That doesn't seem to square with what actually happened though. The industrial revolution happened later and exacerbated both sides. What language you're using in terms of "private interests of one group" etc is actually rousseauian general will which the lockean north denied in favor of natural rights. The south refused to allow the slaves inside their general will to grant them freedom (except infamously with the 3/5ths compromise where it benefited them and, in any case, not granting them 3/5ths freedoms).
In any case, the main push against slavery was purely christian and not economic (there was a physical war, not an economic one with corporate takeovers/mergers etc) unless you mean economy as a byword for culture or state in which I refer back to the north not participating in general wills but natural rights which were influenced and founded, later, by the christian movements there. The whole thing seems christian and there was a ton of secular reactionism against christian abolitionism even in the north. So again unless you mean economy as not in the north but in the christian community but that would trivially concede your point.

It seems there was a divide but I see a lot of political qualifications and less theological ones. In any case christians can be wrong but I don't see any push for getting rid of slavery outside christianity. Even if nominally the enlightenment thinkers were against it (I would say founded in christian ethics), it took christianity to take the charge against secular society on this and it was secular society, through liberal capitalism, that created the issue.
Mercantilism traded slaves but it never allowed the importation of them and were generally against the institutions at home so it was more on the buyers.

I've only seen southern baptists split from baptists. Right now they're a big congregation but baptists were a major congregation then even in the north.

Transcendentalism was influenced by Unitarianism and came after the early abolitionist movements. The northeners banned slavery in states by the late 18th century for some (with future unitarian and future president John Adams writing it in as a clause for Massachusetts' constitution). If I remember correctly, Quakerism had a lot of influence on transcendentalists too.

Your goal is to argue from a basic premise to a conclusion where "1." randomly states what should be the penultimate point but then discards it.
If you instead argue, for any object that exists (however defined), it has a prior cause or it does not (and if it does not then it is a foundation - can be a proposition with justifications if this is hinged on too much for people).
Then you can insert any trivial object x through that (it must be trivial otherwise you need a new proposition just so long as they accept it).

I suspect a large amount of the work done is justifying "prior cause". Whichever argument justifies that (from a basic premise) should be prior.
In any case, because your work is written that way, you cover a lot of ground twice and inefficiently work with what you've been given. You can really write that all in one line (∃x(Px OR !Px & Fx) - there exists x such that it has a prior cause and if not then it is the first cause).

Edit: Notice x or !x is trivially true and valid no matter what proposition for classical logic but the & adds something so a separate proposition is necessary where you could write Px > !Fx, ∃x(Px OR !Px) as two lines.

I missed the universal quantifier at the beginning. I think it's better written with an existential quantifier to be an actual "or".

Edit: you postulate variables it looks like but you can't check them with "1." because it uses a universal quantifier. To be able to check them with "1." you need it to be able to take in "X", "Y", "Z".

The "or" logical connective is meant to make sure that only one condition has to be met for anything. It's to prevent infinite regression. Whether it's justified or not is different but it has to be one statement for validity.

There's overlap but the first asserts a causation chain and the second asserts an un-caused foundation.

Validity can't at all be tackled by datasets or not in a meaningful manner. A lot of data we have is noise and the data is still just past actions of humans which is not the best standard of truth and thus data.

I think SSRN looks really cool but, like you, I'd like to see some more integration with either the university systems or the federal government which can be a completely different program to SSRN if independence is considered an issue.

Evil doesn't exist until you can show an object "evil" and then show causation of "evil" to other objects in reality. Actions are too general and can be in many contradicting categories and "suffering" can't be evil as sometimes pain is good as an evolutionary response etc.

This except I say everything that is good is just what God created or is existence (through God). There are then degrees of good as we get closer to the most universal good which is God. This overlaps with reality perfectly for me like in science, math etc. It's just the most accurate.

I like the idea of living papers and I think a lot of shake-ups will be necessary for that to work and I think it would be best to have a sorta arxiv or vixra set-up which researchers use like that for it to have proof-of-work and applicability.

That being said, I think the overreliance on any statistical methods is almost the single worst factor about the replicability crisis. I know it's necessary for some work in material science and it's impossible to do ai without it but the social sciences should really work on plain validity or we're going to be stuck with the mess they have still.

