1. If the apostles were willing to be martyred for the sake of Christ, then they must have had intense belief.
2. Intense belief must be backed by equally sufficient evidence.
3. The apostles were willing to be martyred for the sake of Christ.
4. Therefore, the apostles must have had sufficient evidence for their intense belief. (MP 1,3) — Josh Vasquez

Absolutely superb! An authentic breath of fresh air. :up:

It turns the tables on the likes of Hume, Hitchens, and Sagan who, in this setting, appear to be put in the unenviable positon of having to deal with being hoisted by their own petards.

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish — Hume

What is more likely, that the laws of nature has been suspended in your favor, or that you've made a mistake — Hitchens

Extraordinary proof requires extraordinary evidence — Sagan

Surely, the apostles would've given the concerns voiced by the gentlemen whom I've quoted above due consideration, right? Resurrection, even in this day and age; would qualify as a bona fide miracle and send scientists scurrying back to the drawing board. Surely then, 2 millenia ago, a time when medicine was in its infancy, rising from the dead would have been taken very seriously indeed, investigated thoroughly, and only then certified as genuine.


However, to be fair to naysayers, the gullibility index was much; much higher than it is now. Even now, the golden age of skepticism spearheaded by influential scholars, the gullibility index is still not negligible enough to prevent scams/cons/frauds that sometimes occur on a scale so massive that it makes us wonder whether P. T. Barnum was right when he uttered his famous words, "there's a sucker born every minute." You can imagine how bad/good the situation was two thousand years ago depending on whether you were scammed or you were a scammer.

With their help I was eventually able to understand what they were saying and then I was able to define it “as the feeling that at this moment it feels better for me to live than die.” — Arthur Jackson

Quite a self-centered definition I must say. It seems to go against the grain in my humble opinion. People seem to be in search of something, let's just say, "bigger" than themselves. I guess it comes from a realization as to how insignificant each and everyone is in the grand scheme of things. Thus, nothing about ourselves will quench the burning thirst for meaning. If there's a meaning that will, at a minimum, let the idea of taking a rest, taking a break, from this quest, cross our minds, it, for certain, has nothing to do with "the feeling that at this moment it feels better for me to live than die". Just saying, not sure. A grain of salt might come in handy.

It would if they were time-traveling humans who have come from the future to save their interstellar society from our primitive mistakes by eating us — Pro Hominem

Yes, but I'm talking about aliens, not time-travelers and also there's no guarantee that we could call each other the same species, in which case cannibalism would be true. Our ancient hominid ancestors aren't considered human.

clothes are needed to survive only in some circumstances, not all — Possibility

:ok:

but because Adam and Eve now possessed knowledge that - gained by awareness (their eyes were opened) - without any practical knowledge as such, and from that alone acted in moral judgement. It isn’t that they ‘knew’ that nakedness was bad, but that they determined it was bad from their initial experience. What they ‘knew’ was only that they were naked, that they felt vulnerable, and that they could respond. The how or why - knowledge gained only by experience over time, which was to be developed over thousands of years - was irrelevant to Adam and Eve in determining their interaction with the world. It seems to me that, for this reason, ‘God’ was unhappy. — Possibility

How did it come to pass that they "determined it (nakedness) was bad"[/i] if not by some criterion of morality? In other words, they had, at the very least, acquired some knowledge of morality, whatever system of morality it was that considers nakedness as immoral.

So your statement that the reason nakedness is bad is because ‘most people think nakedness is bad’ only seeks to validate this error in judgement made by Adam and Eve, in an argumentum ad populum. The truth is that many people rather feel that nakedness is potentially bad in many situations, but it doesn’t follow from this feeling that nakedness is necessarily and inherently ‘bad’. The will to cover up is both problematic and hypothetical, if you think about it. — Possibility

I'm making an argument to the best explanation. There are no reasons other than a moral one why nudism isn't allowed during weather conditions perfect for some naked frolicking at the beach or wherever one fancies.

