I know, dismissing interlocutors is cheap, offering pertinent arguments isn't as easy. Unfortunately you can't emojy your way out. You really have to argue pertinently to earn respect, or at least pity.

You’re too stupid to engage with, sorry. — Mikie

I questioned your imbecile comment with pertinent arguments.
And that's why you deserve no pity.

Russia has succeeded in its goals — Mikie

You mean:
- "Denazification" of Ukraine
- Demilitarization of Ukraine
- neutral status of Ukraine
- no NATO access for Ukraine
???
None of these have been achieved so far.

Occupying/annexing land that is not internationally recognized so far is what Russia has managed to achieve. And it's highly questionable the idea that the strategic goal of Russia was just about occupying and annexing Ukrainian land, as if Russia didn't have enough land already.
Breaking the international order the way Russia did is really serving Russia's national interests? We have reasons to doubt it (see my previous comment)

which was never to conquer all of Ukraine — Mikie

It didn't need to conquer the all of Ukraine to control and justify their control of the WHOLE of Ukraine.

Looking forward to reading more of your imbecile comments.

The aggression of Ukraine is looking more and more like a strategic blunder by Russia, doesn't it?
- NATO was enlarged and revived [1].
- Loss of influence over the Middle East (see Syria and Iran) and the Mediterranean sea (see the fate of the Black Sea Fleet [2]).
- Weakened control over Central Asia (thanks to Turkey and China [3]).
- The war in Ukraine to gain control over the WHOLE of Ukraine isn't over yet (after 3 years) and unlikely to succeed given that the US is looking forward to stepping in once the war is over.
- Growing dependence on China [4]
- Also economic recession is looming [5]

[1] "Nato leaders confirm defence spending will rise to 5% of GDP and say support for members is ‘ironclad’": https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/jun/25/nato-donald-trump-mark-rutte-europe-latest-live-news
[2] "Ukraine has ‘significantly degraded’ Russian Black Sea fleet" https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ukraine-has-significantly-degraded-russian-black-sea-fleet/
[3] "China’s influence is growing in Central Asia. What does that mean for Russia?" https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3315092/chinas-influence-growing-central-asia-what-does-mean-russia
"Turkey’s Pivotal Moment With Azerbaijan"
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/30/turkey-influence-azerbaijan-armenia-treaty/
[4] "Xi in Moscow: China's role in Russia's economic survival" https://www.dw.com/en/xi-jinping-china-russia-trump-tariffs-trade-economy-oil/a-72460014
[5] "Russia’s economy minister says the country is on ‘the brink of recession’" https://apnews.com/article/russia-economy-recession-ukraine-conflict-9d105fd1ac8c28908839b01f7d300ebd

Putin insisting that the WHOLE of Ukraine is Russian:

Trump's wet dreams about Russia?
1. Russia wrecking Ukraine until exhaustion of both, allowing then the US to exploit Ukraine’s resources under Russia’s nose (Ukraine split in two spheres of influence like Berlin during the Cold War ) and conveniently encourage a longstanding antagonism between Russia and Europe. While maintaining an influence over Europe and Russia isolated, the US could still keep it in friendly terms with Russia, playing both sides to maximize the US strategic advantage and global leverage.
2. Israel wrecking Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime to benefit not only Israel and Arab countries (eager to normalize relations with Israel), which fear the Iranian influence in the region, but also to further weaken Russia’s and China’s political and economic partnership with Iran. If Trump could impose a deal to a capitulating Iranian regime (ostensibly focused on nuclear issues, but likely also targeting oil and gas exports), the US would not only cement its status as the world’s leading oil and gas producer, but also gain the power to influence Middle Eastern energy production and markets. This would sideline Russia and China, undermining their influence and economic interests in the region, and further consolidating/preserving American dominance on the global stage.

Suppose I ask someone why they believe P. They answer, "Because I hold to S and S implies P," where S is a "way of life."

What is your objection? Apparently it is that S is an "experience," and, "experiences are not claims over how things are."

So while I would say to them, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt," you would say to them, "S is an experience, not an assertion, and therefore it cannot imply P." They would probably just tell you that they hold to S because they believe it is true, or else that they hold to it because it is good and what is good is true. S is not merely an experience; it involves a volitional and normative choice.

