I don't disagree over "what counts as philosophy". — PossibleAaran

And there's that performative contradiction.

I don't think there is a fact of the matter about what counts as philosophy. — PossibleAaran

You've been arguing with yourself on that point, not with me.

We decide what counts, and what we decide should be determined by what it is useful to include and useful to exclude. Do you disagree? — PossibleAaran

I think that your focus on this particular wording has been pedantic and largely a waste of both of our time. It hasn't made any real difference. We disagree over what's more useful, as you would put it.

The question is, why should the weak be asking for God, and not for being rich or powerful? — RBS

There could be a number of possible factors, such as upbringing, and such as indoctrination. But also, Nietzsche had an interesting answer relating to this. It has to do with his theory of master-slave morality and ressentiment.

I haven't even bloody used the word "correct". Can you please stop indulging your own assumptions? However you decide to word it, it is obvious that we disagree over the semantics relating to what counts as philosophy, and that you don't consider the stance I've been arguing in favour of to be equivalent in merit with your own take on it, which differs from mine. For you to suggest anything different would be to imply a performative contradiction.

You seem to have misunderstood. The only need there is for a god is psychological. This psychological need is symptomatic of the weak, and is absent in the strong. The weak feel the need for a mythical saviour because they struggle with life and cave in to their desire for an easy way out.

We're both arguing semantics in favour of one stance over the other. That much is evident, and that means that you do not hold each stance in equal measure. It means what it sounds like: that you favour one stance more than the other. If forced to pick either one or the other, then you'd pick your favoured stance.

I don't think that that's saying anything particularly complicated or unclear. No need to turn a molehill into a mountain.

Why do you think there is a need of God? — RBS

The weak.

And why do you think there is no need for a God? — RBS

The strong.

How is your contribution helpful with regard to the matter of truth, except perhaps as some guidance to those unaware of this fallacy in attempting to determine truth? Aren't we supposed to talking about the real deal? I agree that such fallacies are common amongst the common folk. But we should be thinking about this more like a logician would think about it.

But I already agreed with NKBJ that there is an ancient use of the word "philosophy" that has it cover "the earth is round". I'll even agree that it might even resemble certain relatively recent uses of the word.

But there is no reason to infer from this that we should only use the word "philosophy" in that way, and that anyone who uses it another way must be wrong - which seems at least to be the attitude you take in disputing my own definition of "philosophy". — PossibleAaran

I'm doing the same thing that you're doing, which is arguing semantics in favour of one stance over the other.

You're just trying to mischaracterise me and make yourself out to be more open-minded, it seems.

It resembles both the philosophy of ancient times, when the question of the shape of Earth was pondered by philosophers such as Thales and Anaxagoras, as well as modern philosophy, such as that of G. E. Moore in his arguments against extreme scepticism. It also fits the description of the kind of questions and claims of metaphysics.

So there is reason to call it a metaphysical claim, irrespective of your own views on the matter, and irrespective of your own decision about whether or not to call it a metaphysical claim. And that it's a metaphysical claim implies that it's a philosophical claim.

Except that is a metaphysical claim. — NKBJ

Agreed. That it is also likely scientific doesn't mean that it isn't philosophical, and more specifically, metaphysical, as though the two categories were mutually exclusive. If we didn't include such claims, then there wouldn't be much good philosophy. It would be full of the evil demon stuff which gives philosophy a bad name.

Yes. He is highly predictable. And the god through the back door tactic is pretty transparent. But remember, none of us have presented any criticism! This is what he must convince himself of in order to maintain his precious delusions.

You are assuming a start. — Frank Apisa

Ah, yes. But he has an argument against an infinite regress. An argument which resembles ancient logic which leads to absurd conclusions. Except that his logic only gets partway through the breakdown and then just, again, simply assumes a start, instead of continuing on to infinity. So it is actually far worse, because although this ancient logic is unsound, it is at least valid, whereas his logic makes an invalid logical leap to his desired conclusion.

Whilst by ancient logic, Homer can never reach the end of the path, because before he can get there, he must get halfway there, and before he can get halfway there, he must get a quarter of the way there, and so on; by his logic, because the event before this one had a cause, and the event before that one had a cause, as did the one before that, and so on and so forth, there simply must be a first cause for no logical reason, but simply because he dogmatically says so under the guise of reason.

