. Their recurrent historical conflicts with Russia supports my belief (as acknowledged also by Mearsheimer in the article you too cited). So Ukrainians too may pursue self-determination against Russian oppression, as much as a political status which grants them greater political-economic freedom through Westernisation. And in order to achieve that they may be ready to pay related (sunk) costs despite being intolerable to peace-maximisers.
3. Ukraine is not fighting alone but with the support of Western allies, so the outcome of their conflict with Russia depends also on the Western allies contribution during and after the war. Both Europeans and the US may be very much compelled to not let Russia win (each of them for their own strategic reasons) as much as they are compelled to not let their alliance be perceived as weaker than the anti-Western strategic alliance.
My conclusion is that no, “likely winning” for a stronger state against a weaker state is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying aggressive or defensive wars.

That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians. — boethius

I don’t find your claim fully intelligible since “trying to do so” semantically refers to an action, but in that contest it’s used as an anaphoric reference to "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" which is not an action. Anyways, let’s charitably assume that you are kind of putting in other words what you just said: i.e. “a smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win” where “preemptive military action” refers to Ukraine joining NATO. I still find your argument misleading.
1. If one wants to reason according to international law, the right for Ukraine to join NATO depends EXCLUSIVELY on the conditions established by NATO and the approval of NATO members, so “being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians” don’t necessarily prevent Ukraine from satisfying the requirements of joining NATO, not exempt NATO members to recognise such a right to Ukraine, if Ukraine satisfies such requirements. Surely unresolved/persistent territorial conflicts are an hindrance to NATO accession taken into account in the accession requirements, but not territorial, demographic, infrastructural and economic losses, even when they are significative. The same goes with the Ukrainian right of self-defence against ACTUAL aggression (not hypothetical one): foreign violations of the Ukrainian territorial integrity put a legal burden on those states which acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty , including Russia. Therefore, talking about rights outside the international law or what has been acknowledged in terms of international order by relevant participants, if that’s what you are trying to do, looks rather unjustified to me.
2. If one wants to reason strategically over longer term objectives under evolving geopolitical conditions one can not discount NATIONAL interest as perceived by the concerned nation (Ukrainians and Russians, to begin with) nor discount how all other relevant players are reacting to such conflict. So defining necessary and sufficient conditions as a function of chances of winning or achieving peace as soon as possible (not even as long as possible?) based on current military capacity of the two direct belligerents, and independently from perceived national interest or other actors’ playing strategy, looks historically and strategically myopic to me.
At best, you may wish to persuade Ukrainians (not me) that it is not in their national interest to refuse to become Russian vassals. But I would be surprised if Ukrainians would find your arguments conclusive since their national identity is rooted in a historical opposition to Russian national identity and oppression. It would like to trying to convince them that the Ukrainian national interest is better served by being Russified.

If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it. — boethius

If all you are saying when distinguishing arguments from “rights” and justification is that one should not conflate legal reasoning with strategic reasoning over security matters, I can agree. But then the one conflating the two is you, when you talk about Russia’s legitimate security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, or the “right to preemptive military action” if that refers to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or the genesis of this war as Western provocation. Here is why:
1. Russia may have security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, but such fact doesn’t commit Westerners to appease Russia’s security concerns in violation of the international world order they support. Russia has no acknowledged right to have its buffer states. While acknowledging Ukrainian sovereignty commits Westerners and Russia (since Russia too acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty) at least to refrain from pursuing unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, or from supporting or approving unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty by foreign powers (where “unprovoked” refers to ACTUAL aggressions of one country against another, not hypothetical ones).
2. On the other side, Ukraine can justify its patriotic war against Russia, INDEPENDENTLY from legal rights to defend itself as acknowledged by others, as a function of heir perceived national interest and a multiplayer evolving geopolitical environment. So Ukraine doesn’t need to appeal to the acknowledged rights of joining NATO to justify its patriotic war against Russia, and to tolerate related costs beyond what you find acceptable. Appeal to rights to join NATO are the reason but the consequence of Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination from Russia’s oppression.
3. Concerning the genesis of this war, again it is not reasonable to justify Russia’s aggression of Ukraine according to acknowledged rights within the Western-led international order, since Russia wasn’t actually aggressed by Ukraine or the US or NATO, there is no internationally acknowledged right for preventive wars. If there was one, Russia wouldn’t need to aspire to change the Western-led world order. It is not even justified to frame Russia’s strategic choice as a function of some “provocation” by the West since all competing geopolitical players, Russia and the US included, may be security maximisers (as Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism claims) and any increase in deterrence by one country can be considered hostile or done at the expense of other countries’ security. The only counterbalance to maximalist objectives by great powers is the risk of overstretching, not the acknowledgement of rivals’ “legitimate” security concerns. In other words, there is no acknowledged legal or strategic burden on the West to appease Russia’s claims over Ukraine or tolerate Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. It’s preposterous for boxers to call out as a “provocation” a punch in the face by their adversary as if they needed a justification to punch back the adversary, the whole point for boxers is to punch each other in the face, no matter who starts first. Similarly in a world where hegemonic powers act as competing security maximisers it's preposterous to talk about “provocation” as justification of their preventive defensive moves. And that's not all, the US approach to Russia and China wasn't even far from being as hostile as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda wants to depict it. Indeed, globalization was the US strategy to push potentially hostile authoritarian countries far from confrontational logic: letting the West do business with Russia (and China) in exchange for Westernization was the US gamble to curb hegemonic competition. DO UT DES, I'll give you wealth for decades, you'll give up on competing against the US on world hegemony. The US propaganda found also a common enemy: Islamic terrorism and climate change to re-direct security concerns. That's why Russia should not have been compelled to perceive talks about Ukraine inside NATO as an unbearable act of hostility. Returning the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal to Russia was an ACTUAL act of good will from the US more than the hypothetical future scenario of Ukraine joining NATO. Unfortunately, the more Russia and China grew richer the more they got ambitious in terms of power projection (while the US got weaker). US-led globalization EMPOWERED and BOLSTERED Russia (and China) wrt the US more than any talking about NATO expansion in Ukraine could ever do. If Russia could invade Ukraine is not because of the US provocation but thanks to the US globalization.
Your emphasis about “provocation” to explain Russia is rather myopic and comes from your confused and confusing understanding of Russia’s “rights” and “legitimate” security concerns.
To summarise, as far as legal reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is Russia’s violation of the international order as recognized by the West (which also Russia was committed to until it violated it in 2014). As far as strategic reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is in Russia’s attempt to exploit an opportunity window to change power balance in its favor at the expense of the US and its allies, given the perceived weakness of the West.

Looking forward to reading your counterarguments to each of my points (I even numbered them).

What I find bizarre is that you keep switching between different premises.

On the one hand, the geopolitical realities are supposed to be impersonal and irresistible forces. But when you have to explain why events don't conform to these forces, you suddenly invoke very personal and contingent reasons. European diplomats are incapable of even basic solutions. Unspecified actors are influenced by the US in unspecified ways. Europeans are "acting in bad faith" or are "ignoring realities". — Echarmion

I agree with this objection but it’s nothing new: Mearsheimer too can be easily accused of such bipolar attitude. On one side he claims to describe “geopolitical realities” when he talks about Russia’s behaviour, on the other he is all about condemning “geopolitical choices” which do not seem to match his “geopolitical theory” when he talks about US’s behaviour.

Tzeench's double standard reflects on his rhetorically conflicting claims such as:

A - “What the US or Europe want is hardly a factor in this. These are geopolitical realities - forces of nature, almost - that they cannot ignore (though admittedly, Europe has been a king at ignoring geopolitical realities).

B - “Where I diverge from these scholars is that they believe this to be a result of US incompetence, whereas I believe there is no way the US would pursue and double down on these policies for as long as they did, if they weren't getting exactly what they wanted”.

“there's no way the US would have provoked this conflict unless the Europeans were willing participants”.

A - “Europe in terms of its economic, intellectual and human potential is way too big for US to maintain its artificial status as suzerain. which is why Europe will simply break free from the US orbit once the US is forced to divert its attention elsewhere”.

“the US is seeking to prepare its pivot to Asia by leaving long-lasting conflict as its parting gift to Europe.”

B - “Even when the US pivots, it doesn't mean the US 'is gone’, and you're suggesting handing the US the biggest trump card it could hope for? Haha, what a 'sensible' strategy”.[/I]

The will and ignorance of the West is contrasted to the Russian geopolitical realities and forces of nature (…almost). The US is doomed to leave Europe, but not really.

Unfortunately, he himself can’t help but talking about the Putin’s “sensible” choices and intellectual failures in light of perceived “vital strategic interests”.

“the Russians after over a decade of warnings chose to use force to secure what they believed to be their vital strategic interests”

“Putin probably banked on the Europeans pursuing a sensible strategy. They didn’t”.


Double standard is still at play when Tzeench is lecturing people about history and propaganda.
While from the US history (”There are plenty of western scholars who voice these ideas, and it fits neatly in the historic behavioral pattern we see from the United States”) it should follow that “despite all the historical evidence, Europe seems chronically incapable to view the United States as a ruthless great power which follows realist logic” or “The only proper way to view its actions is through a lens of utter cynicism, which comes natural to a realist anyway”. An yet from “Ukraine and especially Crimea are of great geopolitical and historical importance to Russia and always have been”. doesn’t follow any claim about Russian cynicism or ruthless behaviour according to realist logic.
While Europeans are under the pernicious spell of the US propaganda machine, apparently Russian-spun propaganda in the West has no pernicious impact on the West worth mentioning. Putin’s claims are cherrypicked to support a defensive, minimalist, unequivocal, and self-contained understanding of Russian posture and war goals (what about Ukrainian denazification? What about demilitarising Ukraine? What about the denial of Ukrainian national identity as opposed to Russia? What about nuclear threats and escalatory rhetoric made him and his lackeys like Lavrov and Medvedev?), while European claims get shamelessly misreported to make them look as confessing their warmongering oompah loompahs proclivity.


Notice also how much his arguments need to rely on painstakingly mystificatory and question-begging expressions like “geopolitical realities”, “forces of nature, almost”, “vital strategic interests”, “the realist framework that says cooperation cannot happen when it is rational to cooperate” which he is rather reluctant to elaborate, especially on how they would apply to all relevant actors beyond Russia, including the US, Ukraine, European countries.

