the unsupported generality that there's some moral weight to national identity alone. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. — Isaac

Not sure if your distinction between ends and means wrt national identity is morally relevant.
For example I see no mention of such distinction here:
Article 15
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

Moving a border at tremendous cost of human life is not an efficient, or conscionable method of either protecting minorities or securing resources. War has catastrophically failed to do either, in virtually all cases. — Isaac

I find your generalisation objectionable again: if Russians mange to annex and see acknowledged the Donbas regions, it's likely that the Russians living there are not going to suffer from alleged genocide and persecutions for generations to come.
Besides I still fail to understand how you calculate efficiency: what's the formula you are using?

Yes, they all take the much more parsimonious route of simply referring to 'right and wrong'. I thought that would be an unnecessarily cumbersome intermediate step. — Isaac

Parsimonious? Maybe but "humanitarian" is not mentioned even once either here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/
https://iep.utm.edu/modern-morality-ancient-ethics/

If you prefer, consider my use of broadly humanitarian or virtuous actions as being those that are considered 'right' and their opposites 'wrong'. — Isaac

OK what do you mean by "broadly humanitarian"? do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights ? Or do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights and pacifism (or rejection of war)? Or yet something else?

Matters that have moral weight tend to relate to issues of "humanitarian" needs or virtues. Either the behaviour in question can be shown to lead to some material harm to human welfare, or it is non-virtuous in some way. Moving a border (in general) is neither. — Isaac

How do you know that “in general” is neither? One could argue that humanitarian needs are best handled within established administrative units. Indeed, in the specific case of Ukrainian and Russian border, your generalisation doesn’t seem to hold, Russians could argue that moving the border is meant to protect Russian minorities in Ukraine from persecutions. Ukrainians could argue that preserving the border is meant to preserve all the material resources in that Ukrainian region which are relevant for the wellbeing of Ukrainians.

'Moral' is a word in the English language, I don't have a private definition of it. — Isaac

The weird thing is that prominent dictionaries like marriam-webster, oxford and cambridge do not mention the word humanitarian in their definition of moral nor vice versa.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/humanitarian
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/moral_1?q=moral
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/humanitarian_1?q=humanitarian
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/moral
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/humanitarian

Some classes of human activities are 'moral', they concern a loose affiliation of behavioral types we've grouped under that umbrella term for various reasons (although some consider there to be only one reason, but that argument's irrelevant here)

When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other. — Isaac

I didn't ask "How does one assign moral weight? " I asked "How do you assign moral weight?".
And the reason why I'm asking is because you claimed:

The point I'm making here is that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter. It has zero moral weight. — Isaac

How do you decide that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is irrelevant, merely an administrative matter? On factual terms, there are people who see borders and national identity not as irrelevant nor as merely an administrative point.
So your claim "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter" is a moral claim, right? something like : "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight", right?
And since you claim "When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other".
Then I'm asking you, what reasons you have to hold such a moral prescription: "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight".

But my answer fails to give any moral weight to the hierarchical arrangement of those units — Isaac

How do you assign moral weight?

Say, it could be the end of any of these, at least in any way that matters: Russia (country, nation); Russians (people); Russian (identity, culture, language); Russians doing Russian in Russia. Something along those lines. — jorndoe

Sure. Add also the fear of losing the "alleged" status of great power. My point wasn't to deny we can figure out ways to disambiguate it, the point is that vague expressions like this have a rhetorical force both for mass propaganda and at the negotiation table, and can blend well with Putin's own personal fears.

Vagueness is key here. The term "existential threat" is not analytical but evocative and it echoes Putin's mantra that the West wants to destroy Russia. In that expression Putin can project all his own fears (to lose his power, his reputation, his life) that he hopes to share with his base. Anyways I found his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club dubbed in English: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wi24CBaqI5w let's see if there is something else to find out.

↪neomac
The head of state stating any attempt at NATO expansion to Russian borders is seen as a direct threat is crystal clear language. You asked for evidence for Russia's perception of NATO as a threat, and I've provided it. — Tzeentch

You are confused. And probably you didn't follow the reasoning which you tried to address.

One has to distinguish the evidence about threat perception from the evidence that support threat perception. The evidence about threat perception is e.g. statements by the head of state that "any attempt at NATO expansion to Russian borders is seen as a direct threat" the evidence that support the idea NATO expansion to Russian borders is a direct threat is e.g. placing nuclear strategic missiles in Ukraine. I asked the latter (What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? ) you now offered me the former.
The reason I asked for evidence that support threat perception is not because I believe there is none, but because whatever evidence is going to be offered, is still questionable as to its geopolitical implications, especially within a security dilemma where players read aggressive intentions in other player's deterring moves. That's why it's a hopeless endeavor to question threat perception when it's grounded in historical mistrust.

One could question that Crimea was in Ukrainian borders. — Isaac

Sure one can! Borders are matter of international recognition. And indeed: At first Crimean authorities attempted to claim that it was a sovereign Republic albeit with a relationship with Ukraine. On 5 May 1992, the Crimean legislature declared conditional independence, but a referendum to confirm the decision was never held amid opposition from Kyiv. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Crimea_(1992%E2%80%931995) )
So in the end the control was restored without war.

Are we really going to rehash the whole 19th jingoism? I suppose that would go well with our rush to world war three, rampant nationalism did a good job of warmongering back then, its got a good track record.

Using what exactly would one go about 'questioning' the properness of a border?

Ought we test the genetic stock of the population either side? — Isaac

Your pointless blabla doesn't take into consideration that I was talking about perceived threats, and Russia was perceived as a threat by the West and not only. I'm not committed to any specific way in which different actors understood the Russian imperialistic threat, nor ground my reasoning based on the specific case of Chechnia. But if playing dumb makes you happy, keep enjoying, by all means.

Russia was 'imperialistically' retaining territory already within its borders. — Isaac

After the collapse of Soviet Union one could question that Chechnya was within Russian borders.
The First Chechen War took place from 1994 to 1996, when Russian forces attempted to regain control over Chechnya, which had declared independence in November 1991. Despite overwhelming numerical superiority in men, weaponry, and air support, the Russian forces were unable to establish effective permanent control over the mountainous area due to numerous successful full-scale battles and insurgency raids. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnya

You mean the war in which; — Isaac

I mean: The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this 'passportization' policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement )
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-soft-power-works-russian-passportization-and-compatriot-policies-paved-way-for-crimean-annexation-and-war-in-donbas/

Oh, and do you even reslise how absurd it is to include Chechnya in your list of evidences of imperialist expansion? — Isaac

I talked about geopolitical ambitions (obvious in the Caucasian region) and arguably a case also for "Russian imperialism" since the Chechen war was a war for independence against "Russian imperialism" and perceived as such not only by the West (About 15,000 Caucasians and their supporters demonstrated in Ankara Sunday. Addressing the rally, Nationalist Movement Party leader Alparslan Turkes said, ``We support the independence of our Chechen brothers. We want the world to stop Russian imperialism.'' https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/1227/27071.html). Interestingly here is the view of Ukrainians about it:
The Chechnya crisis was condemned by the entire cross-section of Ukrainian political parties immediately after the launch of the covert war to topple President Dudayev in summer 1994. To centre right national democrats (Rukh, Union of Ukrainian Officers, Ukrainian Cossacks and the Congress of National Democratic Forces), writers and intelligentsia as well as the radical right nationalists (Ukrainian National Assembly and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) it is a question of 'we told you so' about Russia's long-standing imperialist intentions which will sooner or later turn against Ukraine. 'In this situation the signing by Ukraine of a Treaty on Friendship with Russia will be regarded by the world community as moral support for Moscow's imperial policies', the Democratic Coalition 'Ukraine' believed. 'Russia demonstrated to the world its inability to renounce forceful dictatorship and armed intervention in deciding political problems', Rukh's leader, Viacheslav Chornovil, said. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists applauded the Estonian example of wishing to recognize Chechnya's independence. The Communist Party of Ukraine also condemned 'any forcible resolution of any kind of conflict' , The communist head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, Borys Oliynyk, described Russia's military intervention in Chechnya as 'aggression' and its tactics as 'genocide'. The socialist chairman of parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, also came out against the use of force in Chechnya. Moroz's Socialist Party believed that, 'The Russian democrats are reaping the fruits of their own anti-national policy on the Soviet Union's collapse’.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634939508400925?journalCode=ccas20

@Isaac try harder, you have all my humanitarian support!

