Yeah, but which g/G? Truisms but red herrings. The "divine predicates" ("revealed" in sacred scriptures) entail claims about the world which can be investigated and falsified Where theism is noncognitive, g/G need not exist to warrant belief in g/G. (vide Don Cupitt, Paul Tillich, Ludwig Feuerbach, Immanuel Kant, et al).

The rest of your post ... :roll: — 180 Proof

Excellent! So, you're saying there are 3 things at play:

1. G/g exists/not
2. Belief in G/g [Theism/atheism]
3. Claims about the world that can be verified/disconfirmed, allowing us to make a rational decision regarding theism/atheism.

3 has a direct bearing on 2 because 2 is ultimately a claim to knowledge and thus needs justification (3). It feels almost like you want to draw attention to the epistemological aspectz (belief, justification) and away from the metaphysical ones (G/g exists/not) of religion. Am I right?

have you ever met a Parisian? — Tom Storm

Aaah! Paris! [...] I think you'll find the view over here rather spectacular — Mr. Hyde

the question is whether theism is true or not true (and N O T "whether or not (which g/G?!) exists")? — 180 Proof

This appears self-contradictory. Theism is true iff G/g exists and false iff G/g doesn't exist. It doesn't seem possible to separate them in any meaningful way to allow duscussion of one independent of the other. If my track record is any indication of my having got this right, I'd tell myself, "try again."

I can't think (failure of imagination?) of what better evidence there could be of the "supernatural" than the natural world itself which is purportedly affected by a "deity"; such affects cannot, even in principle, be explained as natural occurrences or explained away as misrecognitions / frauds, but only accounted for as uniquely inexplicable exceptions to, or arbitrary violations of, (at least known) natural laws – that is, "divine fiats" as "revealed" in sacred scriptures as signs ("miracles") of a theistic (e.g. "Abrahamic") deity. Theism cannot be true without such truth-making evidence, can it? And lacking evidence in the natural world entailed by theism, (1) this entails that theism is untrue and, (2) therefore, that agnosticism does not obtain. — 180 Proof

This has left me scratching my head for a long time. There seems to be two, what appears to be, mutually incompatible standpoints on the matter of the so-called natural order (the laws of the universe) vis-à-vis alleged miracles.

On the one hand, we have religious scientists, one being Isaac Newton, who were/are of the opinion that all they were/are doing amounted to deciphering God's will by discovering how the natural order was effected (the laws of nature).

On the other hand, there are non-scientists but of the faith who are not in the least bit impressed by the natural order and have gone on record demanding only suspensions/violations of the natural order [miracles] as sufficient warrant to infer a deity.

What's up with that?

Sorry for bundling the two of you together but I need to bounce something off of you guys.

There seems to be something terribly amiss insofar as I'm concerned about what we mean by real. Ask any person, any person at all, and real = physical. This belief that real is simply a synonym for physical is a deeply entrenched belief, one that in all likelihood develops early on in one's infancy, reinforced as it were as we encounter the "real" :chin: as we live our lives and as the final line of a proof for the physicality of realness, we die, never to be seen again by anyone. QED.

However, the problem, if it's one, is that just because we live in what appears to be a physical world, just because we die in it with a finality that seems irreversible, doesn't actually provide sufficient warrant that everything is physical. It would be like a person who spends faer entire life in, say, Paris and forms the belief that Paris = The universe. A frog in a little pond kinda situation [the frog believes, erroneously, that the little pond it lives in is the universe itself].

I may have bitten off more than I can chew.

Does E=mc2 prove materialism false? — Pop

@Wayfarer

:clap:

E = energy
m = mass
c = speed of light

Materialism: all that's real is matter & energy. E, and also m. What are we left with? The speed of light (c). Speed of light = 300,000,000 m/s

I have a mass of about 70 kg.

That means, I have an energy E = 70 kg × 300,000,000 m/s × 300,000,000 m/s = 6.3 × 10^18 Joules.

More germane to the claim that E = mc² disproves materialism is c² = E/m = [6.38 × 10^18 Joules]/[70 kg].

We, each one of us, are in some sense the speed of light squared (c²). Speed is neither matter nor energy. Materialism, to that extent, must be false.

Imagine, we have two flashlights perpendicular each other. We set our stopwatches and switch both flashlights on simultaneously. At 1 second, the light from the flashlights would've traversed 300,000,000 meters in their respecitive directions (90 degrees to each other). c² = the area of the space, a square with sides 300,000,000 meters. We are space and all of us are the exact same square (Hurrah! for equality) in space. What does materialism have to do with space?

Just thought I might add my own crazy thoughts to the lively ongoing discussion. It's not like it's going to make things even weirder.

One word for all hardcore science fans out there - contradiction. If it ever happens that we find one (a contradiction), all bets are off.

Suppose a contradiction is observed in reality (wave-particle duality? Schrodinger's cat?). That would immediately close off all avenues to a theory of everything (TOE) because a TOE must entail the contradiction but if it does, it's necessarily false.

1.TOE -> Contradiction
2. ~Contradiction [Contradictions are false]
Ergo,
3. ~TOE [the proposed TOE is false]

A coupla ways to handle the situation,

a) The contradiction is not a true contradiction i.e. for instance, the wave-particle duality isn't one or Schrodinger's cat isn't both dead and alive, etc.