Take the example of the role played by the Black Sea Fleet as part of Russia’s “vital strategic interests”.
First of all the Black Sea Fleat is gone from Crimea despite the annexation (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-retreat-from-crimea-makes-a-mockery-of-the-wests-escalation-fears/). So there is no vital link between Black Sea Fleat and Crimea, and so far this is an unquestionable success by the totally disastrously Ukrainian losers. This was in defence of Ukrainian vital strategic interests as the Ukrainian economy still heavily relies on its wheat exports (https://www.cfr.org/article/how-ukraine-overcame-russias-grain-blockade).
Second, what is the purpose of the Black Sea Fleat really? Sure it CAN be used to DEFEND Russia proper from NATO hostile activities (if there are any), absolutely true. What however is also absolutely true is that the Black Sea Fleat is ACTUALLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY used for hegemonic power projection i.e. to undermine Ukraine’s exports, to keep control over the Caucasus regions, to support friend-countries in the Middle East, to expand presence and control over North African countries or in the Balkans, and sea routes in the Mediterranean. These are the kind of “geopolitical realities” has to take into account when reasoning over the alleged “vital strategic interests” of Russia, and margins of economic cooperation with Russia.

I can get that there are honestly compelling reasons for Europeans to bring Russia on their side, for cynically exploiting its resources to benefit corrupt Russian oligarchs who then spend money in Europe and get European elites richer, and to defend christian societies from Islamic terrorism, immigration and the LGBTQ "perverts", and economically compete with the US or look less as US lackeys to non-Westerners: no matter how despotic its political leadership is, no matter how brutal is their repression of independence movements, no matter how exploited materially and intellectually its society is. And I can get that there are compelling reasons for honestly committed European pacifists and humanitarian advocates to radically question military interventions and their actors.
And, notice, even these reasons wouldn't suffice to me. I just would find them honestly compelling for Europeans (for sure, to many Europeans). And I can't dismiss this fact.
But, really, all this talking about provocations, broken promises, bad faith agreements, 15 years warnings about vital strategic interests, refused peace offers, Western warmongering bullshits (allegedly grounded on historical analysis and geopolitical realism) with such self-conceited moral indignation and intellectual self-entitlement is intellectually disgusting. I feel shame for you, really.

It's really hard to catch up with Tzeench's inconsistent and auto-referential bullshit rate:

Tzeench: “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it.”

What a dumb rebuttal. Sure, “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it” once you “have a credible deterrent against Russia”. Not yet if one wants to build it up to catch up with his neighbour’s deterrence build-up, especially if your neighbour wants to subdue you.


Tzeench: “NATO leaders admitted to signing a peace agreement not with the intention of maintaing peace, but with the intention to arm for war”.
“First-hand accounts from Merkel and Hollande tell us that NATO entered the Minsk Accords in bad faith, and used it to buy time to arm Ukraine.”.

What is he even talking about? Any evidence of this admission?
If he refers to Merkel’s statement from the Zeit interview: ”The 2014 Minsk Agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as you can see today.” The expression “not with the intention of maintaing peace” is not there, nor it can be LOGICALLY inferred from that statement, arguably NOT EVEN SUGGESTED. Indeed, you must have heard the Latin adage "si vis pacm, para bellum" (= "if you want peace, prepare for war") therefore admitting that Minsk Agreements bought time for Ukraine's military build-up is no sufficient evidence that peace agreements were made "not with the intention of maintaing peace" AT ALL. So the alleged admission is just your manipulative and defamatory interpolation based on your implicit and highly questionable understanding of the situation. This is evidence of your intellectual misery.
The same goes with Holland’s claims: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point," he told the Kiev Independent media outlet, while commenting on Merkel’s remark that the Minsk agreements allowed Kiev to gain time, but by no means prevented further hostilities in the Donbass. "Since 2014, Ukraine has strengthened its military posture. Indeed, the Ukrainian army was completely different from that of 2014. It was better trained and equipped. It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." https://tass.com/world/1558075
And notice how Holland complements his claims: “for a dialogue to be fruitful, it must be based on a balance of power.”, but how does one state pursue balance of power on matter of security? Russia’s own behaviour shows it: military build-up and economic dependence, he himself suggested it.


The following Tzeench's claim is more foolish than the foolishness he attributes to Westerners:
”This is why I emphasize the foolishness of combining the build up of a deterrent (presumably to avoid war) with economic decoupling, refusal of diplomatic talks and maximalist war rhetoric, etc.)”.

Indeed prior to 2014, the West (including the US) and Russia was NOT decoupled, there was no refusal of diplomatic talks no maximalist war rhetoric, there was not even build-up a deterrent (NATO was brain dead, expenditures for NATO was declining, NATO membership for Ukraine always postponed). Actually it was doing business with Russia that FINANCED Russia’s military build-up and it was security cooperation in the Middle East that proved Russia’s power projection wasn’t at risk. The US-led West was dominated by a logic of APPEASEMENT of Russia (despite voices contrary to it within the US, INCLUDING Mearsheimer's) not provocation/humiliation, hence the push for Ukraine to return the nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for a promise of respecting the Ukrainian territorial integrity and national self-determination (while the warmongerer Mearsheimer was against this! now tell me if NOT returning the nuclear arsenal to Russia was a provocation from the US and Ukraine!).
And yet having discussions of Ukraine inside NATO and EU was perceived as an unbearable provocation and security threat worth a conventional war against Ukraine and its Western allies?! WTF?! What the fuck can Russia sensibly expect from the US which just beat Russia in a world hegemony competition and while Russia was at its lowest also economically and politically (remember the August Coup by revanchist hardliners?!).
AND THAT's NOT ALL, IF Tzeench CLAIMS EUROPEANS ARE THE US's LACKEYS THEN IT MUST FOLLOW FROM HIS OWN LOGIC THAT THE US WANTED THE WEST TO DO BUSINESS WITH RUSSIA AND TO DE-ESCALATE WITH A MILITARY BUILD-DOWN AND TO POSTPONE UKRAINE ACCESS TO NATO IN ~20 YEARS OF GLOBALIZATION PRIOR TO 2014. SO IF THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WERE SO COOPERATIVE TOWARD RUSSIA SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION, IT IS THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WHICH WERE BETRAYED AND PROVOKED INTO WAR BY RUSSIA FIRST WITH A GROWINGLY HOSTILE RHETORIC AND THEN WITH AN ACTUAL ACT OF WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND, INDIRECTLY, ITS WESTERN ALLIES (BTW SHELL WE MAKE A COMPARISON WITH PUTIN’s MAXIMALIST WARMONGERING RHETORIC AND NUCLEAR THREATS AGAINST THE WEST, REALLY?), NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Russian imperialism allows us to predict Russia hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine centuries before Putin and Mearsheimer were even born.
And Mearsheimer based his predictions about Russia on history as well, not only on abstract security dilemmas (which are extrapolated from history anyways). Here:

Second, there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and
Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet collapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast suffering under
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological backdrop, small disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism on either side.
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf

And Putin himself made a historical point (however questionable) in rejecting Ukrainian as an independent nation to justify his war:
In essence, Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation. The common tragedy of collectivization and famine of the early 1930s was portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
https://www.prlib.ru/en/article-vladimir-putin-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians

What Mearsheimer did NOT predict is the window of OPPORTUNITY that Putin chose to aggress Ukraine.

In a nutshell, a nation building their military, even as deterrence, can be seen as a threat to neighboring nations. — Tzeentch

Really? Military build-up is what Russia was doing for decades (especially under Putin) while Europeans were doing the opposite for decades and did business with Russia. So you are saying that Europeans were wrong in ignoring the RUSSIAN THREAT coming back after the collapse of Soviet-Union, since doing business with Russia wasn’t a credible enough deterrent against Russia's hegemonic ambitions, right?

The logic of doing business and pursuing deterrence is what Russia, China and Iran COULD do in the pursuit of their regional hegemony when the West bet on globalization. Why they could and Europeans couldn't?
To me the main difference is that Russia, China and Iran are authoritarian regimes with revanchist aspirations, while European people are governed by democratic regimes focusing on economic issues more than on security issues. But that’s FAR from being all European political and economic elites' fault, indeed they were at least pursuing some form of economic and monetary integration, as a step toward greater political integration, however questionable. While the rest of the political debate was dominated by self-deprecating peace&love anti-EU anti-US populists and make our nation great again far-right nationalist/populist anti-EU, anti-US and anti-immigration (also financed by Russia). And they were far away from perceiving the Russian threat and support policies to boost deterrence AGAINST Russia.

Your pathetically naive assumption (not the only one) is that anti-EU and anti-US populism are best fit to do business with Russia AND build a credible deterrence against Russia, than the pro-EU and pro-US political elites.

One point that I don’t see stressed enough also by views critical toward Russia is the political hazard which Western countries are exposed to while dealing with hostile authoritarian regimes like in Putin’s Russia, and how this relates to security.

Security and deterrence are not just granted by military capacity and readiness, but also by efficient and consistent decision making about security-deterrence and hegemonic conflicts. What Western democracies and system of alliance have shown also during the current conflict is that authoritarian regimes have a comparative advantage over democracies in taking decisions about deterrence and security that are more efficient and consistent over time: indeed, Russia can count on a more hierarchical decision process (so no obstacles from the parliament or the judicial system), repression of political opposition and popular dissent (no obstacles from media and political representatives, INCLUDING those corrupted/infiltrated by the enemy), and consistently pursue strategic goals over decades (because the political leadership remains the same over decades). For democratic countries (including the US) is the opposite.
Exporting democracy, however poorly implemented or questionable in principle, still is/was not just matter of empowering foreign people in defending their rights against foreign authoritarian regimes for humanitarian purposes. It’s also about Western own political vulnerability AND SECURITY.

Russia can replace neither the US nor China as an economic partner to Europe. All it can offer is cheap raw materials. It's neither a big market nor a big manufacturer. — Echarmion

One thing I wouldn’t discount about Russia is that Russia has its military-industry complex to supply other countries and also offer security as a service (as with Wagnerites in African countries), and that means its influence over markets, commodity supplies and migration fluxes can extend well beyond Russia.

If China and the US go onto a direct collision course, Russia is in no position to materially soften the blow for Europe. — Echarmion

Tzeench may still try to claim that, in addition to their economic partnership with Russia, Europeans can still try to turn themselves into some greater supplier for the US/Chinese market (also for military supply?).

Anyways such an hypothetical future scenario seems grounded on the preposterous assumption the Europeans can coordinate their efforts in a way to maximise their benefits apparently at low/no cost/risk with the support of Russia while the rest of the World (including the US) is distracted by a war between the US and China. A “ruthless great power which follows realist logic” (not Russia of course, which is known to be a merciful great power which follows Peace&Love logic, but the US, the Great Satan) which masterminded a proxy war against Russia but now it is evidently doomed to fight China while Europe will economically exploit them and eat pop corns with Russia. How genius is that painstakingly detailed plan?!