The reason I find this conversation so bizarre is because you are basically denying empirical facts — Leontiskos

First, as I clarified in my first post, I’m talking about logic implications. but I do not exclude that there are more equivocal ways of using the word “implication” in common usage.
Second, logic implications are functions in the domain of truth values and we use it to construe complex descriptions which can be true or false from simpler descriptions of how things are. Reasons to believe could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add “conscious”) process of forming a belief. A sharp knife dirty with blood found hidden in X’s house can be claimed by a detective to be a reason to believe that X is the murderer of his/her neighbour. But a sharp knife dirty with blood itself is not a claim over how things are.
Third, logic implications are used in explanations (also in causal explanations) to express a truth-functional dependency between certain described conditions. Both descriptions and explanations are fallible. They can also fail for conceptual reasons: as I clarified in my first post, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt" doesn’t make any sense if we are talking about logic implications for the conceptual reasons I already pointed out. The truth-aptness of S can not be implied from the truth-aptness of P since logic implications can apply only to truth value bearers like descriptions. It’s the semantics of “logic implication” that requires the truth-aptness of all its arguments prior to even applying the logic implication. We do not discover the truth-aptness of one argument from the hypothetical truth-aptness of the other argument AFTER applying a logic implication. One can't meaningfully apply "logic implication" to arguments which aren't already truth-apt.

People do justify propositions on the basis of ways of life, including religions. It seems like you are committed to denying this fact. In Western countries with a right to religious freedom it is commonplace in law for someone to justify a belief or an action on the basis of a religious "way of life." — Leontiskos

As I said, reasons to believe “could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add ‘conscious’) process of forming a belief” . The categorical mistake you are committing is to believe that a truth-apt description of a certain reason to believe something makes the reason itself truth-apt. I can believe certain things for conceptual reasons, factual reasons, causal reasons, logic or arithmetic reasons, emotional reasons, moral reasons, etc. that doesn’t make those reasons themselves truth-apt, at least not in the same sense descriptions are.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac


If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that? — Leontiskos

Our first-person understanding of our own beliefs is that they can be fallible no matter if the content of our belief refers to a fact or a logic implication. So it’s from within our own beliefs that distinction between what is believed and how things are must be maintained. Otherwise just believing that something is true would make it true.
You keep understanding what I’m writing in light of your categorical mistake, not on its own terms. Logic implications are kind of cognitive rules which we can use to process information and can still fail to do so.

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true? — Leontiskos

All the circumstantial conditions (empirical or not) that we take to be relevant to validate that implication. For example, I’m at home and I hear ringing at the door, so I believe that if behind the door there is somebody, then this is my friend which I previously invited at home that day and that time. Then I open the door and see that indeed my friend is there. In this case, I can hold my implication to be true. On the other side, if it’s my neighbor asking me to borrow something from me, then I can hold the implication I believed in false.

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos


We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. — Leontiskos

Again, do you read what your write? I already made my objection in my first post against your argument (“Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is”). Then you say “Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that”. But if you agree with my objection that highlighting attempt doesn’t make any sense. What you can do instead is to check if your interlocutor formulates their reasons to believe via logic implications and go from there to review your interlocutors’ claims.
But even in this case we should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications. Indeed, one can use logic implications to convey the idea of a dependency between claims (and that is what you seem to be trying to do with your highlighting). But that doesn’t mean that our reasons to believe are all “claims” over how things are. Experiences are not claims over how things are. Concepts are not claims over how things are. Logic and arithmetic functions are not claims over how things are. Yet experiences, concepts, arithmetic and logic functions are very much part of the reasons why we believe certain things. For example, I believe true that if x is a celibate, then x is not married. What makes it true? The semantics of “celibate”, but “celibate” is a concept not a claim over how things are.
Even the relation between a rule and its execution is a form of dependency that one can render as a logic implication, but it would be totally misleading, actually a categorical mistake, to claim that the relation between rules and their execution is a logic implication. I can claim: If “3+5” expresses an arithmetic sum, then its result is “8”, that doesn’t mean that the relation between the arithmetic sum rule and my actual calculation there is a logic implication, and this time not only because I can fail the arithmetic rule in an attempt to follow it, but also because an arithmetic sum is an arithmetic rule not a claim over how things are, and my mental calculation is a cognitive process not a claim over how things are.

Here is another example of confusing way of talking: the concept of ‘’logic implication” implies truth values. But that can’t possibly mean that there is a logic implication between the concept of logic implication and truth values. What it means is that truth values are integral part of the semantics of “logic implication”.