One reason why ancient philosophers failed to find the TRUTH seems to be the difficulty posed by so-called opposites. They couldn't understand, lacked the tools to make sense of reality e.g. that hot and cold were actually heat energy at varying levels. The apparent contradiction heat-cold prevented philosophers back then from constructing what would've been a TOE (the TRUTH) albeit just the first and therefore necessarily flawed. This fact, if it's one, is reflected in Lao Tzu's teachings which, whatever else it might be, discourages, frowns upon, has a dim view of generalization, the core essence of what a TOE should be.

b) Adopt alternative logics like paraconsistent logic and dialetheism of which I know too little about to comment sensibly.

Cheers!

To
. . .know of the improbability. . .
— TheMadFool
of a proposition is to admit uncertainty and thus take an agnostic position.

I find theology uninteresting, I reference agnosticism in a much broader scope. I am almost entirely uninterested in whether or not there is a god. Would you care to challenge the argument? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

There are two ways of looking at possibility and they are,

1. Nonmathematically: Suppose I roll a die that has two 6's instead of one 6 like standard issue dice. It's possible to get either, say, a 1 or a 6. That's all we can know without math and if you were asked to bet in a game that depends on rolling a 1 or a 6, you wouldn't be able to make a decision because all you know is that both 1 and 6 are possible

2. Mathematically (Probability math): The probability of getting a 6 is 2/6 = 1/3. The probability of getting a 1 is 1/6. We know 1/3 > 1/6 i.e. the odds of rolling a 6 is greater than that of rolling a 1. Imagine now that you're asked to play a game of chance based on whether you roll a 1 or a 6. Since you now know getting a 6 is more likely than getting a 1, you can make a sound decision how to best spend your money, assuming gambling is a good way to spend your money.


Note: Once you know or can find out the mathematical probability of an event X, it would be unwise/irrational for you to act in ways that ignore that piece of information.

We know that God is possible according to agnostics but "what is the mathematical probability that God exists?" is the question whose answer can help us make the best possible decision in re adopting theism or atheism.

However, it's one thing to say the issue can be put to rest with a calculation and another to actually calculate it. I'm going to respond to this with the standard reply of a British railway information officer when asked for information, "well, don't ask me!"

Make what you want of what I said. Sorry, I've reached the perimeter of what I know think I know.

I've no interest in persuading you or anyone of anything (that's sophistry) — 180 Proof

:fire:

I'll need some time to process :starstruck: that. Thanks. Until next time... :smile:

I should not doubt or question. — Jack Cummins

Delphic Maxims

1. Know thyself [Atman - Brahman]
2. Nothing in excess [Golden mean, Madhyamaka]
3. Surety brings ruin [Skepticism/Doubt]

I'll talk about 1 and 2 as they seem relevant.

In a certain broad sense, every person is like a miniature model with approximate or even perfect 1-to-1 correspondence with the universe itself. We can look at ourselves as a perfect scaled-down copy of the totality of the cosmos. That being so, to "know thyself" is to know the universe itself. I suppose what reality is can be found along the way on your journey to self-discovery. Perhaps, reality, if one assiduously removes all that which can be doubted, essentially boils down to Descartes' cogito ergo sum.

More or less. The map-territory metaphor (A. Korzybski) refers to abstracting information from the world in order to make predictions about the world. To say "map = territory" (e.g. a "ToE") is to say "use the world itself to make predictions about the world" which, in other words, means watch the world unfold as it will in order to find out what happens – no predictions at all. A "Theory of Everything" is conceptually incoherent when taken literally (K. Popper), which is why I call it a ironic misnomer like the "Big Bang" or the "God Particle". Yeah, it's been widely adopted even by scientists, which is unfortunate and, IMO, philosophically naive. — 180 Proof

There's something fundamentally wrong about map = territory because then there's no map. The whole point of mapping, conceptually modeling the world is to get our hands on a map that aids the navigation of the territory and this requires that the map to be distinct from the territory i.e. they must retain different identities based on how each is defined. If map = territory, it implies, I just realized, for whomsoever this is true, that this rather unfortunate (fortunate?) person actually doesn't have a map and thus "...watch the world unfold as it will in order to find out what happens..."

A TOE would be, in re the map-territory metaphor, one that would have, like you said, a 1-to-1 corrrespondence with reality, all that's in it and all that happens in it. The problem would be that such a map would be impossible if ever there are contradictions. The TOE in question, if it is a TOE, entails a contradiction and if it does, it necessarily is false. Now I get why mathematicians are scared silly by contradictions; it implies their axioms are inconsistent i.e. one/more of them are false.

The question is, what if the territory - the world - does have contradictions? Do we discard classical logic which collapses under the weight of a single contradiction? If the answer is no, by token of ex falso quodlibet, the map is no longer of any use for then "everything is true".

Rambling here. Would appreciate your input. Thanks.

