The assumption of X and the assumption of not X are in two different cases.

Each case is separate, there is no incoherence.

Proof by case analysis is not something I just invented, it is widely used.

Do I take your post to mean you don't support the JTB of knowledge for most instances when you use "I know..."?

What you have missed in that example is the conditional statements (or if statements, or case statements).

I am going to argue that I am not guilty of murder.

(1) CASE 1 - IF I did not shoot the gun

I did not shot the gun, therefore I am not guilty of murder. trivial argument.

(2) CASE 2 - IF I did shoot the gun

I shot the gun but it was in self defense because of....

Therefore I am not guilty of murder.

Taken together, CASE 1 and CASE 2 have covered every possibility and show that I am not guilty of murder.

You've got to pick a position and you can't toggle back and forth between them because the conversation won't be coherent. — Hanover

I disagree. I can structure an argument such as as follows:

I will show X

1) If Y is not true ... Then X
2) If Y is true ... Then X

Therefore X

If I do the above, I do not need to show Y is true.

My original general assertion, is that we should dispense with the T in JTB.

JTB asserts that the T is objective, absolute truth.

If there is no absolute objective truth, we dispense with the T because there is no T. This is the trivial solution, end of discussion!

If there is a T, then, the discussion we were having ensures. So we can have this discussion. In this case I am also arguing that we should dispense with the T in JTB as it is useless.

So in either worldview, I assert that the T in JTB should be dispensed with, and replaced with more justification. The dispersal of the T is not dependent on worldview - it should be got rid of either way!

No my justification if for my belief in what the T means in the formulation of the JTB theory.

I am arguing against the T in JBT. That is the T that we have been referring to here.

If the T in JBT is a wrong, then I am correct in saying that JBT is wrong, and nothing further needs to be said. In order for a discussion to happen, it is required that the T in JTB is a valid worldview.

Another way to put my argument is:

Knowledge is epistemology, yet JTB attempts to define it in terms of metaphysics.

However, when anyone says "I know ..." they are using epistemology not metaphysics. So they ignore the metaphysical T and just use epistemology to formulate the "I know ..." sentence.

What is your justification that there is a truth independent of personal justification? — Hanover

This truth is what T in JTB refers to (as far as I understand - I am not an expert on the matter). So really you should be asking proponents of JTB that question.

From the SEP section on JTB:

Something’s truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/

This is the truth being referenced in JTB. I am not arguing for that worldview - JTB implicitly accepts that worldview. I am arguing against JTB.

because I have justification and I believe it.

Which is all anybody needs in order to say "I know..."

My argument is that I cant directly "know" Metaphysical truth. That is absolute, objective truth. That is what is true regardless of what I think, regardless of what you think, regardless of what anyone thinks.

Instead the best I can do if follow the path of best justifications in order to infer this metaphysical truth. I am simply using justifications and more justifications until I am happy to call the result "the truth." But that is not the metaphysical truth the JTB refers to.

That's exactly why I must insist upon at arriving at further justifications to substantiate my knowledge the election was stolen, else I'll have to submit to the authority of my nemesis.

This seems to celebrate confirmation bias as opposed to starting from the notion that there is a truth. — Hanover

And are you able to get this justification? If you are not able to, you do not know the election is stolen. So go away, look at the evidence and try to find justification. If you can find substantial evidence the election was stolen, then you can validly say "I know the election was stolen".

The same would happen under JBT. If you went away and found enough evidence to provide sufficient justification the election was stolen, then you would say "I know the election was stolen". You would say "It is true the election is stolen." The additional T makes no difference to what you say.

I, on the other hand, have looked at the evidence and consider it enough justification to consider the election was not stolen. So I say "I know the election was not stolen." Do I say this because I have direct access to truth? Absolutely not. Rather I am inferring truth using evidence (which is a form of justification). Because there is good justification I have great confidence in this, but it is not direct access to metaphysical truth.

How does adding "objective" and "absolute" help? — Banno

It says it is independent on your view on the matter, my view on the matter, anybodies' view on the matter.

