Right. The problem my terminology addresses is that the science of morality (like all science) cannot tell us what our goals somehow ought to be or what we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do. — Mark S

If morality is about what goals “we imperatively (prescriptively) ought to do” (e.g. when there is a conflict between individual and collective goals), and morality cannot tell us “what our goals somehow ought to be” then there is no science of morality.
If your assumptions leave moral goals to be set and chosen by individuals and not by scientific principles, in what sense we are not ending up in a form of moral relativism?

I can’t say “Prescriptively moral” in the second claim because there is no innate source of normativity in science and, here, I am only describing scientific results with no prescriptive claims based on rational thought or anything else.

Yes, universally moral here refers to what is cross-culturally moral (and even cross-species moral) but has no innate prescriptive power. This is a simple concept in the science of morality but one that does not exist in moral philosophy. — Mark S

You keep repeating that “there is no innate source of normativity in science” and yet you also maintain that “the strategies in fast moral thinking (such as reciprocity strategies and kin altruism) are encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and in cultural moral norms which shape our moral sense” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/816533).
So how can something be encoded in our biology and yet not be innate? What’s the difference between “innate” and “biologically encoded”?

Their normativity first comes from groups choosing to advocate these principles as moral references for refining their moral norms based on being most likely to enable achieving shared goals due to increased cooperation. Their normativity comes in the form of hypothetical imperatives in Philippa Foot’s terminology and conditional oughts in mine. — Mark S

OK my point is that there are costs in increasing cooperation that outweighs the supposed benefits of cooperation. So what I may argue against your core claims is that maybe morality is not only about boosting cooperation but also about shaping and constraining it.
Besides the same social interaction can be seen as a form of cooperation or exploitation: is the capitalist appropriation of the surplus value of wage labour a cooperative or exploitative exchange? If you hold capitalist standard views then you would more likely see it as cooperative, if you hold marxist standard views then you would more likely see it as exploitative.

Prigozhin's mutiny smells so much as a Russian feint and exquisite irony that the "US ordered Ukraine not to use mutiny in Russia to stage provocations, says Lavrov" https://tass.com/politics/1640025

It really doesn't matter if it wasn't a coup (which also some Russian nationalist commentators believe it was). Prigozhin came close to Moscow (after seizing Rostov) armed, ready to kill and with hostile demands against the establishment status quo in a already tense environment for Putin from external and internal pressure. Besides Prigozhin bitterly questioned the Patriotic War narrative promoted by Putin. The slow, weak, contradictory reactions of the Russian establishment against the "mutiny", with rumors of Putin fled from Moscow and ordinary people either indifferent or cheering with Prigozhin (again against Putin's narrative) is striking. This is a major reputational blow against Russia and Putin that Russia and Putin inflicted upon themselves before Russian and Putin's eyes on world stage.

Putin exquisite black belt in feinting speaking to the nation:
"The organizers of the rebellion, despite the loss of adequacy, could not fail to understand this. They understood everything, including that they committed crimes, that they divided and weakened the country, which is now facing a huge external threat, unprecedented pressure from outside". (1m21)

More pro-NATO and pro-Ukraine propaganda by Prigozhin the exquisite feinter.

https://twitter.com/i/status/1672195411598008324

Yes and you predicted all that, obviously. But kept silent to better enjoy the exquisite irony right? Now the explanation pls. Everything must be connected to land bridges, right?

Cool down dudes, that's obviously a feint. Wagner troops are not enough to conquer the entire Russia, even less Moscow, or 17/4567th of Kamtchatka. These are hard numbers, sorry. Even Mearshaimer said it somehow somewhere somewhen. The rest is trite Crypto-Pluto-Nazi-Sionist-LGBT-Neocapitalist-Imperialist-Amerikan propaganda. The US has lost the war between Ukraine and Russia. But feel free to believe your lies.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/23/wagner-chief-accuses-russias-military-of-attack-and-says-evil-leadership-must-be-stopped
"Russia investigates Wagner chief for ‘armed mutiny’ after call for attack on military"

Thanks for the links to the literature.

Since this is a philosophy forum and I take scrutinizing conceptual frameworks as a primary philosophical task, I'm mainly interested in the concepts you use: morality (descriptive vs normative), cooperation, exploitation, "imperative ought" (?), dilemma, and solving "cooperation/exploitation dilemma". You seem to give them mostly for granted.

Descriptively moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies.
Universally moral behaviors are parts of cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

Human morality is composed of strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Behaviors that exploit others contradict the function of human morality and create cooperation problems.

Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality has nothing to do with my background, the social environment these 'moral' norms were enforced in, or any other extraneous circumstances. — Mark S

To me the meaning of "descriptively" must be contrasted to "prescriptively" (or "normatively") not to "universally". If you use "universality" as a condition for identifying rational moral norms then you are no longer descriptive but prescriptive. Alternatively, you can use "universality" to refer to cross-cultural descriptive moral norms and NOT to a condition of rationality. Conflating these two usages would be fallacious.
Then you should give a definition or clarification of "cooperation" and its opposite "exploitation" (independently from any moral descriptive/normative assumption, otherwise you are running in circle). You never did that as far as I can remember.
Besides this claim "Concluding that "Women must be submissive to men" and "Homosexuality is evil" are immoral because they exploit others and create cooperation problems and thus contradict the function of morality " is logically questionable: 1. if morality of moral norms is established wrt their universality then you are taking universality as a rational criterion, so you are talking in prescriptive/normative terms, not descriptive. 2. if certain moral norms exist and contradict a function you claim they must fulfill , then one can question the idea that such moral norms have the function you attribute to them.

More pro-Western pro-Nato pro-Ukraine pro-US pro-Neoliberal capitalism and imperialism propaganda by Prigozhin:
https://hungary.postsen.com/world/194486/Prigozhin-envisions-executions-and-revolution-and-according-to-him-victory-is-not-on-the-side-of-the-Russians.html

Besides talking about a military diversion in this case is itself a form of diversion. Indeed, the military perspective can't trump the political perspective, if war is ultimately politics by other means. The declared reason of this "special operation" was "to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine" [1], not taking land bridges. Did Russia succeed in doing this so far? Is Russia any closer to achieve this now more than ever? Hell no, as Prigozhin must acknowledge:
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661130760978325505


[1]
"The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation".
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T

Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.

And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry. — Tzeentch

The same goes with "he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?"
The point is that "threaten" doesn't mean "feint" or "diversion". You are putting into Mearsheimer's mouth something he didn't say to obfuscate what he explicitly said. If you want hard numbers for the Russian troops, I want hard quotes of Mearsheimer's explicitly claiming that Kyiv battle was likely or possibly a diversion or a feint.

also "threatening to capture Kiev" can still be compatible with the idea of forcing a regime change. It doesn't obviously mean that Russia was making a diversion.

The plan was to take Kiev, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odessa, possibly Dnipro — Jabberwock

Notice that "the entire Western narrative" that Tzeentch seems to argue against is "Russians intended to take over all of Ukraine with their initial invasion" with 190K troops.

Unless someone wants to argue the 190,000 figure is false, we can essentially dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war. I hope people realise that. — Tzeentch

There is no "entire western narrative". There are different narratives. One is yours. There are others though that still differ from the narrative you support or reject.

I am keenly interested in why you say:

The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory.... — neomac


Your interpretation is, strangely, the opposite of what I am arguing.

My first claim was: “Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.”

Perhaps we need a review of how science, including the science of morality, proceeds to conclusions:

1. Assemble an interesting category of phenomena such as “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” - This is the data set to be explained.
2. Look for hypotheses that explain why this entire data set of phenomena exist – perhaps cooperation strategies, or acting for the good of everyone (utilitarianism), or a means of social control imposed by the powerful, or ?
3. If one hypothesis is far better than any competing one at explaining this huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set, we have a potential theory.
4. If the potential theory meets other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science, then we have a theory explaining that data set. That theory may become generally accepted as provisionally true (the normal kind of truth in science) or rejected, with rejection usually in favor a new theory that better explains the data set.

Hence:
“Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense.” — Mark S

I might agree on the 4 points about empirical science. But your way of talking still sounds misleading based on those 4 points: “evidences” are the empirical base for the explanatory/predictive task of empirical theories (see point 1) and related comparisons (see point 3). So empirical theories are based on empirical evidences, not the other way around. If charitably understood, what you may have meant is that your empirical theory of morality is better supported by available data than other competing theories.
If that’s your claim, then let’s move on to more substantive points.

Then you say:

"confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion,

"it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms. — neomac


Do you see why they don’t make any sense?

The theory is empirical, not “external” because it is based on its explanatory power for the huge, diverse, contradictory, and strange data set of “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” (plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth).

Are you arguing that “past and present cultural moral norms and the spontaneous judgments and motivations of our moral sense” is external to what morality ‘is’? — Mark S

Such comment keeps evading my actual points:
- You didn’t offer any such proof that your empirical theory of morality has greater explanatory/predictive power than other competing empirical theories. You just keep claiming that’s the case, that’s all. At least you could point at the literature where this comparison is provided.
- According to your four points, point 1 must refer to a data set that doesn’t presuppose your theory of morality otherwise there would be a selection bias. How do you build this dataset? The least prejudicial approach would be to build such dataset based on what cultural norms are pre-theoretically considered moral within the local culture that adopted them. THIS AND ONLY THIS looks to me an internal and descriptive representation of cultural moral norms. The problem is that these cultural norms may include also EXPLOITATIVE cultural norms (which are the opposite of cooperation according to you), therefore on one side claiming that morality is about solving cooperation problems is actually false if there are cultural norms deemed as moral which are exploitative, on the other side claiming that only cultural social norms that solve cooperation problems should be considered moral because more universal is no longer a descriptive claim but an external normative claim (i.e. Gert’s principle for a normative definition of morality)

What I think one can at best try to empirically prove is that cultural norms that solve cooperation problems and are deemed as “moral”, are the most cross-culturally shared. Or that cultural norms that solve cooperation problems and that are the most cross-culturally shared are deemed as “moral”. Or that cultural norms that are deemed “moral” and that are the most cross-culturally shared solve cooperation problems.
I can even try to guess their plausibility (e.g. the first hypothesis sounds to me more intuitively plausible than the other 2 hypotheses).
While claiming that cultural norms are moral because they solve cooperation problems, doesn’t sound intuitive at all (e.g. there are cultural norms that exploitative and cooperation problem solving norms which are not moral).