If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it. — Leontiskos

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand?
A justification can be understood as a rule based cognitive process by which we derive certain beliefs from some source of information. Logic implication is one of such rules. One thing is the rule another how we process it. You have to compare a logic implication with an arithmetic sum. Arithmetic sums apply to numeric values as much as logic implications apply to truth values. Still we can fail to process them correctly. That “2 + 3” “putatively” equals “23” to me, means that I failed to apply the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3. Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. Is that hard to understand?

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. — Leontiskos

I have no problems with people asserting logic implications, I’m simply claiming that you can not conflate logic implications with inferences based on logic implications, nor conflate justifications and reasons to believe with logic implications. Logic implications are like rules, that we can successfully apply or fail to apply. Logic implication and arithmetic sum can not be meaningfully claimed to be fallible. What is fallible is our processing of logic implications and arithmetic sums.

If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. — Leontiskos

No I’m pointing at a basic categorical mistake you are committing. It’s like you are confusing a rule with the execution of it. It has nothing to do with first-person vs third person reports. A first-person claim that I believe there is an apple on the table because I see an apple on the table, or that my belief that there is an apple on the table implies that I see an apple on the table (or that there is an apple on the table), doesn’t mean that a logic implication holds about what is believed and the source of this information. Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. So a “putative” case of logic implication which does not hold is no logic implication. The fact that 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3 is not matter of first and third person report.

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." — Leontiskos

We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, because reasons to believe have to do with the actual formation of our beliefs, their genesis.
We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, as much as we should not confuse an arithmetic sum with calculating an arithmetic sum or a deduction from certain premises through logic operations like logic implications with logic implications.
The process by which we derive certain beliefs from a certain informational source can be understood in causal terms or as rule-based cognitive activity.

The implication need not be infallible or necessary — Leontiskos

I have no idea what "fallible logic implication" means. Either the logic implication holds or it doesn't. Our beliefs can be said to be "fallible" not logic implications. Logic implication is a function which applies or not. If it does not apply, then there is no logic implication. On the other side, we can succeed in processing a logic implication or we can fail it.

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. — Leontiskos

Focus, you have moved from describing a genetic relation between belief and their reasons as a logic implication (which I’m questioning) to a belief on a logic implication. Sure, if I believe in a logic implication, then I believe in a logic implication. So what? That’s not the point.

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts). — Leontiskos

Focus, I’m talking about logic implications because you seemed to talk about logic implications in that quote while using the symbol "→". That was clearly stated as a premise in my first comment. If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). The relation between belief and experience could be understood in causal terms or rule-based terms.
So either you are confused about what logic implications are, then my comment wasn't out of place. Or you are not confused, then you could have simply said: "no I'm not talking about logic implications" instead of coming back with a pointless rebuttal wrt my comment.

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context? — Leontiskos

Oh, you mean that if I understood the context of the conversation, I would have said something different about logic implications? Why do you answer me if you do not understand my comments to your quotes?
Claims of yours like the one I quoted may contribute to make the context of your conversation hardly intelligible. In fact, even after reading the post you pointed out I didn’t get what you were referring to in your quote.

Good, but what is the premise of your point here? It is that, "No one would ever say that S implies P and yet S is not truth-apt." But we have folks doing that all the time on TPF, including within this thread. — Leontiskos

My comment to your quote is clearly premised with “If the symbol '→' unequivocally expresses a logic implication”. So my or your opinion about what people say or said in this forum or outside is irrelevant. And even if it mattered, I would tell them the same I said to you about logic implications.

We regularly see folks who respond in this way: "Why do you hold P?" "Because of S, but S is not truth-apt." — Leontiskos

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. And if S is not truth-apt then it doesn’t make any sense to claim that there is a logic implication between S and P.

One of the examples I pointed to was an entire thread arguing for that idea. — Leontiskos

I’m not sure what you are referring to. Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post?