The pair have already outlined a potential deal to avert a crisis over Washington's planned missile defence system in Europe, involving a string of safeguards to ensure it could not be used against Russia.
Bush has insisted the system is a shield against a potential Iranian missile attack on Europe or the US, but Moscow sees it as an attempt to blunt Russia's nuclear deterrent.

In other words
- No evidence stronger than Russian development of new nuclear weapons in 2004 and Russia suspension of CFE Treaty in 2007
- Putin's speculations about threat perception from the US despite Bush administration assurances

Whatever it is that’s convinced you of it prior to the NATO summit. I’m not interested in surmise and gut feelings. — Mikie

To that I already answered: “That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia”.
Then you asked me for evidences about Georgia prior to the Summit and I gave you the link to wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement (which case BTW presents -similarities to what Putin is doing now in Ukraine)
Overall, Putin showed a much more assertive politics and foreign politics compared to Yeltsin, as nobody could fail to notice [1]

Regardless, I asked about the threat of imperialism prior to the NATO summit because the claim was that NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions. — Mikie

I feel compelled to prove my claims and my objections not whatever you feel the need to be convinced about. And if you lack a deeper understanding of geopolitics (including Mearsheimer’s views) than what you are showing with such objections, that’s all your problem not mine.
For example the claim that “NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions” is conceptually myopic: however it was presented by American administrations in public, the big concern about Russian (not Putin’s!) imperialist bent was present since the collapse of Soviet Union (so prior to Putin’s presidency). This threat perception was felt by everybody in that debate, and especially by Eastern European countries. The attitude toward this threat was not to deny it but to decide how to address it either by expansion of NATO (as a defensive alliance) primarily and/or by using the EU market and institutional integrations.
If your argument was geopolitically compelling, it would be even more easy for you to question the evidence of Yeltsin’s “imperialist bent” compared to Putin’s given that NATO expanded over 3 ex-Warsaw Pact states during the Yeltsin’s presidency, and there were discussions to integrate ex-Soviet Union republics. Russia was at its weakest point after the Soviet Union collapse, what was the threat then?
Besides your arguments can be retorted against you. What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? Also Putin and Putin’s administration sent ambiguous messages about Nato expansion, after all [2]
Your reasoning is conceptually flawed for the following reasons:

• Geopolitical strategising is of course speculative (BTW also for reasons explained even by Mearsheimer’s) so "speculative" is not an objection to my arguments
• It concerns threat perceptions by countries from other countries, not by specific administrations independently from geopolitical context (if not even a geopolitical theory) and historical trends. And neither you nor Mearsheimer are the ones to assess such threats but political decision makers and their advisors.
• The more mistrust there is between countries the greater is the sensitivity toward threats (so response can be over-proportionate), and the need to anticipate them (that’s the case for ex-Soviet Republics)

As Mearsheimer notes — who isn’t an “average dude” but who, unlike you and I, has studied this for decades and is considered a foremost expert on it— this claim is an invention, started especially after 2014. — Mikie

If you have your argument from authority, I have mine: for the third time, read Brzezinski who wasn’t just an academic (from Harvard) but also an actual United States National Security Advisor. Not to mention that I find Mearsheimer's views inconsistent wrt his own assumptions.

[1]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has just said that his country is working on the development of new nuclear weapons, claiming that they'll be so advanced, no other nuclear power will be able to match them. Besides sparking speculation by saying that Russia needs the weapons to deal with future security threats - President Putin was particularly vague about what these threats might be - the news has also raised fears that we could be about to see a renaissance of the old nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. https://www.nci.org/06nci/10/RNW%20Putin%20nuclear%20posturing.htm (18-11-2004)

“Join Nato and we'll target missiles at Kiev, Putin warns Ukraine” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/12/russia.ukraine

“Defying the United States, Russia agreed in July to sell $1 billion in combat aircraft to Venezuela. The deal marks the latest in a series of Russian arms sales to a state that has increasingly clashed with Washington over different ideological approaches to Latin America and the developing world.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/VenRussia

NATO members say they share the goal of bringing the adapted accord into effect as soon as possible, but had maintained collectively that they would not ratify the agreement until Russia fulfilled commitments to withdraw military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges in conjunction with the adapted treaty’s completion, and many NATO governments saw them as prerequisites for concluding the adapted treaty. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Notwithstanding the lingering presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia, NATO recently suggested that some of its members might soon begin their ratification processes on the adapted treaty. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-01/russia-suspends-cfe-treaty-implementation

At Munich security conference in 2007: President Putin continued in a similar vein for some time. "The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states," he said. It was a formula that, he said, had led to disaster: "Local and regional wars did not get fewer, the number of people who died did not get less but increased. We see no kind of restraint - a hyper-inflated use of force.” The US has gone "from one conflict to another without achieving a fully-fledged solution to any of them", Mr Putin said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (10 February 2007)

the Kremlin has neither forged an EU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” with Washington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of former Soviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATO expansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successful development of a new ICBM to defeat America’s National Missile Defense, and vigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the CIS.5 All these give solid reasons to think that an “integrationist” interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not grasp the continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strong desire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagement with the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinking which guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto”, Putin mentioned about derzhavnosti as one of Russian traditional values on which has to be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia can revive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respected in the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea in international community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.
https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76701018.pdf (January 2006)


[2]
02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html



During his November 2001 visit to the United States, Putin struck a realistic but cooperative tone:

• We differ in the ways and means we perceive that are suitable for reaching the same objective . . . [But] one can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten . . . the interests of both our countries and of the world.

In an interview that month, Putin declared,

• Russia acknowledges the role of NATO in the world of today, Russia is prepared to expand its cooperation with this organization. And if we change the quality of the relationship, if we change the format of the relationship between Russia and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be an issue—will no longer be a relevant issue.

Putin even maintained the same attitude when it was a question of Ukraine someday entering the Atlantic Alliance. In May 2002, when asked for his views on the future of Ukraine’s relations with NATO, Putin dispassionately replied,

• I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day, the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners.

A decade later, under President Medvedev, Russia and NATO were cooperating once again. At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Medvedev declared,

• The period of distance in our relations and claims against each other is over now. We view the future with optimism and will work on developing relations between Russia and NATO in all areas . . . [as they progress toward] a full-fledged partnership.

From the end of the Cold War until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO in Europe was drawing down resources and forces, not building them up. Even while expanding membership, NATO’s military capacity in Europe was much greater in the 1990s than in the 2000s. During this same period, Putin was spending significant resources to modernize and expand Russia’s conventional forces deployed in Europe. The balance of power between NATO and Russia was shifting in favor of Moscow.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/

I'm struggling to think of anything more dumbfoundingly bigoted than thinking the fight for human rights is a 'Western thing'. — Isaac

A 'Western thing' more than in authoritarian regimes like Russian, Chinese, Iranian which are antagonizing the West (indeed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorial_(society)#Persecution). Keep struggling and playing dumb.

Shame not every refugee is equally as 'Ukrainian' — Isaac

You mean that Ukrainians preferring to save their lives over the Africans' are morally on the same level than Russians bombing their "brother" Ukrainians and Africans?

20 Years of Immigrant Abuses — Isaac

That's the West. And also that's the West: Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch).