Finally, you say:

“And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.”

I have already done this in this thread and will repeat it here for convenience and emphasis.

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

The above describes why the cooperation problems morality solves are innate to our universe. The solutions relevant to morality are primarily cooperation strategies such as indirect reciprocity. — Mark S

This comment doesn’t even address my concern. If you want to use game theory in specifying cooperation problems you have to specify strategies (payoffs, iterations, etc.) of specific games in some quantifiable way. If you want to support your claims generically, I can support my objections generically: exploitation is part of moral code maybe because the conditions to achieve long-term goals are simply more uncertain.

Or for this round of globalization that started in the 1990's... — ssu

Indeed as far as I know the expression was introduced by the French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire to express more the fear for the consequences of financial extreme measures like "cutting Russia from SWIFT" to the Western economy itself than to the Russian one.

some more pro-NATO, pro-West, pro-Ukraine propaganda by Prigozhin:
https://www.businessinsider.com/wagner-group-prigozhin-russia-putin-failed-demilitarize-ukraine-strongest-army-2023-5?r=US&IR=T

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1661130760978325505

Science does provide that evidence, based mostly on the remarkable explanatory power of Morality as Cooperation Strategies for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. It is irrelevant to my arguments that there are people who will reject them for irrational reasons such as "God told them something different". — Mark S

The first claim doesn't make sense to me: it sounds as if you are claiming that evidences are based on an empirical theory (if Morality as Cooperation Strategies is an empirical theory) while it should be the other way around. Empirical theories must be based on evidences. Besides you keep lauding the success of such theory, yet providing very little to support it.
The second statement confirms my suspects: taking "solving cooperation problems" as a rational condition (à la Gert) to establish what "morality" is, it's a NORMATIVE criterion, it's external to actual historical cultural moral norms, not descriptive of them (against what you seemed to be claiming in past posts). And it remains generic until you specify what constitutes a cooperation problem and its solutions independently from actual specific cultural moral norms.

Those who could might have already migrated. But it's unlikely that people working on sensitive weapons for the military are that free to move as they please. Anyway until Putin keeps punishing military, intelligence, and weapon developers for his failures, that's good news to me.

nothing new: https://www.thedailybeast.com/putin-claimed-his-hypersonic-missiles-were-invincible-then-he-jailed-the-developers

My claim is that Morality as Cooperation Strategies can contribute to rational discussions about which moral norms to enforce. Specifically, understanding the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes. — Mark S

The present chief barrier to resolving moral disputes by rational discussion is the existing murky, mysterious origins and power of cultural moral norms. Morality as Cooperation Strategies removes that barrier. — Mark S

Identifying origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms can inform a rational discussion about moral norms. I’m not sure that would be enough to overcome cultural clashes though e.g. when cultural moral norms are grounded in religious faith. Besides I’m questioning the way you conceptually frame cultural moral norms as strategies to solve cooperation problems from the start. On one side, if this is the RESULT of an empirical investigation you can’t include it in the definition of morality from the start. On the other side, cultural moral norms can be diverse and incompatible. This fact suggests that there might be limits to the possibility of cooperation which may be at the roots of cultural moral norms. In other words, there might be an ambivalence in morality similar to building walls around a limited area which can be good at keeping certain people within it but also at keeping other people out of it.

And your claim is that a culture and mind-independent understanding of the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms will NOT provide objective evidence for resolving such disputes? I can’t make any sense of that. — Mark S

My claim is simply that you didn’t provide evidence, so neither that there are not such evidences nor that there won’t be. Try to have a rational discussion with muslims while claiming that putting a head-scarf is a way for men to exploit women, so this cultural moral norm is wrong because cultural moral norms are there to solve cooperation problems.

Such discussions would be much more likely to be resolved than if the origins, function, and motivating power of cultural moral norms remained mysterious. — Mark S

That is more likely expressing your confidence (or hope?) about that, it doesn't constitute evidence that your theory can actually contribute to solve moral clashes. Wearing a heads-scarf is cultural moral norm in some societies not in others, do you have any actual evidence that your understanding of morality as solving cooperation problems would fix such difference where it is bitterly defended (like say in a Taliban society)?
The problem is that cultural moral clashes are rooted in incompatible cultural moral norms, so they can't possibly solve cooperative problems in the same sense and as you admitted they generate cultural clashes AS WELL, so they can not be claimed to have the function to solve cooperation problems, only because this might be a possible effect or that knowing this is enough to more likely start overcoming moral differences. There are other effects too: like generating conflicts. Cultural moral norms can be invoked also to justify our cooperation limits.
Maybe it's simply a rationalization trying to find one function (or a function) for moral norms. Different individuals may rely on cultural moral norms to cooperate, others to engage in rivalries, others to spiritually distance themselves from society, others only as socially inherited/imposed habits since early childhood.

Diefenbach does give credit Michels and understands that his conclusions have importance. He also makes quite astute observations. So what is the problem here? The answer is: ideology overriding rationality and logic. This ideology is shown well in Diefenbach's conclusion:

The danger of oligarchy is always there – but, luckily, it does not always materialise. I therefore think that it is more appropriate to call Michels’ theory not the iron law but the iron threat of oligarchy.


By talking about the 'danger' and 'threat' of oligarchy that "luckily will not materialize", Diefenbach clearly shows what he thinks about oligarchy. And this is the trap many fall into: they see the structures of organizations as ideological or ideologically constructed and morally good or bad, and spend little if any thought on the logical and rational grounds on just why organizations have evolved to what they are now.

Perhaps "The Iron Law of oligarchy" is the wrong way to look at this phenomenon. Perhaps it would be better to call it "The fundamental limitations of collective decision making". Collective decision making takes time, people think inherently differently, will disagree and will make different choices. The only answer to this is to try to seek some sort of consensus. Also, specialization of roles in an organization is natural in creating efficiency. Hence the outcome and the effect will be that some people will have pivotal roles in the function of an organization. And hence, you will have "the oligarchy" in some way or another. That "oligarch" might then be the secretary of the council, an employee of the firm like a CEO or an wealthy financier of various enterprises. At this general level, there isn't so much use for this law. That few people will have power over others in any organization should be obvious and insisting that you can eradicate "oligarchy" at this general level is just a thought that hasn't much to do with reality.

Hence the mistake is think about the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" from an ideological viewpoint. Or to give too much ideological value to what basically is a logical or rational outcome of a complex issue. — ssu

:up:

Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.

Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues. — Mark S

The irony is that you keep pointing at an issue of your definition of morality as solving cooperation problems which then you refuse to acknowledge. If cultural moral norms define "who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups" and related "markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups" which are at the origin of moral differences and clashes then cultural moral norms can solve AS MUCH AS can generate cooperation problems !

some more "provocations":
https://www.dw.com/en/common-threats-bring-japan-south-korea-closer-together/a-65562167
https://www.dw.com/en/amid-tensions-with-china-philippines-gets-bolder/a-65591689
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-wants-more-cooperation-with-aukus-allies-advanced-technologies-2023-05-08/

From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. — Mark S

Also traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis.

Because it is empirically true.

From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation?

Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome. — Mark S

Yet you wrote: Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail, so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion.

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail. — Mark S

How do you know that? Maybe cultural moral norms fail to solve cooperation problems indeed because they do NOT have such function.
Again, if the function of ALL cultural moral norms is defined externally or independently from such cultural moral norms, and according to such unique set of external/independent criteria you can establish if any cultural moral norms are right or wrong, then - one might argue - you are not describing what that culture moral norms are actually about. If you claimed that the function of culinary recipes is to nurture us in a healthy way, so the recipes which do not conform to such function are wrong, we may object that you have it backwards, culinary recipes may fail to make us eat healthy simply because that’s not their function. And if a description of the external function of cultural moral norms equates to establishing moral prescriptions (what ought to be done), then you can be accused of conflating what is with what ought to be, description and normativity, roughly as much as claiming that only recipes that make us eat healthy ought to be considered “legitimate” culinary recipes

We ought (conditional) not follow the Golden Rule when “tastes differ” and in certain times of war and when dealing with criminals in order to not decrease the benefits of cooperation. — Mark S

When we ought not to apply the golden rule, given that the golden rule is a cooperative heuristic strategy, what other heuristic strategy should we apply? An exploitative strategy? Criminals in jail ought to be exploited? Enemies in the battlefield ought to be exploited? If not exploited what else?

And we perhaps ought not (conditional) follow marker moral norms such as eating shrimp and masturbation are abominations once we understand their arbitrariness as markers of membership and commitment to ingroups. And understanding “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is immoral” are norms about cooperating to exploit outgroups gives us reasons we ought not (conditional) follow them in order to achieve the goal of moral coherence. — Mark S

To me the relevant sense in which your “oughts” are conditional is wrt the function of morality which you defined as solving cooperation problems, not necessarily “moral coherence”. So “moral coherence” at best is an instrumental goal toward such ultimate moral end. And no matter how arbitrary “markers” norms are but if they actually preserve or boost cooperation, then they are morally legitimate.
Besides solving cooperation problems may be assessed wrt different dimensions: quantity (increasing the set of people joining the cooperation), quality (increasing the reliability of people cooperating), duration (increasing the stability of cooperation trends), resilience (increasing the recoverability of cooperation against external or internal shocks), etc. Now, if different cultural moral norms show different moral profiles wrt such dimensions, what may look as solving cooperation problems for one cultural system, it may look the opposite for another cultural system. In other words, “cooperative problems” and “solutions” would still look cultural-dependent, and not unique for all cultures, even when solving cooperation problems may be considered a likely effect (if not a function) of certain moral norms.