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

If the symbol "→" unequivocally expresses a logic implication, then it expresses a truth function (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_function), where the truth of the implication must be assessed wrt the truth of S and P in a certain way (i.e. according to the truth table for the logic implication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_conditional#Truth_table). For that reason it doesn't make any sense to say "It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is" because if one talks unequivocally about "logic implication" then the kind of thing S must be is already constrained by definition: S and P must be something capable of being true or false. So S can not be whatever kind of thing, since there are things that are not true or false like a stone. That's also why it doesn't make any sense to infer the truth-aptness of S from P based on a supposed logic implication between S and P. S and P must be truth-apt for an implication between them to make sense, we do not need to suppose P to be truth-apt nor to infer S truth-aptness from P truth-aptness through the implication.
Your claim sounds as silly as claiming "suppose the arithmetic sum x + y = z, and that x and y are numbers. The result of that sum is that z is a number, no matter what kind of thing z is"

But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. — Ludwig V

I can agree on that. To my understanding too “feeling” has a wider meaning than “emotion”. And while emotions are feelings, not all feelings are emotions. That’s why I’m reluctant to accept the equation between feelings and emotions you attributed to me.

Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. — Ludwig V

“epistemic” refers to the fact that the “confidence” we feel is about holding something to be the case. In the religious context, people believe in things like Gods, angels, demons, souls, Afterlife, miracles.
In more ordinary contexts, our epistemic confidence is solicited or challenged by other peoples’ behaviour wrt our expectations about their behavior. But, as I said, in my first post epistemic confidence may concern also our own sensory or intellectual capabilities: e.g. we can grow skeptical about our sensory capacity once we understand that they can also mislead us (see, optical illusions or the distortions of our perceptual apparatus with substance abuse). And this is one of the main reasons why talking about religious faith as an epistemic emotion is just a starting point.

Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling? — Ludwig V

I’m inclined to say that drawing conclusions from certain premises is a rule based intellectual activity. We can feel more or less confident in performing such an activity. So one thing is what we do (drawing conclusions from premises) another how confident we feel about it. We can draw a conclusion from certain premises, and doubt we have been performing this intellectual task successfully.

Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. — Ludwig V

A part from the fact that what I wrote doesn't presuppose such equation, “emotions" and "feelings" can be legitimately used as synonyms in common usage [1] that is why I didn’t feel the need to delve into their semantic differences. But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific.

[1]
"emotion
noun [ countable-uncountable ]
/ɪˈmoʊʃən/
Add to word list
a feeling or sentiment
émotion [ feminine ]"

source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-french/emotion



Definition of emotion noun from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary
emotion noun

/ɪˈməʊʃn/

/ɪˈməʊʃn/
[countable, uncountable]

​a strong feeling such as love, fear or anger; the part of a person’s character that consists of feelings
to show/express your emotions
They expressed mixed emotions at the news.
Counselling can teach people to handle negative emotions such as fear and anger.
Fear is a normal human emotion.
This documentary manages to capture the raw emotions of life at the tough end.
Emotions are running high (= people are feeling very excited, angry, etc.).
She showed no emotion at the verdict.
The decision was based on emotion rather than rational thought.
Mary was overcome with emotion.

source: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/emotion?q=emotion

That's a new one to me. — Ludwig V

Besides dictionaries, you can have a look at these entries of the “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”:
The Early Feeling Tradition: Emotions as Feelings
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings

But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification. — Ludwig V

I’m not sure you understood my proposal. I talked about “faith” in terms of “epistemic emotion” not about the reasons/genesis of such epistemic emotions or the metrics to assess the emotional component of such epistemic emotions or the rhetorical forms in which we can express such epistemic emotions. I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. In both cases, it’s about how we feel about people’s dispositions to act in certain ways. It doesn’t matter whether what I feel about these people is based on affection or on material interest.
The emotion I’m talking about when talking about faith is epistemic not affective. It’s not the emotions we feel for friends and relatives like love or admiration. I can still be affectively attached to someone and support him/her even if I do not fully trust or have faith in or feel confident in his/her dispositions to act in certain ways in certain circumstances.
Finally, I doubt that ordinary phrases like “faithful friends” typically expresses some commitment on our side when we talk about our friends, as a religious expression of faith would. “Faithuful” in “faithful friends” is a qualification of our friends’ behavior (e.g. to stress the fact that s/he has never disappointed use, even in daring situations) independently from how we react to it.
Most certainly, it offers us a reason to reciprocate their faithfulness, which in turn can be motivated by their informal commitment toward us as we are inclined to assume when talking about “friendship”.