The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support. — Christoffer

:ok:

The problem isn't really that there will be new nations with nukes, that can be resolved with diplomacy. The biggest problems are broken arrow scenarios in which nukes go missing in the turmoil after Russia collapses. Terrorist organizations could end up with tactical nukes or with knowledge make suitcase bombs out of old bombs. This could become one of the most dangerous terrorist situations in history. — Christoffer

Sure, that too. About this I read a study of 2005 (https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_5.pdf) reporting:
There is great concern that terrorists could obtain nuclear or radiological weapons and
detonate them in a large city. The authors analyse the technical requirements for and obstacles to obtaining such weapons. What difficulties would have to be surmounted?
Could these problems be solved by a terrorist organization without direct support from a State possessing nuclear weapons? The authors conclude that nuclear weapons are most likely out of reach for terrorists. However, radiological weapons may well be used by terrorists in the future. The possible consequences of such an attack are discussed.

Russia will probably collapse in the long run and fracture into smaller nations that want to get out of the national bullshit while healing their relations with the west. — Christoffer

In this case the next foreseeable concern for US/NATO would be - as it was for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the Russian nuclear arsenal (and even nuclear plants) remaining in the hands of ex-Russian sub-states (with all their unresolved border issues) and the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in est/central Asia. Likely even Turkish and Iranian, at least in central Asia.

Then use reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-has-notified-us-about-planned-nuclear-drills-pentagon-2022-10-25/

weird indeed, I just upgraded my firefox version, and still the link doesn't work. :chin:

It looks more shit is coming:

https://news.usni.org/2022/10/18/accelerated-chinese-timeline-to-seize-taiwan-raises-questions-on-pentagon-priorities

https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129652322/ukraine-us-midterm-elections

@jorndoe it depends on the browser: the twitter link still doesn't seem to work on my firefox.

Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it. — Paine

My 2 cents:

• As long as one must address the solution offered by Putin (his non-negotiable demands) to end this war without knowing what the existential threats for the Russians more specifically are, one is left with no other option than to accept or refuse it. If the existential threats for the Russians were stated in more specific terms (like the weapon system available to the Ukrainian army, the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, Russian minorities in Donbas and Crimea, etc.), one could try to propose other solutions which would take into account Russian concerns.
• In international politics, the most super-partes way one could and could have addressed this issue was by means of the UN: like UN supervised referendums (for stronger autonomy if not annexation) in Crimea and Donbas.

Russian National TV:
https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584054018145685504

(Why doesn't the tweet link work?)

If there were both statements and actions that demonstrate it. There were neither before the 2008 summit — Mikie

Again, for the third time, what kind of statements and actions would demonstrate to you an “imperialistic bent”? Statements should be like "Me, Mr. Emperor Putin feel imperialistic bent" and actions should be like


???

Ah, so that's what everyone was secretly thinking, but it was never stated explicitly. And the evidence that would lend them to secretly believe this was what, exactly? — Mikie

Anyway -- you admit it was never stated as a reason. That's a good start, I suppose. — Mikie

Geopolitical strategizing requires anticipating events in medium-long term based on a deep understanding about history, society (people and their leading elites) and geography, not on arbitrarily recent chronology of news and public speeches accessible to any avg dude, like you and me. And it's done behind doors for obvious reasons and without consulting any avg dude, like you and me. They didn’t even consult Mearsheimer, go figure!
The debate over NATO expansion behind doors was complex and nuanced, with a blend of more hawkish and more dovish attitudes toward Russia. But nobody underestimated the “imperialistic bent” of Russia, nor conflated real geopolitical strategizing (affecting the deep state) with current presidents’ preferred posture and official propaganda.

Relatedly, it is important to note that NATO expansion before February 2014 was not aimed at containing Russia. Given the sad state of Russian military power, Moscow was in no position to pursue revanchist policies in eastern Europe. Tellingly, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes that Putin’s seizure of the Crimea was not planned before the crisis broke out in 2014; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In short NATO enlargement was not intended to contain a Russian threat but was instead part of a broader policy to spread the liberal international order into eastern Europe and make the entire continent look like western Europe.

It was only when the Ukraine crisis broke out in February 2014 that the United States and its allies suddenly began describing Putin as a dangerous leader with imperial ambitions and Russia as a serious military threat that had to be contained. What caused this shift? This new rhetoric was designed to serve one essential purpose: to enable the West to blame Putin for the outbreak of trouble in Ukraine. And now that the crisis has turned into a full-scale war, it is imperative to make sure he alone is blamed for this disastrous turn of events. This blame game explains why Putin is now widely portrayed as an imperialist here in the West, even though there is hardly any evidence to support that perspective.


That's exactly right. — Mikie

That’s why you should put aside Mearsheimer for a while, take a deep breath, and start reading Brzeziński.

Feel free to cite any sources at or before the 2008 summit that support your other claim. — Mikie

From:

THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:

Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.


Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :

If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.


"imperialist bent" is meaningless. I said "an imperialist bent on expanding". So do you mean, "What is an imperialist?" I think you know very well what that means. — Mikie

Sure "expanding", also because "an imperialist bent on contracting" doesn't sound right, does it?
I'm asking you what constitutes evidence for "an imperialist bent on expanding". What would prove that concept?

why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008? — Mikie

NATO (very well aware of Russian elites’ anti-NATO dispositions) never planned to take a confrontational attitude toward Russia. Some NATO advisers were prospecting the European Union as way to draw Russia toward a pro-Western attitude.

How do you know there have been no negotiations? Countries contact each other through unofficial, non-public channels all the time. The fact that you claim this implies you have some insight into these. — Tzeentch

No it implies that I couldn't find anything to support otherwise from the available resources.

Second, you blame the Russians for a lack of negotiations (if such a lack there is). Do you not see a clear role for the United States, in the fact that they have made statements and carried out actions that imply they have no desire to negotiate? — Tzeentch

The point I was making is simply that as long as the existential threats are generically formulated, the only thing that remains to address is what Russia demands to restore its sense of security. While if the threat was more specific one could propose solutions (other than the ones proposed by Russia) favorable to Russia.

Excuse me, but you're changing the words. You didn't say "threat," and neither did I. You said "Russian concerns." Your assertion is that "Russian concerns were taken seriously." They were not. — Mikie

Right, I changed the word without realising it and your objection as well as our equivocation are understandable. I can grant you that much. But my claims preserve their value once we deal with the terminological quibble I failed to remove: when concerns are expressed in resentful and intimidatory terms (like NATO expanded despite their promise! Ukraine inside NATO is our red line! An existential threat! Don’t do it otherwise you will regret the consequences! etc.) by a nuclear power claimed to have the second strongest army in the world at the expense of Ukrainians who, coincidentally, were historically oppressed by the Russians. So the expression “Russian concerns” looks to me just as an euphemism for “Russian threats” good for the narrative that presents Russia as a victim.
Besides one should account for the Western (European allies included) caution in providing military support to Ukraine that certainly benefited Russia more than Ukraine.

So it's very strange that suddenly you say you're not interested in what we find "desirable or moral." I'm not interested in it either, which was the point. It doesn't matter if we prefer democracy or authoritarianism -- as you stated. What matters are the actions. We should react the same, not according to what we "prefer" (again, your words). — Mikie

You are conflating objections meant to address different issues. The first one was designed to address your China-Canada alliance thought experiment (where you concluded “How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not”), and it can be rendered like this: take a chess game between D and A. If I know the game enough I can understand how the game is plaid on both sides. Yet I might prefer D to win because D is my beloved brother. So understanding the geopolitical game from both players perspectives, doesn’t commit anybody to impartiality as your China-Canada alliance thought experiment seemed to suggest (if US invaded a China-allied Canada, we wouldn’t excuse it as much as we do not excuse Russia for invading a Western-allied Ukraine, I would - using your terminology not mine - “excuse” the US, I would be biased toward the US, so not impartial, and fine with that).
The second one can be rendered like this: I’m interested in talking about the geopolitical game and moves, not in listening to scores based on how morally attractive you find players' behaviour, even more understandably so after having made clear I have a different moral compass from yours.