Many think that your proposal may fallaciously conflate normative and descriptive level of analysis, if not reduce the former to the latter. I'm not entirely sure if that's the case also because I have some doubts about how to understand "the naturalistic fallacy" per se.
Yet I doubt that your descriptive belief that moral norms are heuristics for solving cooperation problems has relevant analytic power for at least 2 reasons:
1 - if moral norms are “heuristics for solving cooperation problems”, one is capable of defining “cooperation problems” and their possible solutions INDEPENDENTLY from any specific society’s actual set of moral norms, but then morality is not about the cooperation problems that you defined independently from any specific society’s actual set of moral norms unless their moral norms perfectly match the way you formulated cooperative problems and solutions independently. On the other side if cooperative problems and solutions are defined as a function of specific societies’ actual set of moral norms, then the definition of “cooperation problems” and “solutions” varies depending on the society, so what is “cooperation problem” and “solution” to society X may not be such for society Y. In other words, X’s moral norms would not be about “cooperation problem” and “solutions” for Y.
2 - The meaningfulness of a concept is related to its semantically contrastive value. So when you claim that moral norms are “heuristics for solving cooperation problems”, since “cooperation” is the opposite of “competition”, I do wonder why morality can not be understood AS WELL in terms of “heuristics for solving competitive problems”. The previous point is indeed suggesting that different individuals and societies my compete also due to their different moral norms, if not inseparably from their different moral norms. So the moral space is contested as much as the domain of scarce resources for survival (the latter being common between humans and animals), and both can shape social competition/cooperation conditions.

It would be also useful if you clarified how you understand the notion of “heuristics”.

I'm gonna be off topic so I'll understand if you ignore my comment, but it would interesting to see if you can just draft an argument clarifying how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.

The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge). — neomac


This does not in anyway even contradict the my statement:

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius


Everything you said doesn't comment on who's most responsible for the result of a policy. Sure, the most influent party does not control events, but they would still be most responsible. If all the nation-states together push for this policy (to do nothing about environmental catastrophe) the most influent party would still be the most responsible. — boethius

I didn’t mean to contradict your claim. I meant to question:
1 - the strength of your accusation: “the most responsible“ is wrt what the US could have done, not wrt what was desirable, they might be very much different. Since that statement doesn’t make any such discrimination, from that sentence we don’t know what more specific facts the US can be legitimately accused of.
2 - its possible implications (e.g. that we should oppose the US leadership). Maybe the US has made big mistakes, that doesn’t exclude that such big mistakes might not be enough good reason to justify opposing the US leadership by the Westerners. It depends on what the viable alternatives are, including other forms of compensation. Even at the national state level, there are no democratic regimes immune from corruption or bad policies, that doesn’t mean one is ready to give up on democracy and move to ISIS theocracy just to give it a try.

The idea that environmentalism is a US policy to begin with is truly remarkable, but we could continue that discussion in the climate change thread. — boethius

I didn’t claim it’s a “US policy” but one of the most direct and self-conscious products of the US-led world.

Who would? — neomac

The question is not who would, the question is "would you?"
You can answer no. Now, I'm pretty sure many members of the Nazi community in Ukraine would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians. — boethius

What bothers me in your questions is that they are done in a void of realistic assumptions about human motivations. Given the current war, I doubt that there are Ukrainian Nazis willing to fight to death and promote this attitude among Ukrainians by mere principles or ideological indoctrination. Fighting to death to most ordinary people as well as for indoctrinated people may likely be motivated by traumatising experiences of personal loss and collective memories of oppression and abuses, so these feelings are not rooted in any specific ideology. They are very personal like personal feuds with related sunk costs. For that reason I do not have the pretentiousness of either empathising with or dismissing such feelings. They are part of the human fabric, so instead of repressing them or being judgemental about them, it might be profitable to channel them toward greater goals (for Ukrainians, independent Ukraine from Russia, for the Westerners, contained Russian imperialism).
Said that, until the one in power to take presidential decisions is Zelensky, he has to respond for Ukrainian policies in this war, not the Nazi community. Zelensky must care about the Ukrainians’ views on the war at large, not about fringe movements. At least, this is what I must assume if I believe Ukraine is a sovereign state, which I do. In any case, I have no evidence supporting the claim that Zelensky or Ukrainians “would genuinely have no upper bound on the sacrifice of Ukrainians they are willing to make to fight the Russians”.

Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)? — neomac

Deflection, deflection, deflection, as soon as it's "what cost is reasonable" it's somehow all of a sudden a ephemeral netherworld of philosophical speculation we can hardly even scratch the surface of. — boethius

If you talk about “reasonable cost” I would like to understand what the reasoning is, other than your/my gut feelings. If we are talking military, I guess that for a military resistance one needs to take into account really many factors among them the rate of Ukrainian vs Russian people that can be enough trained, equipped and deployed on the battlefield, and their morale. I don’t have the actual figures available to decision makers, nor the military expertise to do the math, nor an insider sense of their morale. I guess neither Russians nor Ukrainians would fight literally to the last man, but they keep their military calculations secret for obvious reasons (e.g. the rule of 1/3 defensive vs offensive doesn’t seem to support an offensive action on either side given the overall deployed manpower on the ground, but depending on given circumstances and other asymmetric advantages this ratio maybe less relevant). I can just guess that they will keep fighting until the ratio in manpower and equipment between opponents supports the idea that there are still decisive moves to be made on the weakest defensive points of the opposing side. Otherwise the war will likely stall, even if there is no declared truce or peace. There is no need to have an anti-American bias to acknowledge that the military situation for the Ukrainians is ugly and chances to regain territories manu miltari are not encouraging. There is no need to have an anti-Russian bias either to acknowledge that Ukrainians might keep fighting as the Afghans kept fighting against foreign occupation, the Palestinians keep fighting and the Kurds who never even had an acknowledged state for their own. For generations. Do you think Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds would be impressed by your “reasonable cost“ line of argument to fight their wars? It’s precisely the frightening idea that “reasonable cost“ for the Russians might be significantly higher than the Westerners could tolerate, that Russian morale is stronger than the Western morale what needs to be countered. That’s the blackmailing trap the Russians, pardon, I meant you, are “proposing” and “recommending” people to fall in. What the Ukrainians are teaching the Westerners, it’s precisely what “morale” it takes to fight for one’s freedom against genocidal authoritarian regimes like Russia.

However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods. — boethius

Why 30k ? Why not 3k? Or 300k? And why would it be relevant to anybody that you start feeling uncomfortable at 30k? If one starts feeling uncomfortable only at 60k or hundred times more, what are you going to do about it?

However, if there was some credible way to just remove Russia from Ukraine and completely end the war and achieve peace (something that I don't believe is actually feasible, but if I'm assuming it is) then 30 000 killed I'd find a reasonable cost, I'd hope for less but be satisfied if spending 30 000 lives achieved this military objective and bought peace with such methods.

In the real world, an attempt to remove Russia entirely from Ukraine by force I would expect would cost hundreds of thousands of lives and not succeed, and, even if it did, would not result in peace but the war would still be on. — boethius

Putting these 2 arguments together reinforces the Western concern that Putin is testing a military plan that can be replicated by himself and other potential emulators again: Putin will occupy territories with whatever excuse good for pro-Russian propaganda against neighbouring countries and then threat tactic nukes if there is a serious chance to suffer a decisive conventional military defeat.
That in turn may reinforce the Western motivation to support Ukraine to prevent Russia (and its possible emulators) from being encouraged to replicate the same strategy elsewhere. How? If an outright and full victory is not possible on the battlefield, nor by diplomatic means, then bogging down the Russian military involvement in Ukraine as long and as costly as possible to Russia without escalation measures may be an effective strategy. But that has its costs, obviously. Especially for the Ukrainians.

the main one being not joining NATO (which is only useful to join before the war ... not after the war) — boethius

.

But the threat of war won’t be over even after peace. For example, Russia may still want to get Odessa once it has restored its military capacity or start somewhere else encouraged by a too favourable peace deal. And find other economic and political ways to bully Ukraine, to corrupt its politicians or oligarchs.

The higher the cost paid, the more the stronger party requires compensation for the cost, not less. — "boethius

That might be true also for a weaker but indomitable party.

Your analysis made no sense and I'll ignore it, does not support your conclusion, and your conclusion is false anyways. — boethius

But I can’t ignore that all three accusations lack arguments to support them.

However, to start the analysis an idea of what amount of lives is worthwhile to spend to achieve what must be posited. — boethius

Sure, but that’s not on me to establish. Politicians and military leaders/experts are there to do the job.
At best I can reason over their arguments, and suspend/withdraw my reliance on them if I find their arguments enough questionable. I’ve read elsewhere many if not all of your arguments (like Ukraine won’t be able to regain its territories from 2014, or Russia might use tactical nukes if there is a risk it will lose territories, or the lack of the Western commitment to Ukrainian victory, the peace deal refused by the West). But again I’m more interested to discuss geopolitical and moral implications/assumptions than to discuss the actual status of the Ukrainian military and morale. For the latter I mostly limit myself to get input from more reliable sources.

I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. — neomac

Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what you are talking about. — boethius

Well, thanks for clarifying you have no idea what I was talking about.

However, if you're interested in assumptions, the assumption of commanding soldiers to fight in a war is that there is something that can be achieved militarily and the cost in lives is reasonable. The implication of war is people die. — boethius

The other assumption is that I’m not a commanding soldier. So I’ll let other people more credited and qualified than I am to express their competent views on military matters. The war has also geopolitical implications like the rise of the Ukrainian nation against their genocide by the Russians.

Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point. — neomac

You made the claim Finland joining NATO is some big geopolitical strategic loss to Russia, I pointed out it doesn't really change anything ... and now you say I should ask Russia about it? — boethius

Again I’m responsible for what I write not for what you understand. You asked me “Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia?” as if invading Russia is the only strategic concern for Russia. That is questionable. The Ukrainian case is there to prove it.