I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs. — Ludwig V

In my post, I already agreed upon the fact that the meaning of “faith” must be determined in the various contexts of their usage. Still, if the task is to identify some commonalities between some (not necessarily all) various usages, then one has to make some effort to abstract from a fine-grained analysis of each specific usage.
Besides, I also warned that my idea that “faith” is some sort of epistemic emotion was just a starting point in need of further elaboration, like the one you suggest: In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test . So yes the behavioural dimension is also worth mentioning.
Still, what I would disagree with you on is the following claim: if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves. Indeed, your putative counter-examples seem to be very much compatible with what I wrote. Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. For instance, when we talk about a faithful friend, parent, dog we are referring to the fact that these friend, parent, dog will act in ways we would expect (and approve of) from friends, parents, dogs based on passed behaviour. It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances).
"Faithful picture" or "account" refers to idea that certain representations won't betray expectations based on them, they can be trusted, I’m tempted to add "as men can be" (because those expressions can sound as a personification or a metonym).
By the way, I’m inclined to say that faith in an ordinary (non-religious) sense looks more synonymous of “trust” than faith in a religious sense (rhetorical nuances aside, i.e. “to have faith in” sounds more solemn or stronger than “to trust”), as if the religious understanding of faith is richer than that of trust.

But I think the religious use of faith is more complicated than it seems. In the Christian faith, the creed and signing up to it are very important. In other faiths, beliefs are less important. What matters most is behaviour - behaving according to the moral code, taking part in the liturgy and so on. Religion is only part about belief and only about belief as part of a whole way of life. — Ludwig V

Again I agree on that the religious notion of "faith" has a complex semantic and that involves behaviour. I also readily referred to it in my post with the expression “normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts)”. But the idea that “beliefs are less important” in faith (at least, in other religions compared to Christianity) sounds rather a misleading objection to me. “Rituals” and “pious acts” concern people’s behaviour, what people say or do in certain circumstances. And behaviour, what people say or do, can be performed without having appropriate inspiring beliefs or, even, theologically elaborated or critically scrutinized beliefs, or even a satisfactory grasp of what it is believed (religious people can believe in mysterious things like the holy trinity, Jesus' dual nature, miracles, etc.). So yes, in some of these senses belief in religious faith can be said to be "less important" than behavior. The point however is that also in the religious contexts behaviour, especially in the long run or under daring circumstances, is typically taken as an indicator of the strength/authenticity of one’s religious beliefs. Indeed, if people would perform rituals and pious acts without believing at all in the creed that inspired them, maybe due to peer pressure or out of irreligious interests, I doubt we would take them as a the paradigmatic example of religious faith. Prophets, saints and martyrs… they are.
On the other side, the difference between Christianity and other religions you are pointing at may even lead us to not consider those other religions as religions if the element of faith in some supernatural/sacred world is remarkably lacking (e.g. Buddhism is considered by some more as a philosophy than a religion).

1) is faith an emotion or a thought? What if it is neither — Gregory

I think concepts (including “faith”) need to be contextualised wrt their actual and scoped usage for better understanding and communication. Then one can abstract from some specific aspects to better identify similarities among different usages.
For example “faith” in ordinary contexts has different meaning from “faith” in religious sense. And its meaning may lean toward one direction or the other depending on what is contextually contrasted to: in the Western tradition, the meaning of the religious notion of “faith” has been contrasted to philosophical rationality and science.
If I wanted to abstract from more specific usages, I would say, as a starting point, that trust is an “epistemic emotion”: “emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). This starting point seems to fit well with ordinary and religious usage. But I say it’s a starting point, for two main reasons:
- Epistemic feelings can concern also our senses and mental calculations. “Faith” seems more related to what somebody else communicated (a friend, a politician, a prophet, the holy book, etc.) or proved through deeds.
- In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test.

The orange US president yesterday night:
"Trump calls Putin 'absolutely crazy' after largest Russian drone attack on Ukraine".
(source: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g2wz74jdzo)

Oh so now is Trump helping Putin prolong the war in order to win?!
But the Great Satan has been propping Ukraine and the corrupt clown Zelensky all along to fight against Russia?
Not to mention that peaceful Russia has already won the war for the past 3 years and want now peace to become the laughing third with Europe while the US and China are fighting to death, while Trump is just fine with making all concessions requested by Russia (namely the Ukrainian capitulation).
In any case, the BLOB is behind both the Ukrainians and the Russians: for continuing the war, for ending the war, for making deals with Russia, for provoking Russia, for the invasion of Ukraine, for the European rearming, for expanding NATO, for leaving NATO. As predicted infallibly by our experts on morality, propaganda, military, economics, politics in this thread since day one.