Nor is a security partnership plausible given the military capacities and the way the Russian elite justifies it's rule (as a bulwark against westernisation). — Echarmion

Unless Russia manages to de-Westernise Europe by propping far-right authoritarian lackeys and populists which do not like super-national governance/market, civil freedoms, democratic regimes, immigration, women rights, secularism, etc. I bet Orban might be happy to rely on Russia for its security.

All the other contradictions just follow from the premise that the theory trumps the details. How can the following statements be reconciled?

In other words, there is no reason Europe should treat Russia as the big threat. The only point Russia becomes a threat is if we A. constantly play our cards wrong, and B. let mercurial powers like the US whisper into our ears. — Tzeentch


Sure. But it needs to do so without pointlessly antagonizing Russia, otherwise rearmament is going to lead to mutual tensions and militarization (which we are already in the process of), which will not achieve security, but the exact opposite: war — Tzeentch


Ordinarily we would suppose that war is a threat. But the war here is supposed to be the result of an unnatural manipulation by the US and thus not actually a threat by Russia. — Echarmion

But Tzeench ignores the theory of his guru Mearsheimer [1], so also its ambiguities (if not implicit contradictions), and limits. Russia is a security threat to European countries because it has offensive military capacity to wreck European countries, it aspires to a regional hegemony if we are lucky (under the assumption that regional hegemony concerns at most all the Eastern European countries which Western Europeans, or just Tzeench, do not give a shit about) and beyond regional hegemony if we aren’t lucky. In any case we are uncertain of either. The theory however suggests a maximalist trend for all great powers (including Russia with its imperialist ideology, very popular among political elites, one may dare to add). And notice the total irrelevance of talking about provocation within such offensive realist views because any aggressive move is justifiable in defensive terms (be the US against Russia, be Russia against Ukraine, etc.). Actually if one takes into account the geographic proximity of Russia or the US wrt Europe, Russia is a GREATER threat than the US or China.
Hence the need for Europeans to ally and re-arm to balance PRIMARILY against Russia, with or without American manipulation.

Concerning Tzeench’s painstakingly detailed pro-Russian propaganda, I would say:

- Any re-arming, military alliance, military activity, military industry which Russia can’t veto or contain or influence is a threat for Russia too. Especially if we are talking about countries geographically close to Russia. So there is no way that Russia will be just fine by letting Europe turn into a regional power with deterring military capacity (see how Macron, the one who tried to appease Russia and bypass NATO, was re-paid by Putin) . So here is the Russian deal which Tzeench is advertising here: as long as Russia can preserve the military capacity to overwhelm Europe and impose its will around European countries (or just the ones Tzeench’s sponsors), then Russia is not a threat to them. This argument sounds as smart as saying: the weaker you appear to your potential enemy the less likely your potential enemy is a threat to you.

- If the US can manipulate weaker states, so can Russia. That’s perfectly in line with Mearsheimer’s theory. And Mearsheimer’s theory offers enough reasons to claim that Russia is a threat to Europe, INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE US and its alleged manipulation or ear whispering. In other words, as far as propaganda is concerned, it's the offensive realist logic that explains the propaganda of "provocation" and "Great Satan" not the other way around.


[1]
The theory of his guru is called OFFENSIVE REALISM and these are the major tenets:

1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is anarchical
2. All states possess some offensive military capability
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
4. States have survival as their primary goal
5. States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival



Mainly, it diverges from defensive neorealism in regards to the accumulation of power a state needs to possess to ensure its security and the issuing of strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism draws a much more pessimistic picture of international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security competition likely leading to conflict and war

As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals",[24] since "the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is".[25] States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with hegemony—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate goal.[26]

John Mearsheimer summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.[27]" Accordingly, offensive neorealists such as Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to hegemony.[28][29]
Since global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best end game status states can hope to reach is that of a regional hegemon dominating its own geographical area.[28][29] This relentless quest for power inherently generates a state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background".[30] Only once regional hegemony is attained do great powers become status quo states.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism

Sorry dudes, I didn’t finish to shit over @Tzeench’s hypothetical “grand strategy” where Europeans will chum up with Russia and eat pop corns together while China and the US “beat each other to a pulp”.

Indeed, it’s funny to see this dude completely overlooking another hypothetical scenario which his guru Mearshaimer would likely support, and even Trump (his beloved American President) would arguably welcome: the scenario where the US reconciles with Russia to better contain China using Ukraine as a bargaining chip.

Now let’s consider a scenario where Russia:

- can be flattered by 2 great powers like China and the US,

- can experience a boost in its fuel and wheat exports (nurturing its power projection in all contended areas, including in Europe), even more so if Ukraine will completely surrender to Russia (something which is welcome because apparently Ukrainian lives matter to Trump voters! And it’s totally risk free and harmless for Europe because if Russia could blackmail EU for its fuel supply when Ukraine was NOT under its control, how could Russia blackmail EU for its fuel supply AND wheat supply when Ukraine is completely under its control ?)

- can enjoy free pass for expanding in North Africa and the Mediterranean (namely, ENCIRCLING EUROPE)

- can have UK+East Europeans locked in an anti-Russian stance due to their historical fear of Russian imperialism conveniently boosted by the US of course (Trump didn’t like North Stream 2, right? nor the German or European economy outperforming the American one, right?) and the rest of European countries with self-conceited anti-US/pro-Russian lackeys (replacing the pro-US lackeys’) as political oppositions or leaders

In this scenario, who doesn't give a fuck about Europeans to put their heads out of their ass more than Russia?

Not only Europe won’t get completely rid of the US but it would completely get split in smaller regional spheres of influence between the US and Russia (however not with the same antagonism as in the Cold War, at least as long as China remains the greatest security threat to both), and with no prospect of boosting their economy or army other than as a function of their hegemon’s interest (BTW I let you imagine how fantabulous is the prospect of experiencing an economic boost under far-right populist political elites when Russia is your hegemon, it’s enough to see the envious example of the ex-Soviet Union republics).
In a wonderful multipolar world, market/industry/technology inputs and outputs and commercial routes are under the political/military control of regional hegemonic powers, negotiating on trading conditions or imposing them for everybody else.

In short, in this hypothetical scenario, there is no way that Europeans simply chum up with Russia and economically profit from the conflict between China and the US, living in happiness, peace and bliss ever after.

Supposedly we were going to feed Ukraine weapons to hurt the Russian military so they couldn't pull another stunt like Ukraine, yet it's the European militaries which are completely stripped and the Russians who now have an army several times the size of their peace-time standing army. — Tzeentch


Just because no-one has challenged this false claim yet: Europe's militaries are not "stripped". Most frontline equipment that has been handed over has been old models from storage. — Echarmion

Tzeench’s claims are plagued by rhetorical inconsistencies which betray his pro-Russian propaganda.

On one side he’s dismissing the European military capacity in the face of Russia’s army and on the other side he’s all about dismissing the Russian military threat as well: “Russia has a fraction of Europe's GDP and population. Russia is hardly a threat if the Europeans would just get their heads out of their asses.” (notice the hypothetical)

On one side he wants the Europeans to take their “heads out of their asses” in matter of security and military readiness and yet he’s all about dismissing “this type of fearmongering nonsense” from our side against Russia. But if Europeans wouldn't get their heads out of their ass out of fear for the Russian military threat, then what else would make them do that?

On one side he wants Europeans and Russia to strategically ally (so see themselves more as partners than enemies) because “while the US and China beat each other to a pulp, Europe and Russia would remain intact and grow in relative power. Why do you think the US is trying so hard to embroil Europe and Russia in a war with each other? It's trying to prevent either of them from becoming the laughing third. It's easy to understand why the Russians are so keen on a diplomatic settlement when you understand this context. The only people who don't seem to understand anything are the Europeans.” On the other if Russia is no threat to Europeans because it seeks an economic partnership, and China and the US are beating each other to pulp, against whose threats would European be compelled to unite and rearm?

On one side NATO is a legitimate security threat for Russia, and on the other side apparently Russia would be just fine with letting Europe be united and rearmed as a geopolitical nuclear power right at its side in name of an economic partnership.

On one side he is all about populist views “European populism threatens to slip Europe from Washington's grasp, turning it from a vassal into a potential rival.”, but on the other side European populism is against EU and pro-nationalist (and also at Putin's pocket) so arguably against political-economic-military integration which might be necessary pre-condition to talk about security threats and economic interests for Europeans COLLECTIVELY (BTW lack of unity and moral are also reasons why Europeans have been and still are so hesitant toward Russia in the current conflict).

@Tzeench do yourself a favour, take your head out of Putin’s ass, and put it back in yours.

Poll says 32% of Ukrainians open to territorial concessions for quick peace
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poll-says-32-of-ukrainians-open-to-territorial-concessions-for-quick-peace/

The first big difference is the Russians aren't committing a genocide in Ukraine, as I just explained. — boethius

But again, mainly, the most important thing, is that Russia isn't carrying out a genocide whereas Isreal is. — boethius

Legally speaking, allegations of genocide. And there are allegations of Russia committing a genocide against Ukrainians too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

Russia is following the law of armed conflict pretty well: extremely far away from starving whole civilian populations to death. And this is born out in the stats of civilians killed during the conflict and in particular children. — boethius

Some more allegations, that one can find in the Ukrainian case too:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/24/war-crimes-dossier-to-accuse-russia-of-deliberately-causing-starvation-in-ukraine

The second big difference is that Russia is not implementing apartheid system and occupying parts of Ukraine without giving those occupied peoples any rights. — boethius

Allegations of discriminatory policies from Russians against indigenous people, you have aplenty:

https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/human-rights-situation-in-territories-of-ukraine-occupied-by-russia-committee-of-ministers-gravely-concerned

https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/EUR5078052024ENGLISH.pdf


People involved in the Crimean Tatar civil rights movement repeatedly noted strong similarities between the conditions suffered by designated "special settlers" and victims of apartheid as well as Palestinians under Israeli occupation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatarophobia

Third, the territories occupied by Russia have large portions, arguably a majority, of ethnic Russians that actually want to join Russia (hence the separatists fighting for 10 years), so there is not only an element of self-determination in the Russian speakers taking up arms against Kiev oppression of their language and culture, but also no one really cares all that much whether Russian speaking Ukrainians become Russian speaking Russians. Russia isn't conquering territory and then keeping Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians that don't want to be occupied by Russians in a giant ghetto with zero rights and lot's of murder, sexual abuse and so on, for the foreseeable future. Of course there will be exceptions, but in general there has been no insurgency against Russian occupation nor Ghettoizaton of conquered territory. — boethius

There is no need to ghetto anybody if forced displacement can do the trick. Mearsheimer has argued that’s the intent of Israel, cleanse territories to dodge the accusation of apartheid.
There is a recognisable historical pattern. Indeed, when territorial disputes are triggered by people aspirations to build a nation-state as for both Israel and Palestinians, cleansing and genocide are likely consequences. Western countries in Europe (https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/35457/) and overseas like in the US , Austrialia, Canada are not immune from this phenomenon either (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Native_American_genocide_in_the_United_States, https://nwac.ca/media/2023/06/is-a-genocide-taking-place-in-canada-short-answer-yes, https://kooriweb.org/foley/resources/history/genocide.html) .
The appeal to self-determination sounds more compelling to me when it’s matter of people aspirations against political leaderships imposing their rule by authoritarian means (inspired by devine mandate?) or against foreign imperialism, less compelling when it’s matter of conflicting national aspirations between different ethnic groups over the same land, or a minority over a majority within the same nation state.