And the wise old man did indeed walk away and leave him alone. He walked and walked, for miles and over days, until he was finally back at his little old house, in his little old neighbourhood.

And as the wise old man entered his little old house, he noticed a dusty old mirror hanging on a dusty old wall. Into that dusty old mirror the wise old man glanced. But he couldn't quite see clearly into it, the reflection was as dim as his wit. And so he gave it a wipe with the sleeve of his little old coat.

The wise old man let out a gasp. And, at the same time, a little wind escaped from between his little old butt cheeks.

To his surprise, in the reflection of his little old mirror, the wise old man saw none other than the troll who had been tormenting him staring right back at him.

A realisation struck the wise old man like his whore of a mother used to strike him when he was a wee young lad and had been caught spying on her whilst she was in the bath. The realisation struck him that he was neither wise, nor a man.

He was a troll.

A filthy old troll, covered in slime and his own ejaculate.

In his horror, it dawned on him that he had answered his own question from earlier: "Well hurry and answer me, you damn fool! And why did that sign say 'Trolls'; as in plural; when there's only bloody one of you?".

There were, in a sense, bloody two of him: two foolish trolls, as such. He was both foolish troll, and foolish troll who had mistaken himself to be a wise old man.

The End.

Well, I trust your intellect, so that's good enough for me, but I can't conceive of such a thing existing, so we either agree to differ or you tell me a bit more about this thing you conceive. Presumably it can't do anything (since that would have an impact, and therefore be detectable), it can't take up any space or time. Are we talking about something like an idea (real, but non-physical) or something in another realm, or in this realm but another dimension (although I would think that made it at least theoretically detectable)? — Isaac

You seem to be treating science and logic in the same manner, whereas I do not. It is possible that science is wrong. It is not possible that logic, in the most fundamental sense, is wrong, because logic defines what's possible. For that reason, it is possible that even though science might say that we would or could in theory detect the existence of any being of any constitution whatsoever, anywhere at all, it might turn out to be wrong. But how is it possible for there to be a square circle?

The troll stared intensely into the wise old mans face and said: — Mr Phil O'Sophy

"Is it worth it?

Let me work it.

I put my thang down, flip it and reverse it.

Ti esrever dna ti pilf nwod gnaht ym tup i.

Ti esrever dna ti pilf nwod gnaht ym tup i".

And I did. Address my explanation or pipe down.

'Subjectivity' aside, I'm asking genuine questions though. They really aren't rhetorical. — StreetlightX

But I think I've answered your questions, although I grant that I might not have spelled absolutely everything out. I don't really get what your problem is. It seems like you're making a fuss over nothing if you ask me, which would be ironic given your complaints about noise.

The terms seem useful, as more commonly understood, in the right context, such as the debate between idealists and realists. Like I said, we can discuss George or that rock or that blade of grass in this context if you really want to. I wouldn't have a problem with that. Some things might turn out to be more clearcut than others, but that doesn't mean that we should throw the baby out with the bathwater. Talk of Jupiter, for example, seems sufficient to use as an example in my argument for realism, and I've made clear what I mean by talking of the existence of Jupiter as something which is objective.

What more is there to say?

It said: — Mr Phil O'Sophy

"Danger! Trolls up ahead!".

The wise old man thought about this for a while, and then he decided to continue on, around the pond, heading in the direction of what appeared to be a bridge in the distance.

As he drew ever closer to the bridge, he began to reminisce about times past, and those closest to him: his family.

His mother, in particular.

His mother was a brave women whom he deeply admired. Though she was short in stature, she could strike fear into the hearts of anyone who dared to challenge her. In his long life, the wise old man had only once seen fear in her deep blue eyes, and that was when his father was on his deathbed. When the hour of his departure drew near, the old man remembered his father crying out suddenly, and his mum got scared. She said, "You're movin' with your auntie and uncle in Bel-Air." He whistled for a cab and when it came near, the license plate said "fresh" and it had dice in the mirror. If anything, he could say that this cab was rare. But he thought, "Nah, forget it. Yo home to Bel-Air!" He pulled up to the house about seven or eight, and he yelled to the cabby "Yo homes, smell ya later!". He looked at his kingdom. He was finally there. To sit on his throne, as the prince of Bel-Air.

And there are better and worse ways to define things. If I define "philosophy" as "tree" that's a really bad definition. If I leave out from the definition of "tree" all conifers, that's a really bad definition. Your definition simply does not cover all that philosophy is. You're leaving out all the "conifers" because you want to limit it to only what is "deciduous." — NKBJ

Yes, nicely put.