I'm not interested in conversing with you.

I'd rather not converse with you.

Nietzsche ended his life trapped in a sanitarium. I doubt there's much information to take from him.
Morals make you a better more assertive and effective person (much to the chagrin of 16 year olds everywhere) and this is plenty evident throughout history even if hollywood tries to make it all seem sacrificial and negative. Socrates death bore western philosophy and christ's sacrifice was much more fundamental than that and bore the supplanting of western philosophy at the time and the basis of western civilization (to include laws, art, politics, modern philosophy, missionaries sent to dangerous areas to make alphabets for them so they can read the bible etc).

I think it's more fair to include all religions we've had (and maybe all possible ones). The major religions are around because their truth order is really high. An example is the early christians who took on philosophers then supplanted them (the conception of God by christians was placeholdered by Plato's form of good and aristotle's prime mover in a very pagan society). These stoics, skeptics etc could choose which philosopher to follow and yet they all ended up choosing christianity (with the neoplatonists being the last group of pagan western philosophers).
This phenomenon happened throughout milennia through the burial cult stage, animist, pagan, axial age etc so we can say these aren't just "good true" but they have a universalness of explanatory power that informs diets, ethics, law, politics, economics, ontology, science, math etc. It's a modern perversion to solely assume relative truth to their society they grew up in (and that doesn't really come off as fully accurate anyways, clearly people have disliked their city they've grown up in and cities pay consequences for being wrong regularly).

The first can be rewritten having orders of truth and then a proof of convergence is necessary but I don't think that's hard.

Interesting, I assume belief is derived from truth or oughts are derived from personal is's (as they're just personal propositional statements). Whichever is happens to be the most fundamental truth for you is what you'll believe imo.

Edit: but I don't think validity is enough to be a most fundamental truth for anyone necessarily. Still needs to be personally sound.

I'm just saying assuming the relationship is justified (that zeus created lightening), changing zeus to be of the mind but not changing lightening to be derivative of the mind (and thus keeping the relationship that zeus created lightening even while changing the substance) doesn't get a valid analogy for what they were saying and positing which means it never captures what their religious or spiritual thoughts were.

I don't think it's possible to ontologically negate/debunk anything (because we don't have epistemic certainty). I assume we just can't derive some things from particular chosen metaphysics/frameworks (such as science can't derive ghosts or even math but that doesn't mean neither don't exist).

What do you mean by repercussions?

I wasn't supposing mystical. I was trying to see if there was anyway we could find it to be causative of material things or even universal things like math but given your last reply then you may be looking for a universal ethics which can "put you in the right place at the right time with the right attitude"? There are certainly ethics like that but it requires a good, universal axiology (value structure) for you to align yourself with.

I see. I'm trying to find some way to understand if it's possible and the only metaphysics I know which may be able to is idealism but I'm not sure how an idealist would deal with objects that they haven't seen or conceptualized but that do affect them.

I'm thinking of transcendental idealism for Kant where he said we had to start with epistemology and that we could never see things-in-themself which would be a limit to it.
I know other german idealists avoided that term but I don't know if they solved it.
Would this be amenable to regular idealism?

I don't think our thoughts have any causative effect on anything external to us. It seems like an induction problem. I would say there's a general "positive" metric and you can get there but what you do in your head won't reach it fundamentally.
I think there would need to be an analyzable proposition to justify validity of that.

I think an issue is with treating Truth/Falsity like an objest as Frege did. It creates contradictions by asserting the existence of false things (and if false things exist then what is truth aptness really doing).

I get what you're trying to say but the way you're wording it makes it seem like you're making evolution equivalent with existence. It's hard to answer your question because the ideas and words are structured in ways that come off as contradictory.
An x realist is one who asserts x is the foundation of reality or, less commonly, is a part of reality (which is pretty trivial unless you don't have a foundation for reality or that foundation contradicts the part of reality).

Anyways I don't know Wittgenstein's views on evolution but anyone can be a mystic or fan of mysticism and contemporaneously be an evolutionist or fan of evolution.

Pythagoras coined it right?

I'm just seeing this.

or to us homo sapiens to whom everything is the "real" and non mystical?