I want to clarify here that I’m not making an argument for doing away with clothing, as a rule. My point is simply to be aware that this will to cover up is neither necessary nor inherent to human experience. I don’t believe an experience of nakedness should necessarily be subject to moral judgement, but rather evaluated on practicality and potential health risks. That we continue to consider nakedness a moral issue seems to me a function of this inherent human fear of feeling vulnerable. Of course, I could argue that much of morality is a function of this deep-seated fear, but that may be another discussion. — Possibility

You have a theory but I don't know how well it'll stand up to careful scrutiny. I mean, look, there are tribes in the tropics like in the Amazon and African rainforests who don't wear any clothes at all and then, moving toward the higher latitudes we have Eskimos in the Arctic who are, well, dressed in many layers of clothing from head to toe. What explains this pattern? Can your theory that we're fearful and feel vulnerable in a psychological sense, as you seem to be implying, explain this phenomenon? The best explanation seems to be that people aren't afraid of nakedness but they are afraid of hypothermia. For your theory to be reasonable, peoples everywhere, in the tropics, in the mid-latitudes and in the frigid zones, should have a clothing industry at some scale. This isn't the case.

With reference to the Hijab: there is covering up nakedness, there is concealing identity, and then there is protecting private property. These are separate issues. The potential threat of ‘negative ethical consequences’ still does not make this will to cover up necessary. — Possibility

If you think it's vulnerability and the associated fear that causes us to wear clothes then it follows that the Hijab is the perfect design to address that vulnerability and allay the fear that comes with it.

Of course not. Believing humans are at the top of the food chains is as absurd as believing in cannibalistic aliens. — Pro Hominem

Aliens eating us would not qualify as cannibalism. I'm trying, in some sense, to make the case that all predation actually is - we're all equals.

Can you just answer the question of what should be done if two "infinitely valuable" life forms are placed into a situation where one must die for the other to live - say, tics on a dog or mosquitos feasting on a human and spreading malaria. We can also go with a tapeworm nesting itself into a human.

It seems to be that the upshot of this is that there are no correct answers because everything is infinitely valuable - so in effect we get moral nihilism here. It doesn't matter if the value is infinity or zero - it's all the same. — BitconnectCarlos

I'll put my money on God's one approach that seems to be the cause of much consternation for the faithful and also a source of vindication for many atheistic comedians - the no intervention policy.

Congratulations! I don't know if anyone has specifically delineated the "appeal to aliens" in the list of fallacies. If you hurry, you can claim credit for it! — Pro Hominem

It doesn't make sense to people who think they're at the top of the food chain.

I'm still in a fog but not in the dark about your position. In other words I think I have a partial grasp of your view on the matter.

Firstly, I don't understand the notion of identity you're employing here. You seem to be saying that the cause and effect are the same in the case of essential causes and ergo, nothing by way of an intervening "force" can be positioned between the two. So far so good but the cause, if there is one, arising from God's foreknowledge can act before a person makes decisions.

I agree with the second part of your post - there seems to be no contradiction i.e. it's completely plausible that god's foreknowledge is not deterministic like ours is. I'd like to ask you to review the key premise in the Omniscience paradox - god's foreknowledge causes people to make the decisions they make. Taking this to its logical conclusion, foreknowledge of any kind, god's or a time traveler's, should have causal power of some nature to force people to make decisions according to what was foreseen.

Your explanation that god's omnipresence as the source of divine foreknowledge is compatible with free will because, well, it's completely non-deterministic.

Here's a short argument based on your insight:

1. There are non-deterministic methods available for foreseeing the future

2. If there are non-deterministic methods available for foreseeing the future then, god's foreknowledge of the future could be non-deterministic in nature

3. If god's foreknowledge of the future could be non-deterministic in nature then, god's foreknowledge doesn't imply that we lack free will

4. If there are non-deterministic methods available for foreseeing the future then, god's foreknowledge doesn't imply that we lack free will (from 2 and 3, Hypothetical Syllogism)

5. God's foreknowledge doesn't imply that we lack free will (1 and 4, Modus Ponens)

Nobody is saying to treat "inferior" animals like dogs or horses or cats badly. Everybody should be against animal cruelty, but we don't let animals vote or treat them the exact same as humans. We should obviously protect animals and treat them well — BitconnectCarlos

Ok.