In otherwords, Russia is implementing a "one state solution" in their occupation of new territory. The one state solution is one of the two solutions that everyone agrees solves these kinds of problems, therefore all is well and you can rest your pretty little head.

The situation in Gaza is simply not similar at all to the situation in Crimea or the Donbas.

Israel does not offer Gazans citizenship and equal rights.

There is not one state or two state solution, but oppressed stateless people in a ghetto that have a right to fight the forces of oppression.

Now, Ukrainians in territory occupied by Russia would have the same right of insurgency against an occupying force (just it's less palpable because they are offered equal rights) — boethius

It’s not up to me to decide for the oppressed ones what is palatable. I do wonder if all Palestinians in occupied territories find it palatable to convert to Judaism, which would bestow them a right to join Israel and definitely have their own nation-state without spilling a single blood drop.
Anyways, Russia is annexing territories AFTER forced cleansing, colonization and russification in the occupied areas, so I wouldn’t be surprised if the majority of people in the occupied areas (arguably ethnic Russians) would be fine in being part of Russia (however I don’t think they have the ultimate decision on this matter, that’s all) and Russian would welcome it.
For Israel, the situation is different and the comparison to immigration in Western democracies can help understand why. No Western democracy (ESPECIALLY with a regime supporting populist views) would accept mass migration (ESPECIALLY from alien ethnic groups) that would dramatically alter the demographics of a State, for security and economic reasons. Discrimination and oppression of stateless people are very common conditions in the West for illegal immigrants (apartheid state, here too?).
So it’s politically questionable to expect Israel to accept a one state solution altering its demographics in favour of the Palestinians minority. Besides there are Palestinian living as Israeli citizens and enjoying the rights which the Palestinians in the occupied territories do not have. So the problem for Israel is not the civil/democratic integration of Palestinians per se, but how to deal with those Palestinians that are pressing outside its borders. Which is even worse than the case of the illegal immigrants for Western countries, since those Palestinians pressing on the Israeli boarders are fighting for their right to same land and they are led by Hamas (with the support of foreign powers hostile to Israel) into an asymmetric war against Israel and Israelis. So security concerns are in order and no state is expected to intentionally sacrifice the security of its own citizens at large for humanitarian concerns over alien people perceived as hostile at large.



To me, Western priorities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not ideologically withdraw from historical tragedies and people’s nation-state aspirations , but take hard decisions informed primarily by ideological proximity, political-economic-military cooperation and common challenges.
Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

4. Regardless of what you think about fighting a disastrous war to (maybe) get something that would offer protection (maybe) from disastrous wars, it still only makes sense to do if you can actually win.
For example ssu's argument at the start was that while agreeing with me that he saw no way Ukraine could win, well maybe Ukrainian general have something or know something we don't and will pull off a brilliant victory. Turns out Ukrainian generals had no such thing and exactly what was predictable given the available information is what happened. The corollary of @ssu's position is that if Ukraine had no surprise then their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war). But these positions are just conveniently swept under the rug of "Ukrainian agency". — boethius

I won’t argue for SSU’s claims, he can do it by himself. I can argue for my claims.
And I think here again you are playing with words, like “victory”.
I’m less concerned with a military notion of “victory” and more with a strategic notion of “victory”. I doubt that a military notion of “victory” automatically translates to a strategic victory.
The problem from the West and the US perspective is the political, economic, and military threats posed by authoritarian regimes growingly powerful, ambitious and hostile to the West and the US. That means that there is a serious risk for the West its elites and its people to lose all the economic, political, security privileges they could enjoy in a Western led world order.
If enemies can/should not be military defeated in a significant way, then enemies need to be contained or deterred. Ukraine is an important piece to counter-balance hostile powers like Russia which aspires to lead the revolt against the West by the Rest of the World.
Ukraine has decided so far to side with the West and now pays the consequences for its choice, as much as Palestinians decided to side with Iran and now they pay the consequences for their choice. Was this worth it? I’d let the Ukrainians (and Palestinians) decide. This is why I’m talking about “Ukrainian agency".
And I don’t think that “their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war)” at all. So far, Ukraine managed to keep its political independence, to control its most important cities (including Odessa), and to control a good part of economic resources against a much stronger enemy. As long as Russia will keep fighting, Ukraine will be out of NATO and EU and wear out its capacities, but this also ensures that there is no buffer state between Russia and NATO, and that Europeans have more time to properly regroup against Russia. I wish the West could do more and better for Ukraine, but they seem unable/unwilling to do it. So I don’t need to exclude that, for the Ukrainians, this war can turn to be as endless as the Israeli-Palestinian war is, and as disastrous to Ukrainians as the Israeli-Palestinian war is disastrous to Palestinians. But I wouldn’t say it’s immoral and people died for nothing in either case just because they were disastrously defeated. BTW, how strange it is to read such an objection from a self-proclaimed man of honour: aren’t men-of-honour those ready to sacrifice life, wellbeing of themselves and people they are responsible for to save their honour? There are people who kill themselves and their children with their own hands to save their honour.
Concerning the Russians’ offer which Ukrainians should have accepted, the problem remains: both were requiring Western security guarantees with no benefits for Western alliance, only for Russia. So Ukraine could have accepted the deal with Russia without the Western assistance. But they preferred not to. You can speculate it wasn’t good for Ukrainians, but I do not give a shit about your speculation, you are not Ukrainian, right? And even if you were, it doesn’t seem to reflect the views of Ukrainians at large.

5. Regardless of what you think about fighting a war you can't win, the West's policy has clearly been to make sure of this result by drip feeding in weapons systems. Now that the drip feed of weapons systems has run its course, the West has turned to drip feeding "maybe we will, maybe we won't" send in ground troops to turn the tide, to maintain the policy of having Ukraine fight, giving them hope (such as the next wonder weapon or wonder intervention; something we've already seen at the start with all the hullaballoo about a "no fly zone" which was critical in encouraging Ukrainians to fight while the weapons drip feed system was put into place: as that takes logistics).
As I've argued, this is my main problem with Western policy. We are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe. — boethius

Western policies look pretty disappointing to me as well. But while I’m more sure about the underlying strategic reasoning for the West to support Ukraine, I’m very much less sure about what the West could actually do, especially because the West harbours its own internal conflict of interests and nasty devisions, even in the face of such dramatic and epochal historical events. On the other side these constraining factors are expected since we live in countries with democratic institutions (i.e. more exposed to people’s mood and opposing political views) and a system of allegiance which grants greater political autonomy wrt the hegemonic power (i.e. less submissive to hegemonic power pressure, see Hungary). It could have been very much different for Russia if European countries had authoritarian regimes like Belarus and responded to USA’s demands like Belarus responds to Russia’s. This leads me to believe that your effort to discredit the drip-feeding approach of the West is DEFINITELY not only a pro-Russia argument, but a pro-authoritarian regime argument.
Your critic of the drip-feeding approach would be more compelling if you could actually argue for MORE EFFECTIVE Western policies to counter anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ political/economic/military challenges in general or Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in particular, in a democratic and peaceful way. But you didn’t offer any so far. Also because if you really could do such a thing, I do wonder: why aren’t you leading the Western world instead of wasting your time on the internet as an ordinary nobody like me?
The drip-feeding approach is arguably also the result of conflicting interests: the US wants to contain Russia but also wants to reduce its engagement in the European defence. The US wants Russia to lose but not too much to favour the collapse of the Russian Federation which may also benefit China. Leading EU countries want to contain Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, but they do not want to sacrifice their economic ties with Russia and China, or worse risk a nuclear war in Europe. Leading EU countries need the US protection for their national security, but they do not want to contribute to it significantly nor want to align with the US foreign policies in the face of anti-Western challenges. So what you are framing as “we are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe” is questionable. There is no single Western head taking decision wrt Ukraine as in Russia. And the Ukrainians without Western help would have not lasted 2 years war against Russia as they did which is still very far from being disastrous or absolute beating as you claim. The Palestinian aspiration to their nation state is what looks to me disastrous and an absolute beating so far. And yet Palestinians are still fighting, foreign powers support their fight materially as much as people like you support their fight politically. And once you accept that the Palestinians misery, destruction and alleged genocide is worth if done in the name of their nation-state (that’s Hamas argument) and support for anti-US forces (like Iran) how credible are your objections against the Western support of Ukraine, really?
On the other side Russia has neither made Ukraine a pro-Russian buffer state (actually it achieved the opposite) nor strengthened its international status and regional control (like in Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict and on Kazakhstan) nor secured its Black Sea backyard to support its power projection.

6. Regardless of what you think of the drip feed theory, if there was some genuine intent to use the leverage of clearly being willing to drip feed weapons into Ukraine to seek a diplomatic solution that is favourable to Ukraine, the Western leaders would put on their big boy pants and go and try to negotiate that happening and using their leverage (such as the sanctions and so on; whole point of sanctions being to serve as leverage to compel compliance, if the goal to effect Russian decision making and not just have a big giant war for the sake of all the sweet, sweet profiteering).