Are you saying evolutionary realism is just reality which is non-mystical? Then definitionally that's what it is but there's an issue with soundness there and a conflation of evolutionary theory along with mysticism and the inaddressable, too-general word "real".

What's an evolutionary realist? The nature of causation and definition of evolution is still undefined which is partially why it's a theory still. As far as I'm aware it's just an observation and nothing people can do hard science on at least as macro-organisms. Taxonomy is still not a science sorta as a result.

I don't see mysticism qua mysticism in any contradiction with evolution.

There's an issue both ways as in it's "weird" for either position validly. Until a metric is developed so where sc nominees are picked more "objectively" then it's going to be political.

Sometimes the word used is epistemic such as epistemic priviliege (where one is privilieged with a unique epistemic set, or way to deal with reality, based on your upbringing (or based on ontological events that happened in your life vs epistemic ones which you may have participated in epistemically but not actually such as watching a horror movie or waving back at someone who was not waving at you)).

I would agree with the distinction between temporal sequentialism and logical sequentialism. I think I'm trying to capture sequentialism in general and have just been calling it causation. I'm not a big fan of temporal sequences and just redefine them in terms of their ontology (such as where a rock on mars may be from t1 to t2 is entirely dependent on the object rock and mars).

Epistemological is just a way we try to order things so an example may be that darkness is the opposite of light, so allowing polarities creates this concept that because light exists materially that darkness does. This would be a distinction between validity and soundness where darkness is ontologically just the absence of light (also valid but sound).
There's a particular order where the ontological nature of an object informs what epistemic standards can be used to understand it (such as what eyes or hands will "know" about a blade of grass under a running river). This order is asymmetric where the "belief, degree of knowledge, hunger-inducement the idea may make you etc" have no impact on the ontological position in question (say quantum mechanics or theism etc).

So for emergent computing they try to develop a valid structure for dealing with objects they propose exist (such as birds and them turning into flocks) and formally this fails because the game of life deals with completely different units (just dots in general I suppose).

Yeah that's fair. I think for me causation doesn't inherently need time in order to speak about cause. To me cause is solely the "why" something "is" so the basis is a type of predication of the is. This definition and generalization allows an inclusion of math/logical problems such as 1+1=2. If we include time then we can't include universals and then we have no means to speak about "what caused math" which is important for the "foundations of mathematics" etc.
In that, we would need to be able to speak about what causes time and how time is ordered (linearly, hierachically, cyclically). I've heard arguments which necessitate time for causation but then it becomes deficient to speak about time itself and makes any causation narrative a bit ad hoc to what the basis is (seasons, years for cycles or convergent evolution for hierarchy or linear time).
What are some good conceptions of causation in principles or full narratives that you prefer?

As far as the epistemological conception of emergentism, this video below called the game of life takes zero input from the person and plays itself (a zero-player game). It creates multiple shapes etc and people have tried to map what shapes are created (when birds appear and what happens after) and it seems impossible but the issue is they're establishing an epistemological fraking of the code ("birds") then trying to create patterns off that when the code doesn't compute by that so epistemologically emergentism seems to appear but ontologically this isn't the case.

https://youtu.be/C2vgICfQawE
It's called emergent computing.

I agree with the inherent ontological and ethical necessity of man to have an action such as christ did. I don't even mean politically in that we needed that to be where we are today. Just looking at Socrates who showed an ethically important action, we have the foundation for western philosophy (which was supplanted by christianity during Rome and then christianity became the basis of early modern philosophy).

That being said, I feel the transcendental argument fails due to its circularity. I'm more an advocate of the ontological argument (which Plato would have enjoyed) and the cosmological argument (which would point to Aristotle's prime mover) slightly less. I don't see the benefit or historical relevance for the transcendental argument. If you already believe then sure it makes sense even with less explanatory power.
I'm reminded of a hegelian who was asked to formalize their position and he said "a", which is formal and still just an assertion.

I think perfection is a bit of weasel-y word with no real address one can speak of. I find arguments involving "omni-" prefixes to similarly have issues. It's like trying to communicate "objective facts". You don't have objective knowledge and neither do I or any human so at best you're saying "what my subjective knowledge believes is objective" which functionally communicates nothing in and of itself. I think a lot of proofs suffer from this. Godel's ontological argument has less issues.