Mosquitos are a different story. — BitconnectCarlos

:chin:

The instant an hierarchy is developed, we'll have a place in it and I wouldn't count on us being in the upper echelons; somewhere around the lower rungs, maybe. That being the case, we must pray and pray hard that our planet isn't discovered by an alien life who are as different from us as we are from mosquitoes. What's frightening is that aliens that "superior" might be on the verge of discovering Earth and we haven't put our house in order yet. At best, it might be a big embarrassment, at worst, we might be farmed for our meat.

I get it - I was trying to work within your metaphysic. I was saying that the implication is that you can't defend the child from fire ants because they would involve valuing one being over another.

I'm not trying to disprove you here. I'm just running with your system here.

It's not personally something that I would really entertain.... in fact I don't think the vast majority of the planet would entertain it because it leads to actions/consequences which most of the population would consider not only completely absurd but also extremely contrary to human nature and our day to day lived experience.... but if you want to plant your flag on this worldview then more power to you. I just don't care enough to argue with you about it. If you want to consider the life of your child or mother the same as that of an ant or a mosquito then you be you. I take it swatting away or killing mosquitos is again immoral to you because they are infinitely valuable. Enjoy your life with this worldview, it'll be an interesting one. — BitconnectCarlos

It may look ridiculous - the thought that an ant/mosquito is of equal value as a mother or child - but, forgive my stubborness, it isn't. If a pecking order in morality is a sensible idea, you should be ready to be treated by a "superior" being in just the way you treat an "inferior being" and drawing from how humans have treated supposedly "inferior" life, it's defintely not going to be a pleasant experience for us. In fact, by treating mosquitoes and ants as equals to my mother and child, I'm actually ensuring their wellbeing in the hands of our "superiors". If I didn't then I would have nothing to go on to make the case that my mother and child shouldn't be harmed. I'd say such a view can be considered far-sighted.

In a world of only two people, X and Y, X can't be sure Y is real and Y can't be sure X is real. There are two relationships to consider:

1. Reflexive: X assesses X and can come to the conclusion that X is real and Y assesses Y and concludes Y is real.

2. Symmetric: X can't be certain Y is real and Y can't be sure that X is real.

Reflexively, everyone is certain that they are real but symmetrically, everyone is uncertain about whether an other is real.

Is there some way to resolve this issue?

It's not possible, on pain of a contradiction, that both X is real and X is not real AND that both Y is real and Y is not real. There's no obvious contradiction because of the fact that the real but also could be not real status of X and Y are from different perspectives, like objects that look different depending on the viewing angle.

The way I see it, either reflexive or symmetric, the claim, whether that X and Y are real or that X and Y could be not real, inhabits the same universe, the one in which X and Y exist. In other words, it's safe to say that the X being real for X and possibly not real for Y and Y being real of Y and possibly not real for X are declarations in the shared universe in which both X and Y exist. Despite the differing perspectives, the claims of X and Y aren't restricted to the perspectives themselves i.e. their subjective (perspective-dependent) nature is ignored and they're treated as objective truths about our reality i.e. X is real AND X could be not real, Y is real and Y could be not real and there we have our contradiction. Solipsism suffers from a contradiction. :brow: :chin:

(3) If the freedom for creatures to choose to come into being is precluded, then creatures were forced to come into being in a world that consists more of what one does not will. — Jjnan1

This premise seems problematic. Either creatures exist eternally or they come into being. Either way, it's impossible for God to force existence. In the former case, we already exist and in the latter case, creatures never existed.

Imagine this: There's an X that exists eternally and so, compelling it to exist makes no sense. There's a Y that previously didn't exist. Since there is no Y, forcing Y into existence makes zero sense.

Closer examination of this point reveals that the thought some people have - the thought that given a choice, a certain segment of the population would forgo the option of existence - is nonsensical because they want to be able to give consent on the matter of their existence but to do that they would have to, well, exist before they "exist". Two issues with this one. If at every point of this logic, one would like to be offered the option to exist or not then, we would have to exist eternally to make a choice. If, on the other hand, we come into existence at a certain point in space-time, it's impossible for our creator/god to ask us our preference on the matter.