Furthermore, sending money to a pervasively corrupt polity is a de facto bribe to the elites of that polity. That the West puts zero controls or supervision on the money nor the weapons sent into Ukraine is making explicit there's not even pretence that this money is not a de facto bribe. That the West recognizes a lot of that money and weapons "disappears" but has not found one single Euro of laundered money or laundered weapons outside Ukraine, is explicitly participating in the money laundering scheme. — boethius

Surely sanctions are not a magic wand to fix international conflicts, they are a double edged swards since they can damage the economy of the sanctioning countries, not only the sanctioned one. But also excessive fever can kill people, still fever can be effective in killing parasitic bacteria. And even though sanctions may not be effective in inducing compliance, still they can increase costs and constrain power projection opportunities, so they have an attritional force. If sanctions were utterly pointless there was no need to strengthen them against Iran (as Trump did) and for China to refrain from openly doing business with Russia and Iran, and avoid sanctions. It’s a power struggle so also economic sanctions can be a valid defensive mechanism within a wider and long-term strategy. What the impact of sanctions against Russia or Iran shows is that Russia can count on a network of strategic alliance, which needs to be countered by a network of strategic alliance not by a single actor, no matter if it as powerful as the US.
Concerning the bribing argument, assuming it’s broadly or decisively true or just plausible what you claim (but what are your evidences to support it, really?), I would counter as easily that Russia too is bribing Ukrainian politicians (oh… and Western politicians too!). So if Ukrainian politicians are there to be bribed, better to be bribed in support of pro-Western objectives than pro-Russian. A similar argument to that one about dumb people who believe in propaganda, better they believe pro-Western propaganda than pro-Russian propaganda. The point is not propaganda or bribery but efficacy in advancing pro-Western objectives with whatever leverage currently available. Politicians do not operate in a world starting from ideal conditions, effective and efficient tools, universal good will and patience, to fix a cosmetic local issue but from any shitty predicament humanity ended up with at certain time in history where one problem is connected to every other problem, and conflicting interests press in all directions from all directions. So they are compelled to use whatever they can afford to gain relative advantage wrt competitors. And this reflects in the policies of the countries they lead as well as in the off the record measures they take to advance national interest (if we are lucky).
Moreover it is naive to expect that a country struggling for hegemony or national aspirations would spare itself from using a questionable but effective measure (be it bribing, torturing, exploiting terrorists, committing war crimes, using weapons of mass destruction, concentration camps, provoke famines, killing civilians, etc.) if the enemy doesn’t do the same, unless its power to impose its will with other means (including a valid network of allies) on its enemy is overwhelming. There is also some karma here: the more unfairly demanding our expectations about our politicians versus foreign politicians are, the more easily we will get disappointed.

Therefore, the policy of propping up Ukraine is to have it destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and maimed and traumatized, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. — boethius

…unless you are projecting on the West the martyrdom rhetoric of Hamas (which btw you support, right?). One could also argue that Iran is propping up Palestinians to have them destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Palestinians killed and maimed, traumatized or cleansed, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Israel to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. And this is perfectly in line with what was declared by the Palestinian political leaders governing Gaza.
My counter argument is that you may be confusing reasons and consequences: precisely because "our hearts being in the right place" are not wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson” that Ukraine may be utterly destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of people killed and maimed and traumatized, and trigger a demographic collapse. Indeed, it’s people like you underestimating the Russian threat and pointing at the US as the Great Satan, among the reasons of why many Western politicians can afford at best a drip-feed strategy policy. You are pointing at a problem rooted in people more persuaded by pro-Russian arguments like yours than by pro-US ones, but simply too scared to irritate the US. And, my objection sounds even more plausible to me after reading your defamatory argument: indeed, your argument shows how you cornered yourself into a position where whatever Russia does against Ukraine and the West, this will be nothing compared to what the US has done and is responsible for (that’s actually one of your major claims, you argued a while back if I remember correctly). So the more perverse you can depict Western intentions in Ukraine the more self-rewarding your feel it is your piece of propaganda against the Great Satan. As far as I’m concerned I find such arguments more speculative than evidence-based, more rhetorically appealing than analytically appealing. Yours is just populist porn. Intellectual misery at its finest.

The war is not existential for the Ukrainian people, Russia has no way of conquering all of Ukraine anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could, the Russian speaking regions have pretty solid evidence they (a lot, perhaps even a very solid majority) happy being in Russia (considering the real repression they experience by Ukrainian speakers). — boethius

I disagree. The Ukrainian war is existential in that it has to do with the very existence of an independent nation state with its territorial integrity. In order to do that Russia is ready to destroy Ukraine, massacre Ukrainians, reject Ukrainian national identity and commit war crimes at convenience . So yes Russia is an existential threat to the Ukrainian people too.
On the other side, even Russian security concerns which Putin is waving at to justify his war in Ukraine are not existential for the Russian people, since Ukraine (or the US, for that matter) has no way of conquering all of Russia anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could. So if Russia has security concerns, Ukrainians too has.
This raises another issue: not only the claims that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians and that Russian security concerns are legitimate are questionable, each one in its own merit, but why are you using different criteria?! Why are you assessing Russia’s case in terms of its legitimate security concerns but not Ukraine, while Ukrainian’s case in terms of existential war?! And if legitimate security concerns and existential wars are related then why Russia’s aggression of Ukraine can be explained/justified in terms of security concerns but Ukrainian self-defence can not be explained/justified in terms of existential war?!
Concerning the UKRAINIAN MINORITY happy of being part of Russia against the Ukrainian majority, either they could pursue a war of independence (no matter if the autonomy of related Ukrainian regions was already acknowledged prior to this war) but that wasn’t their choice. The alleged civil war was imported from Russia, actually by Russia private imperialist and neo-nazi militias (with the blessing of Russian politicians), plotting with a few local likeminded (or bribed?) politicians, as far as I can tell. Or they could migrate to Russia to avoid persecution, as Jews fled to Israel to avoid persecution. I’ve heard Russia is plenty of unpopulated lands where they could host their fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians. I’ve also heard Russia is also impressively effective in forced migration of non-Russian people and Ukrainian children, so I let you imagine how effective they could be in supporting wilful migration of fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians eager to be enrolled in military armies in the pursuit of imperialist goals, right? But if a minority of Ukrainians want to keep Ukrainian land while rejecting the Ukrainian rule and replace it with a Russian rule, why on earth should the majority of Ukrainians let them do it? Russians too repressed Chechen independence movement for the same reasons with two (civil?) wars. So, under the questionable assumption that there were all the premises for an indigenous civil war, also Ukraine should be allowed to repress independence movements within its territory in blood, and Russia’s military siding with the independence movement should be deemed as an illegitimate interference.

Therefore, if the war is not existential, there must be some reasonable cost to waging it to accomplish the objectives.

This is the core question, which no one on the self described "pro-Ukrainian" side has even attempted to answer: no matter what you think of "justice" there must be some limit to the cost to Ukrainians in their war. Likewise, regardless of what you think of Ukrainian just cause, it is not good for this so called just cause nor moral in and of itself for the West to continuously manipulate Ukraine with false promises and false assurances. — boethius

I’ve attempted to answer your and your sidekicks’ analogous “core” questions sooooo many times that I was really looking forward to doing it again, of course. The answer that best fits your “core question” to me is that your “core” question is dumb, so I’m not surprised if other representatives of the “pro-Ukrainian" side didn’t answer. People can't take seriously answer so grossly misleading questions. It's like asking people how many grey-looking hair has the current king of France on his head. If the question is flawed, then it should be denounced as such.
Indeed, you are asking people who do not put their skin in this war to answer for those who put their skin in this war, based once again in non-shared assumption surreptitiously taken to be shared (that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians?! But Russian security concerns are legitimate?! Are you crazy?!). The “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Ukrainian Westernisation are decided by Ukrainians as much as the “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Palestinian nation state are decided by the Palestinians. Ukrainians have agency as much as Palestinians. And Ukrainians are arguably better equipped in terms of military support and strategic allies than the Palestinians. These people do not fight because they are brainwashed by Western or Iranian propaganda into fighting, they are struggling for their nation-state and they rely on the support of INTERESTED strategic allies accordingly. Palestinians strategically allied with Soviet Union and then with Iraq before allying with Iran to oppose Israel, while Ukrainians allied with Habsburg and then with the German Nazis, before allying with the West to oppose Russia’s hegemonic ambitions.
Besides when people are driven by identitarian motives there are uneconomical sinking costs which explain why nations are built into blood, genocides and cleansing over generations, and their wars can be ENDLESS (see the Afghans and the Kurds).
So I gave you two reasons why your “core” question looks preposterous to me: first reason, national interest is by definition identitarian, and costs and benefits are shaped by identitarian national interests. This is why you should not ask me what is worth fighting against Russia for Ukrainians, I’m not Ukrainian. In the end, it’s their motivations that guides their choice of fighting Russians not Western motivations for Ukrainians to fight the Russians. Second reason, identitarian aspirations are grounded on uneconomical sinking costs, such uneconomical sinking costs of human life and welfare are very much essential, intrinsic, inherent part of nation building processes. And such aspirations can go as far as the logic of martyrdom by Hamas (which you support, right?) goes. I don’t think it’s the case of the Ukrainians though.
Your one-sided moral blackmailing is a goofy way to dispense Russian leaders from the moral burden of starting and prosecuting this war until Ukrainians surrender to all their demands. And if you dispense the Russians, I’ll dispense the Westerners.
All I can concede is that the West will more easily succumb to its enemies if Westerners are not ready to fight against its enemies as much as Ukrainians are ready to fight against Russia, when the time has come. So Ukraine, far from being a dumb puppet of the US proxy war, is giving the West a bitter but decisive moral lesson and precious time to regroup against the common enemy.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

1. Regardless of what you think about Russia, countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns. A nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern. — boethius

You don’t seem to follow through your own reasoning here. Indeed, what is true for Russia, it is true for the US and Ukraine too: regardless of what you think about the US and Ukraine, “countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns.” A re-arming nuclear power with hegemonic ambitions over the US own sphere influence (e.g. Europe) and elsewhere (like in Africa and Middle East), engaging in Russia’s direct/conventional threats or asymmetric/unconventional threats, programmatically hostile to the US-led Western hegemony and pledging a strategic allegiance with other hostile authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and North Korea is a legitimate security concern for the US-led allegiance. Actually, the security dilemmas you think explain or justify Russia’s imperialist war are very much the same that led the US to become world hegemon, build-up a Western alliance and turn into some Great Satan to people like you. Russian elites imperialist's ideology and military build-up, supporting Western enemies and projecting military power in Africa and Middle east at the expense of Western interests, are all provocations from Russia against the US and its allies in their backyard. That’s why your argument looks so self-defeating to me.
Concerning the idea that a “nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern”, that’s currently the case of Russia at the expense of the US allies (see Kaliningrad). States can live with it. And also the Cuban missile crisis shows another way in which hostile hegemonic powers dealt with their security concerns, without engaging into a war with territorial annexations. If Russia wishes to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, but the US and its allies don’t acknowledge the right of Russia to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, then Russia has to impose its will against the US and its allies like enemies do. Western DO NOT need to feel rationally compelled by Russia’s claims of legitimacy about its security concerns, other than for the threats the go along with it. Russia and the US are not the same, do not play the same role in the Western world so they do not have to enjoy the same status AT ALL. Europeans have American bases in Europe, and yet they can live with it despite they may be seen as a national security threat. Switzerland borders with countries with US military bases, and yet they can live with it despite this may be national security concerns. So Europeans have to take position wrt Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe and all its implications in terms of security, political stability, and economic opportunities.