That's simply not the case. That wasn't the US's or NATO's position in 2008. I asked what was the Russian threat in 2008 -- because it was in April of 2008 that the Bucharest summit declared that Ukraine and Georgia would be admitted to NATO. Claiming the war in Georgia was a threat, and thus a reason for membership of NATO, is anachronistic. The war in Georgia did not break out until August of 2008. So that claim is nonsense. — Mikie

I wasn’t after a chronological recollection of events, so for me a Russian war in August of 2008 is a Russian threat in 2008. But if you are looking for a chronological recollection of events then wikipedia may help:
Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation in 2000, which had a profound impact on Russo-Georgian relations. The conflict between Russia and Georgia began to escalate in December 2000, when Georgia became the first and sole member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on which the Russian visa regime was enforced. Eduard Kokoity, an alleged member of the mob, became the de facto president of South Ossetia in December 2001; he was endorsed by Russia since he would subvert the peaceful reunification of South Ossetia with Georgia. The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this "passportization" policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories. In 2003, President Putin began to consider the possibility of a military solution to the conflict with Georgia.
After Georgia deported four suspected Russian spies in 2006, Russia began a full-scale diplomatic and economic war against Georgia, followed by the persecution of ethnic Georgians living in Russia.
By 2008, most residents of South Ossetia had obtained Russian passports. According to Reuters, Russia supplied two-thirds of South Ossetia's yearly budget before the war.[74] South Ossetia's de facto government predominantly employed Russian citizens, who had occupied similar government posts in Russia, and Russian officers dominated South Ossetia's security organisations.[75]
[…]
In early March 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia submitted formal requests for their recognition to Russia's parliament shortly after the West's recognition of Kosovo which Russia had been resisting. Dmitry Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, hinted that Georgia's aspiration to become a NATO member would cause Russia to support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian State Duma adopted a resolution on 21 March, in which it called on the President of Russia and the government to consider the recognition.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement

The actions in Chechnya was the threat? Problems there had been occurring for years, internal to Russia. — Mikie

Precisely, the unresolved ethnic tensions within ex-soviet republics were perceivable as a source of political instability and revanchist urges. And the way Russia under Putin handled it in Chechnya provided a precedent for other ex-Soviet Republics’ strategic minds to digest.
There is where the link between NATO and ex-Soviet Republics could have more likely been perceived as beneficial for both sides: “Ethnic conflict in Russia: Implications for the United States” (Jan 2008)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576109308435930?journalCode=uter20

It's quite true that if the US/NATO felt that Russian revanchism was threatening, that this should be taken seriously as well -- even if we believe it unjustified. But that was not the case. Neither the US, nor NATO, believed this was true in 2008. — Mikie

Have you considered the prospect that you are not looking in the right place? Read more Brezinski, if you want to get deeper insight into US/NATO’s strategy.

Sorry, but you simply declaring that one thing is more threatening than another is not interesting. Ask the Russians if they felt it was threatening. It is their opinion that matters, not yours. And they've been quite clear, for over decade.

This distinction between "lethal weapons" and "defensive weapons" is kind of ridiculous. Everything the US has ever done, accordion to them, is "defensive." When we invade Iraq, we're "defending" Iraq. So that's already a sign of repeating propaganda. But think about it for a minute: what do you think "defensive" weapons are? They're all completely non-lethal? So machine guns are for "defense," therefore they can't kill? Are the FGM-148 Javelins simply "defensive"? Because those have been supplied as well. They certainly seem lethal to me. They're called "anti-tank missiles."

Furthermore, "lethal weapons" had already been deployed in Ukraine prior to December. Russia troops had already begun mobilizing at this point as well. — Mikie

You may find ridiculous whatever you want, but there are unquestionable evidences that the history of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations wrt Russian aggression is marked by their reluctance to send lethal weapons to Ukraine (“How successive U.S. administrations resisted arming Ukraine” https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378) because - as it is evident now - the American offensive weaponry would have made the difference on the battlefield. The first package of lethal weapons actually released by the US in Sep 2021, didn't come from Biden’s administration, but from Trump’s administration, and its release was ironically the side effect of the Trump Ukraine scandal, as I said. Knowing from his intel that might have strengthened Putin's resolve to wage war, Biden held the second package of lethal weapons in late December likely as a diplomatic leverage. But it turned out to be too late, it just gave more time to Putin to finalize the military build-up before the war declaration.

Everything that NATO/US does is "defensive" and meant merely as "deterrents." Right. Unfortunately, the Russians see it quite differently. They view anti-tank missiles and military drills with NATO -- including Operation Sea Breeze -- as a threat. — Mikie

As I said, we are in a strategic dilemma whereby every player reads aggressive intentions in others’ deterring moves, so it’s an ineffective argumentative retortion to remind me what I already expressly and repeatedly acknowledged before you ever did. Both rival geopolitical agents can plausibly denounce threats from their opponents and plausibly deny their own threats, especially when there is historical mistrust on top of conflicting strategic interests. But I’m not the one who is clinging that much on “who started first” issue as you seem to do. Nor am I clinging on picturing the US/NATO/Ukraine as a victim of Putin as much you seem to cling on picturing Putin as a victim of US/NATO/Ukraine to show off your moral impartiality.
In any case, acknowledging the strategic dilemma is not enough good reason to refuse the distinction between lethal and defensive weaponry: indeed, even if technically vague or inappropriate, that distinction is understandably related to the type of weaponry that is capable of making a difference in undermining the Russian aggression (here you can find some reactions from Russian officials: https://medium.com/dfrlab/much-ado-about-javelins-525055175d75). In other words, the distinction between lethal/defensive is less related to the nature of geopolitical strategic dilemmas and more to the designed function and operational performance of the weapon systems in strictly military terms.

Retreat from what? — neomac
From NATO expansion. — Mikie

And what does it mean to retreat from NATO expansion (in Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia), if we exclude NATO invasion of Russian territories (from Sovereign States other then Russia and acknowledged as independent by Russia)?

Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats? — neomac
Suddenly evidence is important, and not "myopic"? Interesting.
Putin didn't have evidence, because that's not what Putin was claiming. Putin never claimed NATO wanted to "invade" Russia. Your failure to even minimally understand Russia's position here is telling. — Mikie

Evidence is important for rational assessment of course, “myopic” can be one’s way of assessing it. Now, asking for evidence that triggered support of Ukraine and Georgia NATO membership (as you did) was as legitimate as asking for evidence that triggered Putin anti-NATO reaction. And, as far as I’m concerned, the lesson here is twofold: threat perception is neither always grounded on actual direct threats but also on perceived strategic threats, nor is always voiced in clear/reiterated terms in public speeches (coz even vagueness - like the Russian nuclear threats - or offline diplomacy - like private negotiations e.g. “not one inch” eastward alleged promise - play their role). So e.g. Putin never specified what NATO existential threat is, nor what Russia was supposed to retreat from once Ukraine entered NATO. One can however guess what he might have meant in many ways based on geopolitical and historical considerations, along with experts’ feedback and public news/reports of course: e.g. in the case of Russia concerns about Ukraine threats might be persecution of Russian minorities, the Black sea fleet in Crimea, nuclear or long-range missile systems at the border, weaponry that could frustrate Russian land grab attempts, etc.