Sure they are different things, but it amounts to equivocation, to use falsity in the two different ways in the same argument — Metaphysician Undercover

What I did would qualify as an equivocation if and only if I used different definitions of falsehood. I didn't. The actual definition is important for sure but inconsistency is relationship in which propositions differ in truth value. If so, surely one of them has to be a falsehood; otherwise how would the differ in truth value?

However, the detection of logical inconsistency cannot be claimed to be a detection of falsity, as you insist, because we have divorced the logical proceeding from the judgement of truth and falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read above.

You are describing the logical process as if we must make a judgement as to truth or falsity before applying the logic. But this is not the case, as described above. We are actually trained to proceed without making any such judgement. That's why logicians use symbols which do not refer to anything, to learn the procedures, so that we can proceed with pure logic without the bias which judgements of true and false present to us, impeding our progress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consistency/inconsistency is about logic and not about the definition of true and false.

By the way, there are systems of logic (paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, and perhaps others) that tolerate, even encourage I suppose, inconsistencies and contradictions. Perhaps you should have a look at them.

I just can't wrap my head around someone saying P and ~P and being true on both counts. Proposition X is something that I can't make heads or tails of: Ne caput nec pedes!

To not stall this discussion, I'd like to suggest something. Please describe what the meaning of the most obvious inconsistency, the contradiction (p & ~p), would be in a system that tolerates inconsistencies, the kind you're suggesting here?

So an omnibenevolent god doesn’t treat every life form equally because every life form is not equal — xinye

You're conflating two things: 1) Equality of life-forms and 2) Equality in the eyes of God. Definitely, we're all not equal - some are stronger, others are weaker; some are slow, other's fast; some are big, others small; some are gorgeous and others are ugly; so on and so forth. However, in the eyes of God, all differences are immaterial. The smallest and the biggest, the most beautiful and the ugliest, the saint and the sinner, all, and I mean all, are equal.

If everything was made of the same color and shade of said color then perceptually we wouldn't be able to actually make out distinctions in our waking experiences. The same is with assigning moral value universally as we desire to know what moral actions (personally morality doesn't make much sense to me independent of the humans who currently exclusively use it) are wrong or right and your playing a language game here saying that any action period is morally permissible. — substantivalism

Yes, I agree, differences must exist to give distinct identities to things and no better contrast for a thing's distinctness can be provided than by its exact opposite. Basically, I accept that good and bad give each other their distinct identities. Are we on the same page because I get the feeling we're not?

Anyway, if you agree with me so far, let's revisit your monochromatic world thought experiment. Suppose there's a world that's completely red, having no other color at all. Yes, we wouldn't know what not-red is but, surely, we would know what red is, right? Similarly, in a world that's completely moral, we wouldn't know what immoral is but, again, surely, we would know what moral is, correct?

Under your metaphysic, everything is infinitely sacred because God is omni-benevolent - and remember that God is also omniscient too he's right about it. — BitconnectCarlos

If the trail ends there, so be it. What, if anything, is wrong with it?

Everything is infinitely sacred. This has some very ridiculous consequences in practical action. If a group of fire ants are attacking a child, are we allowed to swipe them away and hurt the infinitely sacred fire ants? Are you allowed to kill infinitely valuable bugs in your home? Your metaphysic implies that you ought to value your child or parent or brother the exact same as an ant because after all, God does, and God is also right about everything by the way. You couldn't even follow this psychologically speaking is you wanted to so its setting everyone up for cognitive dissonance. — BitconnectCarlos

You're approaching the issue with a preconceived notion viz. that one of the two, the child or the army of ants attacking the child, is more worthy of life than the other. This is exactly what needs proving - ergo, begging the question.

Worrying about who's dearer and who's not is distinctly undivine, and by extrapolation, immoral.

Inequality in the moral sense would work like this: a certain individual or group has a greater claim to happiness than another individual or group and that's just another way of saying certain individuals or groups should suffer while others should not. However, morality is very clear on its position on the happiness/suffering dichotomy - it is, by its own admission, about happiness and definitely not about suffering. Ergo, inequality, since it divvies us up into one group that's suffering and another group that's not, can't be moral.