2. Regardless of what you think about point one above, it is just dumb to provoke a war, then actually fight a war, on the principle of denying Russia has legitimate security concerns that would lead a rational actor in the international system to wage preemptive war ... when apparently we all now agree that Ukraine would never join NATO anyways, but also not really we'll just go ahead and claim that's going to happen someday from time to time. Fighting for something you can never actually have is dumb. — boethius

There are several issues with such claims. The idea that the war was provoked PRESUPPOSES the idea that Russia has hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine either for very limited security concerns (e.g. by creating a “neutral” buffer state between Russia and Nato which doesn’t exist yet, right?) or for wider imperialist ambitions and power projection, because 1. Nobody attacked Russia proper, as Hamas attacked Israel proper (this is where I would talk about provocation but I guess Israeli has no “legitimate” security concerns even in this case, right?) 2. No NATO missile bases have been installed in Ukraine yet. But this war started by Russia made this undesirable outcome for Russia more compelling for Westerners (as in a self-defeating prophecy). 3. There was no arm race against Russia (“NATO is brain dead”, Trump’s willingness to have Russia on the US side against China). That’s also why Westerners have great difficulty to military supply Ukraine. BTW it was Mearsheimer himself who suggested Ukraine shouldn’t have returned the nuclear arsenal to (a however much weaker than today’s) Russia at the end of Soviet Union, for Ukrainian preemptive security concerns, especially given their historical beefs. But the logic of appeasement of Russia prevailed in the US back then, not provocation.
I put “neutrality” under quotes because the very existence of the Russian Black Sea Fleat in Ukraine shows that a “neutral” Ukraine is nothing more than a base for Russian power projection led by corrupt politicians bribed by Russians with a pretence of autonomy as Russians understand it.
You are playing with the word “legitimate” in “legitimate security concerns“. To me security concerns are “legitimate” because acknowledged according to relevant politically commitments. Westerners could acknowledge Russia’s security concerns based on international laws and treaties, or based on a strategic logic like that of strategic allegiance in response to security concerns and hegemonic ambitions. Neither case holds for Russia. Russia is not a Western ally nor there are treaties that commit the West to comply with Russia’s security concerns at their own expense.
So according to such an understanding of “legitimate”, Russia has NO “LEGITIMATE” SECURITY CONCERNS to justify this war. Russia is an enemy to the West and should be treated accordingly. At this point, talking about Russia’s “legitimate” security concerns is like talking about mafia’s, terrorists’ and nazis’s “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has no “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has just “illegitimate” security concerns.
The problem for the West is to understand Russia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken Russia not to acknowledge them, as much as the law enforcement would need to understand mafia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken mafia.
Ukraine doesn’t need to be inside NATO as long as circumstances are not amenable to such an outcome. The point is that NATO is taken to be a military alliance which challenges Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe. Other forms of wide military allegiance comprising Ukraine but not Russia could be a problem as well for Russia. Ukraine not turning into a buffer state and neutralising the threats coming from the Black Sea Fleet would help against Russia’s hegemonic ambitions as well. WHATEVER security system that involves Ukraine and Western countries, BUT EXCLUDES Russia may be perceived as a security threat by Russia. And it’s even worse for Russia if Europe manages to become a competing power that could engage in an arm race, build its own security system of alliance, with its own nuclear weapons, and power projection in Africa and Middle East (historically Russia got invaded from Europeans not from the US). Russia needs a weak, defenceless and submissive or divided Europe to counter balance China, even in the case where the US has completely withdrawn from Europe.
So containing and deterring Russia is an imperative ALSO for Europeans, including Ukraine, not only for the US, if Russia can not (or should not) be significantly defeated. There is a balance to be found of course, given the emergence of other hegemonic powers in the international arena (e.g. China) that could profit from Russia’s defeat, the growing challenges coming from the rest of the World with all their aspirations or grievances against the West (which are in good part nurtured by Westerners themselves, including random nobodies like you), the growing discredit and lack of unity suffered by political elites in the Western world. Not easy task I guess but there is nothing inherently dumb in struggling for this goal, that’s part of the game with all its hazards. Once we agree that Russia and its sidekicks are definitely the enemy then we can discuss how, how long it takes, at what cost. And uncertainty remains no matter what path one follows.
That’s not all, talking about “provocation” has little explanatory power wrt the timing of Russias’ gambit. Actually it hides the OPPORTUNISTIC motives which led Russia to aggress the West in a time where the US looks much weaker than it looked after the end of the Cold War while Europeans look extremely vulnerable to economic and security shocks. Pro-Russians underestimate the Ukrainian and the European agency as much as they underestimate the Russian agency. There is only one agent morally and politically responsible for every evil: the Great Satan. All the others are mechanically reacting to the US abuses. So the perceived weakness of the West is the relevant motivational factor for this war NOT provocation. And so the West has to take more seriously its weaknesses as perceived by self-assertive anti-Western authoritarian regimes. The msg here is not: “they wronged me so this is the pay back” or “they made me do it”. But “the US is weak, now it’s time to challenge him, turn its coward allies against him, stab the boss in the back”.
Anyways, I’m looking forward to hearing you whining about China’s security concerns threatened by the US and Western provocations in China’s own backyard.

3. Regardless of what you think about how smart it is to fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you (which, if they did, the whole point would be to then avoid a disastrous war such as what is happening right now[b/]). Fighting a disastrous war to (maybe, hopefully, wishfully) get something to protect from fighting disastrous wars, is completely moronic. — boethius

You can conclude it’s all moronic if you present things as moronic in all your premises. It’s tautological. But I do not share your questionable assumptions so the conclusion has no appeal to me.
There is not metaphysical necessity in saying “fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you”, right? It’s matter of choice, so one has to make an effort to understand the reasoning behind such choices. I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain political moves just because some random dude thinks politicians are playing or should play in the way he suggests, as much as I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain game moves just because some random dude thinks people are playing or should play the ball as in soccer, whiteout considering that maybe people are playing basketball and fine with it.
To me, the reasoning behind such political choices transcend HOW THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO PEOPLE, so beyond pro-Russian and pro-Western propaganda (in the press, on TV, in the social media, etc.), and it is grounded on my understanding of how politicians are compelled to reason in a highly competitive and uncertain political struggle, constrained by all sorts of conflicting interests and limited resources. Besides, the conflict we are discussing has long term and worldwide consequences that most likely will survive us, so I would refrain from putting too much credit on drawing lessons limited to how things look now.
Concerning your onanistic propaganda criticism you so tirelessly and self-conceitedly indulge on, my argument is that if people are dumb to engage in a war because NATO will save them from future wars with Russia, they would still be dumb to not engage in a war because their economic welfare, social freedoms and political autonomy would be safer under Russia.
Dumb people will believe things based on dumb arguments no matter what they are, even when arguments are based on whatever propaganda one wishes to denounce. So politicians are compelled to ensure that dumb people would believe their own propaganda not that of their rivals or, even worse, enemies. Surely, also propaganda war can be played badly, but that’s not necessarily an argument against propaganda in general (no matter how misleading, false and dishonest), just against the efficacy of specific propaganda moves vs others. In that sense, I have no problem to acknowledge that Western propaganda wasn’t as effective as desirable and that Russian propaganda was more effective than desirable, no matter how false.
But, besides the fact that propaganda is only one aspect of the problem, there is also a legitimate security concern about propaganda wars, which you keep ignoring with your populist rhetoric: assuming that there are dumb people believing in propaganda in the West, Ukraine, Russia, China and Iran, the problem is that Western propaganda can be easily infiltrated and instrumentalized by hostile foreign powers while the West can’t do the same against them if they are authoritarian (see Russia, China and Iran). Russia can exploit useful idiots (or honorable men as you wish) in the West but the West can to the same as easily, so Russia has an advantage over the West in terms of propaganda war, which is multiplied by the network of anti-Western authoritarian regimes supporting Russia.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

far right and nazis uncorking bottles of champagne in Europe with Putin's great satisfaction but sure the Ukrainian denazification by Putin is what we should be concerned about and welcome.

> It is simple, clearly, unambiguously genocide.

Even if that's the case, Hamas and Palestinians who support Hamas are to be blamed for it. They provoked Israel. Israel has legitimate security concerns. They kept repeating this for decades. Given the disproportionate military capacity of Israel wrt Hamas this would be the likely conclusion. There is no single moment in which Hamas didn't lose the war to Israel. Palestinians should surrender and concede to Israel, to Netanyahu, whatever he asks of them. We should stop supporting Palestine. There was a time in which Palestinians could negotiate peace, but they refuse to accept because some dude from Iran told them to continue fighting. Israel could use nuclear bombs, etc. etc. etc. right?

If we should not confuse military achievements with political goals, then we MUST NOT confuse Russia's military achievements with political achievements, even more so if political leaders (like Putin) defined their conflict ends in terms of strategic political achievements (like Ukraine out of NATO, denazification/demilitarization of Ukraine, keeping NATO far from Russia's boarder and out of Ukraine, stop Western provocations, create a non-Western-led world order, etc.). But the manipulative reasoning which certain pro-Russian propagandists in this thread keep showing off, dictates otherwise unfortunately.

> But not if the US manages to embroil the two in a war with each other.

Ok let's stick to your reasoning, despite the manipulative framing. Here is my question: by signaling willingness to a diplomatic settlement with the US since 2008 until now AND yet persisting in a conflict with Ukraine where European puppets are cheerfully embroiled into, isn't Putin (along with European political leaders), who all know to be unsurprisingly dumber and/or uneducated than Tzeench on economics, military strategy, politics, finance, propaganda etc. (so much so that he can solve anything in politics with 2 cents anonymous comments on the internet) playing by the US book and failing strategically EVEN IF he is "winning" the war ?

We can go further back: the Arabs colonised Palestine too. — neomac

Which "Arabs"? When? Coz, if you want further back, we can consult Deuteronomy.
Of course, that response was to the issue of self-determination, not who settled where in pre-history. — Vera Mont

OK, if "The whole situation is one of the many dark sides of colonialism" is not the issue of "who settled where in pre-history" but an "issue of self-determination", how is the reference to colonialism help us understand better a predicament where two people (or relative political leaderships, if you prefer) ultimately pursue self-determination aspirations over exactly the same piece of land?

The whole situation is one of the many dark sides of colonialism. Britain promises everything to everybody in order to further its own war effort and then arbitrarily disenfranchises some of its allies, while enabling other groups. They did the same with natives in North America and Africa a few decades or centuries earlier. All that guff about self-determination went on the scrap heap when the Big Four were carving up Europe after WWI, and and the even bigger three redrew the borders after WWII. — Vera Mont

We can go further back: the Arabs colonised Palestine too. What shell we do with this piece of information now?