The difference with Ukraine compared to Finland is that there is an important Naval base in Crimea, there are lot's of Russian speakers in Ukraine, Ukraine is a former soviet republic, and there is first and foremost an economic conflict over Ukraine (spheres of influence of the major powers).
Finland was never part of the Soviet Union, was squarely part of "the West" and never part of Russia's sphere of influence. There is no conflict between the West and Russia over Finland. — boethius

If that’s the case then invading Russia is not the most realistic security and strategic problem that Russian imperialism has to face. Notice that Putin never presented the Western security threat specifically as a threat to the naval base in Crimea (other points were e.g. denazification Ukraine, NATO neutrality, demilitarisation). Besides Russia has Russian minorities in other ex-soviet union countries and accused other neighbouring countries to have nazi regimes. So the problem is not just what Russia did, but what it might do next if the war ends the way Russia wishes. Russia is challenging the West world order so this war must be assessed in that perspective not just as some beef between Russians and Ukrainians over marginal territorial disputes.
That Finland joins NATO is a problem for Russia for at least 3 reasons:
1 - Reputation: Finland doesn’t fear to anger Russia and feels safer within NATO as other countries who joined NATO.
2 - Security: Russia is compelled to react because if NATO enlargement was a downplayed provocation prior to the war in Ukraine by the Westerners, now Finland joining NATO is an overt provocation to Russia. Since NATO border is widening and the NATO control over the Baltic Sea getting stronger Russia must deal with related security threats.
3 - Network: NATO has become more anti-Russian by having countries like Finland and maybe later Sweden within NATO (counterbalancing the weight of other US allies milder against Russia).

This conflict is the US wanting to expand it's imperial influence in Ukraine and diminish Russia's imperial influence, made the bold move of orchestrating a coup to replace a legitimate leader willing to compromise with Russia (i.e. not insane and in power because many Ukrainians did, maybe still do, support compromise with Russia over conflict and warfare).

There are two empires sorting out the question of who indeed does have more influence over what happens in Ukraine at the end of the day.

Neither empire has a moral case. — boethius

Talking about “a coup to replace a legitimate leader” is a way to dismiss a popular revolt against an illegitimate leader. If it was the case and Russia had by far the popular support of the Ukrainians, I doubt that Western coups would succeed. Besides Ukrainians have a long history of opposing the Russian rule and have suffered for that a great deal (way more than they are doing now in terms of body counts). Even the entanglement with Nazism (as it happened in Finland) was also due to historical grievances with Russia. There is nothing here that the US propaganda invented.
I don’t know what you take to be a “moral case”. And if no wars in human history are grounded in what you consider “a morale case“, then I would find your moral claim useless. As far as I can tell there are no wars that aren’t morally controversial so when we talk about the morality of war we should take into account that moral controversy management is part of the game, and as far as I am concerned, how differently is played in Western democracies vs non-Western-like authoritarian regimes. So if you prefer the former to the latter then you better ask yourself what “reasonable cost“ is worth to spend to keep it that way.

The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends. — neomac


That's because actual evidence exists in the present and only speculation exists about the future.
To conclude one speculation is better than another, turns out requires evidence in the present to support. — boethius

You look more pressed to conclude how the West failed practically on all relevant grounds (military, economically, politically, morally) against Russia, based on a very selective view of the evidences you claim to have. So speculations (like in your hypothetical scenarios) are framed accordingly: Russian wins whatever military strategy pursues (annexed territories consolidation, more land grabbing, tactic nukes, wartime economy, alliances with the Rest), the US loses whatever military strategy pursues (with less engagement Russia wins, with greater engagement escalation to nuclear war, with peace on Russian deal-breaker terms then Russia will result victorious). But if the US is losing whatever it does, you should be glad. The primary/entirely responsible for the human suffering and global environment unimaginable devastation for decades is digging its own grave, isn’t that worth millions of Ukrainian deaths over 8 billions world population and more if one considers the well being of future generations? Why isn’t THAT a reasonable cost?

Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend). — neomac

This seems accurate.

I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!). — neomac

This literally means:

“A proponent of US foreign policy” — neomac

If you are supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so, but "let them fight".

If you are starting to doubt if the lives this policy costs are worthwhile to spend, then "preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude the idea that Western intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death. — boethius

Oh if that’s enough to call me “a proponent of US foreign policy” then you are “a proponent of the Russian foreign policy” since opposition to “supporting the arms supply to Ukraine and the policy of not-negotiating, even frustrating any attempt to do so” is what Russia propaganda does. Actually I’m tempted to say the same for all your arguments.
“Preferring the Western avg life" does not exclude either the idea that the Western LACK OF intervention in Ukraine is not leading the avg Ukrainian to the avg Western life, but to trauma and sadness and death like the Ukrainian genocide during the Soviet Union. Worse, it could lead the avg Western life close to the avg Ukrainian life more than the other way around.

You also seem to agree the US is the world's super power and global hegemon ... and not merely today but, most critically, in the 1990's after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the rise of China US was even more top dog than it is now, and it's that decade that was the most critical for setting climate and environmental policy.

Why wouldn't the party with the most influence and power in setting a policy, not be the most responsible for the results? — boethius

The shortest answer is that to assess such responsibility one should be able to distinguish what is feasible (by the ruler) from what is desirable (by whom? The ruler? Humanity? You?). Being the most influent and powerful ruler on an “anarchic” international system doesn’t necessarily imply that the ruler has enough power to reset the world according to what is desirable on a global scale (BTW the scientific investigations on the global environmental effects of human development, its promotion and popularisation are all integral part of the US-led world, so global environmental self-awareness are also a product of the evil American demiurge).

Would you be willing to sacrifice a million Ukrainians on the battlefield and still lose, a more-or-less fight to the death scenario, as the principle is more important than the result? — boethius

Who would?

Do you find it acceptable the losses since Russia's offer last spring (assuming the offer was genuine: give-up claim to Crimea, independent Donbas) in the event the lines do not change further? — boethius

Who would?

Would the losses since the Russian's offer be worth it in the event Ukraine outright loses? — boethius

Why would they?

Finally, to achieve the goal of removing Russia further from Ukraine, both including and excluding Crimea, how many losses would you (if you had to choose) be worthwhile? — boethius

Give the example and tell me how many losses would be worthwhile to you (if you had to choose)?

If you want to discuss, don't deflect further with "Ukrainians want to fight it's not my decision, the West is just supplying arms", but engage in the argument and put yourself in the position of choosing the number of lives for the given scenario. Certainly you'd be willing to sacrifice 1 Ukrainian to achieve complete removal of Russia from Ukraine if it was both possible and your decision to make (I'd make the same decision; one life for the complete end of the war? no hesitation, will obviously save many more lives than the war continuing), so just keep increasing the number from there until you either reach a zone where you start to be uncomfortable (100 000, 200 000, 500 000) or then never become uncomfortable and inform us every single Ukrainian life is worth sacrificing to remove Russia from Ukraine. — boethius

Give the example and tell me what’s the number you start feeling uncomfortable with.

And these sorts of decisions are part of NATO military training (which I've done) that the cost in lives must be justified by the worth of the objective achieved. The mere fact the other side is presumably "bad" (otherwise why are we fighting them) does not justify fighting at all cost to both your own troops as well as civilians. We are willing to sacrifice X to achieve Y is the fundamental framework of all military decision making. — "boethius

Your questions are all heavily framed to hint an obvious answer.
But I’m questioning the framing for the following reasons:
1 - Context: as the Multivac would answer, “insufficient data for meaningful answer.” (cit.). Am I the president of Ukraine or some avg non-Ukrainian dude? What does “lose” mean? Just lose a battle or the war, and what does losing the war implies? What principle are we talking about? The principle of of being free to buy a second mobile phone or the principle of keeping the nation free from subjugation, exploitation, or genocide? What does “at all cost” mean? Context is always much richer of relevant details, constraints and uncertainties that are relevant for decision making, than your framed & simplistic hypothetical scenarios may suggest. Besides many assessments can be done only a posteriori, if done in advance they may be speculations as plausible as others, even if they turned out to be the best approximation to reality, later on.
2 - “Morale” vs “moral”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. “Morale” is a psychological condition. It has to do with motivation, emotional resilience, discipline, "having the guts". It’s unreasonable to expect/require that an avg dude not directly involved in the war has the “morale” or can empathise with the “morale” of those involved in the war. It’s unreasonable to expect/require that ordinary individuals have the “morale” of trained and leading political/military/decision-maker figures (it’s not by chance that division of labor and labor specialization exist also in the political and military context).
“Moral” has to do with reasons to act in a certain way. One may have “morale” to pursue “immoral goals“ and one may not have the “morale” to pursue “moral goals“. The result of your psychological test may be good to assess “morale” or capacity of empathising with involved parties’ morale (I even doubt that because we are talking about hypothetical scenarios), but it doesn’t equate to a moral assessment of the reasons behind a war.
3 - “Military” vs “geo/political”: to me, the two notions may be related but they do not refer to the same things. A geo/political strategy doesn’t coincide with a military strategy. Military strategies are way more constrained than geopolitical strategies, and also subordinated to geopolitical strategies. "War is the continuation of policy with other means" (cit.). I’m obviously very much interested in military arguments from experts, and military analysis about how much the Ukrainians can afford to sacrifice as a function of military objectives. And I do not mean to discount them at all, but they are one aspect of a geopolitical strategy. An example is the Bakhmut battle, which is said by many military analysts to be of little strategic importance to justify the heavy losses on both sides, yet it has now gained great political importance (for its reputational costs? For the morale of all supporters within and outside Ukraine?).

Conclusion: I don’t answer your questions not because I’m emotionally uncomfortable, but because I’m intellectually uncomfortable to answer heavily framed questions for which I can't provide a meaningful answer (even if I was tempted to answer them exactly the way you would answer them). I’m interested to argue about morality and geopolitics, not about morale and military.