This is right up your alley, mate: Boredom

The French term for boredom, ennui, is sometimes used in English as well, at least since 1778. The term ennui was first used "as a French word in English;" in the 1660s and it was "nativized by 1758".[7] The term ennui comes "from French ennui, from Old French enui "annoyance" (13c.), [a] back-formation from enoiier, anuier.[7] "The German word for "boredom" expresses this: Langeweile, a compound made of lange "long" and Weile "while", which is in line with the common perception that when one is bored, time passes "tortuously" slowly. — Wikipedia

If boredom is a pain and if it means "...time passes tortuously slowly." what can be said of immortality when time actually comes to a grinding halt?

Is it to avoid moral ‘shame’ or fear that we insist on clothing? After all, being naked in front of someone else is the most vulnerable a person could ever be. No barriers, no shield, no interface, no pretence. And no weapons, either. Nakedness exposes us to every potential danger that we know: from cold and pain to assault, criticism and rejection. When we are naked, we have nothing to help us deflect or absorb the injury - we must bear it all, physically and emotionally. — Possibility

My approach the matter of clothing will be from a moral perspective which I surmise is your intent here.

Of course clothes are necessary for basic survival as other posters have not failed to mention - clothes are analogous to natural fur in that they protect us from the elements, keeping out the cold as well as the heat.

However, as the Biblical story goes, the first act Adam and Eve performed after partaking of the forbidden fruit was covering their nakedness with fig leaves and it was precisely this that clued God in to the fact that something was wrong in Eden.

Two things to consider here. Is it that God blew a gasket simply because of the disobedience, inferable from the fig leaves placed over the duo's private parts or because the couple had acquired knowledge of morality? In the former case, God is ired more by the disobedience than the moral knowledge gained by Adam and Even and in the latter case God is unhappy not because of the act of defiance per se but because Adam and Eve now possessed moral knowledge.

Which of the two possibilities is true? It matters because in one of them, Adam and Eve recognizing and feeling ashamed of their own nakedness isn't the problem at all, the disobedience is, and in the other, the world's first couple's shame felt because of their nakedness is the core issue, it serving as their first step into knowledge of morality.

Suppose, for the moment, that God punished Adam and Eve for the second reason - that they, once having eaten the forbidden fruit, gained knowledge of right and wrong, of good and evil. In other words, using fig leaves the way they did amounted to having understood a moral lesson, that lesson being nakedness is bad.

How is nakedness a bad thing?

You already mentioned how things could quickly go south if nakedness weren't prohibited as it is at the present, nudists being the exception. Other posters have mentioned that covering our bodies is a survival necessity but the weather isn't bad throughout the year and if the powers that be prohibits nakedness only for the reason that clothes preserve our lives, they should allow nudism during certain parts of the year when the weather holds up. This isn't the case and that implies that there are "other reasons" why nudism is banned or permitted only in certain secluded enclaves. This "other reason(s)", I guess, is that most people think nakedness is bad.

This should make you rethink (take a long, hard look at) the controversy surrounding the Muslim Hijab; after all, Western clothing seems to be, among other things, about concealing the body for moral reasons and the Muslim Hijab is designed to do exactly that, to perfection. Why get offended by someone who's doing a better job of what you yourself want to do?

Coming to the matter of necessity for clothing from a moral standpoint, all I can say is, given the negative ethical consequences of nakedness in the current social climate, something you seem to be completely aware of, clothes seem as necessary for morality as Hijabs are necessary for a stable Muslim population.

Or, does such a god himself have free will? What exactly is free will? If will is reason, then subject to reason. If will not-reason, then how is it free? And it would seem that in a world that thwarts all will, that world makes all will free with respect it - how not if failure is a part of every calculation?

Free will is analogous to the domain of a function, possibility the range. The operative primitive concept being "to let." To take any step at all, one first and primordially has to "let" - has to be able to allow for the possibility of - a first specific value, and then others.