I've not once suggested that we let Ukraine "fall prey to Russia." I support US helping Ukrainians defend their country. — Mikie

Encourage and facilitate peace negotiations. The most immediate action would be a ceasefire. — Mikie

Right, where did I hear that already? You are claiming that facilitating peace negotiations and ceasefire can be more effective strategy in helping Ukrainians defend their country and its territorial integrity than by providing NATO membership, military training, or weapons to Ukraine? How so? Where are the evidence to support your claim from within your perspective? The conditions of peace negotiations by the Russians are unacceptable to Ukrainians, that’s why negotiations have failed. And if facilitating peace negotiations means to refuse the military support necessary to possibly conquer back their territorial integrity or preserve what is left, then that fails the strategic objective of helping Ukrainians defend their country. It sounds like saying: surrendering to terrorists' demands is the most effective way to fight terrorism, because if you do what they want they don't fight you back and you live in peace.
Besides once again, you are missing the big picture: the Ukrainian war is of global geopolitical significance, even more understandably so given how Putin framed the war in explicit defiance of the pro-Western global order (you didn’t miss his declarations right?). The US/NATO front while supporting Ukrainians is pursuing its strategic geopolitical goals as any great power is expected to do, because that’s the game I and Mearsheimer are talking about (despite the divergences which remain).

No, I'm not blaming the US and NATO for the war. The US and NATO were primarily responsible for escalating the war. That's a crucial difference. The blame for invasion is Putin's. — Mikie

Then I can’t follow your reasoning. If Putin is claimed to have started a war in response to the US/NATO/Biden administration attitude which didn't take Russian concerns seriously as Putin expected, and you believe this narrative to be enough supported by facts (given your line of reasoning “do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training?”) then the US/NATO/Biden administration conduct is a one major causal factor (along with Putin) in the genesis of the Ukrainian crisis that dragged until beginning 2022 and led to this war. So unless you deny agency to US/NATO/Biden administration you logically have to attribute them some responsibility for the genesis of the war without denying Russian agency in directly starting the war, and if you disapprove of US/NATO/Biden administration conduct then you must consider US/NATO/Biden administration to some extent blameful. Indeed that’s in line with Mearsheimer’s argument in “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault”.

I have indeed mentioned peace. For good reason. — Mikie

Geopolitical reason or moral compass reason? Again I’m interested in listening the first kind of reasons.

It would help if you quoted the entirety of my response:

“Only”? I blame Putin for the war. NATO was a reason given for invasion — one that was given for years, clearly and consistently. The conclusion? That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that.


There is no evidence that the was an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. The answer given is about Crimea as evidence. This has been addressed before as well. — Mikie

No it doesn't help. What is an "imperialist bent"? What kind of evidence proves an "imperialist bent"?

I will just quote Mearsheimer, an expert on these matters, who puts it more succinctly than I could: — Mikie

Mearsheimer hinges on his own version of realism and on what he takes to be evidence for geopolitical theory to be assessed. I find his position problematic for reasons I'm lazy to summarise. I already mentioned a few of them in my earliest posts in this thread. I might add some more later on.

Not only is your premise here false — boethius

What premise is false?

If it was clear to everyone in the West that Ukraine would never join NATO ... then talking about it, giving some little NATO crumbs of equipment and training and so on, has no moral justification, it is purely a provocation to start a war. — boethius

Why would it be clear that Ukraine would never join NATO? Neither NATO open policy nor the Ukrainian willingness to gain its membership, nor the NATO/US administration was against it, but geopolitical concerns were interfering and Ukrainians were well aware of it. One might find this predicament regrettable for the Ukrainians and certain Western reluctance blameful. However your blunt moral accusations suggest a take on world affairs devoid of any realistic geopolitical expectations.

I'm talking about a very specific military threat (i.e. nuclear bombs), not about demilitarization, NATO membership, Ukrainian annexations (Crimea or Donbas). But as far as I know Putin requests didn't focus specifically and primarily on weapon systems, nor clarified what the existential threats those requests were supposed to address.

And precisely because the Americans failed they had to deal with the fact that Cuba was lost under the Russian sphere of influence. The red line was the actual nuclear threat, and the solution was focused on finding an agreement about the nuclear threat. Russia could have proposed the same to the US. But it didn't. And the other lesson here is that "the invasion's defeat solidified Castro's role as a national hero and widened the political division between the two formerly allied countries. It also pushed Cuba closer to the Soviet Union". So Russian attempts at invading Ukraine will likely push Ukraine into Western sphere of influence.

and?

They put their own sailors in harms way and made the ultimatum to the Soviets that if they wanted to keep their nukes in Cuba, then it would be war. — boethius

The US didn't annex parts of Cuba nor obtained Cuban neutrality/Cuban demilitarization/regime change. And US reaction was against an actual nuclear threat.

That he’s an imperialist bent on expanding Russia. That’s wrong. It’s wrong because there’s no evidence supporting it, no matter how often it’s repeated in the media or on this thread. If you think there is evidence, happy to discuss that. — Mikie

I’m responding only for my arguments. If you want to talk about “imperialism”, you better clarify what you mean by it in a way that is clear what you would take as an evidence for the concept to apply, because otherwise we are just quibbling over a terminological issue. See here: “Imperialism is the state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas,[2][3] often through employing hard power (economic and military power), but also soft power (cultural and diplomatic power).” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism)
So America is called “imperialist” (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/05/putin-speech-ukraine-annexation-western-imperialism/) even if they didn’t annex territories while Russia under Putin made 3 annexations (Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk) and subtracted territories to Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Besides Putin’s mission to protect persecuted Russian minorities is a popular pretext common in those who have imperialistic ambitions (https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ethnic-russification-baltics-kazakhstan-soviet/25328281.html).

So pushing for NATO membership by East European countries is an example of taking Russian concerns about NATO enlargement seriously?

“We take your concerns seriously by doing exactly what you’re concerned about.”

I’m not sure you’ve thought this through. You’re meandering into incoherence.

The point stands: the US and NATO did not take Russian concerns seriously — as was demonstrated above[/]. — Mikie

That’s why you are blaming also US/NATO for this war, right?

Either way, if pushing for NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc., is “taking Russian concerns seriously,” as you asserted, then the assertion is indeed baseless and wrong. If their concerns were taken seriously, these actions wouldn’t have been taken. — Mikie

Taking a threat seriously means that one should not ignore the threat, but it doesn’t imply a specific course of action in response to that threat. If a mafia mobster goes to some business reclaiming his "pizzo", and the business owner manages to call the police to rescue himself instead of paying the mobster that doesn’t mean that the business owner didn’t take the threat seriously, on the contrary he did, that’s why he called the police. The points I was making with my comment were: first, we shouldn’t cling on the conflation between threat and expected response when we talk about “Taking Russian threat seriously” which has no other use than serving Putin’s narrative and therefore it prevents us from seeing US/NATO response as a deterring strategy (indeed, deterrence makes perfect sense against perceived serious threats!). Besides if NATO/US didn’t take Putin seriously, then also Putin didn’t take seriously “NATO membership, supplying weapons and military training, etc.” because if he did, he would have felt deterred.
Secondly, the Western response is mired in unresolved tensions between hardliners and softliners (since Obama, Westerners could have sent lethal weapons to Ukraine in greater stock much earlier than they did), while Putin response doesn’t suffer from comparable obstacles. And this observation is pertinent and non-negligible in a geopolitical perspective.

I prefer living in the US over living in Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq was still wrong.

Even if Russia were a democracy, the war is wrong. The US ignoring the Russian concerns and contributing to escalating the crisis is also wrong. — Mikie

So what? I’m more interested in testing the rationality of our expectations not in what we find desirable or moral. If all you have to offer is a list of scores based on your moral compass or desiderata, you are not intellectually challenging to me.

What was the Russian threat in 2008, exactly?