If you want to know why then you can't use quantity to properly divide them. It's self-defeating. A lot of answers have gone over specifically or hinted at what the real distinction is and it's a more realistic framing of reality. Physics develops off a metric of frameworks with more explanatory power of the objects it is interested in (e.g. why Newton's physics supplanted Galileo's and why gr supplanted cm and qft is attempting to supplant gr and qm).
Religion is, like philosophy, interested in a general explanation of reality and the better ethical/ontological/political etc frameworks come from monotheism vs paganism and paganism has advantages over animism etc.

Edit: In conclusion it has nothing to do with numbers and animism has totem animal worship which is worship of one animal or one natural event and paganism sometimes holds just one god to be supreme so there is no paring down of gods as some atheists may like to frame it/think it is what's happening.

If those two people are developing a conception of theism and both are catholics who agree in every other issue except purgatorism, then the fact that they're both monotheists implies the number one isn't at all a factor for them deciding whether they should be infernalists or not.

A person who is attracted to 21 year olds has no perversion for the number 21 and instead appreciates their perceived qualia of a 21 year old.

Failing all that, yes poly- means many, mono- means one and a- means negation (a placeholder for 0 but not actually 0). Those never go into anyone's decision making about accepting a religion or not so your metric you offered doesn't have enough explanatory power.

How much, in that scenario where two catholics disagree on purgatorism vs infernalism, do numbers get involved when they're both monotheists and of the same God?

How many apples does it take to intuit sweetness or tartness of the apples in question?

Quantity isn't the metric anyone should be using especially as it necessarily entails a qualia for deciding to use numbers in the first place.

You made the claim that polytheism + atheism can equal monotheism and it seemed to be the only measure you offered to arrive at monotheism but intuitively we see an error with only using quantity because, as pragmatic as it may be for an atheist, it isn't a good explanation for why people pick a conception of God even if they worship the same God per se (so numbers aren't involved in this decision at all). Other metrics are needed.

Also, polytheist religions don't necessarily accept all gods and there's a lot of back and forth between who is best to serve. Priests generally served one god in pagan cultures iirc so qualia applies here as well.

I can only say I think using a quantity explanation can't explain the qualia of picking any conception of God (especially if it's the same God per se).
That and the Hebrews monotheism and a lot of early types of monotheism actually avoided proselytization.

The argument for monotheism can be seen partially in monolatry/henotheism of the ancient greek city-states and the hebrews, it established sovereignty where accepting the whole pantheon did not. It created a particular ethical framework they could all follow, and develop, as one.
Monotheism has a better cosmology and ethical grounding where pagans gods are clearly imperfect and there's a necessary fundamental ethical narrative to hold them to. Paganism implies the errors of itself as fixed by monotheism. Aristotle and Plato used a single grounding foundation (prime mover and form of good respectively) even in a pagan society.

In any case you can't use an accident like quantity to ever deduce anything about the quality of the subject. It's an induction issue and is similar to trying to understand where apples come from simply because you happen to know there are 52,000.

There's not a problem with it but you demonstrated a naturalist theory of religion and I was saying that it implies anaturalism even if you only use members of naturalism (e.g. it's not sufficient an explanation to say "the reason people thought zeus existed was to explain thunder" because it requires elements outside naturalism to substantiate it which it usually declares gods as being of the mind which isn't sufficient to explain the proposition as said).

Edit: For the zeus example, I think an asymmetry is in the structure as in you would need to show thunder is then in the mind (as the naturalist rebuttal here is in the substance of zeus) so if zeus is the best explanation for cause of thunder for them and if zeus is best explained by the naturalist as in the mind, then thunder would have to be in the mind all other things being equal if naturalism offers a better argument for the substance or nature of zeus/gods/religion/spirituality.

To what you wrote yes.

People wanted to know what it was, this bright object in the sky. All this only to say that the sun - like all meaningful things - became more and more meaningful as people attributed more and more meaning to it. In short, we do this by drawing correlations between the sun and other things. At some point, we gave the star at the center of our solar system a name, and began using that name to pick it out to the exclusion of all else, all as a means to talk about it. Some worshipped the sun, which is not such a far stretch for a bunch of ignorant humans seeking to explain stuff.