And it seems to me that free will is best defined on the individual who's will is in question, amounting simply to this: if for any decision, he or she has the capacity to negate it, then he or she has free will. Buridan's ass then necessarily possesses a free will, although not necessarily the ability to use it to good result. — tim wood

I must confess I don't quite understand what you mean here but you made an important observation - the underlined bit above. Free will is about not being influenced and influence is, to my reckoning, always positive in the sense that it takes the form of a cause bent on producing an effect. The instant we become effectable - a something can cause us to do one thing rather than another - we become not free, part of the causal web. Ergo, one form our freedom of will can assume is resistance to whatever can become causes that produce effects on the decision-making center of our brain. Basically, as you said, "...the capacity to negate..." is key to claiming free will.

2. If God is omniscient then X can't do something different to what God thinks X will do (premise)
— TheMadFool

If God knows X does Y because X freely chooses to do Y, this is re-phrasing the principle of identity. This says nothing about what causes Y -- simple that X does Y. — Dfpolis

I probably didn't understand what you mean here but if one imputes a cause to Y then, we're presupposing determinism is true and that's begging the question.

When God knows X will do Y, it means that, on pain of God losing his omniscience otherwise, X must/will do Y when the time comes. That's why X can't do something different to Y.

If X can't do something different to what God thinks X will do then X doesn't have free will (premise)
— TheMadFool

This is an equivocation. In 2, "can't" denies the possibility of God erring about what is real. In 3, it denies the possibility of X choosing freely, which has nothing to do with whether God knows the truth of how X acts. If X chooses freely and God knows it, there is no problem. — Dfpolis

Yes, you seem to be thinking along the same lines as me. God's knowledge that X will do something and X doing that thing when the time comes doesn't imply that X lacks free will. Do you have a reason why you think this? You said that there's an equivocation fallacy in there somewhere. Can you point out where exactly?

I am assuming we can't prove an afterlife. Therefore a loss of life is a loss of everything — TiredThinker

Then you've answered your own question, right? For sacrifice to be a meaningful concept, there should be no afterlife and, as far as I can tell, no evidence for an afterlife exists. In other words, a soldier giving his/her life for another counts as a sacrifice for all intents and purposes.

You want to define truth in relation to correspondence, yet you keep insisting that falsehood can be demonstrated by inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're conflating two things. The definition of truth/falsehood and the falsity implied by an inconsistency. These are two different things. The former is about what we mean by truth/falsehood and the latter is about the truth/falsehood relationship among a given set of propositions. When I say that an inconsistency in a group of propositions implies a falsehood, I don't mean that in the sense the inconsistency provides us with a definition of falsehood, as you seem to be thinking, and that that definition aids us in deciding there's a falsehood among the propositions.

What's actually going on is that, an inconsistent set of propositions, call this set X, entails a contradiction (p & ~p). How did we arrive at that contradiction? By assuming all propositions in the set X to be true? Ergo, reductio ad absurdum, at least one of the propositions in X must be false. The detection of a falsehood in X isn't based on some kind of definition of falsehood inconsistency provides us but is actually a reductio ad absurdum inference.

You claim that inconsistency has nothing to do with truth or falsity, then you proceed to argue that inconsistency demonstrates falsehood. — Metaphysician Undercover

By that I meant the definition of truth and falsity has nothing to do with inconsistency which is what you're all about. By way of an explanation for what I mean, allow me an analogy. You must've played the game of chance, LUDO, as a young child. Suppose you and I are playing this game one-on-one. There are four colors to choose from and we're free to choose any one of them. However, once the colors are chosen, they're antagonistic in the sense, whatever color we choose, both can't occupy the same square. Definitions of truth and faleshood are like the colors we choose and inconsistency is the rule in the game where, whatever color we've chosen, they both can't occupy the same square. If I were now to inform a third party that a situation where two pieces were on the same square occurred but that it resulted in one of the pieces being returned to the starting position (inconsistency), the third party can come to the correct conclusion that the pieces involved were not of the same color (falsehood detected). As you can see, the third party's realization that the colors are not of the same color (inconsistency i.e. one is true and the other is a falsehood) doesn't depend on knowing which colors the two of us were playing with (which definition of true and false the two of us were employing).

but how does one justify risking ones life for any cause whatsoever without knowing what if anything may exist after life? — TiredThinker

There may be a good reason behind what you're saying but I think you have it backward. The notion of sacrifice involves a loss. If there's an afterlife, nothing is lost and sacrifice becomes meaningless.