Re: To All ... Interesting but irrelevant, even incoherent, because you're overthinking a quote that does not refer to what's actually being pursued in fundamental physics. Popper's caveat, after all, is only philosophical, and has nothing to do with whether or not a "ToE" is falsifiable. Reread me and others. — 180 Proof

You know, people's minds seems to be like containers, their shapes, sizes, capacity, so on are determined by how much they know (and don't know), their overall attitude, their experiences, etc. When someone gives faer point of view on an issue, like this one - Popper's statement, naturally that what the fingers type would be a reflection of the "container" which held the issue, the mind that processed the data. Take my opinion on the issue as idiosyncratic at best or foolishness at worst. I'm responding to "...even incoherent..." I have a lot to learn (so little time). :smile:

"Explains everything" is the maximal, complete, 1-to-1 map of the territory, which is merely the terrority itself, and useless, therefore, as a map. The only "ToE" is the everything itself, thus useless as a theory. That's how Popper's statement speaks to me. — 180 Proof

Thanks for asking me to reread your post. I had an Aha moment! How right you are, assuming I understood you that is. The idea behind thinking, its purpose, its defining character, is to map reality. I suppose it's like taking mirror and capturing an image of what's out there and what's in here ( :point: :broken: ). Necessarily then, if only out of regard for the mind and appreciation of its distinctness, the map shouldn't be merely the territory. Did I get you or am I, as usual, holding the wrong end of the stick? :chin:

That's also look legitimate to me, perhaps even central.

Quine I believe does not like this solution, but we can speak of "real" and "existent" as separate but related concepts. Existence refers to things in the world, real to almost anything. Thus there are real fictional characters, such as Frodo but he doesn't exist in the world. But there can be fake fictional Characters such as Fred, who I just made up and is not in any novel.

On this view, one suggested by Haack, real is to be contrasted with fictional.

Existence is thus slimmed down somewhat, but continues to be very complicated. — Manuel

I made a boo-boo. The corrected version is posted below for your consideration,

In the exchange of arguments between mathematical realists and their opponents (mathematical antirealists), I noticed that when the former claims that numbers exist, they don't mean it in the same sense that stones exist but when the latter rejects the claim that numbers exist they mean it in the sense that stones exist. A textbook case of fallacy of equivocation - ambiguity in the meaning of "exist" is to blame. — TheMadFool

My take on this matter of real, existence, unreal, nonexistence, fact, fiction is that what most philosophers think, assume, infer are mistakes in usage and application of words, products of alleged wooly thinking might infact point to something deeper. So, for instance, when somene and I chat about some "fictional" character such as Hercule Poirot, we do it with the same type and degree of emotions, gravity, interest, as we would if Hercule Poirot were a "real" person. At the moment we converse about Poirot, the lines between "fact" and "fiction" are blurred or even vanish. This, to most philosophers and psychiatrists, would be treated as confusion or delusional respectively. The question is, are they correct?

Here's how I conceptualize this apparent paradox. — Pantagruel

Thanks for alerting me to the paradox. I failed to notice that a theory that explains everything, explains nothing was one, a very interesting paradox indeed.

results in a different description of exactly the same thing — Pantagruel

It's been about 2 - 3 months since I gave the issue you raise here some thought. Back before physics and mathematics became subjects in their own right, philosophers like Heraclitus and Lao Tzu conceived of the world as a interaction between opposites (light vs dark, hot vs cold, good vs evil and so on).

When science began studying such phenomena with the aid of mathematics, it was discovered that (some) opposites could be, in a sense, united under one banner For instance, hot and cold were simply different positions on a numerical scale of the kinetic energy of particles. In other words, hot and cold, a particular instance of so-called opposites were actually different manifestations, albeit extreme ones, of the same underlying phenomenon (heat/kinetic energy of particles).

That's to say opposites are an illusion of sorts and imply, at least from a scientific and mathematical standpoint, either a misunderstanding or gross oversimplification of reality, the world.

Nevertheless, from a phenomenological perspective, opposites (dualistic, yin-yang thinking) are how the world appears to us and ergo, on that score should be given the respect they're due.

The most interesting thing about mechanical theories is the point at which they fail. Physics is the science of...approximation. — Pantagruel

Examples?

You do see people saying "everything is information" or "everything is energy". That's the sort of theory that explains nothing. — Daemon

Kindly expand and elaborate.

"Explains everything" is the maximal, complete, 1-to-1 map of the territory, which is merely the terrority itself, and useless, therefore, as a map. The only "ToE" is everything itself, thus useless as a theory. That's how Popper's statement speaks to me. — 180 Proof

If you have the time, please go through what I have to say under To All vide infra.

As the good Kantian that he was , Im sure all we’d need to do to please Popper is adjust the TOE so that it acknowledges we can never reach the thing in itself, and instead aim to approximate absolute truth as asymptotic limit via progressive falsification. — Joshs

Well said! :up:

@Wayfarer & @Banno

To All

A. I reckon that what Karl Popper meant by "a theory that explains everything" is a scientific theory that can't be falsified because it doesn't matter what the observational results are, such a theory will, as claimed, "explain everything".

The usual way science is done is positing a theory Y, making a prediction Z based on Y. This yields the following conditional,

1. Y -> Z

If Z is observed, the theory is said to have been confirmed but not necessarily that it's true (fallacy of affirming the consequent). However, if Z fails i.e. the prediction fails, the following is true,

2. ~Z -> ~Y

The theory Y is now falsified.