Then you have no place in policy discussion about warfare, because that's what it's about. — boethius

I discuss policies as any avg dudes who is neither a politician nor an activist. And since I’m in a philosophy forum, I’m interested to explore assumptions and implications without feeling pressed by political/military/economic urgency, or frustrated out of lack of expertise. As I argued in other occasions, I think all these points need to be addressed to make sense of the impact of a policy:
1. Values: saving lives may not be all that matters. Freedoms and welfare count too.
2. Present vs future: saving life or standard of life now as compared to saving future lives and standard of life.
3. Actual vs counterfactual: saving life or standard of life by actually doing X vs saving life or standard of life by counterfactually doing Y
4. Strategy: the relative risk&payoff of a strategy (relative to other players’ strategy) is more relevant than its absolute risk&payoff of that strategy.
5. Bounded rationality/morality: all relevant actors have a limited cognitive resources to process consequences of different strategies, and will to respond adequately to moral imperatives. The cumulative effects of all these limits introduce imponderable constraints in all policies.
6. Matrix of competitive/cooperative strategies: every individual and group of individuals is immersed in a multi-dimensional matrix of cooperative and competitive games which are totally a-priori uncoordinated (precisely because coordination is the more or less stable result of how these games are actually played)
7. History: historical legacies (power relations, bad habits, bad memories, historical debts) from past generations hunt current generations despite their current dispositions.
8. Decision process: how much the decision is concentrated in the hands of few and hierarchical the chain of command.

But I don’t see how all such points can neatly fit into a reliable mathematical formula that gives anybody the best moral guidance in quantifiable terms (like a body count) easily computable by anybody. To have something quantifiable one needs to give for granted lots of shared assumptions on a computable set of variables. In other words, as far as I’m concerned, it’s IMPOSSIBLE to calculate and execute an optimal strategy in practical sense, and a certain degree of fault-tolerance for mistakes and even big mistakes may be required because nobody can prove to be able to do better just “in theory”. For that reason, I’m skeptical about responsibility attributions which do not take into account such predicament, but instead look for a convenient scapegoat to blame for man-made world catastrophes.
In any case, if I do not have place in policy discussion about warfare in moral terms WITH YOU because that’s what it’s about TO YOU, why do you keep addressing my comments?

Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?

Exactly why strategic bombing is so controversial is that it's difficult to argue it saved more lives than it cost, which is the usual framework for these sorts of calculations. — boethius

OK, give me a historical example of hundred of thousands of innocent civilians killed were morally worth the cost, because my suspect is that you are NOT doing any math. You are simply convinced that there is no historical example of wars with massive casualties also among innocent civilians that was morally worth fighting. But if that is the case, you are offering an argument against wars (defensive and offensive), not against this war, and independently from who started it or provoked it.

Certainly Russia's reputation is decreased in the West ... but is it really true world wide? Vis-a-vis China, India, most developing nations? Certainly not enough for these nations to stop trading with Russia.[/quota]

Most likely, Russia looks weaker (than prior to the war) and particularly needy to the Rest too. Indeed, they exploit Russia’s predicament to reap the benefits and blackmail the West. For that reason India and China may want the war to last as long as possible. But without too much exposure so far, indeed if India and China felt so confident to challenge the West, they would support Russia’s war more openly and directly as Iran is doing.

— boethius

- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries — neomac

Is there any scenario in which Finland / Europe is going to invade Russia? Does any of that actually matter in the current geopolitical "power struggle" as you put it? — boethius

Concerning the question about Finland/Europe, you shouldn’t ask me, you should ask Russia. To your questions, I would add mine: e.g. was there any scenario in which Ukraine was invading Russia? Was there any scenario in which NATO or the US was going to invade Russia?
NATO enlargement can grow the military and reputational costs and threats against Russia’s imperialism. That’s the point.

That's how political blocks work. If you are in a geopolitical power struggle with the West, then being economically tied to the West exposes you to coercion (the whole point of the sanctions). Sure, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and obviously China and India) have more influence with Russia, but there's no evidence right now these parties are seeking to harm Russia through those economic ties and influence, whereas that's very clearly the West, and in particular the US', stated policy since decades (containment, no "peer competitors" can rise in any region etc.). — boethius

The Rest is not an economic-military-technlogical integrated block yet as much as the West. And again power must be understood in relative advantages, timing, trends. You are unnecessarily focused in the present (which is not what geopolitical agents do when engaged in power struggles). Things my look very differently over the next decades depending on how this war ends.
Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have increased their influence in the Middle East (e.g. Syria), Central Asia (e.g. Armenia vs Azerbaijan), and Africa (e.g. Sudan) at the expense of Russia.
China looks still interested to keep relations with the EU and to protract the Ukrainian war at the expense of the US, but not to the point of escalate it and be heavily dragged into the Ukrainian war by Russia. So if the EU (more precisely France and Germany) find a way to mediate between China and the US, that too might be bad for Russia too.

The primary reason Germany and France would be fed up with the US is that the US creates this mess in Ukraine and then also blows up European infrastructure. But, otherwise, I agree that the US' main competitor in this conflict is the EU and the possibility of the Euro emerging as a "peer competitor" to the USD. — boethius

Until EU will build enough unity to support of common foreign strategy and cumulate deterrent/coercive power against competitors like Russia, China and the US.
This war suggests that the EU is not only far from that, but things may go awfully wrong if the alliance with the US will break. The void or significant weakening of American hegemony in Europe can likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (now including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe worse than in the past decades (including during the Cold War). And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control ensuing social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).

It's difficult to interpret this as something other than being a proponent of US foreign policy.

But if you really want to believe yourself to be some impartial observer, then we can discuss on that basis. If that's true you should have even less problem answering questions of what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what, as you can be more objective in evaluating the costs and the benefits. — boethius

I don’t claim to be an impartial observer if that means that I do not have preferences or that I didn’t pick a side: I prefer an avg life in the West than an avg life in China, Russia or Iran. I side with a strategy that weakens Russia’s aggressiveness as much as possible. But this partiality is perfectly compatible with objectivity in understanding how the game is being played by competitors. And presenting it as honestly as possible (at least if one is not doing propaganda!).
“A proponent of US foreign policy” to me means being engaged in political propaganda as an activist or a politician to support the US in general or in this war. I’m neither. I’m not here to fix the world. To solicit people in this thread to press our politicians to support more the US in Ukraine or to express my moral outrage against those who oppose the US in Ukraine or to spread memes boosting “morale” for one party against the other. That’s not what I’m doing. That’s the kind of activity you and your sidekicks are doing.
I’m here just for the fun of re-ordering my beliefs and assumptions in a more rationally compelling format, while challenging other interlocutors to do the same.
Finally, to repeat it once more, I can try to answer only questions that at least make sense to me: e.g. asking what you feel is a reasonable sacrifice to achieve what doesn’t “feel reasonable” to me. And it's symptomatic that you didn't answer it either.

However, if you want to argue climate change isn't happening, species loss isn't happening for this and a bunch of other reasons as well, or this environmental destruction, to the extent you agree it's happening, won't be extremely bad, better to argue that in the climate change thread.
For this thread, I'm sure you can appreciate that someone who concludes the environment has been grossly mismanaged and the US primarily responsible, won't assign much moral superiority to US foreign policy. — boethius

I’m neither arguing that “climate change isn’t happening” nor that “won't be extremely bad”. I’m questioning your way of assigning responsibility and its implications.

Of course, the debate remains, even in your basic framework of "US good", as to whether the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order" without any benefit to Ukrainians.

As well, even assuming it's true that it's morally justified to sacrifice Ukrainians (or let them sacrifice themselves for Western purposes), if the war is actually harming Russia and benefiting the US. — boethius

I already argued against this miscaracterization of my views.
- my basic framework of "US good” as opposed to your basic framework “Russia good”, “Iran good”, “China good”, “North Korea good”?
- the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is sacrificing Ukrainians for this US "rules based order” as opposed to “the war in Ukraine is morally justified if it is killing,raping,deporting,destroying Ukrainians for Russia anti-West order?
- "without any benefit to Ukrainians" as opposed to “without any benefit to Russians”?
I questioned the assumption that the West “is sacrificing” the Ukrainians.

As yet, no pro-US policy proponent here has answer the question of how many Ukrainian lives are worthwhile to sacrifice to accomplish what objectives. — boethius

I can’t answer such a question if I don’t know how I am supposed to do the math or if it makes sense. Why don’t you pick whatever historical example and show me how YOU would do the math? Here is an example: ”Civilian deaths during the war include air raid deaths, estimates of German civilians killed only by Allied strategic bombing have ranged from around 350,000 to 500,000.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II). By taking into account that the civilian deaths were estimated in the range of 350,000-500,000, do you calculate that it was morally worth bombing Nazi Germany or not? How did you calculate it?

Likewise, if Russia survives sanctions, as they seem to be doing, and stabilise the front, which they seem to be doing, and continue their arms manufacturing, which they seem to be doing, how exactly does this war harm Russia's geopolitical standing, compared to increasing power and influence and put them in a position to strike deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example? — boethius

It has already harmed Russian’s political standing:
- Reputational costs: e.g. Russian military standing didn’t impress on the battlefield
- Security costs: e.g. NATO enlargement and the rearming of European countries
- Economic costs: e.g. economic decoupling between Russia and the West
It’s Russia which increased power and influence, or it’s Iran and Saudi Arabia that increased power and influence over Russia?

Now, if Russia is gaining power and but China even moreso, for all the reasons we've discussed and you seem to agree with, ok, sure, maybe Russia's relative power vis-a-vis China is decreased, but if this China led block that includes Russia, in whatever influence you want to assign them, is on the whole increasing in power, how is this good for the US? — boethius

What might be the lesser evil for the US is to break a Western-lead globalization which was benefiting more EU, Russia and China than the US. And re-compact the West in a logic of political, economic, security blocks as in the Cold War. But this attempt may fail not necessarily because of Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia have significantly increased power and influence. But because of EU, in particular Germany and France ,are fed up with the US. Or because of a domestic internal crisis in the US.