This truth plays no part in my use of "I know ..."

Yeah, sure, we don't have access to "objective metaphysical truth", whatever that might be. — Banno

The T in JTB, as far as I understand (please correct me if I am wrong), is objective absolute truth. It is what is true regardless of what I think about the matter. It is what is true regardless of what anyone thinks of the matter.

So if we don't have access to that, then what is it doing in a definition of knowledge?

Some things, such as that Banno can be bloody annoying, are true.

Ah but see I am not yet sure that is true. Though I reserve the right to invoke that at a later point in the discussion if need be!

But that lack of doubt is due to strong beliefs and/or good justification.

They are not due to that person having direct access to objective metaphysical truth.

Things I have little doubt about are because I have strong beliefs or very good justifications for that. Not because I am some kind of oracle that directly connects with absolute truth. So why include absolute truth in the definition of knowledge? It serves no practical use.

Well, yes - there's knowing how to do things as well as knowing what is the case. But the two are not entirely unrelated. — Banno

Yes that is right. but I'm not referring to those cases.

There are people who have said "The Earth orbits around the sun." They said that because they believe it, and because they have good justification to believe it. That is all I am saying - that metaphysical truth does not come into it.

In these cases JTB does not adequately define what they mean when they say "I know..."

Not all of them - I don't know what I don't know. I just know that I am capable of being wrong. and I know this not using JTB but using JMAOJB.

Surely you also recognize that something you completely and utterly believe today may turn out to be wrong?

That allows us to ignore any inconvenient truth. If the election were not stolen, then I must accept rule by my opponents, and I'd prefer not to, so I arrive at my knowledge, with all my justifications, without regard for truth. — Hanover

However you want, you can not directly access metaphysical truth, whatever method you use. So when you say you "arrive at the truth," you arrive at enough justification that you think it valid to claim it as truth. This is my point - the metaphysical truth is not something any of us have direct access to - we only have justifications (like evidence) to come up with a provisional (or conditional if you like) truth.

The situational aspect I suggest is this - the more consequential the knowledge is, the greater is the burden for justification that should be applied.

Your example is very consequential, thus a higher burden of justification is needed to claim something as knowledge.

The situational component of what is needed for practical knowledge is a good point.

And again, note that JTB is a definition, not a method. — Banno

But no one pays any heed to this definition of knowledge when uttering "I know ..." Hence I am suggesting there exists another definition for knowledge that explains what people mean when they say "I know ..."

How do you know they could be wrong? — Banno

Because I believe I have justification that beliefs can be wrong. I believe this belief can also be wrong. I believe this belief....

To snap out of this regression, I accept anything that has a lot of justification as true. A conditional truth. I use JMAOJB to consider what I know, not JTB.

Anyway what you seem to be suggesting is that T is redundant and not used. In which case that is close to the point I am making. It is belief and justification that is needed for knowledge. The metaphysical truth is of no help whatsoever.

Sure, you have false beliefs. But if you believe that the Earth is not flat, then you are committed to the truth of the sentence "the Earth is not flat". Step (3) is already done for you. — Banno

Moore's paradox, as far as I understand, is that I can't simultaneously hold the following sentences:

-"I believe the Earth is not flat"
-"The Earth is flat"

However I can hold the following sentences

-"I believe the Earth is flat"
-"I am unsure if my beliefs are an accurate reflection of reality - they could be wrong"

Part of the problem is that JTB is a definition of knowledge, rather than a method for finding it. It doesn't tell you what is true and what isn't. You will have to work that out some other way. — Banno

Yes you are right that is a large part of it. But I want to go further and say no one pays any heed to this definition of knowledge when uttering "I know ..." Hence I am suggesting there exists another definition for knowledge that explains what people mean when they say "I know ..."

Yes, what I think is along the lines of what you have said there.