↪neomac
↪neomac
Oh fun, let's pretend it's inevitable for two people to bash each other's head in. — Benkei

I didn’t write it’s inevitable, nor implied it, nor suggested it, nor think it’s inevitable.

The reductio of that argument is that genocide is ok. So, yes, it's wrong. And I don't care that they don't care but I (e.g. my country) shouldn't be picking a side as a result. — Benkei

If genocide is ok or not, that’s up to you to decide so I’m fine with you claiming “I don't care that they don't care but I (e.g. my country) shouldn't be picking a side as a result.”
However if you write “I don't care that…” to others, others can say the same to you. Still the burden of costs and risks for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more on the Palestinians AND the Israelis, than on an avg Westerner (I assume it’s your case too). So since they have much more skin in that game than an avg Westerner, my guess is that their motivation to the conflict is much stronger and unifying than that of an avg Westerner about the same conflict. What I think Westerners should care about is how strong and unified the will of certain people, countries, governments is (by comparison with theirs), what they are ready to do, what sacrifice are willing to accept or impose to achieve their shared goals. As much as they should care about means and opportunities that powers hostile to the West can exploit in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As long as the “not picking side“ policy is contributing to stability or symmetry of the power balance, it’s impossible to not pick side. Not to mention that the “not picking side“ policy can be perceived as a sign of weakness and cowardice by others.

Unfortunately contended territories easily end up in genocidal or cleansing perceived practices. When one evokes self-determination aspirations against empires is one thing, another is when self-determination aspirations of some people irreparably clashes with the self-determination aspirations of other people. That's the dark side of self-determination.

So, really what's your point? Two people are fighting and they both don't want to stop? So they should continue? That seems the wrong answer. — Benkei

Why though? Why should the two people care about what seems wrong to you about their beef? Why do you take your humanitarian feelings as universal if the two people do not feel the way you feel about their conflict?

Russia is not invincible, but is winning because that's NATO policy for Russia to win. — boethius

So NATO is winning too now? Or is NATO policy to slowly lose to Russia?

What about Russian security threats from NATO enlargement?
Did Russia get rid of such security threats? Is NATO now more likely unable to threaten the Black Sea fleet or make military drills on Russian borders or put nuclear missiles on Russian borders or to have Ukraine fall within Western sphere of influence or give Ukraine a second chance to attack Crimea, Donbas, and land bridge in ten years or so? Did Russia get its wunderbuffer to contain Western imminent invasion of Russia and genocide of Russians? Are Western provocations finally over?

Are War Crimes Ever Justified?

I guess your question refers to a non-instrumental evaluation of “war crimes”. Indeed, if “justified” means to have compelling reasons to believe that war crimes will likely enough succeed in attaining the desired outcome, then of course one can justify “war crimes”.
The question sounds less trivial if we are talking in terms of legal and moral justification, because desired outcomes may be successfully achieved also by violating legal and/or moral constraints.
Now, when we classify certain acts as “war crimes”, I take it to mean that those actions are major violations of the law and therefore can not be legally justified by (legal) definition. There is no legally justified crime.
What about moral justification? If one takes morality as a set of “universal” para-legal or pre-legal norms (like do not kill, do not steal, do not lie, etc.) and takes the legal norms defining “war crimes” as a legal codification of moral norms, then I find it reasonable to take “war crimes” as morally unjustified, again, by definition.
As far as I’m concerned, I deeply question such an understanding of moral claims. Moral norms (and, ultimately, also legal norms) MUST be grounded on historical and political conditions. This is a rational requirement, since historical-political conditions set what CAN be done by individuals in some contingent yet constraining sense.
I’ll try to make my point more clear with a concrete example: one may believe that Netanyahu SHOULD stop the current massacre in Gaza, because killing innocents as collateral damage (i.e. unintentionally but consciously) is morally wrong by (moral) definition. This moral claim MUST presuppose at the very least that Netanyahu CAN stop the current massacre in Gaza to make a rational (not emotional) appeal to me. Well, can he?
It seems that all that it is required for such an assessment is a credible assumption about certain Netanyahu’s rule-following abilities, like the ability to intellectually grasp moral norms, the physical ability to perform a series of bodily actions and speech acts in compliance with such norms (e.g. verbally instruct its military and political servants to withhold the Israeli war machine), and the ability to will or being disposed to act accordingly.
Such an assessment completely and arbitrarily misses the political dimension of our human condition, more specifically the POLITICAL ROLE of Netanyahu facing a HISTORICAL PREDICAMENT (the massacre of October the 7th). To simplify, the Israeli society (or an influential subgroup of such society) has POLITICALLY SELECTED Netanyahu for his specific abilities to act in accordance with certain political EXPECTATIONS in a variety of challenging historical circumstances. To my understanding, such political abilities and expectations are what allows us to assess what Netanyahu CAN do in certain historical circumstances in a more compelling way. And the same goes with ALL other politicians (including Hamas’ leaders).
Far from being presupposed by political expectations about individuals and collectives, moral norms as much as legal norms MUST presuppose political expectations about individuals and collectives to look rationally compelling to people living in society. The very idea that by following a pre-defined “universal” moral norm by my own initiative and in any circumstance (without considering how others will act and re-act, or what consequences will follow) will turn me into A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE of moral behaviour to others, presupposes the expectation that others (all or the absolute majority or the relative majority or the relevant minority etc.) have the ability to grasp paradigmatic moral examples and the disposition to conform to them.
If moral reasoning is grounded on a set of a-priori universal norms then it’s a-political (because it is not grounded on political expectations and the circumstances of the political struggle - btw I even find it questionable that anybody concerned with social discipline can consistently adopt such a view on morality). If moral reasoning guides political life and struggles then it can’t plausibly be grounded on a set of a-priori universal norms (at best, one can extrapolate such alleged “universal” norms a posteriori by comparison across societies and/or held in support for intersocietal institutions like “international law”). In other words, “war crimes” (as legally defined) can be morally justified if one doesn’t reason in terms of a-priori and “universal” moral norms, yet moral justification may not be enough to dissipate the controversial nature of such actions. And this observation can no be used to question a specific moral reasoning, since it can be retorted against all examples of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning can not be de-politicized if it is supposed to inform political life.

↪neomac
The imperialist interpretation I'm referring to has been mostly forwarded by ssu, which I'm replying to. I take it as a given others have read that interpretation, so I don't need to set it out. — Benkei

I challenge you to make explicit the “interpretation” of imperialism you think @“ssu” is forwarding, because maybe you are misunderstanding his claims.
Here a definition of imperialism:
Imperialism is the practice, theory or attitude of maintaining or extending power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing both hard power (military and economic power) and soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more or less formal empire. While related to the concepts of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism
According to such definition, would you consider Putin decision to invade Ukraine and annex part of its territories, imperialist or not?
If you do not like that definition, you can propose yours.

And nowhere have I given justification, only explanation. I think most countries largely act immoral, driven by real politik considerations. I condemn Western’s needless fanning of the flames in Ukraine, increasing their own "security concerns" as a result, raising Russia's security concerns in return. — Benkei

Well, I understand “most countries largely act immoral” as equivalent to “most countries largely act in a morally unjustified way” so it’s like your explanation however includes an assessment about justification on both sides, right?
Anyways, if you explain and not justify, under what circumstances can one then switch from explanation to justification? From description to condemnation?

But I note that the facts I raised do not concern Western security at all. Only Ukraine could be affected by the "near abroad" doctrine and we can hardly complain about economic integration. So we can wonder in what sense Western security concerns were protected by expanding eastwards. — Benkei

If one includes the US and Europeans as part of “the West”, Ukraine is “the near abroad” of the West too, If Russia feels threatened by the expansion of the West in Ukraine, the West can feel threatened by Russia wanting to expand in Ukraine.
Besides if Ukraine wants to join the West through the EU and NATO, and the West would welcome Ukrainian westernisation. Russia has initiated a war in the West near abroad and hindered the Western hegemonic interest to westernise Ukraine which was reciprocated by the Ukrainians.
Russia committed two questionable moves in terms of security in this hegemonic struggles: discounted Ukrainians will despite having acknowledged its sovereignty and started an actual violent expansion in Ukraine which violates the Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.
Do you agree with such explanation?

Those considerations can only be of a geopolitical nature and not a direct military threat for which NATO is in principle the answer. For existing NATO members there never was a reason to expand NATO after the cold war when the threat had actually largely dissipated. And yet we did it any way. — Benkei

If Europe is part of the West and Europe ends in Eastern European countries, then Russia is DEFINITELY WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE DOUBT a direct military threat to the West: it has motivations (hegemonic ambitions and revanchism after the fall of Soviet Union) and it has means (including nuclear arsenal). The threat kept growing under Putin given the military build-up and the centralization of power. And since the war with Georgia, Russia has actually proven its aggressive dispositions toward neighbouring countries (and not only).
Even if, back at the end of Soviet Union, security concerns were more about anticipated than imminent military threats (which is what real politik strategic thinking in the domain of security and defence is all about), NATO was repurposed to expand the democratic and economic European institutions and Western collective in line with the US hegemonic ambitions. Also because Islamic extremism seemed the most urgent threat to deal with.
Do you agree with such explanation?

My main problem with "real politik" views towards geopolitics is that they a) ignore the international legal framework (but of course it will be whipped out when it supports an argument) and b) a predisposition towards conflict that must be won if it materialises, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict. — Benkei

How do you explain the fact that "real politik" views ignore the international legal framework? And the “real politik" predisposition towards conflict, instead of fundamentally aiming at avoiding conflict?

But the West (particularly US) will pursue conflict if it furthers their geopolitical agenda even if facts don't support their position (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). — Benkei

Would you say the same for Russia, China, Iran?

If then historically we've seen the most successful roads to peace have been extensive integration and co-operation then these decisions are consequences of us-them divisions, maintaining status quos (to stay top dog, you have to kick down the competition) and projection of power. So to me, the very methodology of framing international relations in real politik terms is an important driving force towards conflict, instead of avoiding it. — Benkei

Yet, realpolitik theorists such as Mearsheimer and Walt are arguing that the idealist pursuit of “extensive integration and co-operation” and not what political realism would dictate is mistakenly driving the Western (particularly the US) in conflicts which are against the US interest (like the conflict in Ukraine and in Israel).
BTW, do you think Russia, China, and Iran are framing international relations in terms of real politik or in idealist terms ? Are they pursuing power projection, and leaning towards conflict, unlike the US? Do you think the US is the Great Satan, namely the most evil/oppressive geopolitical entity on earth or history so that the entire world (including other Western countries) wishes (or should wish) to support Russian, Chinese, and Iranian hegemonic ambitions than the US’s in lack of better alternatives?

