Given a sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptability of the underlying modal logic, the listed theorems do follow from the axioms. (This point was argued in detail by Dana Scott, in lecture notes which circulated for many years and which were transcribed in Sobel 1987 and published in Sobel 2004. It is also made by Sobel, Anderson, and Adams.)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#GodOntArg

From Wikipedia:

"Relativism is a family of philosophical views which deny claims to objectivity within a particular domain and assert that facts in that domain are relative to the perspective of an observer or the context in which they are assessed."

I go one step further though. I don't deny any objective reality.

- EugeneW

A fallacious argument can still be a proposition and even a valid proof even if unsound.
In any case Godel's ontological argument has been automated and verified in other languages or terms and as itself. That would be a proof. Even the sep, among many papers that sought to automate it, has said so.

Yeah why questions seem to have an unfalsifiability to them as they can't ever verify an answer and become effectively uninformative and useless. It's a similar issue with any negation like "no" to any question but that suffers from unverifiability.

You changed demonstrate for proof. I don't know if that was to side-step an empirical requirement (depending on your definition of demonstrate) or if you are making an asymmetrical analogy.
In any case there are proofs of creation from God in cosmological arguments, contingency of creation arguments, ontological. Aristotle required a prime mover and Plato required a form of good. I'm not sure if those overlap with your statement.

Relativism doesn't deny "objectivity", it just says the particular domain is distinct in some manner from the more universal domain. So what energy and matter is in biology is different from (either by being a partial of or not) physics.

Relativism just says no objectivism to a particular domain. We can speak about a "relative truth" in terms of the particular domain but none of this gets to the issue of objectivism being meaningfully incomunicable and in any sense that's not a definition of objectivism.

I think that's the issue with defining things by their negation - you get contradictions and really no answer.
Instead, morality is defined by what is most prudent actions to take (which means nothing on its own). When we predicate biology and get bioethics then we get a propositional statement depending on how you define biology.
We can assume biology in general is life founded upon, perhaps, amount of proteins and amino acids so where all of biology is to promote, and is dictated by, the amount of proteins/amino acids. So from that type of bioethics, torture would be fine assuming no proteins or amino acids are lost torturing the baby and that the torture leads to the safety of the other amino acid/protein creatures living.

If something is objective because it's dependent on the subject (like idealism?) then are you getting rid of the subjective distinction? If you're not doing that then how can the word be communicable between people unless you deny other objective worlds (or other subjects)? If it is communicable between different subjects then whatever realm that is that allows communication is still meaningly incommunicable and if you deny other subjects then however you account for reality outside your knowledge come up to the same issue.

There seems to be no way to verify that atheism is true. There is no way to ever get to theism being false without asserting theism as a verifiable proposition but if theism is verifiable at all (can be true or false) then atheism is contradicted (after all, it would inherent the truth aptness of theism if it's a second order claim as you say).

What does "helium is objective" introduce? If we lived in a simulation and found out helium was computer code would you call that objective still? Why would that preclude the social construct fact of helium being the second element on the periodic table by Mendeleev?

Agreed, there's also a bias for being or existing things at least epistemologically.
If we deny quantum mechanics then we epistemologically never deny/negate physics entirely (we could be extreme general relativists or string theorists) however if we assert quantum mechanics, then that entails mechanics (at least epistemologically).
If atheism is defined as the negation of theism then I'm not sure how one ever gets to that position even given infinite negations of physical theories.
Now physics can be shown to be an issue by attacking the premise of it (that the material universe is fundamentally matter and energy) but this doesn't seem to imply that physics has no validity or doesn't exist in this world (can't be talked about) or that we have the means to justify that we have exhaustive means to show it doesn't exist.

I think atheism ends up throwing the baby out with the bathwater and theism, and even atheism, should be assumed that they are real but in terms of what they are like social constructs etc.

What Angelo said and you also can't say "x is everything around y" because you're not communicating anything meaningful.
When you say e.g. "helium is objective" you're communicating nothing anyone can use but if you say "helium is the second element on the periodic table" it becomes an actual proposition.

Randomness is a human construct

This is definitely true. So is goodness/infinite etc. There's nothing except a human abstraction which is randomness.

If you're going to spout scientifically illiterate and innumerate

It even says in the link that "In addition to exhibiting sensitive dependence, chaotic systems possess two other properties: they are deterministic and nonlinear (Smith 2007)."

This in no way implies an equivalence between what was said about randomness.