If, as I suspect, "a theory that explains everything" is one that can't be falsified, the option expressed in 2. ~Z -> ~Y should be unavailable to us. In other words, false that ~Z -> ~Y or,

3. ~(~Z -> ~Y) [we can't falsify Y with ~Z)
4.~(~~Z v ~Y) [3 Imp]
5. ~(Z v ~Y) [4 DN]
6. ~Z & ~~Y [5 DeM]
7. ~Z & Y [6. DN]
8. Y [assume for conditional proof]
9. ~Z [7 Simp]
10. Y -> ~Z [8 - 9 conditional proof]

Take a look now at lines 1 and 10. They are,

1. Y -> Z
10. Y -> ~Z
11. Y [assume for CP]
12. Z [1, 11 MP]
13. ~Z [10, 11 MP]
14 Y -> (Z & ~Z)

Initially I thought a theory Y that "explains everything is, taking 1 and 2, together, 14. Y -> (Z & ~Z) but this is clearly not someone in faer right mind would claim [no one would claim a contradiction]. Ergo, a theory Y that "explains everything" would entail either a prediction Z or the contradictory ~Z but definitely not both (Z & ~Z). That is,

15. Y -> (Z v ~Z) [Y is a theory that "explains everything"]

The way to falsify Y would then be,

16. ~(Z v ~Z) -> ~Y

and then,

17. (~Z & ~~Z) -> ~Y [16 DeM]
18. (~Z & Z) -> ~Y [17 DN]
19. (Z & ~Z) -> ~Y [18 Comm]

Observe line 19 carefully. The antecedent (Z & ~Z) is false (contradiction) but we know line 19 is true. That means, the consequent ~Y has to be false (a true conditional with a false antecedent must have a false consequent). If ~Y is false, Y has to be true. Put simply, we're unable to falsify Y using the standard technique [see lines 2 and 16].

Another way to look at it is as below,

Suppose we do observe the contradiction Z & ~Z,

20. Z & ~Z
21. ~Y [19, 20 MP]

You might then believe that Y has been falsified [line 21].

Not so fast!

22. Z [2o Simp]
23. Z v Y [22 Add]
24. ~Z [2o Simp]
25. Y [23, 24 DS]

Y is true [line 25, ex falso quodlibet]

In other words, Z & ~Z (contradictions), as expected and as warned, leads to all kinds of nonsense but, more importantly, Y can't be falsified and if you insist that it has been, you'll have to accept it's true as well. Z & ~Z is a no-go area. ~Y can't be proven or Y can't be falsified.

B. A TOE isn't a theory that's compatible with both what it predicts and a failure of that prediction. In other words, given a TOE T, prediction P, it's not the case that, T -> (P v ~P). T would "explain everything" except the predictions it makes that fail to come true.

Redacted. Got my and's and or's confused.

Sleep time. — Banno

Interesting. I had the exact same problem when I began thinking about the TOE and Karl Popper's statement. For some unknown reason, there's no good explanation of Popper's claim that if a theory explains everything, it explains nothing available on the www.

I tried a number of approaches, a few I'll mention below:

Suppose theory T is a theory that "explains everything". T should entail some observables (experimental findings) and suppose one of them is P.

Suppose T is just like your garden variety scientific theory. If that's the case, the following relationship should hold,

1. T -> P [T entails P]
2. T [T is true]
3. P [1, 2 MP]
4. T & P [2, 3 Conj]

Now, since T "explains everything,

5. T -> ~P
6. T [T is true]
7. ~P [5, 6 MP]
8. T & ~P [6, 7 Conj]

9. ~(~T v ~~P) [8 DeM]
10. ~(~~P v ~T) [9 Comm]
11. ~(~P -> ~T) [10 Imp]

13. ~(~T v ~P) [4 DeM]
14 ~(~P v ~T) [13 Comm]
15. ~(P -> ~T) [14 Imp]

Notice 1. T -> P is falsifiable only if ~P -> ~T but 11. ~(~P -> ~T) says no, that's not the case AND T -> ~P is falsfiable only if P -> ~T but 15. ~(P -> ~T) says that's not the case either. Ergo, the theory T that "explains everything" can't be falsified.

Phew :sweat: :sweat:

The "ToE" is like the "BB" – an ironic misnomer. Quantum Gravity is what "ToE" is about: the unification, or subsumption under a third, more fundamental theory, of GR and QFT. Such a theory, I suspect (gleaning from wikipedia), is suppose to explain black holes, white holes, cosmic inflation, how to unify all four fundamental forces, emergent quantized spacetime, whether or not time or space is more fundamental than the other, and whole host of other gaps haunting fundamental physics. That, Fool, is not "explaining everything"; QG will only explain the dynamic relation of this false vacuum (universe) to less false / truer vacuums (???) — 180 Proof

Roger that! Will get back to you when I can.

What Popper means is that a theory that explains everything is so general as to be useless — Wayfarer

Good to know but why is it "useless"?

It's your wordplay, Señor Tonto, and not mine that's raised an issue where there isn't one. — 180 Proof

How? Don't you see anything wrong with a TOE that's supposed to explain everything? It (the TOE) could only do that if it were compatible, truth-wise, with both the truth and falsity of a prediction. In other words, it could never be falsified for to do that a contradiction would have to be true but that, as you know, is an impossibility.

I must confess though that I have serious misgivings regarding my analysis of the...er..."situation". I would deeply appreciate your help in making me wrap my head around this issue.