A proposition without context is meaningless. So the terms in your example, "God", and "exists" need to be defined. Otherwise saying "God exists" says nothing at all in the first place, so negating it changes nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, put it in whatever context you wish but the fact that you're cutting off the very branch you're sitting on remains unchanged.

is a misunderstanding — Metaphysician Undercover

:chin: The concept of inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of truth/falsity. All it reveals is that you're, in logical terms, taking one step forward (affirming a proposition) and taking one step backward (denying the proposition you just affirmed), essentially you're just standing at one spot without making any progress.

I dismiss Cantor as misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

How so? He applies the math used by, we could even say, prehistoric hunter-gatherers, [blone-to-one correspondence[/b], which, by the way, is also the foundation of modern number theory.

That is the point, to determine whether contradiction truly is bad. If reality is such, that contradiction is required to accurately describe it, then how can we say that contradiction is bad? — Metaphysician Undercover

A contradiction is "bad" because, to give an analogy, it's like writing down a proposition on a blank piece of paper and then erasing it. If I say P and then follow it up by saying ~P and P = "God exists" then it amounts to this: God exists. It's as good as not saying anything at all.

Again, this is to define "falsehood" as inconsistency. But if reality is such that inconsistencies are the result of true descriptions of our natural world, how can you say that inconsistency represents falsehood? — Metaphysician Undercover

Inconsistency has nothing to do with the definition of falsehood. Allow me to explain (as best as I can). Imagine there are two definitions of truth and falsity: 1. Correspondence, 2. Pragmatic. Whether I use definition 1 or definition 2 doesn't matter for inconsistency is simply the situation in which you say something and then take back what you said. Refer to what I said about contradictions.

both all-powerful and free. — SophistiCat

:up:

I very much enjoy that definition of selflessness. Again, my question is still taking form (which is why I posted here, to try to temper it). But I suppose then, what is the distinction between, say, someone doing a selfless act to shine their halos and an actually selfless person? The halo shiners are trying to benefit themselves while "thinking of the welfare of others"- but they are still selfish, and yet I can't help but think that they believe they need to do it, that they NEED to look out for others even if they otherwise wouldn't.

So, is that selfish or selfless, and are we all halo-shiners? Thank you for your input! — dan0mac

The way I formulated the notions of selfishness & selflesness allows some of their nuances to be captured

3. Think of someone's welfare = Think of your welfare + Think of the welfare of others.

The equation form gives away the mathematical turn I want to give it.

Let's develop a scoring system:

Thinking of your own welfare ( X )
-3 = Thinking a lot about your welfare
-2 = Thinking more than necessary about your welfare
-1 = the lowest level of thinking of your own welfare can't be zero

Thinking of others' welfare ( Y )
+3 = Thinking a lot about others' welfare
+2 = Thinking moderately about others' welfare
+1 = Thinking about others' welfare
0 = Not thinking about others' welfare

X + Y
-3 + 0 = -3
-3 + 1 = -2
-2 + 0 = -2
-3 + 2 = -1
-2 + 1 = -1
-1 + 0 = -1
-3 + 3 = 0
-2 + 2 = 0
-1 + 1 = 0
-1 + 2 = 1
-2 + 3 = 1
-1 + 3 = 2

The total selfishness/selflessness score [X + Y] ranges from -3 to 2 and they mean the following:

-3 = Extremely selfish
-2 = Moderately selfish
-1 = Selfish
0 = Selfless
1 = Moderately selfless
2 = Extremely selfless

Does this answer your question?

My two cents:

First, ought implies can: If there's a moral injunction that demands selflessness, it's absolutely necessary that it's possible to be so. I say this because there are folks who think that there's always something to gain in any act of kindness and ergo, there's no such thing as selflessness.

Second, since it's impossible not to personally benefit from being good, any notion of selflessness must factor in this truth. The best definition of selflesness I can think of is that a person is selfless when s/he, even if profiting from the act, does something that also benefits others.

There are two possibilties that are laid out before you:

1. Think of your welfare [it's impossible not to]
2. Think of your welfare + Think of the welfare of others

1 = Selfishness
2 = Selflessness

This view of selfishness and selflessness is fact-based and realistic unlike their more romantic alternatives which are sitting ducks for anyone with a little bit of common sense.

Like a breath of fresh air

Tithonus Ring any bells?

The best thing is choice — Pfhorrest

And because dying removes choices -- you can't change your mind when you're dead — Pfhorrest

A very crucial observation in my humble opinion. There's no such thing as a second chance once we die, no reconsidering the decision to die - death is final and once it occurs, your options run out.

Therefore, if one is ever put in a position in which dying becomes an option, one has to be extremely careful not to goof up.

That said, to be asked to choose between an eternity of suffering and death is going to be extraordinarily easy. Right?

I am serious. Hell is not meant literally but is a metaphor for suffering - nobody would want to live forever if it meant one has to suffer while doing so. Suicide is unequivocal proof that people would agree with me. After all, if even a finite lifespan of suffering is undesirable, surely living forever in suffering, which is worse, is infinitely more repugnant a proposition.

The best thing I can say about immortality is in a hedonistic context. There are 4 possibilities:

1. Happy + Immortal
2. Happy + Mortal
3. Sad + Mortal
4. Sad + Immortal

I ordered them in terms of desirability. As you may have already noticed, the key parameter is hedonistic - happiness/sorrow. Immortality is only important after happiness has been achieved; in fact immortality is a major disadvantage if you fall in category 4. Sad + Immortal.

The mere presence of another changes the experience. — jgill

In what sense does the presence of another change our experience?

Suicide? Immortality isn't the be all and end all, you know. Eternal life is only a means to something else which is happiness on most occasions. Hell is a place you live forever but nobody wants to go there :smile:

It's a weird question. The idea of a forum, other similar platforms, is to exchange ideas; to be precise, to care what others think and, let's not forget, for others to, likewise, care what you think.

I suppose you're talking about times when others think you are wrong or that your views are stupid. In that case, you do yourself a big favor by caring more - you found out you're wrong/idiotic, you don't want to stay that way for the rest of your life, right?

2. If the universe could not have existed, then God could have failed to achieve His purposes — Jjnan1

There are other reasons, reasons that are compatible with omnipotence, for the possibility that the universe couldn't have existed: Tiger Spares Deer's Life

If this is the case, then why do we give consistency any esteem? According to the op, many would give greater esteem to consistency than to correspondence. This may be due to the fact that it is usually much more difficult to determine correspondence than it is to determine correspondence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consistency is important for the reason that if an inconsistency is detected then, there's a hidden contradiction and that's bad, right.

Let me give you an example. Imagine I subscribe to theism (T) and materialism (M). As part of theism, god is considered immaterial (I)

1. M.........premise (part of my belief)
2. T...........premise (also part of my belief)
3. T > I.....premise (if theism then god is immaterial)
4. I > ~M...premise (if god immaterial then materialism false)
5. T > ~M....3, 4 HS
6. ~M...........2, 5 MP
7. M & ~M....CONTRADICTION
8. Either ~M Or ~T

Statement 7 reveals the inconsistency, a contradiction, and implied theism and materialism are incompatible in the sense both can't be true. If you believe one, the other must be false. All in all, inconsistency checking ensures that there are no contradictions or falsehoods in your beliefs.

How intriguing . . . please explain. — jgill

I don't think I can make it clearer than that.

There's no reason why physical laws have to be such that the exact same mathematical relationship holds between the various parameters involved, right?

Probably. But take for example the element of the power set of N: {2,6,7}. This could be interpreted as guest(2)->room(6), guest(6)->room(7),guest(7)->room(2). Kind of silly, I guess. — jgill

I don't know what a power set is and I don't see anything "unusual" like that going on in Hilbert's hotel

Surprise your instructor or whoever will assess your work by using all the colors in the rainbow. White, after all, is a fusion of all colors. White gives you virtually unlimited freedom as far as hues go.

The power set of the naturals. — jgill

Thanks. I didn't word it well. I meant nothing that happens to the naturals in Hilbert's hotel can change the cardinality of the set of natural numbers.