And to put my views more succinctly, in JBT knowledge (epistemology) is being defined in terms of metaphysics (absolute objective truth). But since we can never actually access this, instead I propose to define knowledge in epistemological terms - provisional truth that can be justified using the best current justification methodology. That to me is what most are referring to when they say "I know"

Hence, if you believe the Earth is not flat, you cannot consistently deny (3). — Banno

But I understand that I can have incorrect beliefs. I understand that just because I believe something, that does not make it true. Does that answer your objection?

And specifically, I believe that I cannot directly access truth. Yet I use "I know.." plenty of times.

Nevertheless, I see others saying "I know the Earth is not flat."

I ask one of them to explain themselves. Overwhelmingly they say:

1) I believe the earth is flat
2) I have justification for that belief
3) I have so much justification for that belief that I can now claim knowledge.

In practical use, everyone substitutes the T (truth) for MAOJ (Massive Amounts Of Justification).

And so in practice, everyone uses JMAOJB (Justified Massive Amounts Of Justification Belief) when using "I know..."

If everybody uses JMAOJB when invoking knowledge, then is it not the case that knowledge is actually JMAOJB and not JTB in any practical use. A meaning of a word is what is in common usage, after all.

True!

But I'm not sure that corresponds to a p=0.5, as you suggested in the OP.

I don't think the following two mean the same thing:

1) "I don't know the probability of that happening"
2) "The probability of that happening is 50%"

I'm afraid I don't know!

To try to put it succintly, it's reasonable to be agnostic about alien contact ten years from now, but not ten minutes from now. — RogueAI

If by agnostic your mean p=0.5 (as you said in your OP), I would disagree that it is reasonable to think that there is a 50 percent chance that we will have alien contact in the next 10 years.

Then again I have no idea what would be reasonable - anything would be a stab in the dark for me.

I sometimes wonder if heat death is merely the transformation of actionable energy (light, thermal, kinetic, chemical etc) - observable energetic interactions, back to the un-observable - pure potential energy (as energy cannot be created nor destroyed but only change from one form to another). — Benj96

The theory of heat death is postulating a state where entropy has increased to a point where it can no longer increase. This state does not mean there is no energy, rather it means that the energy cannot be used to do work.

So it is almost the opposite of what we conceptualize as potential energy - it is energy that has no potential to do any work at all.

I need some kind of reason or justification for assigning probability to the value P(H), P(E/H) or P(H/E). I have no good reasons or justifications for any of them - so I would just be fumbling in the dark blind. I can't even attempt a rough estimate.

About the only one of your probabilities I could attempt is P(E), which as an above poster said is 100%. Every potential contact with aliens so far has been disputed, so the probability that there has been no undisputed contact with aliens so far is 100%.

Entropy always increases in a closed system. Life is not a closed system - it is interacting with the other parts of the universe all the time. For example life is getting energy from the sun. The energy in the sun is created by nuclear fusion of hydrogen into helium, with energy released. This process increases entropy.

So while life may temporary decrease entropy locally, the total entropy of life and all other parts of the universe that interact with life is increasing. Any local decrease in entropy in living organisms is smaller than the increase in entropy elsewhere that it interacts with (eg in the sun).

I put forward that the base on which Wittegenstein has learnt his language, was itself formed through ostensive definitions.

Watch how any very young kid learns the definition of words. The parent points at a brown wood table and says "table." Points at a brown plastic table and says "table." Kid points at brown car and asks "table?" Parent points at brown car and says "not table." And so on.

With enough examples of what is a table, and enough examples of what is not a table (which is my addition to the examples in the above posts), you get a definition of what a table is.

Ostensive definitions are what our language foundation is based on.

Philosophy goes around in circles (in my head, anyway). Is it not the case that matters we have called a fact are sometimes later demonstrated as being wrong? Does this mean that it was not ever a fact then? How do we tell the difference between a fact and a holding statement? — Tom Storm

Isn't this the difference between what is, and what we know is?

And (apart from in some philosophies), those two things are not the same. As far as I can tell it is not our knowledge of things that make them exist. What exists does exist whether we know about it or not.

However we can do no better than our best knowledge at any given time. Hence we call our best knowledge as "fact," because we can't bypass our best knowledge and directly tap into perfect knowledge.

While, conventionally speaking, true propositions are related to facts, but it is not necessary that they do, insofar as it is not necessarily a fact that makes a proposition true. Philosophy proper does not concern itself with convention. — Mww

I disagree, I think it is necessary that it is a fact that makes a proposition true. But I think that is for another discussion, perhaps a "what does "fact" mean" discussion.

Are contradictions not the basis for self reference and agency. For example two humans must be in contradiction with one another's beliefs otherwise they would operate as a unanimous hive mind. Thinking and acting as one. No individualism. — Benj96

I don't see two humans having two different beliefs as contradictory. They are two different people, and thus there is no contradiction if they have two different beliefs any more than two different cars being two different colors.

It is true that if I held a different belief to you, I could contradict you, so contradictory is used in the sense you describe. But the use of the word in terms of God I took to mean true contradictions - for example a car being only blue, and not blue at the same time. That is impossible in terms of how we think of the world normally.

The following two statements are a contradiction.

1. The color of the car is blue and only blue
2. The color of the car is not blue

They both can't be true at the same time based on the way we currently view the world.

No. The truth value of a proposition is not sufficient for proof of existence. Truth value is nothing but logical relation to the LNC and resides nowhere else than propositions. Proof of existence, for humans, is experience. — Mww

Is not a preposition that is true, linked to a fact? That fact really objectively exists, if nothing else.

I don't think you can have a true preposition that is not linked to a fact.

Yes. It is true objective reality is not a question of fact.

I just see this as itself stating a fact about objective reality. You are not saying that you subjectively experience this but others may subjectively experience differently. You are claiming an objectively fact about reality that objective reality is not a question of fact.

The issue I have with logical arguments about a omnipotent/omniscient/can make contradictions true God can be seen using an (imperfect) analogy.

I have a being locked in a room. He has real magical superpowers and can make anything happen. I will argue he can't escape.

-The room has walls that are so thick it is impossible to escape
-The door is secure in a way that it can never be opened
-There are no windows
-There is no other escape route

Therefore the being cannot escape.

Have I proved my case? No of course not! For a normal human, sure if the above is true then he is not escaping. For a magical being with superpowers who can make anything happen? He can make anything happen, so of course he can still escape!

And he can escape not only any physical cage I put him in, but also any logical cage. For he can do anything - I have said so myself!

You can't attribute a being with all encompassing superpowers and then ignore the consequences of those superpowers.

I'm starting to doubt I understand what it would mean for logic to not work because of your arguments. If God made logic stop working, how could we use it to come to any correct conclusions? — ToothyMaw

We would have to accept our ignorance and either give up, or look for another tool other than logic to analyses the statement.

But this confusion comes from assigning a characteristic to God that I don't think you fully understand the consequences. What are the consequences of a being who can make contradiction true? I don't think you even understand such a scenario, nor do I, nor do I think anyone does. I'm not sure you, or I, are fully capable of understanding a world in which a contradiction are true.

As I've said enough times to drive even me crazy, I don't think whether or not objective reality exists is a question of fact. I think it's a metaphysical question with no truth value. — T Clark

Is there a truth value to "Objective reality is not a question of fact."

If there is a truth value to the above statement, does that not show objective reality does exist?

If there is no truth value to the above statement, what even is the meaning of that statement?

I thought about another piece of logic that may help (or may not!)

Premise 1: God is capable of making contradictions true
Premise 2: X is unjust
Premise 3: God let X happen even though he could have prevented it

Conclusion: God is unjust

I'm saying our logical system cannot ever be used to derive the above conclusion from the premises, as long as premise 1 is there.

No set of premises that contain a premise that God is capable of making contradictions true, can be used to derive any conclusion. Our logical tools are stumped if premise 1 is correct, and we remain conclusion-less unless we find another tool.

To be clear, my issue is with your statement: " He could make any two contradictory things possible at the same time if he so desires."

If this is true, can you give one example of how this could happen? Perhaps that would help clear any confusions up.

My contention is that were true, the our logical system would not be capable of being used to analyze such a God.