Where I am right now:

1. A TOE must, by definition, explain everything but does that include the scenario that, if T is the TOE and its prediction/observable is P, that both (T & P) is true and (T & ~P) is too. A comprehensive theory of thermodynamics (call it Y) exists and it explains both the hot (H) and the cold (~H) i.e. (Y & H) and (Y & ~H) but these two don't seem comparable in the way I compared them. The question that puzzles me is WHY?

2. What exactly does Karl Popper mean by "if a theory explains everything, it explains nothing"? My take on this is Popper's applying his falsfiability criterion here and deems any theory that, "explains everything", to be unfalsifiable, something that I attempted to outline in my OP.

What's going on here?

Of course. Completely explaining a donut includes explaining the hole. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Yeah, I can't help but agree, "completely" explaining the donut includes explaining the "(w)hole". Nice play on words, Amigo!

:joke:

To my tiny brain language boils down to two elements viz. 1. semantics (meanings of words) and 2. syntax (rules for word combination). Worth noting though is syntax can alter meaning of statements e.g. "dog eats man" vs "man eats dog". Other aspects of language may matter but let's not get ahead of ourselves shall we.

Coming to metaphysics, I'll focus on existence because both it's the core idea of metaphyics and I'm just beginning to get acquainted with it.

To the extent that I'm aware there seems to be a huge controversy on the issue of what kinda things exist and what kinda things don't. Some claim that abstract objects like numbers exist and others disagree. The debate on the existence of numbers is an authentic one iff the word "exist" is used consistently i.e. the word must be semantically constant (same meaning); otherwise, it's just another case of two sides talking past each other.

The question then is, does "exist" mean the same thing in the two sentences below,

1. Stones exist
2. Numbers exist or don't exist


In the exchange of arguments between mathematical realists and their opponents (mathematical antirealists), I noticed that when the former claims that numbers exist, they don't mean it in the same sense that stones exist but when the latter rejects the claim that numbers exist they mean it in the sense that stones exist. A textbook case of fallacy of equivocation - ambiguity in the meaning of "exist" is to blame.

N.B. This is just a very superficial analysis of the role language plays in generating, perpetuating, and further complicating philosophical confusion. Perhaps if one digs a little deeper than I have here, the confusion may resolve into crystal clarity either because language and philosophy are connected in a profoundly interesting way or because there is no such relationship and philosophers can get back to what they were doing before the question arose with one less thing to worry about.

That tree is number 7 and smells fishy.

Hey only kidding. What impresses me about platonic realism is that numbers and fundamental concepts are not the product of your mind or mine, but can only be grasped by a mind. Whereas the tendency of empiricism is to attribute reality only to things that exist in space and time - the expression is ‘out there somewhere’. So they’re real in a way that sense objects are not. — Wayfarer

:up: It looked like a good lead to follow and I thought you might be interested. Like they say somewhere in a little town in America, don't forget to be awesome! G'day.

No, but a probable personal catastrophe if one accepts the COVID vaccine. — baker

Possible, yes. Probable, I don't know.

As far as reasoning to 'play or not play' a lottery goes, the agnostic does not play because s/he can't decide whether or not its worth the risk, the theist plays because "with g/G everything, including the jackpot, is possible" and the atheist plays because, no matter how improbable, it remains possible to "win" an extraordinary return on a deminimis investment – white swans do happen! :smirk: :up: – otherwise, not winning is an absolute certainty guaranteed by not playing. The agnostic, seems to me in this instance, is the least rational actor. — 180 Proof

I see you've ordered your usual, "confuse the hell out of TheMadFool". :up: :clap: Gimme some time to process this gem of pure logic will ya?

Superb demonstration of how thinking should be done! Kudos to you 180 Proof. I just want to add a point of my own if you don't mind.

Lottery

The purchase of lottery tickets cannot be accounted for by decision models based on expected value maximization. The reason is that lottery tickets cost more than the expected gain, as shown by lottery mathematics, so someone maximizing expected value should not buy lottery tickets — Wikipedia

So, announce/hold a lottery. Those who play are likely to be agnostic because they're clinging as it were to the possibility of winning [God is possible]. Those who refuse to play are atheists because they know of the improbability of winning [God is improbable].

@Wayfarer First off, I must apologize if I am, as I suspect, barking up the wrong tree but from what I gather, you seem to be interested in mathematical realism which I reckon falls under the rubric of Platonic Realism.

Mathematical realism, like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind. — Wikipedia

You might wanna take a look at Synesthesia and grapheme color synesthesia

Some excerpts below for your consideration:

Grapheme–color synaesthesia or colored grapheme synesthesia is a form of synesthesia in which an individual's perception of numerals and letters is associated with the experience of colors — Wikipedia

Reports include feeling sensations in the hands or feet, coupled with visualizations of shapes or objects when analyzing mathematical equations, physical systems, or music. In another case, a person described seeing interactions between physical shapes causing sensations in the feet when solving a math problem. — Wikipedia

The point is, for (some) synesthetes, numbers have colors like an apple or a banana has and some math problems can give you the sensation of being physically touched! Are numbers real like apples, bananas and the hands of a masseur on your feet?

As far as I can tell, if politics (civil liberties) and health (pandemic-related morbidity & mortality) are what matters to the vaccine hesitancy phenomenon in some countries, we need to listen to both sides of the story as not doing that may actually backfire in both the short-term and the long-term.