And yes security concerns can justify some action. Not all and certainly not war crimes. But again, I think that mixes geopolitical theory and international law. — Benkei

This mixing is precisely what’s most worth to philosophically investigate, as far as I’m concerned, especially what allows one to switch from explanation to justification.

I think I've said before in this thread:

1. from a geopolitical/international relations point of view both Russia and the West are equally to blame for the war in Ukraine
2. from an international law perspective Russia is an aggressor

But since 2 is in any case an optional argument (pace every "humanitarian" intervention ever and western-led wars) it should be ignored in favour of 1 - as much as that goes against the grain of what I studied and worked for for decades as a human rights trained lawyer. 2 is more about how the world should be and could've been if international law hadn't been applied in such a double standard way — Benkei

“Ignore” in the sense that “international law” and “humanitarian intervention” do not play any explanatory role?
“could've been if” in the sense that “international law” is sort of wishful thinking? If not, what’s the difference?

But an interpretation of these actions as "imperialist" isn't necessary where Russian security interests suffice to explain their actions. — Benkei

You have to clarify what you take others to mean by "imperialist" before making objections to them.
We can quibble also over Israel committing a "genocide" if security concerns is enough to justify their actions against an actual aggression from Hamas. Russia has no equivalent justification, because there was no aggression from NATO or Ukraine against Russia proper. Besides Russia has plenty of lands where to relocate what he claims to be persecuted Russians in Ukraine.

Besides it doesn't matter how you want to call it. If Russia's security threat and sphere of influence must be taken into account in a strategic calculus, the same goes for Russia. Russia must take into account security threat and sphere of influence of all interested players. And if such concerns are inherently competitive, players will find competitive ways to settle it.

If you take seriously perceived security concerns, you MUST do the same for the US, Europe, Ukraine, Israel, not only for Russia and Palestinians. Unless you side with them, and then pretend to be impartial.

Self-determination is at the heart of Palestinian nationalism for sure and the belief that Palestinians who voted for Hamas and sided with Iran (both committed to fight Israel), have a right to do so, is a foolish way to think about international politics, people who do not have a properly functioning and acknowledged state and live next to great powers don't have the right to pursue any foreign policy they want. That's what Mearsheimer would say, wouldn't he? Best to listen to someone who’s been right for the last 30 years, right?

https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afds-krah-faces-probe-on-russia-china-payments/a-68912872
https://newrepublic.com/article/180630/russia-corruption-network-europe-buying-politicians-america

:up:

Concerning Scholz's speech, I would highlight the following claim:
“We all want peace for our time. But peace at any price – that wouldn’t be any at all.”
(https://globalhappenings.com/politics/496848.html)
which is pretty much in line with what I repeatedly said:

people may not pursue peace, if that means WHATEVER peace. — neomac

That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:

↪neomac

People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here. — Punshhh

indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?

Again it’s about risks, probability. — Punshhh

Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now. — Punshhh

Also to assess risks on hypothetical and counterfactual scenarios you need arguments or evidences to support them.
Besides, pointing at a risk is not enough to discourage crossing alleged red lines: motivation is surely one thing, but also means and opportunities need to be taken into account. Indeed, Putin showed his anger in 2008 at the prospect that one day Ukraine would join NATO, as Georgia. But it took Putin 14 years to prepare and find the right opportunity (which include the divisions between EU and the US, with the EU and within the US, and the declining power projection of the US vis-à-vis of its challengers) to aggress Ukraine, differently from what happened to Georgia.
To my understanding, the risk you are referring to is more specifically grounded on Western divisions, decisional weakness, and military unreadiness, than on Putin’s anger. If the West showed a united front, stable resolve and readiness to make the needed military efforts, Putin could have been and could still be very much deterred from pursuing a war against the West over Ukraine. And notice Putin frames this war mainly as a war against the West, but still Western public opinions are far from getting how existential this war can be to their prosperity and security. That’s why Putin can count on the possibility that the West gets tired of supporting Ukraine.

First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”

This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors? — Punshhh

The logic is analogous to the one compelling military units to destroy their own military equipment, for example during a withdrawal, out of fear it may fall in enemies’ hands. To the extent Russia comes out emboldened and empowered from this war, the West may experience a surge of anti-Americanism which could further weaken the US power projection and leadership in Europe. So the US, along with Russia, will be compelled to try to play such divisions on their favour at the expense of the rival. Europeans experienced something similar during the Cold War: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Years_of_Lead_(Italy)

I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning. — Punshhh

Such a claim sounds overly bold given the available polls. I get that such polls can be wrong and there is still time for Biden’s campaign, but no chance of winning looks definitely as an overkill.

If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?

That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU. — Punshhh

Non sequitur?! Doubt because...? These are the facts I’m referring to:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/01/nato.georgia
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/09/german-chancellor-merkel-visit-obama/23115859/
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/14/politics/ukraine-nato-joe-biden/index.html
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-01/france-and-germany-are-split-over-ukraine-s-appeal-to-join-nato
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220404-merkel-defends-2008-decision-to-block-ukraine-from-nato
https://washington.mfa.gov.hu/eng/news/why-is-hungary-blocking-ukraines-nato-accession

I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.

When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East? — Punshhh

To me “superpowers” is a shorthand for the US, China and Russia. While Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are regional powers in the Middle Eastern area which are engaging in a hegemonic struggle in the Middle East. They are hegemonic because they are vigorously supporting military and economic projection beyond their borders to primary control the middle-east, but also in Asia and Africa (example: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240312-turkey-iran-morocco-joust-for-greater-role-in-sahel).

Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps? — Punshhh

Iran is now military supporting Russia and pressing Israel with its proxies, related to two strategic regions which have compelled, still compel, and risk to compel further the US’ intervention at the expense of pivoting to the Pacific.
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117148/witnesses/HHRG-118-FA13-Wstate-StroulD-20240417.pdf

The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.

You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S. — Punshhh

We are talking risks, right? I argued for the risks I see through historical evidences (which you admit but downplay without any counter-evidence) and strategic reasons potentially appealing to geopolitical competitors (which you conveniently narrow down based on hopes).

It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too. — Punshhh

Besides “hopefully” doesn’t mean “probably”, the point is that this wake up call is too recent to have set a stable and compelling trend in Western security.
Furthermore also non-Western and anti-Western powers had a wake up call at the expense of the West: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel are acting accordingly.

Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/

Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle. — Punshhh

I didn’t reference that link to argue that desalination will produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. There may be more methods available to tackle water crisis depending on available and evolving technologies. I limited myself to argue that governments in the Middle East show self-awareness wrt climate challenges (as much as geopolitical challenges) and are already making efforts to deal with them. So it’s not evident to me that in the next ten years or so the Middle East will turn into a Mad Max style location because of a water crisis, and will stop playing any significant role in international equilibria.

Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population

There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. — Punshhh

If you have evidences that support your claim, bring them up so we can compare.
I’m talking of evidences such as:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/irans-order-chaos-suzanne-maloney
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/breaking-out-its-box-washington-tehran-regional-influence
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/20/iran-khamenei-supreme-leader-strategy-middle-east/
https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/the-new-middle-east-a-triangular-struggle-for-hegemony/
https://isdp.eu/irans-regional-proxies-reshaping-the-middle-east-and-testing-u-s-policy/
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/30/briefing/iran-proxies-israel-gaza-red-sea.html
https://epc.ae/en/details/featured-topics/navigating-the-iran-challenge-and-regional-instability-de-escalation-and-sustainable-development-strategies
https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/the-iran-factor-in-the-china-taiwan-us-triangle/
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/us-deterrence-against-iran-damaged-not-dead
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/

Notice that I do not need to argue for the emergence of a superpower in the Middle East. A dominating regional power can be already enough to contain the American power projection on the globe if the US' power projection is already offset by Russia and China's in Europe, Asia and in Africa.

It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.

I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. — Punshhh

Still that’s possible because the West is currently perceived as a greater threat than Islamism.
Besides the “my enemies’ enemy is my friend” between Russia and Iran is far from being conjunctural given the numerous treatises between them like this one
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-irans-raisi-sign-new-interstate-treaty-soon-russia-2024-01-17/
And the fact that their strategic alliance is increasing since the end of the Cold War.

I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling. — Punshhh

We didn’t agree on how to measure geopolitical risks. My arguments are based on my understanding of how threats are perceived and acted upon by the actual players. The US intervened in support of Ukraine and in support of Israel. And the latter even happened at the expense of the former. This is not what one would expect if the conflict in Ukraine was evidently of grater strategic importance.
My argument is that, even if the stakes in the Ukrainian conflict may have greater impact in the hegemonic struggle between the US and China, than Israeli-Palestinian conflict one can’t reasonable use the former to downplay the latter for, at least, two reasons: there is a link between the two, and up until now the US never managed to disengage from both areas to pivot to the Pacific (and that, to me, doesn’t depend only on domestic factors like the pro-Israel lobby or the military-industrial complex)

1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.

As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of importance geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it) — Punshhh

Concerning your reasoning, as long as the West and the Rest runs on oil from the Middle East, the Middle East is strategically important for geopolitical developments.
I think however that their importance goes beyond that since Middle Eastern’s power projection goes beyond the middle-east. So they can play a role on securing/controlling commercial routes (https://newsletter.macmillan.yale.edu/newsletter/fall-2010/american-grand-strategy-middle-east, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative), immigration trends and political networking (through Islamism, financial means, military aid, etc.). And not only in the Middle East.

You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office. — Punshhh

Some anomalies may be more than conjunctural events. See, also re-arming to face the Russian threat is an anomaly in EU foreign policy, yet it happened under the pressure of historical circumstances. And now you may wish to argue it will grow further into a stable, effective and comprehensive defence strategy. On the other side, the prospect of Trump running for a second presidential term suggests me the possibility that Trump’s political base may be wide, strong and persistent enough to survive him. As much as the burden of the imperial overstretch inducing the US to downgrade its commitments to global hegemony. Even more so, if the EU will remain structurally weak.

for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric

This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.

(and often pro-Russian)

Lol. — Punshhh

Here some more evidence for you to downplay (while you provided none as usual):
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153/
Concerning pro-Russian populist parties also in Western Europe, Italy offers a good case:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/31/a-success-for-kremlin-propaganda-how-pro-putin-views-permeate-italian-media
https://theins.ru/en/politics/268921
https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/09/see-what-your-friend-putin-has-done-salvini-mocked-in-poland


Dude, we clarified our different positions enough. At this point we seem to disagree so much on what constitutes an interesting, if not compelling, argument in support of some claim that I really don’t see the point of dragging this exchange further.