More on peaceful Russia provoked by warmongering Finnish Nazis as humpa lumpas of the US Blob, forcing Russia to prepare against imminent NATO aggression:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/19/world/europe/russia-finland-border.html

Here is an argument:
If Russia won, Russia would impose their conditions unilaterally on the losers.
The latter claim doesn't look true yet, so neither the former.
If Russia wanted peace, Russia would agree on what the US (with a pro-Russian president) has proposed. The latter claim doesn't look true yet, so neither the former.

Robert Francis Prevost (now Pope Leo XIV) once said in 2022:
It is a very serious problem that is affecting the entire world. There are many analyses of the conflict, of the war that is currently taking place in Ukraine, but from my point of view it is a true imperialist invasion, where Russia wants to conquer a territory for reasons of power, and well, Russia's own advantage due to the issue of strategic location as well as the great value of what Ukraine is culturally, as well as historically and also in production for Russia. Crimes against humanity are being committed, it has already been proven, there are crimes that are being committed in Ukraine. We must ask God a lot for peace, but I believe that we must be clearer too, even some politicians in our country do not want to recognize the horrors of this war and the evil that Russia is carrying out in all its actions there in Ukraine.
source: https://www.outono.net/elentir/2025/05/11/the-words-of-robert-prevost-the-new-pope-leo-xiv-on-the-invasion-of-ukraine/

More on peaceful Russia signaling good will to EU to be the laughing third while China and the US are beating each other to death: https://united24media.com/latest-news/zelenskyy-russia-amassing-up-to-150000-troops-in-belarus-for-training-5893
Sorry, Great Satan but not sorry.

(Meanwhile in Poland: https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/04/30/poland-promises-appropriate-response-to-russian-military-exercises-in-belarus/)

the problem with AfD is also due to their ties with unfriendly and hostile powers like Trump's US and Putin's Russia.

↪Mikie
My burning dislike for politicians is non-partisan, don't you worry. But what I loathe even more is to see people of reasonable intelligence falling for their game. — Tzeentch

As if you could call yourself out of the game. If people just watch, others will play at their place. On the other side, if you want to play, you must swallow all the shit that comes with it. Even when you do not deserve it.

But what I loathe even more is to see people of reasonable intelligence falling for their game. — Tzeentch

In other words, your non-partisan views, are politically irrelevant. You are loathing your own irrelevance.

:up:

More on the European nazis and American lapdogs provoking peaceful Russia:
https://en.belsat.eu/86255589/russian-intelligence-service-suggests-us-and-russia-fight-eurofascism-together

More on Russia signalling goodwill for peace and cooperation with Europe:
https://kyivindependent.com/shoigu-threatens-europe-with-nuclear-weapons-if-russia-is-faced-with-unfriendly-actions/
https://tass.com/politics/1948611

Where are the pro-Russians? Where are the experts of propaganda, morality, military, economics, geopolitics criticizing the European lapdogs and the Great Satan? Those who have predicted everything since day one?
Russia is getting everything from the US and Ukraine has lost since day one, Putin has achieved all his goals the same ones he had since the beginning of the war, Zelensky is a catastrophic corrupt clownish American-lapdog looser whom all Ukrainians hate. Why is Putin not stopping this fucking war?

More threats from Trump against Zelensky, the corrupt clown American lapdog Nazi and Jewish warmonger catastrophic looser (have you seen his cloths?!): https://nypost.com/2025/04/23/us-news/trump-gives-zelensky-dire-warning-on-russia-ukraine-war-accept-peace-or-risk-losing-the-whole-country/

What is the propaganda Trump is spinning about the conflict in Ukraine? The silence of the US propaganda critics is destabilizing me. Peace in one day? Nope. In 90 days? Nope. And now "let's take a pass within days" if no progress in peace negotiations (let's make it 100 days?). And Zelensky was just a clownish corrupt American lapdog, how can Ukraine be in the way of blocking two superpower leaders' efforts to bring peace in a devastated land, with no men left fighting or wanting to fight, with no military support, corruption everywhere, and humiliated for all their catastrophic choices and losses they have suffered? While Russia has already won since day one: they just wanted the Donbas and Crimea from day one, and they got that. Why is this conflict not over yet?