For what it's worth I like to look at the issue from a two-word perspective, the words being "certain" and "probable."

Considering the fact that vaccines have a long and illustrious history, let's begin there. I'm under the impression that those involved with vaccine research, development, and deployment know their stuff in a manner of speaking - well-trained, highly-experienced, not to mention very intelligent folk are part of vaccine projects and a Google search indicates that data supporting the immense benefits of vaccination campaigns are available for review/analysis at the click of a mouse button. Factoring this in, it would be the heights of stupidity to not pay heed to vaccine advocates' warning that disaster of unimaginable magnitude is certain if the global vaccination drive were to falter or halt.

On the flip side, those who voice concerns for civil liberties, their violation to be specific, seem to be worried about how mandatory vaccination could be the first insiduous step towards some form Orwellian authoritarian state of affairs. The problem, if it is one, is that this is far from certain. In other words, such a world, the one some who want to preserve their right to choose whether to take the vaccine or not want to prevent, is at best only probable.


The choice then, if choice is so important to us, is between a certain health catastrophe if one refuses the COVID vaccine and a probable political catastrophe if one accepts the COVID vaccine.

But there is one thing that may hold us back : the friction of differing opinions & worldviews -- as is evident on this forum. As long as we are free to choose what we believe, even if it's wrong, we will make grudging gradual progress only after protracted political struggles. Some humans are Luddites & Heaven-bound, while others are Technophiles & Transhumanists. History is a Hegelian struggle between opposing forces — Gnomon

I kinda agree although I struggle, very hard indeed, to wrap my head around the alleged "...struggle between oppposing forces..." My response, for what its worth, would be that just like two potential suitors can agree to set aside their differences to save the woman they both love, we too can. The fighting if it's unavoidable can be done after we've "saved the woman's life." It seems unlikely that people will want to engage in conflict of any kind once the world has been fully transformed into a completely human-friendly environment - there's just too much at stake.

"kill them . . . kill them all!" — Gnomon

That particular line of thinking never appealed to me but I have a feeling that one fine day some hapless future US president - the so-called leader of the free world - might just have to do that! Let's hope it'll be a quick death for those destined to such a grim fate. :sad:

You’ve already assumed that this hedonic value system exists. It’s like asking: does ‘God’ exist because we look for him, or do we look for ‘God’ because he exists? — Possibility

Not so. I clearly didn't assume the existence of any hedonic or nonhedonic value system, hence the question, do things have value because they make us happy or do things make us happy because they have value?

If things have value because they make us happy then all value, even purportedly nonhedonic ones, ultimately end up being about happiness/suffering - hedonism then pervades everything we think/say/do, hedonism subsumes all there is.

On the other hand, if things make us happy because they have value, hedonism is either an erroneous idea or an incomplete one for there must exist a nonhedonic system of values which supersedes the value of happiness/suffering.

The ways in which we make sense of our world are inherently affective and hedonic — Possibility

That we do something from habit - one that seems to have been widely prevalent and passed down from parent to offspring not to mention horizontally in worldwide communities - doesn't make it right. Wouldn't that be the fallacy of appeal to tradition? In addition, such a stance begs the question; after all, the question is whether hedonism is a standalone value system that, in a sense, is not a proxy for a value system that's the real McCoy so to speak but one which is concealed for reasons I, as of the moment, can't fathom. Speculative, yes, but not, in my humble opinion, beyond the realm of possibility.

Yes, sex can be a momentarily happy experience, but no more so than life in general. It can also be, has been and is, a painful and/or harmful experience for many - and may even be both happy and harmful. — Possibility

Let's not split hairs on this issue. John Stuart Mill, one of the founders of utilitarianism (hedonic through and through) did all he could do to distance his ethics from pleasures of the flesh - he created, by way of a solution, the distinction higher pleasures (mind) and lower pleasures(body). That Mill had to divorce bodily and mental pleasures like this is a clear indication that sex can, has, and will gum up the works for any philosophy founded on hedonic values that wants to avoid becoming just an excuse to have wild drunken orgies.

Returning to the main issue which is, allow me to reiterate, whether things have value because they make us happy or do things make us happy because they have value?, I'd like to narrate a short story below.

There once was a man, his name was Hedo. Hedo was an average bloke closer to fool than wise but he more than made up for it with his immense wealth. Hedo, despite lacking in the brain department loved art and wanted to create his own private collection in one of his mansions. Unfortunately, he didn't know the difference between good and bad art.

Hedo did what anyone with that much money would do - he hired a local middle-aged art critic called Nism whose task it was to separate the wheat from the chaff in the numerous galleries in the city. A happy partnership most would agree between a man who had the moolah to buy good art but couldn't recognize it and a man who knew good art when he saw one but wasn't rich enough to buy them.

Over the years, the duo - Hedo & Nism - managed to purchase the best the city's artists had to offer. Hedo's art collection became the talk of the town and that filled him and also Nism with great pride and joy.

15 years passed by and then it happened. Unbeknownst to either, Nism's abilities began to decline, age had taken its toll. Nism could no longer assess the quality of an artist's skill as well as when he was younger. Unfortunately, Hedo was still as bad at discerning an artist's talent and execution as he had been but he wasn't in any way bothered by that - Hedo had full faith in Nism's now nonexistent skills.

