I don't consider that relevant — SpaceDweller

Now, if you're interested into unlocking the meaning of "knowledge of good and evil" as much as I am then what we should focus on is, why knowledge of good and evil is bad for people, because if there is an answer to this then we'll know whether God is indeed good or not. — SpaceDweller

Physics deals with force and energy as well as matter, and these are non-physical, yet assumed by physicists to exist — Michael Zwingli

David Chalmers: 'First-person experience is such that it cannot be fully described in third-person terms. Experience is inherently subjective, it has a quality of "something it is like to be...", and that quality is inherently irreducible to an objective description.' — Wayfarer

relearning how to see the world — Tom Storm

Why is it that neither science nor logic can disprove God? — Shawn

So geometry then injects just enough physical reality into the mathematical abstraction to raise the problem? — apokrisis

Zeno's paradoxes were another route into the same issue. As an object of the mathematical imagination, the number line claims to be both continuous yet also infinitely divided. That is a useful quality for modelling/measuring the world, but what way is it realistic? — apokrisis

I'm with Peirce and those who argue that reality is at root vague — apokrisis

Nope, because the English sentence is arguably not a proposition in the sense desired, but Godel's G absolutely is, in that it makes a definite, well-defined statement about a definite, well-defined subject (namely itself), in definite, well-defined terms. — tim wood

Not necessarily assuming,
If definition of God is "omnipotent, omniscient and all benevolent", then there is no reason to assume God would command contrary to that definition. — SpaceDweller

There must be private experiences?
— TheMadFool

The fear of being empty, not unique, creates the idea there must be some "thing" beyond language which is mine, that I can know. Now it's not that there is nothing there, it's just that experience isn't known, it is expressed or denied (by me)' it's accepted or rejected by you. So to say "It was amazing" is to express our ineffable experience (however poorly). So there are personal experiences but they don't work the way Witt tried to imagine (as the skeptic would like them to). — Antony Nickles

Why not using same perspective toward this problem but from different angle, imagine 2 extremes:
1. Doing everything as God commands
2. Doing everything the opposite, defy God in every aspect

Which one of these 2 extremes would be natural?
Complete anarchy, madness, pain and destruction vs opposite of that. — SpaceDweller

What you call controversial I call comprehensive or broader context, my pronouncements are abstraction of that broader context.

The central topic here is the garden of Eden, don't you think knowing broader context is essential to unlock the garden of Eden? Isn't that reasonable? — SpaceDweller

commandment violation. — SpaceDweller

And then, also, there are those more than abstract — in fact, transcendental — orientations of the mind, such as goodness or truth or beauty in the abstract, which appear to underlie every employment of thought and will, and yet which correspond to no concrete objects within nature. And so on and so forth.
— David Bently Hart

Morality has an other-worldly feel to it! The laws of nature are not aligned with morality. In fact morality goes against the grain - why is being good liking walking uphill? Unnatural! Nonphysical! Kant might be relevant.

Commit the most heinous crime imaginable and you will, at no point, violate the (physical) laws of nature. No wonder God! — TheMadFool

That's not what's going on. It's electrical storms going on on the lightning- and fractal-like neural network. This electric storm gives rise to consciousness. Electric charge being a concept not understood intrinsically by modern physics. — GraveItty

But, alas, his story does not hold together. Some of the problems posed by mental phenomena Dennett simply dismisses without adequate reason; others he ignores. Most, however, he attempts to prove are mere “user-illusions” generated by evolutionary history, even though this sometimes involves claims so preposterous as to verge on the deranged. — David Bentley Hart

eliminativism: Whatever cannot be reduced to the most basic physical explanations cannot really exist. — David Bentley Hart

This problem, moreover, points toward the far more capacious and crucial one of mental intentionality as such — the mind’s pure directedness (such that its thoughts are about things) — David Bentley Hart

And then, also, there are those more than abstract — in fact, transcendental — orientations of the mind, such as goodness or truth or beauty in the abstract, which appear to underlie every employment of thought and will, and yet which correspond to no concrete objects within nature. And so on and so forth. — David Bently Hart

If you want to make claims about what Dewnnett says, then nothing will substitute adequately for Dennett's own words. That should be obvious, even to a fool — Janus

Wittgenstein himself was incoherent, from what I can tell, so he can't help you out. — Olivier5

An immaterial mind would be as unnecessary
— TheMadFool

Unless it decides to take a course of action. Which material object created the computer you're writing this on?

Reading your reply again, you've entirely missed the point, and the implied irony, of the passage you have quoted. — Wayfarer

From Dennett himself, Fool. — Janus

If you want to support that assertion then quote directly from Dennett. — Janus

 So, as Dennett wryly notes, he is committed to the belief that we are all philosophical zombies (if you define the term "philosophical zombie" as functionally identical to a human being without any additional non-material aspects)—adding that his remark is very much open to misinterpretation. — Wikipedia

Not that this is very surprising. After five decades, it would be astonishing if Dennett were to change direction now. But, by the same token, his project should over that time have acquired not only more complexity, but greater sophistication. And yet it has not. For instance, he still thinks it a solvent critique of Cartesianism to say that interactions between bodies and minds would violate the laws of physics. Apart from involving a particularly doctrinaire view of the causal closure of the physical (the positively Laplacian fantasy that all physical events constitute an inviolable continuum of purely physical causes), this argument clumsily assumes that such an interaction would constitute simply another mechanical exchange of energy in addition to material forces. — David Bentley Hart

Because we are talking about 1K+ pages that are subject to debate, framework of which I hopefully laid out above. — SpaceDweller

From at least the time of Galileo, a division was introduced between what Wilfrid Sellars called the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” — between, that is, the phenomenal world we experience and that imperceptible order of purely material forces that composes its physical substrate. — The New Atlantis

I can't help but think we've lost the thread here, because the point of PI is that the conclusion of the Tractatus was wrong. We can talk about all kinds of things (just not when we first require that the outcome be certain). Just because there are times when we feel like we can't put an experience into words does not mean that we must be silent. We can try again, we can bring someone along with us as far as we can (we are not alone); and those examples above were things we can actually say--something that expresses our "ineffable" experience. The fact we do not want to accept that as enough is because we want there to be some thing that is unique and special about us, but there very well may not be. You may not exist if you are a ghost of yourself, one of the herd, if everything you say is propaganda, quotation---you can be empty inside. This is the desperation of the person who wants to "strike himself on the breast and say: 'But surely another person can’t have this pain!' " (Witt, PI, #253) It is this fear that compels the idea that there must be a private experience in the sense Witt explored. — Antony Nickles

I believe that what is the case is that there is always an incommensurability between two dimensions. This is demonstrated by the irrationality of the square root of two, and of pi. What it indicates, is that as dimensions, is a faulty way of representing space. Space being represented by distinct dimensions is a convenient fiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I actually addressed TheMadFool because he or she repeated that same strawman attributed to Dennett. — Janus

As a minor point, geometry and algebra are dual descriptions of nature as Michael Atiyah argues across a number of addresses. — apokrisis

As a minor point, geometry and algebra are dual descriptions of nature as Michael Atiyah argues across a number of addresses. — apokrisis

So one way to arrive at a constant in a dynamic world is perfect symmetry. And that will produce a simple rational value. With quantum spin, the values are 1, 0 or -1. Or when it comes to the electromagnetic charge of quarks with their more complex rotational symmetry, rational fractions like 1/3 and 2/3. — apokrisis

Why does it got to be coherent in the first place? — Olivier5

Our 'private worlds' are what people talk about all the time, what poetry and literature have been about for several thousands years. I will never understand expressions of stupor or bewilderment at the most familiar stuff of all: our own thoughts. How alienated from oneself can one pretend to be? — Olivier5