Yes, it's true. Scientists make claims about how the world is, and according to some philosophers, that's what metaphysics studies. But there are many different ways that philosophers have defined metaphysics and so no reason to stick with any particular definition so far as I can see.

But even if philosophers had always in the past defined "metaphysics" as the study of reality and listed it as a branch of philosophy, I don't understand what reason there is for sticking with this definition now. I don't see the point in defining philosophy in such a way that it includes topics which are simply not investigated by anyone who identifies as doing philosophy and explicitly called something other than philosophy by most people. Am I missing something? — PossibleAaran

Yes, you seem to be missing that this actually harms the reputation of a serious academic subject, and those who partake in it, without good reason. It would exclude good philosophy from philosophy. Good philosophy incorporates history and science.

Something can't come from nothing. An infinite regress is impossible. There must be a timeless first cause. That first cause is God. No one has provided any arguments against this. All glory to the hypnotoad.

Sure, but I wasn't interpreting your claim. I don't much care about your claim - whatever it is - at all, and I believe the 'interpreting' was done by you. — StreetlightX

Okay, so you just decided to turn up to a discussion relating to such claims, only to make it known that you don't care about them?

Bit strange.

Sure, and this is fine! And I agree it's also an entirely different use of the word objective to mean something entirely different. I mean, I still think it's rather a bit of noise still - as if anti/realism is at all a worthwhile debate having - and it remains rather arbitrary: as if one ought to qualify the 'existence' of anything (as 'objective' or otherwise) as turning upon 'our existence', or lack-thereof. As if we were so important that existence itself begets a whole new qualifier ('objective', or 'not-objective') to mark its proximity (or lack-thereof) to our existence. But why not the existence - or lack-thereof - of George? Or this rock here? Or that blade of grass there? Whence the conceptual necessity of this qualification, and not another? (not a rhetorical question! - It's only here that one even begins to do philosophy at all). (Edit: And maybe you can begin to see why your question isn't about Jupiter at all - it's about - and always has been - about 'us').

And I'm sure you know what subjectivity means. Everrryyonnee knows what subjectivity means. — StreetlightX

Jupiter was just one example out of innumerable others. We can talk about George or that rock or that blade of grass if you want to. But you don't, it seems, because you're above such discussions, right? Such discussions are beneath you. You're more sophisticated than that, and you have it all figured out, unlike us peons.

Yet your answer to the questions those discussions focus on isn't clear, unless it is basically just to stick your head in the sand.

And what's your problem with the meaning of subjectivity? Why are you making out that it's so absurd that I would know the gist of that word, such that it isn't meaningless? It's not a word that I've coined just now that no one has any familiarity with. You're the one who's coming across as absurd from where I'm standing.

Your contribution has basically been to disregard the intention of this discussion and to set out a different meaning of the terms which apparently comes from a narrow scientific context. What exactly is that supposed to achieve? I don't get it.

If cause and effect holds then there must be a timeless first cause. — Devans99

Very funny.

Honestly you are talking about the Summa Theologica, one of the greatest works of philosophy, and calling it dogma. — Devans99

Dogma in a fancy suit is still dogma. Honestly, would you expect any less from the Diogenes of The Philosophy Forum? I am not exactly of the sort to hold back criticism out of a sense of awe and respect. Brutal honesty is the order of the day.

I'm afraid that will only make him worse. In the end, we have only this:

Don't feed the trolls! — Pattern-chaser

You know, if you're going to keep publicly slandering me like that and attempting to manipulate others against me, then you can't at the same time act like you have the moral high ground without hypocrisy.

Please tell me where cause and effect does not hold? — Devans99

It seemingly does hold, and that's the problem you have to contend with. You have proven only capable of reasoning up to a certain point before resorting to your dogma of a first cause.

My reasoning against an infinite regress is that it has no starting cause, so that the 2nd cause cannot be defined (because it is determined by the first cause), nor the 3rd, and so on. That is a topological argument that the start is causally connected to the rest of the infinite regress. It does not rely on infinitesimals. — Devans99

The logical resemblance is crystal clear. It's just a backwards chain and a forwards chain. You go into detail in a similar way that Zeno's paradoxes do, with a similar logic, and then at an arbitrary point, you randomly assert your dogma of a first cause, like the mirror imagine conceivable dogma of a final destination.