One hot day in July, Hedo and Nism were on their way to a gallery in which an exhibition was being held. As they were walking down the streets they saw a group of men, women, and children exclaiming loudly and clapping hard. The two decided to investigate. They weaved their way through until they came up to what all the commotion was about - a chimpanzee with half a pencil in its left leg scrawling haphazardly on a blank page torn out of a child's notebook. "Oh! Magnificent! This is art at its finest!" exclaimed Nism euphorically. "You must have this in your collection Hedo," he urged. Hedo didn't hesitate for even a second, looking at the man who looked like the chimp's handler, he asked, "how much for this masterpiece?" The man, realizing an opportunity when he saw one replied, "well, er, $10,000" and threw in "take it or leave" for good measure. Hedo filled out the check and thrust it into the handler's outstretched hand and with utmost care, gently folded the chimp's doodle and deposited it into his velvet-lined breast pocket. Hedo & Nism were never this happy in the so many years they had worked with each other.

In set theory, 'everything' doesn't name a thing. Rather, 'everything' is used for quantification.

(1)

Suppose ExAy yex. ("There exists an x such that every y is a member of x")

Let Ay yeU.

So UeU.

'UeU' is not a contradiction (self membership is consistent with ZFC-regularity).

(2) Cantor's paradox

Suppose ExAy yex.

Let Ay yeU.

So PU is a subset U. ("The power set of U is a subset of U")

So Ef f is an injection from PU into U.

So Ef f is a surjection from U onto PU.

Previously proved theorem: Ax ~Ef f is a surjection from x onto Px.

So ~Ef f is a surjection from U onto PU.

So ~EAy yex. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Above my paygrade fellow forum member. Thanks for the effort. Much appreciated! When I do get round to studying set theory in earnest, I might just be able to have a intelligent conversation with those like you who know their stuff.

You're a romantic... — Tom Storm

at the end of his tether :lol:

I nearly died watching a Marvel superhero film once. The soft-core, quasi-fascist iconography and we-solve-all-problems-with-a-big-fight were too much for me — Tom Storm

It was different for me. I felt a huge sense of relief rush through me when reinforcements arrived at the tail-end of the movie and Thanos, although I have a soft corner for him, was snapped out of existence by Tony Stark. I think I'm talking about Avengers, EndGame. It felt, despite knowing all of what I was seeing was CGI (no, not corrugated galvanized iron), so R-E-A-L.

Some tearjerkers, true to their name, made me cry like a baby. Maybe it's just me but you never know.

Hmm. Not really a 'so what' though, is it? When was the last time a Sherlock Holmes tale ended a person's life — Tom Storm

Not Sherlock Holmes but take a look at this: HORROR DEATH Brit pensioner, 77, found dead in cinema seat after watching horror movie

I seriously advise against the elderly, especially those with heart conditions, watching horror movies - they're getting better at scaring the living daylights out of viewers even though it's all make-believe.

The mind makes it real — Morpheus (The Matrix)

But if you accept that universals are real - then the question becomes, in what sense are they real? — Wayfarer

If I were to hazard an opinion, I'd say that though it's hard for me to say in what precise sense universals exist do remember, take note of, the fact that insofar as the mind matters :smile: there's no difference between a stone and redness/treeness, both being mental representations that though different in content, possess the same ethereal quality of all mental goings-on. Since no distinction can be discerned between thinking about a stone and thinking about universals like redness/treeness/cupness, it isn't too much of a stretch to say that if a stone is believed to exist, universals too can be said to exist. In my humble opinion, this aspect of mind - numbers, stones, Allan Pinkerton, Sherlock Holmes, treeness, tree can't be told apart in terms of qualities of thoughts/thinking - is the very reason why this issue is alive even today; a stone can be felt but also thought while redness can't be felt but thought - an overlap at the level of thought/thinking becomes the source of endless controversy.

Another point worth noting here is there seems no good reason as to why physical sense data should take precedence over all else (purely mental stuff). Yes, a well-aimed, large enough stone can end my life but so what? I'm also stoked when I read Sherlock Holmes. :chin:

I wonder do morons have a low threshold of tolerance for smart alecs? — Benj96

There's no reason why the feeling can't be mutual but know-it-alls have an unfair advantage - it hurts to be called a moron but when someone calls you a walking encyclopedia it boosts the ego.

anyone to behave like a Moron at least sometime during their lives. I — Benj96

In my case, it's all the time. Yes, I confess, I've been hoodwinked far more times than the man on the Clapham omnibus. I suppose I could feel proud about myself on that score...in a moronic way. :sad:

if the person is truly omniscient than any skeptic is a moron — Benj96

I don't think that's true. The only difference between a fool and a sage is that the former is ignorant about faer ignorance while the latter isn't. In a certain sense omniscience seems to be about self-knowledge à la gnōthi seauton.