Attempting to reduce all of this to “both sides have an opinion, so there’s really no way to tell” is a cop-out and is quite convenient, as it relieves you of having to learn about it. — Mikie

I answered that already. In geopolitics, there are not only imminent military threats but also long term strategic threats [1]: nationalist revanchism was the most serious threat that Europe could think of after 2 WWs, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia. This was already enough to alarm the West and the ex-soviet union countries (including Ukrainians who have a long history of nationalist tensions with Russia). That’s why NATO enlargement was welcomed by ex-Soviet republics and not the result of military occupation and annexation by NATO, you know.
Additionally your myopic demands for evidence fails to take into account the initial assumption of my geopolitical reasoning: “You candidly admit that Putin’s perception of the threat was honestly felt (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s not justified) , but that’s pointless to the extent that all geopolitical agents (not only Russia) as geopolitical agent reason strategically. And strategic reasoning comprises threat perception, signalling and management , so if one must acknowledge that Putin/Russia felt threatened by US/NATO (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified), then one must acknowledge that also US/NATO/Ukraine can feel threatened by Putin/Russia (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified).”. So US/NATO felt Putin and the rising of Russian revanchism honestly threatening, even if, ex hypothesis, it wasn’t justified. Period.

"Real intentions"? Again, let's stop simply declaring the "real intentions" of the US or Putin, and look at the facts. From the summit communiqué in June 2021 to the Joint Statement in September 2021 to the statements by Blinken in December (after Russia made clear demands about NATO) -- the words were consistent. What about the actions? Well, not only weapons were provided, but extensive military training, including with NATO forces. — Mikie

You are missing the fact that Biden froze the procurement of lethal weapons by the end of 2021 (https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/appeals-ukraine-biden-admin-holds-back-additional-military-aid-kyiv-di-rcna8421) which were a more serious threat for Putin’s war machine than military training, defensive weapons and NATO promises. And again: NATO/US military support to Ukraine was meant as a deterrent (however weak), not as a buildup for a Russian invasion (here is another proof of concept: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/06/us/ukraine-war-missile.html).

10 thousand trained troops a year (Obama), Trump supplying "defensive weapons," and Biden's long-held and continued hawkishness toward Russia (including what I've already gone over) -- hardly what you describe. — Mikie

Again you are forgetting the issue of the lethal weapons. Not training, not NATO expansion, not defensive weapons, not the hawkish claims were the serious threat, otherwise Putin would have started his special operation much earlier. The serious military threat was the offensive weapon system provided to the Ukrainians against Putin’s expansionist ambitions.

Also in December, Putin said: “what they are doing, or trying or planning to do in Ukraine, is not happening thousands of kilometers away from our national border. It is on the doorstep of our house. They must understand that we simply have nowhere further to retreat to. Do they really think we do not see these threats? Or do they think that we will just stand idly watching threats to Russia emerge?” — Mikie

Retreat from what? Did Putin have evidence that Ukraine or NATO wanted to invade Russia? Or are we always talking about perceived strategic threats?
You keep presenting facts according to the Russian perspective but you didn’t explain yet why the West should act according to Putin’s way of framing the issue and related demands (NATO membership, no military training, no weapons for Ukraine) while letting Ukraine fall prey to Russia. How is that right? If Russia did something wrong in invading Ukraine according to your moral compass, what do you think it’s sensible to do about it? Besides you even claimed “So you don't believe Putin. Understood. I don't blame anyone for that. I don't blame anyone for not believing American presidents when they say things either. I think we should be very skeptical”, so what’s the point of objecting that the West didn’t take Putin’s demands the way he expected ?

Based on the statements and actions by the US and NATO, it's quite clear they weren't "naked and powerless," nor did Russia see it that way.

So this is another baseless assertion. — Mikie

If Putin must be treated as a rational agent, then Putin couldn’t possibly start a military confrontation with a non-aggressive competitor against which, ex-hypothesis, he believed having no chance or little chance of winning. If Putin is a rational agent, we must assume he acted according to some rational expectations appropriate for those circumstances: namely, he believed to have a serious chance to get what he wanted and NATO/US couldn’t really deter him, so that he could plausibly claim to have won a war against the West, because that’s how his propaganda keeps framing the war. And even now that the military performance of Russia proved to be so poor on the battle field, Russia keeps escalating, mobilising people, threatening to go nuclear and celebrating his trophies (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63052207). What matters here, it’s not if he “really” wins but if his victory claims based on his military achievements sound convincing enough to destabilise the cohesion of the Western alliance, draw on his side resources and commitments from his anti-Western valuable allies and therefore inflict a big geopolitical blow on Western hegemony.

So here we stand:

• You are blaming also US/NATO for this war in Ukraine
• You do not ground your judgement based on geopolitical strategic concerns, only on your cute moral compass (honesty, impartiality, peace&lovefulness)

[1]
And one wants to assess strategic threats, then one has to reason like Mearsheimer's here:
The only way to predict how a rising China is likely to behave toward its neighbors as well as the United States is with a theory of great-power politics. The main reason for relying on theory is that we have no facts about the future, because it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we have no choice but to rely on theories to determine what is likely to transpire in world politics.
https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

No. I never said the US or NATO should be blamed for the war. Putin is to blame for the war. Why? Because it was his decision to invade Ukraine. I think it’s on par with the US invasion of Iraq. — Mikie

* I’m not blaming the US or NATO. — Mikie

I didn’t mean that you were blaming this war only on US/NATO. But as your line of reasoning goes (“do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training?”), US/NATO expansion and meddling in Ukraine provoked Putin’s “special operation”, and therefore “US/NATO is to be blamed for the beginning of the war” where “beginning of the war” is Putin launching his “special operation”.
Indeed, that’s the kind of premise that Mearsheimer holds (along with his type of geopolitical realism) to support his controversial claim : “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”.
And if you are not claiming that what is your point in asking me that question?

the Russian concerns for NATO enlargement precede Putin and have been taken seriously — neomac

This is an assertion. Where’s the evidence? Pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc., all why Russia was repeatedly calling it a red line (acknowledged by allies, experts, and our CIA as threatening and provocative) — is all that taking it seriously? — Mikie

“Taking seriously” means different things for different geopolitical actors depending on their strategy: for Russia it meant that the West should provide security assurance and of course “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” are the opposite of security assurance for Putin. For Germany it meant boycott any attempt to have Ukraine joining NATO (which is in line with Putin’s security assurance). For East-European countries (including Ukraine) it meant “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” because they needed security assurance from the US against the Russian revanchist threat!
Yet one can argue that Russian’s threats have been addressed the way Russia preferred to some extent by the West, proof of that is not only prominent Western allies' reluctance to welcome Ukraine candidature for NATO membership but also the many ways in which the US administrations avoided sending “lethal weapons” to Ukraine (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/obama-trump-biden-ukraine-military-aid-1.6371378). The irony in this is that, as far as I’ve understood, the first aid package including lethal weapons that was actually released for Ukraine came from Putin’s old sport Donald Trump after the Trump–Ukraine scandal came out (where the Trump–Ukraine scandal consisted roughly in Trump pressuring Ukraine to compromise Biden in exchange for lethal weapons!).
What I find particularly misleading in your claim is your “acknowledged by allies, experts, and our CIA as threatening and provocative” because the understatement is that since allies and some experts were against threatening and provoking Russia by “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” then those moves were illegitimate. But that’s a biased view, indeed one could as easily claim that other allies, other experts and other pentagon representatives were “pushing for NATO membership (up to and including the 2021 NATO summit), supplying weapons, conducting military drills, providing extensive training, etc.,” with the intent not to provoke but to deter Russia!
In other words, we are facing here a security dilemma: while we can argue that NATO had no malign intentions against Russia (just legitimate security concerns) as plausibly as we can argue that Russia had no malign intentions against the West (just legitimate security concerns), it may certainly be the case the case that each side reads hostile intentions into the other’s actions, probably due to deep-rooted/historical mistrust! That’s why it’s a hopeless exercise to take any side to admit having been the first one to start the escalation.