You are obviously a proponent of US foreign policy with regard to this Ukraine war, if your justification is that it's good for US empire then that's your justification. — boethius

We discussed that already. I’m not a “proponent of US foreign policy”. One thing is to try to make sense of what the US is doing, another is to decide what do about it. As far as I am personally concerned, independently from what the US does, I can only say as much: I’m a person who prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in authoritarian regimes like Russia, China or Iran. Therefore I’m inclined to see as a threat an increase of power and aggressiveness of such authoritarian regimes at the expense of the West. If the West can and wants to do something against such threat, then I would welcome it. And since I’m aware of how messy and dirty human history is, I limit myself to reason in terms of lesser evil.

:up:

That’s what I asked you because that is what Tzeench claimed “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII” and that is how you interpreted it: “The one that causes most death and misery”. — neomac


@Tzeentch's claim here is pretty easy to support.

We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism (however "soft" you want to call it -- being smothered by a pillow can have the exact same end result as being stabbed in the chest).

Now, if you want to argue that the Soviet Union, China and India weren't and aren't any better and would have done equally bad or worse things (and did and do their best to help destroy the planet as second and third fiddles) had they been the dominant super power and setting the terms of world trade, I'd have no problem agreeing to that.

But the reality is that the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.

Unsustainability literally equates to destruction, that's what it means: destroying the ecosystems we require for survival, not to mention a host of other species.

And global unsustainability has been a Western choice, championed by the US and supported by their vassals. The policies for sustainability are pretty easy and known since the 60s (public transport, renewable energy, less meat eating, sustainable fishing, strict care what chemicals are allowed in the environment and how much, and farming in ways compatible with biodiversity and soil protection) and since the 60s the policies critical to sustainability could have been easily implemented to create a smooth transition.

The War on Terror, and now this conflict with Russia and China, are sideshows to the main event. — boethius

“Setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US” may have significantly contributed to many events: triplication of the World population, peace/ greater wellbeing/cultural emancipation in Europe, technological progress, rise of competing powers (like China and Russia), not just destruction of “the ecosystems we require for survival” or its destruction on a “unimaginable scale” (whatever that means). But even acknowledging the latter won’t be much of a help in conceiving a realistic strategy to fix the world. The point is still the same: enforcing policies on a global scale effectively and stably is possible only if there is enough economic/coercive power (which I doubt the US/the West still have, if they ever had it). But such power doesn’t come for free (i.e. not all humanity will benefit from it, no possible cynical abuses or nasty unintentional consequences can be systematically prevented) nor without consensus (e.g. by being the perceived as the lesser evil wrt realistic alternatives). The point is that no long term goal policies (whatever they are) can be ensured if there isn’t enough economic/coercive power to support it, so no economic/coercive power will be likely spent by political elites to pursue such policies if that is perceived as just loss of power for themselves and/or for serving their base. Conclusion: until humanity can’t self-govern by itself (how?) and will rely on politicians to do what they are incapable or unwilling to spontaneously do by themselves, then the politicians will reason in terms of power to govern people for the good or the bad (including an unimaginable scale of human or environmental damage) with the populace’s or workers’ consensus as long as this is perceived to be the lesser evil.

Which, as I've mentioned before, is the counter argument to your actual position:

Sure, here I restate it again and bolden it: The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. Outrageous right?! — neomac


The West has no moral high ground. I wish it did, but it doesn't and so there is no justification to "inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power" because there is no moral superiority. Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale). Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism, far from being in some different and worse category, and is far less destructive for the reasons Isaac has outlined in some detail (mainly as it's regional and not global).

The West is not a responsible steward of global affairs and so there is simply not much moral differentiation that justifies sacrificing so many Ukrainians for the US policy of inflicting enduring damage on Russia, as you eloquently put it, which is debatable if that's even happening. — boethius

First, power struggles do not need moral justification to make sense. And most certainly they do not need to be grounded on your understanding of “moral justification” (which I find questionable for reasons I argued a while ago). Power struggles can simply raise from security concerns that transcend specific ideologies. And the intervention of the West in Ukraine is meant to frustrate threats from powerful anti-West competitors, independently from the question of who are the good guys or the bad guys. On the other side, your “morally justified” policies (whatever they are) would need massive concentration of coercive and economic power to be enforced on an international scale. So until you show me compelling evidences to support the idea that Russia or China (as US power competitors) or Europeans have means and will to enforce an ecologist program on a global scale more effectively than what the US can do, I’ll keep believing yours is just wishful thinking.
Second, if “Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism” is reiterating the idea of the provocations from NATO enlargement or the US/Western intervention in the Middle East or in ex-Yugoslavia, then the argument would sound more compelling if it wasn’t for the entire history of Russia until Putin and the memories it left or the impression it leaves in neighbouring countries like Ukraine.
Third, that “our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)” is debatable. In some relevant sense there must be a very significant difference in standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities otherwise people would have more incentives to migrate from the West to China, Russia, Iran than the other way around. Even Russian, Chinese and Iranian political/economic/ideological elites’ kids enjoy studying and living in the West more than the other way around. And your claim would sound hypocritical if said by a Westerner who still prefers to enjoy standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities of avg Western people instead of enjoying standards of life, freedoms or economic opportunities for avg people living in Russia, China or Iran.

you tried to back him up with more handwaving. One can't fairly accuse others of "vacuous handwaving" while indulging on his own vacuous handwaving. That was the whole point of the two previous posts and I clearly stated so. — neomac


Yes. And I'm clearly stating that your claim of 'handwaiving' is not a "sharply formed, evidence-accompanied type of claim" and so fails your own requirements. You simply declared it to be so. You require of others what you fail to supply yourself. — Isaac

You dishonestly chopped out “from somebody accusing me of handwaving” again. I wasn’t the one who started accusing others of “vacuously handwaving”. Baden accused me of “vacuously handwaving” in the first place. And you backed him up. So I retorted: it’s on you both to give the example first, then you may challenge opponents to reciprocate. But you didn’t, so there is nothing on me to reciprocate.

Suggesting a vague relation between what I’m asking now and what you reported in the past, doesn’t prove that you already offered evidences to answer my question. — neomac

No. You actually taking the bare minimum of effort to look back (or even remember) what has been offered already is what would prove that. The evidence has been given. I'm not going to re-supply it every time it's asked for because the asking is itself just a rhetorical trick to make your opponent's positions sound un-evidenced. If you genuinely have just forgotten or didn't noticed you would be making a polite request for a repeat. You're not. — Isaac

Sir, would you kindly provide pertinent evidence which I was asking here: “Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of ‘the western world under US leadership’’s policies? All right. Quote your preferred expert’s report concluding as much. Or prove it yourself”?

I claimed “I abundantly argued” and that’s a fact. I didn’t claim you agreed or you found my arguments persuasive or that the magical expected effect was changing your mind. — neomac

Then why "apart from the fact…”? If 'the fact' consists of nothing but your having written what you consider to be an argument, then my response doesn't stand "apart from" that fact, it stands alongside it. I've not disputed the mere fact that you've written copious words. I've, in fact commented several times on the inordinate length of your posts. — Isaac

Because I was accused of “vacuous handwaving” by Baden but I offered arguments that he or whoever else is interested can address. There is nothing in the accusations of “copious words” or “inordinate length of your posts” that contradicts the fact that I provided arguments. And if my arguments are vacuous handwaving I want to see who isn’t handwaving here when talking about geopolitics and morality.

A part from the fact that you were talking about calculations not me and that your defence of Baden’s accusations of “handwaving” against me is handwaving in all sorts of directions, but the point is that there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations. That’s why a pretentious accusation of “vacuous handwaving” (or “give me the metrics“ or “no shred of evidence”) which you tried so clumsily to defend, is doomed to be self-defeating. — neomac


Bollocks. It's an absurd argument to say that if one cannot provide the actual mathematical calculations we are therefore in some hyper-relativistic world of speculation and hand-waiving. A bomb is more destructive than a stick. I don't need to do the maths, but nor is it mere speculation. — Isaac

You lost track of what I was talking about. When I asked “What is “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” supposed to mean?”. You answered: Including them in the calculation about what course of action we ought morally support. I abundantly and repeatedly argued against an “accounting model“ (not only against you), and I didn’t receive any compelling counter-argument, mostly just cheap dismissals like “inordinate length”, “copious words“. As I summarised previously: “there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations”, that’s why cheap accusations of “vacuous handwaving” can be as cheaply retorted. In other words, “taking into account” “those victims’ lives” can be done, and it’s done, even without giving an exact and reliable estimate of the moral/geopolitical costs of certain policies (e.g. in the military context, how can one exactly estimate “morale” and “morale difference” in opposing armies when the war is ongoing? But morale is relevant in the conflict as much as affected by losses, among other factors). And if that’s true for experts, it is even more so for avg dudes.

In this thread, we have abundantly seen how problematic is to talk about “demonstrable effect” depending on the nature of the facts (e.g. an accounting of the victims of an ongoing war), the reliability of the source of information (e.g. if it’s mainstream or not mainstream, if it comes from Russia or Western sources of information etc.), the time range in which one wants to see the effects (the chain of effects is in principle endless which can cumulate and clash in unpredictable ways), the relevance of such effects (there might be all sorts of effects not all equally relevant for all interested parties, e.g. not all Ukrainians and Russians think that nationalities are just flags), the explanatory power presupposed by “effects” and “policies” (depending on the estimated counterfactuals, and implied responsibilities), and so on. — neomac


I don't know why you keep thinking this is a remotely interesting line of argument. Yes, different ways of working things out yield different answers. The same is true of your arguments (despite your pretence to some AI-like hyper-rationalism). So what? That just means that the matter is underdetermined - which is the argument I've been making all along. we choose which argument to believe. — Isaac

Because as long as human beings do not work out their moral/political differences and can’t tolerate each other, nor can avoid each other, then they will likely fight each other, as it happens in Ukraine.
The fact that human beings fail to work out differences is not necessarily a failure in rationality: i.e. opponents can overall be both rational, or both irrational, or one rational and the other irrational. 2 chess players can rationally move in compliance with basic rules and with sensible strategies, yet have opposing endgames. In a war between Russia and the West, it’s a rational move for Russia to run anti-West propaganda the most effectively they can, and for the West to run anti-Russia propaganda the most effectively they can. If it is rational for Russia to react to Western provocations, it is rational for the West to constrain potential competitors. If it is rational for Russia to threat nuclear escalation, it is rational for the West to not show panic. And the examination can go on, toward more general assumptions (e.g. the rationality of wars) or toward more specific assumptions (e.g. the rationality of supporting Ukraine the way the US did so far).
Concerning claims such as “the matter is undertermined“ and “we choose which argument to believe”, what is the argument? How do these claims support Baden’s accusation of “vacuously handwaving” against me? And if one chooses to believe in arguments, then why is there any need for arguments at all? One can choose to believe any claim without arguments.
If we are rational we can’t choose to believe fallacious arguments or arguments grounded on premises we find implausible. As long as there are reliable and shared epistemic rules to establish what premises are plausible and what arguments are fallacious we can converge in our assessments about statements and arguments. And if one fails them then this would be an unintentional rational failure, not a choice. If two arguments reach opposite conclusions from equally plausible premises, then one suspends judgement, not choose which argument is right.
“Choosing to believe an argument” happens when we do not engage in rational examination of our certain arguments on their own merits either because we can’t as when we trust experts or because we do not want to as when we indulge in wishful thinking.