:lol:

The point is that your Homer example demonstrates that space is discrete. So it is a valid argument that leads to the valid conclusion: that space is discrete (not that Homer can't walk the path). — Devans99

Stop changing the subject to a different argument resembling Zeno's argument, but with a different conclusion.

Zeno's argument concludes that it is impossible for Homer to get to the end of the path.

I never reason like this. Your example has a completely different structure to my argument. — Devans99

You're either lying or deceiving yourself because you can't handle the truth.

You really want the logic to work in the special case of God, even though it doesn't work elsewhere. It's illogical to argue that the universe must have had a start on the basis of that reasoning, yet to reject that reasoning in other contexts. You haven't reasonably demonstrated the necessity of a start. Your reasoning against an infinite regress is just of the sort that Homer has to get halfway, and half of halfway, and so on, only backwards instead of forwards, and then you randomly assert a first cause, which would be a bit like randomly asserting a necessary final destination which simply must be reached.

What do you have to back up this bald assertion? — Devans99

Logic.

So homer cannot walk to the end of the path so by your logic the universe has a first cause? — Devans99

No, lol. Homer can walk to the end of the path, so the universe can be without a first cause. The logic against either conclusion fails.

No it does not. It's a topological argument. First cause is topologically connected (casually connected) to every other cause. Take away the first cause and everything else ceases to exist. It has nothing to do with infinitesimals. — Devans99

I've seen you with my own eyes break it down in a similar way. You reason backwards along the same lines. If you were more logical, then you would maintain that Homer can never reach the end of the path, because to reach the end of the path, he must get halfway, and to get halfway, he must get half of halfway, and so on. That's like you reasoning that for the universe to have existed the time that it has done, then it must have existed half of that time, and half of that time, and half of that, and so on. Except that you then just randomly assert without reasonable justification that there must have been a first cause, which you've also called a start.

The difference is that the logic in the case of Homer goes forwards, whereas yours goes backwards.

Seriously, can you present a logical argument for a universe without a first cause? — Devans99

Yes.

If Homer can walk to the end of a path, then the universe can be without a first cause.

Suppose Homer wishes to walk to the end of a path. Before he can get there, he must get halfway there. Before he can get halfway there, he must get a quarter of the way there. Before traveling a quarter, he must travel one-eighth; before an eighth, one-sixteenth; and so on.

Your argument for the necessity of a first cause uses the same logic.

It doesn't work in the case of Homer and the path, so it doesn't work in the case of the universe and the supposed necessity of a first cause.

Of course not, but Zeno's arguments highlight the nonsensical nature of the continuum - that is the purpose of the arguments - not to prove an arrow is motionless. — Devans99

If you don't believe that an arrow in flight must be motionless, then why do you believe that there must be a first cause?

Looks like the same kind of logic to me.

Zeno's arguments have some merit; else we would not still reference them. — Devans99

I wonder if that distraction technique was deliberate or unconscious. :chin:

Do you, or do you not, believe that a flying arrow is motionless?

I agree that, if I'm right I'm only right by definition, but I disagree that it is the same as your ad absurdum. I have reasons for defining existence the way I have, using the term that way will not in any way hamper my being understood, and no one has yet provided any reason why I shouldn't. All three such criteria of reasonableness are not met with your horse/toast example.

Maybe, after discussion, you'll convince me that my definition is useless, or inappropriate here, but until that has happened, it remains a reasonable one. Now if you need to check why defining 'horse as cooked bread is unreasonable... — Isaac

You shouldn't define it that way because I can conceive of the existence of an undetectable being. It makes sense. Yet your definition rules it out.

An undetectable being is not like a square circle. An undetectable being is more like a black swan.

I was asking you to describe the faults in my arguments. I don't see what purpose a discussion of Zeno's arguments serves at this point. — Devans99

I'm trying to get you to see the purpose of my relating your argument to Zeno's arguments by getting you to use your brain instead of me spoon feeding you the answer.

Describe the bad logic please. — Devans99

Describe it yourself. Describe to me the faults in Zeno's arguments.

When you were at school, did you just sit back and ask your teachers to explain everything to you, so you didn't really have to learn through tasks and challenges? If you had've done so, how do you think your teachers would've reacted? Is this reflective of your understanding of education? It's your job to sit back and hold to your assumptions, whilst everyone else works to spoon feed you and get you to actually think?