Trump in Afghanistan again?
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/the-mysterious-case-of-the-bagram-airbase-1503420373.html

More on Russia signaling goodwill to become a laughing third along with Europe in the prospect of a future US-China war:

Russian propagandist warns Brit and French troops 'we will kill you all' and threatens to sink London under a nuclear tidal wave in TV rant
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14507187/Russian-propagandist-warns-Brit-French-troops-kill-you-threatens-sink-London-nuclear-tidal-wave-TV-rant.html

Russian State TV Host Threatens Strikes on NATO Countries
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-state-tv-host-threatens-strikes-nato-countries-1991581

Putin Ally Threatens to 'Erase' NATO Ally 'Off the Face of the Earth'
https://www.newsweek.com/putin-ally-vladimir-solovyov-threatens-germany-nato-2037345

Russian TV Says Europe Will Be 'Destroyed' By 2029
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0unhxkWkiKY

Russian propagandist targets EU Parliament VP with harsh insults
https://decode39.com/10155/russian-propagandist-targets-eu-parliament-vp-with-harsh-insults/

Putin Threatens To Send Arms To Countries That Could Attack Kyiv's Allies
https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-russia-ukraine-nuclear-europe-us/32980827.html

State TV says Russia will divide Europe if JD Vance wins in 2028
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFBvas94-ps

Trump mocks world leaders, claims they are ‘kissing my ass’ to make a deal on tariffs
https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/trump-s-trade-chief-admits-us-running-up-the-score-with-tariffs-on-australia-20250409-p5lqap.html

https://bsky.app/profile/snellarthur.bsky.social/post/3llf6e32oe22x — Punshhh

Trump doesn't seem to want to gift Ukraine to Russia, nor does he want to leave Europe to Russia. He wants to take Ukraine from both Europe and Russia, and to make them both dependent on the US.

What I do not really understand is why corrupt, coward, dumb, servile European leaders and Zelensky the clown are not doing right away what they are being told by their master, the Great Satan. Can the experts of geopolitics, economy, propaganda, international law, moral, etc. in this thread explain the mystery? I'm begging on my knees.

Brussels ask EU citizens to prepare a 72-hour emergency kit for crises
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/26/brussels-ask-eu-citizens-to-put-together-a-72-hour-emergency-kit-to-face-crises

Tourist Detentions at the U.S. Border: What International Visitors Should Know
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/travel/us-border-crossing-international-visa.html?partner=slack

Free to be expelled

Prohibition to enter the United States and then the repression of a French researcher who came to attend a conference, because he had expressed a "personal opinion" on American research policy.

"I learned with concern that a French researcher", on a mission for the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), "who went to a conference near Houston was prohibited from entering US territory before being expelled," said the Minister of Higher Education and Research, Philippe Baptiste, in a statement transmitted to the France-Presse (AFP) agency (AFP). "This measure would have been taken by the American authorities because the phone of this researcher contained exchanges with colleagues and friendly relations in which he expressed personal opinion on the policy carried out by the Trump administration in matters of research," he added.
Read also | Article reserved for our subscribers "in the United States, science is attacked, hampered, and even prohibited"

According to a diplomatic source to AFP, the incident occurred on March 9. This spatial researcher would have undergone random check when he arrived, during which his professional computer and his personal phone would have been searched. Similarly, messages evoking the processing of scientists by the Trump administration would have been found. He would have been criticized for messages "which reflect a hatred towards Trump and can be qualified as terrorism". His professional and personal equipment would have been confiscated and the researcher would have been sent back to Europe the next day.
Reminder of freedom of opinion

According to another informed source of the file to the AFP, "hateful and conspiracy messages" were reproached for the French researcher by the American authorities. An FBI investigation would have been announced to him, for which "the charges were abandoned," said the source.

"Freedom of opinion, free research and academic freedoms are values ​​that we will continue to claim proudly. I will defend the possibility for all French researchers to be faithful, in compliance with the law, "said the Minister of Higher Education and Research. The Embassy of the United States in Paris, requested by AFP, referred to customs services. The American customs, contacted, did not react immediately.

source: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2025/03/19/etats-unis-un-chercheur-francais-refoule-pour-avoir-exprime-une-opinion-personnelle-sur-la-politique-menee-par-l-administration-trump_6583618_3210.html