How would that scenario play out? Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not. But it shouldn’t come as a shock. Nor should we invent stories about how the US President’s “real” motive is to conquer all of the Western Hemisphere. — Mikie

Again this example seems inspired by Mearsheimer’s article “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” [2]. The problem is that there Mearsheimer was just talking about threat perception and intolerance signaling between state powers, and this was meant to prove the concept of “legitimate security concerns” (as opposed to imperialistic ambitions) in the case of Russia. No great power tolerates threats at their doorstep, fine hence my concession earlier (when I said I don’t deny “the fact that Putin’s concerns bear some strategic plausibility (having US/NATO so close to the Russian borders was too risky, even if NATO is a self-proclaimed defensive alliance)”). However there are 2 problems in the way you rendered Mearsheimer’s example: 1. I find your rhetorical question (“Would we therefore EXCUSE the US for invading Canada? Of course not”) controversial. If state A threatens state B in its proximity or state A invades state B, I could react differently depending on which state is democratic or authoritarian, because I prefer democracy over authoritarian regimes. 2. I find the reference to “President’s ‘real’ motive” highly misleading in the case of Putin for the following reasons: A) Putin’s ambition to challenge the Western world order is declared and perfectly in line with Russian revanchism (so Putin is not simply talking of having a buffer state, and the so far annexed territories aren’t a buffer state anyways!), B) Putin’s military-economically-ideologically projection outside Russian borders in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, Mediterranean, Baltic and Artic proves his ambition to expand the Russian sphere of influence on a global scale C) Putin’s real motives pre-existed him (revanchist nationalist ambitions aren’t an invention of Putin) and might last after him (even if Putin is deposed, whoever will replace him can end up being like him, strive to achieve what Putin couldn’t), and be inspiration for others (challenging the West is a study case for other potential Western challengers like China and Iran). So the geopolitical relevance of his actions and claims go beyond his personal motivations.

I wouldn’t have predicted an exact date, of course, but things had escalated in 2021 after Biden took over. The Biden administration made it quite clear what its intentions were. So from the statements by NATO in June of 2021, to the joint statement by the White House on September 1st, to statements made by Blinken in December ‘21 and January ‘22 — yes, there was a shift. It wasn’t out of the blu — Mikie

Even in this case, I'm still looking after a bigger picture:

• That’s why I keep an eye on what is done, not only on what is said (BTW Putin said he would increase “support” to the military occupied area of Dunbas in late 2020): on one side we have Putin that maintains his military control over occupied Eastern Ukrainian territories, signals escalating intentions early after Biden started his presidency in January 2021 [3] on the other we have Biden freezing by the end of 2021 his own procurement of lethal weapons (despite having declared his willingness to send lethal weapons to Ukraine) and making de-escalating claims (“Biden says the US won't put troops on the ground even if Russia invades Ukraine”), under the pressure of many who wanted him to de-escalate with Putin. So, Biden administration’s real intentions do not necessarily match with their declared intentions. And Biden’s hesitation vs Putin’s determination must be acknowledged.
• Additionally what I care most it's not the beginning of the war as a function of its military deployment per se, but its broader geopolitical significance: in 2021 Putin was already de facto military-occupying and Russifying people in Donetsk and Luhansk regions for 7 years (under Obama’s and Trump’s watch). Given Obama’s soft approach, Trump’s complicity, Biden administration’s hesitation, the success in annexing Crimea, no real deterring counterpart to his military buildup strategy in Donbas, the Russian intel assuring him about the likely success of a blitzkrieg (leaving de facto no time even for the procurement of lethal weapons), the prospect of doing all this without mobilising the Russian population, plus all kinds of pretexts that even the Western public opinion was so passionately ready to acknowledge, one can’t possibly fail to see why Putin must very likely have felt that the times were propitious and US/NATO couldn’t really do anything about it. So finally the US/NATO king was naked, powerless!

[1] My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931


[2]
After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington i! China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider
the expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia—a message that the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also made crystal clear.

https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf


[3]
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/world/europe/russia-open-skies-treaty-biden.html
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/kremlin-tv-chief-russia-must-annex-east-ukraine/
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-russian-military-escalation-around-ukraines-donbas

The issue is whether or not it's true, and to weigh alternative explanations against the evidence. I've done so, and I'm of the opinion that Putin wasn't lying about Russia believing NATO involvement in Ukraine was a threat. Please note -- and this is very important -- that this doesn't mean it actually WAS a threat -- simply that he actually believed it. After saying so consistently for 14 years -- reiterated by others in the Russian government, by experts, by foreign leaders (including Angela Merkel), we should at least consider the possibility that he really believed it. — “Mikie

You are convinced that the issue is whether or not Putin is lying b/c probably your line of reasoning looks something like this: since Putin honestly believed and repeatedly declared that US/NATO expansion was a threat (no matter if it really was) and US/NATO kept provoking Russia, then the US/NATO should be blamed for the beginning of this war. And since the US/NATO is to be blamed for the beginning of the war, then it has to both take the negotiation initiative and make all the necessary concessions to restore Putin’s sense of security. This is what can be done to reach peace, and peace is what we all should pursue. And if I don’t acknowledge the validity and truthfulness of this reasoning it’s because I’m biased or fell for the lies spread by the US/NATO propaganda, like the Western noble/harmless intention of supporting Ukraine, or Putin is Hitler’s reincarnation. And if I try to talk about something else, I’m missing the point.
Now, I’ve heard this argument several times on this thread. But it’s not here that I’ve heard it (or at least the first part of it) for the first time, since I’m very much interested in geopolitics and knew Mearsheimer’s views (often reported as a source for such arguments) well enough prior to even reading posts in this thread.
However, if that’s your line of reasoning and that’s all you’ve got to question my views, then you totally missed the target. Indeed, read carefully, I do not question the plausibility of your premises (Putin warned the US/NATO several times and he should have been taken seriously) nor the conclusion you care so much about (the US/NATO provoked Russia into this war) nor the fact that many experts blamed the US/NATO enlargement for that reason (after all, if the US/NATO didn’t provoke Russia, Russia wouldn’t have felt pushed to wage war) nor the fact that Putin’s concerns bear some strategic plausibility (having US/NATO so close to the Russian borders was too risky, even if NATO is a self-proclaimed defensive alliance). What I question is the idea that that’s all there is to say: on the contrary, until all these points are properly understood in geopolitics terms, as precondition to form rational expectations about geopolitical agents (i.e. Russia, Ukraine, US, NATO, etc.), your line of reasoning is deeply misleading. Here is why:

• You are analysing historical events as a function of 2 results: peace (which you like) and war (which you do not like). Now in geopolitics the endgame is neither peace nor war, it’s power (even for Mearsheimer!!!), so what one should expect from geopolitical agents (US/NATO or Russia) is a course of action that in given circumstances is, at least, perceived to maximise power or minimise loss of power (so peace and war must be assessed as a function of power)
• You candidly admit that Putin’s perception of the threat was honestly felt (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s not justified), but that’s pointless to the extent that all geopolitical agents (not only Russia) as geopolitical agent reason strategically. And strategic reasoning comprises threat perception, signalling and management , so if one must acknowledge that Putin/Russia felt threatened by US/NATO (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified), then one must acknowledge that also US/NATO/Ukraine can feel threatened by Putin/Russia (even if, ex hypothesis, it’s unjustified).
• You are claiming that Putin warned the West so many times since 2008, suggesting the idea that US/NATO didn’t take him seriously, but you are completely wrong: the Russian concerns for NATO enlargement precede Putin and have been taken seriously very early since the collapse of Soviet Union [1], and even more so with Putin since 2008 [2] (hope you know who Brzezinski is!). Russian revanchist nationalism after soviet era and concerns for NATO's presence in Europe were among the motivations of NATO expansionism.
• Your analysis doesn’t offer any relevant insights about the timing of Putin’s decision to wage war against Ukraine. This would allow a better assessment of Putin’s posture wrt alleged US/NATO threat. If US/NATO were warned for such a long time and Putin felt repeatedly provoked by US/NATO meddling in Ukraine, why did he wait so long to wage war against Ukraine? Or why didn’t he wait longer? After all Ukrainians’ NATO membership wasn’t imminent? From a geopolitical point of view, the timing of Putin’s gamble is clear: US/NATO was perceived at its weakest point! Indeed, EU was deeply divided (conflicting national interests, populist movements, Brexit), France was declaring NATO brain-dead, Germany was economically deeply dependent on Russia and reluctant to invest for its security or to confront Russia (e.g. by welcoming Ukraine inside NATO), the US was on the brink of a civil war, focused on the long term challenge against China, tired of an endless war against terrorism (which ended badly in Afghanistan), tempted by the isolationist siren songs, and led by a senile president while other global problems (pandemic, recession, climate change) seemed deplete whatever Western residual reactivity. Add to that A) Putin’s successful military operations within Russia (against Chechens and Georgians), in the middle east and in Africa, and most of all the easy-peasy annexation of Crimea. B) The success of the pro-Russian propaganda at home and in the West (with the support of western populist movements) C) the strong economic ties or partnerships in Asia and the rest of the world. All winds were blowing in the right directions. D) Russian intel convinced him he could obtain regime change in Ukraine in one week or so, the Americans too didn’t expect the Ukrainian would have resisted as they did (Biden even expressly said the US won't put troops on the ground even if Russia invades Ukraine!), and Zelensky didn’t even believe Putin could really start a war (bombing and invading a brother country?!). E) He didn’t even need to sacrifice Russians (ethnic minorities and mercenaries would have been enough for a blitzkrieg). Putin’s conclusion: so let’s go for it, fellas, because US/NATO is reeeeeeeeally threatening, but… well not to the point of scaring me, head of the most nuclear power state with the second strongest army on Earth, out of waging war against little Ukraine, not now anyways, so better to profit, right? And since the US/NATO power is declining, let's even make everybody clear that that's a New World Order challenge led by Russia (that's how much he felt threatened by US/NATO you know!). Implication: what does that mean if Putin succeeds? That indeed US/NATO is weak and incapable to deter, right? Right China? Right Iran? Right ISIS terrorists? Right European populist movements? Right anti-Western-Capitalist-Colonialist-Multinationals-Freemason-Zionist activists? Right MAGA activists? Coz that's why Putin wanted so badly to brand his reasons for this war on world stage. Punish the West and take everybody else hostile to the West on board to punish the West naked king. Now that’s roughly, what is at stake from a geopolitical perspective, and your narrow-minded blaming game totally fails to acknowledge.

A last remark: WE ALL (me and you included) are in the same predicament here. Despite our best intentions and the best of our knowledge, we must deal with the prospect that our claims may very well be or sound instrumental to some evil propaganda as well as indirectly complicit to past/present/future crimes of evil forces. So don’t waste your time convincing me that I’m a dumb partisan while you are an enlightened impartial observer, just because you want peace&love for everybody and everybody for peace&love.


[1]
Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO impact Russian interests?
Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that reason as well.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/html/CHRG-105shrg46832.htm

[2]
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq08springbrzezinski.pdf

Notice I don't condemn the US for helping Ukraine defend itself from invasion -- or Germany, or Britain. If I pick a side, I pick the side of the Ukrainian people being murdered and displaced. No question. I’m against war, nuclear weapons, NATO, the Warsaw Pact (when it existed), etc. — Mikie

There is a deep-rooted assumption here that we have to clarify beforehand. You seem to take your claim in bold as a justification of your other claims. If so, your political view seems matter of establishing what you want (e.g. rights) and are against (e.g. war), and then keep condemning left and right to get as much as possible in compliance to your preferences. For me, this is not the most rational political attitude, because it sounds like me wanting pizza and being against calories, and then condemning the government until they oblige the pizza chefs give me the pizza I like with zero calories without ever wondering if my request makes even sense. So the political attitude I find more rational is trying to understand better what can be done by the government, and then push for my demands.

However, the issue here isn't one of slavery. It's one of geopolitics. — Mikie

I disagree. Here is a definition of geopolitics: “Geopolitics is the study of the effects of Earth's geography (human and physical) on politics and international relations. While geopolitics usually refers to countries and relations between them, it may also focus on two other kinds of states: de facto independent states with limited international recognition and relations between sub-national geopolitical entities, such as the federated states that make up a federation, confederation or a quasi-federal system.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geopolitics)
So the struggle between federal government and confederate states wanting to secede, is matter of geopolitics and abolition of slavery is what avg people with progressive views could see cashing out from this bloody war.

But let me ask you: do you think Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training? I'm pretty sure you do think he would have. Fine. — Mikie

No I don’t claim that Putin would have annexed Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine had the US not (1) pushed for NATO membership, (2) supplied weapons, and (3) conducted military training. I just claim that if Putin wanted to annex Crimea and/or invaded Ukraine, he would have done this with whatever pretext. More about this below…

So what would be the rationale for doing so? To win back the territory of the Soviet Union? Putin himself said he thought it was a stupid idea. But what evidence convinces you of it? — Mikie

But why expand NATO, if Russia was so different then? It was NATO's goal to be the balance against the Soviet Union, so when it fell, why keep it around? What's the threat? — Manuel

You guys are missing 3 key points in the history of NATO expansion:

• The role of countries in western and eastern Europe: it’s not like the US just wanted to expand and puff it expanded, against everybody else’s will and for free. Western and eastern European countries welcomed the preservation and expansion of the US security umbrella as well as the market integration that would have allowed for their national security concerns and economy benefits. Western Europeans’ security concern was more focused on Germany, Central Europeans’ security concern could be focused on either Germany or Russia while Eastern Europeans’ was more focused on Russia (if not other neighbouring countries). So the implicit win-win bargain for European countries to the US was roughly something like: you give me security and I’ll give you an integrated/peaceful market for your products and technology.
• The threats ensuing from the collapse of Soviet Union: there is a load of literature since the early 90’s talking about the resurgence of revanchist nationalism movements in ex-Soviet republics, with Russia on top of all of them, and notice that the incentives for the rising of local revanchist nationalist movements were present prior to the collapse of soviet union given how the central Soviet Russian government treated its republics (like Ukraine). Yugoslavia was the clearest evidence of such threats before this war.
• The geopolitical gamble the US took with the globalisation: the implicit bargain the US offered to the Rest of the world was roughly something like the European countries proposed to the US, namely “let’s form a global market for everybody’s prosperity in exchange for global security assurance”. After ~30 years of trying to make this work the US concluded that some ambitious regional powers (e.g. China, Russia, Iran) instead of improving standard of life and regime of rights for their people with the resources available thanks to the globalisation (peaceful and convergent with western progressive views), they were growing more authoritarian, more sympathetic toward anti-western propaganda (if they weren't already, and exporting it also into western countries), more assertive (in economic-military terms) outside their borders and naturally converging into a front hostile to the West. And that's the opposite of security assurance. So Ukraine turned out to be willingly or unwillingly the plausible key test for the US to revise their security strategy both in Europe and on a global scale and address the threats coming from powerful authoritarian anti-Western regimes before it was too late.

:up:

One can enjoy the hard-fought rights of the US — freedom of speech, for example — and still recognize the awful foreign policy of the government.
I condemn Putin for this war, and I also condemn my government for its actions leading up to it. This idea of “picking a side” is strange. — Mikie

It’s like me saying: I can enjoy pizza and still recognise the awful amount of calories it contains. In other words, there might be a strong link between a regime of human rights under a certain government and the awful foreign policy of that government which is undeniably hard to swallow once you realise it.

BTW the abolition of slavery in the US was the result of bloody civil war where, one could argue, Confederates were provoked into war by the federal government: indeed, many Southern leaders had threatened secession if the Republican candidate, Lincoln, won the 1860 election. After Lincoln won, many Southern leaders felt that disunion was their only option, fearing that the loss of representation would hamper their ability to promote pro-slavery acts and policies (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_War). Now I imagine somebody like you at that time saying: “I condemn the Confederates for this war, and I also condemn my federal government for its actions leading up to it. This idea of ‘picking a side’ is strange”.

:up: