Comments

  • Biggest Puzzles in Philosophy
    IMO, religion is for mystifying answers (i.e. placebos, snakeoil) whereas philosophy is for clarifying questions (i.e. medicine, surgery). Believers seek certainty; thinkers seek lucidity.180 Proof

    Précisément! If all this is a dream, let it be a lucid dream!
  • Should we adhere to phenomenal conservatism?
    Innocent until proven guilty! If it seems that P, then P is (only provisionally) true, to be swapped with Q, when P is proven false, such that one can only say Q seems to be true, so on and so forth, ad nauseum. The point is to having ad interim beliefs while the search for truth is in full gear. As you can see there are 2 components to PC - one is to go by appearances and the other is to seek the hidden truth. Skepticism differs in that skepticism can sometimes mean that the quest for truth is futile (re Agrippa's trilemma). Unlike PC, skepticism recommends epoché; it's a form of mental paralysis, brought on by adiaphora cum aporia.
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    True, what you're talking about is part of the overall worldview that includes the existence of souls/spirits.

    See, you do have the basic ingredients to weave some form of salvation into your Enformationism. Anyway, what I find intriguing is that in your theory the simulation is reality, making the idea of moksha moot. Your point seems to be that The Architect of The Matrix is your Enformer aka G*D. Remember what Agent Smith says to Morpheus - we rejected the first Matrix (no evil/paradise) for the current version of The Matrix (with evil)? That says a lot, oui? We're not actually interested in liberation/salvation. What then is the deal here? What exactly do we want?
  • Biggest Puzzles in Philosophy
    Well I was referring only to philosophical puzzles (per the OP). Otherwise, I suspect neither QFT or GR are "solved" (i.e. complete) theories which may be why QG is so intractably elusive. String theory, btw, makes untestable (due to astronomically high energies required) predictions. And, as Gnomon says, "Enformationism" is not scientific but "Meta-physical", therefore its a pure speculation (e.g. transcendental illusion) that does not make any predictions, testable or not, in the first place ... like "First Cause", "Intelligent Design" or other woo-of-the-gaps.180 Proof

    :up:

    Science is materialism's posterchild.

    Anyway, I'm surprised that no one's mentioned paradoxes so far (4th page now).
  • Mind-body problem
    Or a five-sided triangle. :smirk:180 Proof

    :grin:
  • Mind-body problem
    Since life only begins at the molecular level, there is no need to search for life on all the scales below.
    — Wolfgang
    :up:

    Since the philosophy of mind addresses consciousness as an entity in its own right, it fails to present it as an (emergent) consequence of life.
    :fire: Ergo the 'panpsychic' woo-of-the-gaps of (pseudo-scientistic) idealists / anti-physicalists.

    NB: Excerpt from an old post ...
    The MBP was dis-solved in the 17th century by Spinoza (re: property dualism). Furthermore, given that mind is an activity or process (i.e. minding) and not a thing, the dualistic fetish of "mind" separate from, or without, "body" (or brain) is a category error (e.g. dancing without legs? digesting without guts?) ...

    And why confuse the scientific problem of explaining 'mind' with antiquated metaphysics of making up shit without evidence or sound reasoning about 'mind'?
    — 180 Proof
    180 Proof

    :fire: :clap: :100:

    A person without a soul cannot know what you know mon ami! :lol:

    Jokes aside, I haven't really seen any argument that could at the very least, at a minimum, prove just the possibility of an immaterial mind.
  • Gettier Problem.
    In my book, they certainly are failed and attempts at knowledge, so that’s fine.

    It is also true that my tipster believes that his horse will win. So that's my preferred classification.
    Ludwig V

    I've lost track of the discussion mon ami. Suffice it to say that Gettier "problems" are pseudoproblems and the timehonored practice of checking one's assumptions when doing philosophy will speak for me.

    If you can I would like to see a mathematical Gettier case.
  • Biggest Puzzles in Philosophy
    A puzzle solved fits some other puzzle.180 Proof

    :up: I think so too, but the Quantum puzzle (solved) doesn't (seem to) fit the General Relativity puzzle (solved). The Theory of Everything remains uncracked except theoretically using Strings where the problem, ironically, is reversed from no choice (no model) to overchoice (a near infinite number of models). Odd that! :chin:

    @Gnomon - String Theory generates a Theory of Everything that makes no observable predictions. Is Enformationism not similar in that respect?
  • The role of observers in MWI
    what am I missing then? If you can explain me, I would be so much appreciatedjavi2541997

    You're exploring a vital aspect of the issue, but I would rather not go down that road. I'm bad at it and your precious time, mon ami, your ever so precious time.
  • Brexit
    I suggest a single "Elizabethan age", subtitled "the age of Empire" to stretch from Liz 1. to Liz 2. Brexit is the thus the last gasp of Colonial sentimentality and the final end of British dominance in the world, orchestrated by the same buccaneering (rapaciously exploiting) spirit that built the Empire in the first place, turned full force on the populace and accumulated wealth of the mother country.unenlightened

    The death throes ...
  • How can metaphysics be considered philosophy?
    It is not the sleep of reason but the awakening of the imagination that begets monsters. — Numerius Negedius

    Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate. — Novacula Occami
  • The role of observers in MWI
    I find your views on the matter are relevant but ... (deliberately?) misses the point.
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    Précisément, mon ami, précisément.

    The sleep awakening of reason imagination begets monsters. — Numerius Negedius

    Minimize metaphysics (novacula Occami).
  • Brexit
    Someone who has a time of age named after them surely has a legacy.

    But how much of that is of her political decisions is a different thing. I assume that later Elizabeth II's reign will be talked about the Elizabethan era too. Especially if Britain in the time of the current and future monarchs is very different
    ssu

    Well, in line with your beliefs, I'm inclined towards a no-time-limit view of causation (re chain of causation). Intriguingly, if I'm correct, some things become effectless i.e. their causal power diminishes with time to zero.

    Perhaps we could take a more nuanced approach and talk about remote and proximate causes of Brexit. Let's meet at the halfway point, eh?
  • The role of observers in MWI
    I'm not an observer, no, I'm definitely not. — Numerius Negedius

    This is very confusing. :chin:

    Does the observer have to be conscious or are there non-living "observers"?
  • Brexit
    You then should convince us just why Queen Victoria's policies have still effect today, and having more effect than for example the decision of the conservative party of the present holding a referendum on the issue thinking it won't get the reply from the people that it did.

    Simple as that.

    And I would think the prime ministers and the leaders (political and economic) and their policies and decisions would be more important as Queen Victoria wasn't an autocrat.
    ssu

    Does Queen Victoria not have a legacy? All powerful people leave their mark on the country or so I hear. I dunno! :confused:
  • Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
    It isn't defined because it is gotten at indirect means. He can only gather that it strives, and thus there needs to be a playground for striving to take place... I guess?

    He at the same time seems to want Will to be a double-aspect to reality, yet seems to also think it is prior in some sense. The Will, "wills life". But that implies that the Will was there first before the "will-to-live". But then again, I don't know.
    schopenhauer1

    The question is how do we work with just a word, an empty term, that from what we can infer has no referent. Are we supposed to plug in our own personal meaning for "will"? I've seen this kinda thing happen elsewhere as well, but I can't seem to recall the particulars.
  • Brexit
    :up: So, if there's no time limit to causation, the Brexit problem could be due to Queen Victoria' policies!? :chin:
  • Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
    The main question that is hard to answer with Schopenhauer, is how it is that there are objects when there is only Will. What is objectification of Will? He goes on about Forms as the original objects, and how artists perceive them best in their expressions in art and music. But this generates more questions..
    Why does Will (unified and solo) have Forms? Why do forms have lower gradations of physical objects? It's all a bit obtuse.
    schopenhauer1

    From on another forum "what exists is that we can encounter but cannot will". Was Schopenhauer part of German idealism?

    As far as I can tell, Schopenhauer's will is either poorly defined or is left (deliberately?) undefined, like Robert M. Pirsig's Quality in his book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.

    I regret to inform you Herr Schopenhauer, but the conditions of my employment are as of the moment unacceptable. However, I'll be regularly monitoring your ideas in case we might be able to come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement. :lol:
  • Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
    There must be a what it feels like to be a toothbrush? A good, imaginative writer, can easily pen a short story on that topic, oui?

    I was just sitting there, in me blue cup, mindin' me own business when suddenly, a gentle hand gripped me, and lifted me up ...
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    Cancel my subscription to the
    Resurrection ...
    ... moksha :fire:
    180 Proof

    :up: Sorry for the double reply, but you seem to have updated your post with a comment on moksha. I don't know what it means exactly but I've seen it being interpreted as liberation/salvation; fits right in with The Matrix theme of freeing oneself from maya (the machine-generated virtual reality). @Gnomon, remember you said, quite a number of times, that your Enformationism doesn't offer any soteriological services. I see an opening here. How exactly you'll work the idea of moksha into your theory is currently beyond me.
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    Your rambling has lost me again.180 Proof

    :lol: Buddhism is the middle path and so can't affirm anything; anatta, an affirmation, isn't Buddhism; however, it is a part, only one-half, of the refutation of two extreme positions, eternalism (there's an eternal soul), which the anatta doctrine is aimed at, and nihilism (there is no eternal soul) (the Buddhist argument against this position is not so popular or discussed often). As I tried to explain, the anatta doctrine appeals to us because it's very Zen (induces WTF? moments, which everybody likes to experience) i.e. there's a psychological element to the idea's popularity, but it comes at a great cost - misunderstanding the Buddha).

    :smile:
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?


    Religion's origins can be retraced to uncertainties regarding the self and spawned the idea of souls in all cultures (the problem was/is/will be Thanatos).

    Spirit is a related term, but is larger in scope, includes ethereal beings, usually powerful, and whom we must placate with prayers and sacrifices in order to gain their favor; the seed of god(s) is visible therein.

    As for the mind, it has been equated with the soul, the self and the essence of what a person is.
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    Who am I and what happens to me (postmortem)?
    — Agent Smith
    "Who" you are is constituted by your personal and social relationships. Self-identity (ego) supervenes on self-continuity (embodiment). And, like an orchestra after the final encore of an evening's symphony performance, your (everyone's) identity's constitution dissipates due to entropy into oblivion "postmortem". Anicca —> anatta, no?
    180 Proof

    Yep, that's what I believe happens too, but from what I've heard the soul of Buddhism, like that of a cornered government official, is to neither affirm nor deny neither the existence nor the nonexistence of souls. This is clearly inconsistent with the anatta doctrine. What I suspect is going on is people have latched onto this belief in Buddhism because it tends to produce a Zen moment in us, and we all love that feeling don't we? The truth is Buddhism also neither affirms nor denies nihilism (anatta). These are all extremes which Buddhism attempts to avoid. So I'm afraid you're not entirely correct - the anatta doctrine is meant to refute eternalism and by itself is only half the story of Buddhism. What sayest thou? I would like to seek @Wayfarer' counsel on this matter.
  • Gettier Problem.
    The horse example describes a fallible justified belief and it fulfills the JTB criteria although the justification is flawed and the proposition itself is false. Consider fallible knowledge as failed attempts at knowledge.
  • Is Atheism Significant Only to Theists?
    They decided a fake happiness avoiding reality or truth. Like when a drug addict consume narcotics because he is engage to the "fantasies" or "trips" that the drugs provide to him. Paradoxically, he wants to avoid truth but at the same time is addicted to an artificial lie :chin:javi2541997

    :up:
  • Biggest Puzzles in Philosophy
    Perhaps, but as Raymond Chandler said “A writer who is afraid to overreach himself is as useless as a general who is afraid to be wrong.”RussellA

    :up:
  • Is Atheism Significant Only to Theists?
    Wasn't it William K. Clifford who wrote The Ethics of Belief?

    It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. — William Kingdon Clifford (Clifford's Principle)

    It seems our priority is not to lose touch with reality (don't lose your sanity). Reality usually gives you a sound beating if you, even for a second, forget its rules.

    Reality is that which doesn't go away when you stop believing in it. — Philip K. Dick

    However, William James (?) had a different idea. Life is not just about facts, it's more than just knowing jumping off the balcony means broken bones or even death. Truth? Post-truth is prescient in James' views. For example, people, some, are no longer interested in truth, they just wanna be happy.
  • Is "good", indefinable?


    Perhaps we're conflating equality with predication.

    1. Good = Happiness (g = h)
    2. Good is happiness (Hg)

    In the former case, happiness and good are the same thing, but in the latter case, happiness is a property of good. The question why is happiness good? makes less sense in re 1 than 2.

    Also ...

    The word "sacrifice" has a positive connotation of a kind such that even if the devil sacrifices, it doesn't affect the word's positive valence. :lol:

    And ...

    Moore's question, as @Banno pointed out, is a bit weird.

    It amounts to asking, if I told you that water is transparent (good is a beneficial act), why is transparent water? (why is a beneficial act good?) The question makes zero sense (to me). I dunno, it feels odd.
  • Have we (modern culture) lost the art of speculation?


    :lol: Random shots do hit the bullseye on occasion.
  • Mind, Soul, Spirit and Self: To What Extent Are These Concepts Useful or Not Philosophically?
    These - mind, soul, spirit, self - are topics in the philosophy of mind/religion, identity (broadly metaphysics), ethics, thanatology, and are significant insofar as knowledge of who we are and what our fate is are important questions for us. Who am I and what happens to me (postmortem)?
  • Is "good", indefinable?


    But the very existence of the word "sacrifice" is the proof you seek.
  • Is "good", indefinable?


    I'm inclined to agree with @Banno that on occasion one has to sacrifice one's happiness for good, implying they aren't the same. I'm shocked Aristotle missed such an obvious fact.

    The other issue is that we can ask the question why is happiness good?. To me the infinite regress doesn't terminate.
  • Is "good", indefinable?
    Why is happiness good?
    — Agent Smith

    Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing.
    Banno
  • Is "good", indefinable?
    In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good". It's pragmatic to address disvalue by preventing or reducing disvalue (e.g. harm to h. sapiens); however, we can only aspire to value because value tautologically transcends (in "platonic heaven") our condition such that "moral value" judgments / actions are arbitrary in practice (à la nihilism). Moore seems half-right but wholly for the wrong reasons. Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal). Epicureans / Stoics rather than Bentham-Mill / Kant.180 Proof

    In line with your via negativa approach to many things - let's deal with what is not good first; our intuitions tend to be less at odds with each other in re disvalue than in re value and before I forget, reducing harm is more actionable than increasing benefit. The Epicureans were of the view that happiness is the absence of suffering and the highest happiness is the complete cessation of suffering (aponia).
  • Is "good", indefinable?
    I disagree with it as well, but the reasons are given in the Nichomacean Ethics. Basically there is the appearance of infinite regress, as you described. So Aristotle looked for something "self-sufficient", wanted only for the sake of itself, because that would put an end to that regress. If X is good because it is for the sake of Y, and Y is good for the sake of Z, and Z for A, etc., he figure that there needed to be something final, that all the others would lead to, as ultimately being for the sake of that final thing. That's the ultimate end, wanted only for the sake of itself. This he assumed is the person's happinessMetaphysician Undercover

    :up: Read Banno's reply to me here:
    Why is happiness good?
    — Agent Smith

    Almost. Better, "Is happiness the very same as what is good?" The answer is "No", since it is conceivable that we might have to give up one's happiness for what is good. Happiness anf the good are not the very same thing.
    Banno
  • Is "good", indefinable?
    :up:

    I suspected as much. Danke!
  • Have we (modern culture) lost the art of speculation?


    I believe I see your point. We're dissatisfied with the mundane and it is exactly that which we encounter in our daily lives. Every single moment we're reminded of how small we are while our hearts & minds yearn for the great. Soul-crushing it is (for those who recognize the problem).