It's like if I give you an inch, you take a mile.

We disagree. I rule out square circles because of the law of noncontradiction. Without that fundamental law of logic, nothing makes any sense. But although I do not actually believe that there exists a god or any being at all that is undetectable, it is conceivable, and it doesn't contradict the concept of existence, because existence doesn't entail detectability, even if there is no known exception. That's a black swan error, or just an attempt to win an argument through definition. If you define existence in that way, then by that definition, you're right and I'm wrong. And if I define a horse as cooked bread, then by that definition, I'm right to say that I had cheese on horse this morning, and you can't argue against me on my own terms.

Do you understand how it can be doubted that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, and that the flying arrow is motionless?
— S

I don't find either paradoxical; the universe is discrete, so not very good examples.

A logical argument can lead to something at odds with common sense? This is true. Relativity and QM are both examples where common sense does not cut it. — Devans99

If you understand how they can be doubted, then you should be able to understand how your argument for the necessity of a first cause can be doubted, unless your psychology prevents you. They all use a similar sort of bad logic.

That's a really inconspicuous straw man: I did not say at any point that philosophy only involves metaphysics and epistemology. And I'm well aware of the distinction between philosophy and history and science. I'm not suggesting what you are wasting your time attacking. Please don't insult my intelligence.

Is it, or is it not, the case that history and science make claims of the sort that fall under the broader category of branches of philosophy such as metaphysics and epistemology, in spite of belonging to the more specific category of history or science? Is the claim that Earth orbits the Sun not a claim about reality or what's the case? Is the claim that we know that Caesar crossed the Rubicon not a claim falling under the broad category of epistemology?

I'm not pitching philosophy against ordinary language. I'm pitching ordinary philosophy against senselessness. You say there's a 'context' for your claim - well, show it.

For instance, what would it mean to say that objectivity can be predicated of fact about existence, for instance? What kind of question, or questions, would it take to eatablish this (or not?). I know the question for reproducibility: is this observation reproducible under fixed conditions, yes or no? (Therefore it is objective (or not)). Now say I want to disagree that the existence of Jupiter is an 'objective fact' - what exactly am I disagreeing with here? Why is it not just a fact tout court? What conceptual work does the modifier 'objective' do, in this context? And what concequences follow - or not - from agreeing or disagreeing with this statement? And why are those concequences significant? What do they tell us about things - about Jupiter, or about facts, or about the relation between the one and the other (or something else perhaps?) What, in other words, is the grammar of 'objectivity' as you use it?

Note that I'm not saying there isn't such a grammar. Only that you've not provided one, and without it, the claim is - and remains - senseless: not even wrong. — StreetlightX

Is it not a massive problem to interpret my claim about the existence of Jupiter to be a claim about an observation being reproducible under fixed conditions? For starters, I'm not talking about an observation.

The logical consequences of what I am saying, if we assume it to be true, is that Jupiter would still exist even if we had all ceased to exist. It is about a planet, not an observation.

Contrary to what you've said, it is very much about mind and feelings and independence and perception and reality and truth and so on.

Contrary to what you said, I do know what subjectivity means.

Yours is a very peculiar and self-defeating approach to the topic. You can't just waltz in and erase the ordinary meaning of terms and dictate a new approach to the issue which flies in the face of how the issue is more commonly understood. That carries a giant burden, and I wish you luck, as it seems kind of futile to take that approach. It seems like you'd just not be properly engaging with what folks like myself and Banno are wanting to discuss, but instead it seems as though you're wanting to reframe the topic in a different way, where the language has a different meaning, and we're at risk of talking past each other.

I don't understand how you can doubt there is a first cause... — Devans99

There's a reason for that, but it's not what you think. It has to do with psychology.

Do you understand how it can be doubted that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, and that the flying arrow is motionless?

I can't help but be logical about this when I'm in that mode, although I can switch between being logical and being practical. It just doesn't seem very interesting or deep to be practical about this from the angle of epistemology. Unless a proposition is demonstrated through sound logic to imply a contradiction, then it is reasonable to maintain that it is logically possible. The actual existence of an undetectable god is one such proposition. And the rest, meaning all this stuff about in practice and what matters and suchlike, is changing the subject. We can be practical by just shutting up and making some cheese on toast or doing the washing up or something, but that's not doing philosophy.