They would kill.
— SimpleUser

Yes. Kill the pig! Cut her throat! Spill her blood! — T Clark

:brow:

I'm not going to launch to an exposition of Parmenides, as I am not in the least qualified to do so, other than to note that it was the subsequent response to his ideas which gave rise to the Western tradition of metaphysics — Wayfarer

I vaguely recall this as being a fact, I think it's mentioned here :point: Parmenides

This is what leads to the arguments about, well, if you say numbers and ideas are real, then how about Bugs Bunny, or Sherlock Holmes? — Wayfarer

Thanks for the short but informative introduction on realism vs nominalism. I did my own reading, cursory though it may be. Anyway, to get to the point. While Platonic Realism blurs the lines between Allan Pinkerton (real life detective) and Sherlock Holmes (fictional detective), it can't be denied that though some version of realism would have us believe both exist, there is a difference between the two e.g. I could've talked to, touched, smelled, tasted (yuck!) Allan Pinkerton but I definitely can't do those things with Sherlock Holmes. As far as I can tell, to the best of my knolwedge, the nub of the issue lies in a particular distinction we've been habituated with over perhaps at least the past 6 - 7 thousand years, continuing on to the present. What's this distinction I'm talking about? Well, the existence-nonexistence one. So long as we frame metaphysics in terms of existence and nonexistence, metaphysics will, to my reckoning, remain forever mired in controversy and not an inch of progress will be possible.

What do I recommend?

Break free from the existence-nonexistence trap which has claimed so many victims beginning with the great Plato himself and instead look to a more nuanced view of existence itself. So, for instance, instead of saying "god is nonexistent" we could offer what I feel is a more useful alternative like, "god exists but not in the same way as a stone does." I'm sure some philosophers must've already hit upon this idea. Such a tactic would allow a universalist to respond to a nominalist by saying that universals exist in such a way that to talk about them in terms of existence as applies to other things that are claimed to exist would amount to a category error.

Given that physicists rely heavily on math and knowing that the current foundation of math is Set Theory and taking into consideration The Axiom Of Infinity, it becomes impossible for ALL physicists not to believe in an actual infinity, the set of Natural numbers {1, 2, 3,...}.

@Jack Cummins @Wayfarer



The Paradox Of Fiction

The paradox of fiction, or the paradox of emotional response to fiction, is a philosophical dilemma that questions how people can experience strong emotions to fictional things. The primary question asked is the following: How are people moved by things which do not exist? — Wikipedia

Faith

Faith, derived from Latin fides and Old French feid, is confidence or trust in a person, thing, or concept. In the context of religion, one can define faith as "belief in a god or in the doctrines or teachings of religion". Religious people often think of faith as confidence based on a perceived degree of warrant, while others who are more skeptical of religion tend to think of faith as simply belief without evidence. — Wikipedia

:chin:

So, our continued freedom to enforce our collective Will in the world, requires that we respect, and adapt to, the natural forces that still dominate our artificial endeavors. — Gnomon

This was and is the status quo but the future doesn't necessarily have to be like that - our technological prowess could one day free us of the need to adapt to the world by granting us total control of our environment, the one we're comfortable in and that I'm quite certain is one of the main objectives of science.

The heart has reasons that reason cannot know. — Blaise Pascal

Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. — David Hume

Firstly, emotions tend to have causes e.g. when you see a gorgeous person, one experiences love and happiness; when someone insults you, sadness and hate well up inside you. You get the idea. Try and feel happy/sad/love/hate/anger in a causal vacuum and you simply can't - there has to be a cause that's specific to the emotion that it elicits as outlined above.

Secondly, reason's views on the causality of emotions seems to be marked by disapproval in that emotions, whatever form or shape they assume, are logically inappropriate or disproportionate i.e. there's something terribly wrong with emotional causation. As to why reason is so deeply concerned about feelings, the obvious answer is emotions interfere with reasoning and though emotions seem to be primal survival-oriented psychological tools, reason has an edge over it in being a more reliable means of living to see another day so to speak. The bottom line is that emotions can spiral out of control in the blink of an eye and that instantly puts reason out of commission and no prizes for guessing how that ends - if one's lucky only minor cuts and bruises but if one isn't a sticky end can't be ruled out.

Thirdly, from the above we seem fully warranted to conclude that emotions that are both appropriate and proportionate are completely acceptable. Thus, for instance, a fit of rage when someone tries to shoot you with a gun for no rhyme or reason is not offensive in any way. The caveat though is that in the heat of passion, reason takes the day off and that, as we all know from personal experience, spells trouble with a capital "T". There is a clear and present danger if feelings have a say in one's decisions - situations can quickly get out of hand - and reason recommends that to be on the safer side, to err on the side of caution we should simply refuse to entertain any and all emotions. That means we'll have to keep even the good emotions like love, wonder, etc. at arms length just to make sure the bad ones don't tag along into the sanctum sanctorum of reason and cause havoc.

Last but not the least, there's been a lot of commendable work done on Emotional Intelligence/Quotient. One model (Salovey &Mayer) recommends that,

1. We should be able to perceive emotion in ourselves and in others; learn to detect and decipher emotions from speech, facial expressions, and body language.

2. We should understand emotions i.e. get a handle on their complex interrelationship and have a good grasp on their causes and how they evolve.

3. We should use emotions in the sense work with them, channel them, tap into their potential, all in order to make our lives more productive.

4. We should manage emotions i.e. control/regulate them so that we can both minimize their negative effects and capitalize on what they have to offer.

Easier said than done but I'm just so bowled over by how reason hasn't thrown the baby out with the bath water and wants to forge a more mutually beneficial partnership with emotions.