“Diplomacy” requires leverage namely exploiting or exploitable dependencies over often unfairly distributed scarce resources (related to market opportunities, commodities at a cheaper price, or economic retaliation, military deterrence/escalation, territorial concessions, etc.) — neomac


Not at all. It can appeal to humanity, to popular opinion. It can appeal to public image, future stakes, the willingness to avoid mutual destruction. there's all sorts of levers for diplomacy that are not traditional forms of power. — Isaac

First of all, the examples I offered weren’t meant to be an exhaustive list (that’s why I put “etc.”), and the examples you suggested are nothing worth the qualification of “not traditional”. Most certainly, I didn’t mean to exclude “public image” among the leverages of power struggles, I argued about reputational costs in the international arena on several occasions. But the main argument is still the same: also good reputation needs to be capitalised by elites if it serves to win power struggles (that’s particularly evident when ideologies are involved like when we talk about the Roman Empire converting to Christianity or the end of slavery in American Civil War or Putin allying with the Orthodox Church). And the fight between Western democracies and authoritarian anti-West regimes is matter of reputation as well.
Second, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” fall in the domain of propaganda for public consumption with related risks of hypocrisy or exploitation (like any “panem et circenses” of the past). Power struggles can boost propaganda wars as in this war where Russia (along with China) is expressly challenging the Western world order, the Western notion of human rights, sovereignty, international laws, US leadership. So those kinds of appeals may work for diplomatic compromises as much as to nurture propaganda wars (like when the Russians accuse the West of using Ukrainians as “cannon fodder”). And precisely because propaganda wars as much as economic and military wars can be threatened that they can be the content of a diplomatic pressure, as prospected by Western analysts when talking about military defeating Russia, but offering Putin something he could claim as a “victory” for his internal propaganda.
Third, most importantly, “appeal to humanity, to popular opinion”, “public image” do not necessarily offset imbalance on other leverages of power. That’s the diplomatic lesson given by Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: the power with greatest economic/coercive resources will impose its will over the much smaller power and the diplomatic argument would simply be like “if you want to survive, surrender to our dominance” from the former to the latter. For the same reason, also the allusion of “willingness to avoid mutual destruction” presupposes power to destruct each other e.g. in the form of nuclear arsenals. BTW the US, while leading “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, was running the risk of a mutual destruction situation and it didn’t screw up. It even promoted denuclearisation. So maybe the US too is not doomed to screw up after all.

“Sustainable development” and “fair trade“ presuppose public infrastructures, compliance to contracts, a financing flow efficiently allocated to say the least which all require a massive concentration of economic and coercive power. — neomac


No they don't. Things can be fairly traded on trust. and there's absolutely no requirement for "massive coercive power" to simply grow sustainably. what's more, the largest and most powerful force is, as history has repeated shown us, the populace. People strive for their well-being and will strive against authorities which seek to suppress it. It's people who represent the greatest coercive force. Mobilising those people is what drives progress. — Isaac

Maybe “the populace” drives progress and holds the greatest coercive power, but I still see elites in power practically everywhere, since states have been formed. And whenever the populace revolted, even when if that contributed to regime change, they just put new elites in power, sometimes as bad if not worse than the elites they revolted against.
Can you kindly provide examples of goods “fairly traded on trust” between countries, sir?

“International law” and “human rights courts” presuppose the monopoly of a coercive power (the opposite of disarmement) to be enforced or powerful economic leverage (whose effectiveness depends on how unfairly economic resources are distributed) — neomac


again, it does no such thing. Human rights laws were instigated against the will of those in power by force of will from those subject to that power. they are a restraint on power that was opposed at every step. People in power are (or should be) afraid of those over whom they have power. Governments are afraid of revolution. Company boards are afraid of strikes. Leaders are afraid of non-compliance. The moment they're not we get no progress at all. Human Rights are the result of that fear, not the exercise of their power. — Isaac

A part from the fact that fear of social unrest is what turns many political elites to be authoritarian and suppress “human rights”. Indeed what would be the point of being authoritarian if the populace is spontaneously submissive?
Anyways I didn’t talk about the genesis of “human rights laws”, I talked about their enforcement. And to enforce laws one needs the monopoly of coercive power (if not in theory, in practice). But the tragedy in “international law” (differently from national laws) is that there is no superior coercive power, so states have to ensure the means of their own security. You must know all that because you champion Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.

“Democratic reforms” can happen only if there is democracy (and assumed we share the notion of “democracy”), so how can democratic reforms happen when one has to deal with non-democratic regimes in building institutions like “International law” and “human rights courts” that should support and protect democratic institutions? — neomac


People. It was the people who brought down the Ceaușescu regime, not armies or international law. Workers. — Isaac

So now we do not need international laws anymore nor armies (yet Ceaușescu’s communist regime precipitated when his army turned against him, so I’m not sure it’s a good example), workers are enough (should we assume that the Romanian workers very happy after the fall of Ceaușescu, democracy and wealth spreading all around, no more corrupted elites, human rights raining everywhere?). Where are the workers revolting against Putin, Xi Jin Ping, Kim Jong-un, Ebrahim Raissi? What are they waiting for?
Besides, are you suggesting Western workers or populace should make a revolution against Western governments? Start a civil war against “the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”? If not, why not? After all given the following superlatives and bold expressions of anonymous outrage, populace and workers of the globe should mass revolt against the US all at once yesterday, shouldn't they? What was slavery in the US, absolute monarchy in France, Russia, China or Iran compared to what the US is doing to the entire earth at an unimaginable scale?!
“The western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII by an incredibly large margin, having positively ruined dozens of countries.”
“the one that causes most death and misery”
“We are literally in a 6th mass extinction event heading towards civilisational collapse that is entirely due to US policy and acquiescence of their fellow Western acolytes, not to mention pollution of various other forms as well as neo-colonialism and US imperialism”
“the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale.”
“Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale). Russian imperialism is a pretty banal reflection of our own imperialism, far from being in some different and worse category, and is far less destructive for the reasons Isaac has outlined in some detail (mainly as it's regional and not global)”

“Dis-coupling of politics from industrial influence (share holdings and lobbying)” like in China, Russia, North Korea, Iran you mean? Like in the Roman, Mongol, Islamic, Carolingian Empire you mean? Like in some Taliban village or in some aboriginal tribe in the Amazon forest? — neomac


The latter. If something's not having been done in recent history is your only argument against it being possible then I can see why our politics are at such odds. Had homosexuals ever been allowed to marry in law before this millennia? Good job you weren't involved in that campaign. Had slavery ever been outlawed before the eighteenth century? Did women previously have the vote and merely had it returned to them in 1928?

The idea that if a thing doesn't have precedent it can't happen is utterly absurd. — Isaac

Where on earth did I write that “a thing doesn't have precedent it can't happen”? You persistently lose track of what I’m arguing, or don’t understand it and make random objections. What I argued is that concentration of power leverages (economic, coercive, ideological, etc.) is a common trait of political entities we live in, namely states, and such concentration of power is required to enforce rules over wide enough territories and population. This is true from the earliest historical formation of states, it’s constitutive of them, that’s why there is no precedent. Acknowledging that there are no precedents, it’s relevant to investigate the reasons behind such phenomenon. The examples you are bringing up do not question my assumption, they confirm it in the most evident way: there was no homosexual, women, slavery revolutions led by the oppressed ones for their emancipation (“revolution” as in “French revolution”, “Russian revolution”, “Chinese revolution“, “Iranian revolution”) in any major state constituting the Western world. But there were homosexuals, women, blacks which allied with some pre-existing elite political power in a battle against other political competitors. It is claimed by some that none of such social changes ended exploitation and discrimination for blacks, women, workers. Exploitation and discrimination just evolved in new forms, to some, more tolerable, to others, still intolerable, or widened into something catastrophic if not apocalyptic (e.g. “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII”, “the dominant power since WWII setting most economic policies on the planet (what and how things are produced) has been the US, and the consequence has been destruction on a hitherto unimaginable scale”, “Our system is no better than the Russian system and arguably far worse (if only due to scale)”). The point is that if one day there will be a decoupling of “industries” and “politics” the concentration of leverages of power will come in some other form (which doesn’t mean you or the populace or the workers will like it better). An example is the emergence of powerful elites leading the technological revolution of information which are competing with elites dominating more traditional technologies. As I already argued, competing moral or ideological movements require power to win over competitors (practical rationality demands it), so typically either they harvest economic/coercive power within them (which often leads to the emergence of a new powerful elites) or they rely and ally with on pre-existing power to succeed.
The end of the American hegemony in favour of authoritarian regimes won’t change that, I don’t even see how this could be a first step in that direction. The void of American hegemony will more likely boost the economic/military/ideological competition between European countries (the premises are already there, see the divergence between the UK and the EU, Eastern European countries and Western European Countries wrt the war in Ukraine, the rivalries between north Europe and South Europe about the immigrants) which can’t rely on the Western-lead international order, and between global powers (including the US) which will bring their competition in the heart of Europe more than ever. And will more likely encourage authoritarianism even in Europe, to control following social unrest (the right-wing turn in many European countries may favour this trend).

to ensure policies over time one advocates one needs to rely on massive, stable and unequal concentration of power in the hands of few with all related risks in terms of lack of transparency, lack of accountability, exploitation or abuses — neomac

No one doesn't. Progress has been a matter of resisting that power with an equal and opposite power afforded to the masses. — Isaac

It’s a very romantic and populist view of progress. It overlooks the role of the masses in social regress (how many revolutions - including the communist ones, which didn’t happen in capitalist societies contrary to Marxist predictions - ended up in bloody dictatorships, because populace and workers can turn out to be shitty human beings as those who exploit them), the role of pre-existing elites which promoted social progress to win over political competition, the role of technological inventions (which didn’t come from the populace or the workers) in altering power relations favouring social progress.

I’m expecting substantial claims that are sharply formulated and accompanied with required evidences. Your blah blah blah is still flying in the domain of vague possibilities. Namely, more hand-waving. — neomac


Is the latter claim supposed to be an example of this sharply formed, evidence-accompanied type of claim you're wanting to advocate? "Your blah blah blah is still flying in the domain of vague possibilities" I'm not sure I can live up those standards. — Isaac

You dishonestly chopped out “from somebody accusing me of handwaving”. Baden accused me of erasing “the entire post WWII history of western violence and the culpability that comes with it with vacuous handwaving”. And you tried to back him up with more handwaving. One can't fairly accuse others of "vacuous handwaving" while indulging on his own vacuous handwaving. That was the whole point of the two previous posts and I clearly stated so. Your clumsy attempt to retort the burden of proof for the second time is still failing.

What do you mean by “the one that causes most death and misery”? Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of “the western world under US leadership”’s policies? All right. Quote your preferred expert’s report concluding as much. Or prove it yourself. — neomac


It's already been cited several times over. I'm not playing this stupid game where every few pages you all pretend that there's been no evidence presented in the hope that no one will bother to go back and look. I've already discussed the papers showing the deaths from the US's 'war on terror', the deaths and near starvation condition of nations in the developing world, the links between those conditions and US/European trade policy, IMF loan terms, colonial history... There's plenty of scope for disagreement, but don't sink to this childish level. The evidence is there. If you disagree with it, that's fine, it's underdetermined enough for you to do so, but then I'd ask why. — Isaac

I’ll repeat once more: “Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of “the western world under US leadership”’s policies? All right. Quote your preferred expert’s report concluding as much. Or prove it yourself”. That’s what I asked you because that is what Tzeench claimed “the western world under US leadership has been the most destructive force on Earth since WWII” and that is how you interpreted it: “The one that causes most death and misery”. Suggesting a vague relation between what I’m asking now and what you reported in the past, doesn’t prove that you already offered evidences to answer my question.
Providing evidences to support the claim “the one that causes most death and misery”? Do you mean that since the end of WW2 until today at least more than 50% of the non-Western World misery (=poverty and sickness?) and death was the direct and exclusive consequence of ‘the western world under US leadership’’s policies” is not the same as providing evidences to show “the deaths from the US's 'war on terror', the deaths and near starvation condition of nations in the developing world, the links between those conditions and US/European trade policy, IMF loan terms, colonial history”. And since the previous 2 posts were about accusing people of handwaving by Baden and you, you are still handwaving.

A part from the fact that I already abundantly argued against such accounting model of understanding geopolitics and its moral implications — neomac


It's not 'apart from the fact...'. I know this will be a difficult concept to get into your messianic brain, but I disagreed with your argument. I did not find it persuasive. Strangely, you merely writing it down did not have the magical effect you might have expected. — Isaac

I’ll repeat it once again: A part from the fact that I already abundantly argued against such accounting model of understanding geopolitics and its moral implications. I claimed “I abundantly argued” and that’s a fact. I didn’t claim you agreed or you found my arguments persuasive or that the magical expected effect was changing your mind. Indeed, I can’t care less if my arguments do not sound persuasive to you, that’s the magic effect of not caring about convincing people. I’m arguing as if you will NEVER change your mind. I’m arguing as if you are and will always be like the ugly Donkey Kong in a Super Mario video game. If you have counterarguments the game continues, otherwise it stops. That’s all. So keep throwing your barrels, dude.

give a concrete example of what such calculation looks like — neomac


Again, I already have. A concrete example looks exactly like the arguments I've already given. If a policy leads to over 300,000 civilian deaths and has no demonstrable effect, I don't need to do any "maths" to derive a sound opinion that the policy is flawed. If a country bathes in opulence whilst one it is trading with, has investments in, has a colonial history of abuse with... has 50 million starving children in it, I don't have to do any "Maths" to hold the sound opinion that one country is probably exploiting the other. — Isaac

A part from the fact that you were talking about calculations not me and that your defence of Baden’s accusations of “handwaving” against me is handwaving in all sorts of directions, but the point is that there is no way to get rid of the speculative and approximative dimension of geopolitical and moral considerations. That’s why a pretentious accusation of “vacuous handwaving” (or “give me the metrics“ or “no shred of evidence”) which you tried so clumsily to defend, is doomed to be self-defeating.
Of course you don’t need to do the math when you can conceal possible reasons for disagreement behind childish hyperboles. In this thread, we have abundantly seen how problematic is to talk about “demonstrable effect” depending on the nature of the facts (e.g. an accounting of the victims of an ongoing war), the reliability of the source of information (e.g. if it’s mainstream or not mainstream, if it comes from Russia or Western sources of information etc.), the time range in which one wants to see the effects (the chain of effects is in principle endless which can cumulate and clash in unpredictable ways), the relevance of such effects (there might be all sorts of effects not all equally relevant for all interested parties, e.g. not all Ukrainians and Russians think that nationalities are just flags), the explanatory power presupposed by “effects” and “policies” (depending on the estimated counterfactuals, and implied responsibilities), and so on.
Of course you don’t need to do any math to denounce the link between the “opulence” of certain countries and the “starving children” in other countries when it’s enough to vaguely hand wave at the trite arguments by populist propaganda one can easily find on facebook too. And the problem is not simply that such emotional appeal looks so “powerful” because it’s oblivious about the pervasive and rational nature of power relations, but also that it can be very much instrumental to surreptitiously advance the agenda of interested parties as any emotional blackmailing. In other words the argument itself is liable of being accused of exploiting “starving children” to advance agendas that do not give a shit about “starving children”. Russia and China sell themselves as “benign” powers for the Rest of the World because either the Rest of the world is too ignorant/corrupted to believe them OR simply because even CYNICAL & GREEDY & ELITIST & UNFAIR & AUTHORITARIAN & EXPLOITATIVE & IMPERIALIST & WARMONGERER agents are perceived to be USEFUL BY the exploited countries/people (as well as to jacobins, apparently), if they look the lesser evil!

Maybe you should rephrase it, but if you accuse your opponents to claim a false couple of alternatives (no matter if accurate), then you should show at least a third alternative clearly distinct from the other two, not just hand-wave at it. — neomac


again, this has already been asked and already answered. Diplomacy, sustainable development, fair trade, disarmament, international law, human rights courts, democratic reform, dis-coupling of politics from industrial influence (share holdings and lobbying)... I'm not about to list the entire agenda of the various progressive, socialist, or human rights groups in the world. That's why I talk about it in terms of your imagination. It is utterly ridiculous to paint only two alternatives as if we lived in a world where no one was presenting any other. It's an absurd tactic to suggest that the third (or fourth, or fifth) options are somehow these mysterious options barely mentioned. There's entire global movements advocating for them. — Isaac

A part from the fact the alternatives I was talking about were obviously related to what I was arguing (i.e. “it must be acknowledged as well that the western world under US leadership fought against its perceived enemies”) not to whatever you think it’s worth discussing. But if you want to hand wave in that direction, I’ll hand wave back.
“Diplomacy” requires leverage namely exploiting or exploitable dependencies over often unfairly distributed scarce resources (related to market opportunities, commodities at a cheaper price, or economic retaliation, military deterrence/escalation, territorial concessions, etc.)
“Sustainable development” and “fair trade“ presuppose public infrastructures, compliance to contracts, a financing flow efficiently allocated to say the least which all require a massive concentration of economic and coercive power.
“International law” and “human rights courts” presuppose the monopoly of a coercive power (the opposite of disarmement) to be enforced or powerful economic leverage (whose effectiveness depends on how unfairly economic resources are distributed)
“Democratic reforms” can happen only if there is democracy (and assumed we share the notion of “democracy”), so how can democratic reforms happen when one has to deal with non-democratic regimes in building institutions like “International law” and “human rights courts” that should support and protect democratic institutions?
“Dis-coupling of politics from industrial influence (share holdings and lobbying)” like in China, Russia, North Korea, Iran you mean? Like in the Roman, Mongol, Islamic, Carolingian Empire you mean? Like in some Taliban village or in some aboriginal tribe in the Amazon forest?
Concerning the “entire global movements advocating for them” (assumed they are immune from criticism and they are not promoted by the West), people can “advocate” all they want (even Khomeini was advocating for more democracy before establishing his Islamic theocracy), the problem is that to ensure policies over time one advocates one needs to rely on massive, stable and unequal concentration of power in the hands of few with all related risks in terms of lack of transparency, lack of accountability, exploitation or abuses (as the Jacobin dictatorship has proven). That is why there are exactly ZERO democratic & humanitarian & disarmed & pro-international law & pro-human rights courts & immune from industrial influence governments in the entire known human history. The closest to such ideal society the entire human history could ever get was within the most developed Western-like societies but for Isaacs that is still not good enough on the contrary they are labelled as "the most destructive force on Earth since WWII by an incredibly large margin". Isaacs think that with old fashion imperialism which means land grabbing through wars, overexploitation (see forced labor in Russia and the nightmare of Chinese factories) and genocide humanitarian goals are better served. Power to the imagination.