For example, physicalists insist they are not making a metaphysical claim, but they are. If everything is physical, then nothing is non-physical. Okay, that explains nothing.
So, if I thought about my grandmother the other day, they'd say that is a physical process. To which I'd say, so what?

If all my thoughts are physical, that only accounts for necessary conditions. But the principle of sufficient reason says, why did you think about your grandmother rather than something else.

As a postmodernist, I tend to think of metaphysics as synonymous with worldview, and worldviews are inclusive frames that address all aspects of culture , from the r winces to the arts to ethics and politics. — Joshs

The positivists obsessed with telling us what we're not supposed to be able to think about. That legacy is still with us, though receding.

To be clear, I don't think metaphysics is about referring to how the world really is, but what we say about the world.

My own understanding is that it addresses the question, What kind of thing is the world?
Does the universe have a beginning? Did it come from somewhere?
Metaphysics overlaps with epistemology--and aesthetics--so the clear delineation is not useful to make.

I think we need to shake the traditional views of Parmenides and Heraclitus. This "being versus becoming" is a false one. Why should we presume that "being" means something opposed to "becoming"? This essentially equates being to permanence.

Beings exist. Beings change. Change -- becoming -- itself is a being. Not a "physical object," of course, but a process. Processes exist. Change exists. Thus, change is "in" being as much as permanence is "in" being. — Xtrix

Agree with that. Many confuse metaphysics with theology.

Is there any metaphysics that does not offer a grounding of the sciences? — Joshs

I was not aware metaphysics had to be about grounding science. Not a definition I would abide by.

Anything can be not good for anyone. Can you say any source that is good for you and shows that what I said is wrong? — Angelo Cannata

I asked you to name a book or article you read that is doing metaphysics in a way you do not approve.
Let us look at some examples.

Many scholars say Aristotle did not name his text "Metaphysics." Or that it simply referred to what he wrote after the Physics.
In the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the project as "first philosophy." Or, analysis of basic concepts.

You can have a look here, as an example. — Angelo Cannata

I know this roils some, but Wiki is not a good source for philosophy.

“In seeking a comprehensive account of everything, metaphysics is continuous with science, going beyond particular scientific theories.”
(Metaphysics of science between metaphysics and science, Michael Esfeld) — Joshs

Sorry, did not understand that. Why does metaphysics have to be about science?

I am interested in seeing how it is not true, according to what philosophers. — Angelo Cannata

What articles or books in metaphysics are you referring to?

The aim of metaphysics is to go beyond physics, beyond science — Angelo Cannata

That is just not true.

I should note that for writers like Heidegger, Derrida and some of the phenomenologists, the notion of the human is presupposed but is instead a derived abstraction. From their vantage framing metaphysics in terms of what is within or outside of human experience is already anthropocentric because it begins from the notion of the human subject. nModern empirical science, including physics, is anthropocentric for this reason. The transcendental starting point for these authors is not yet a human subjectivity Even though it is a kind of subject, it does t lend itself to a dichotomy between what is experienced from a human point view and what is outside of it. — Joshs

Yes. They presume a definition of subjectivity as if it is self evident. Is a subject merely a biological entity?

My interest is Leibniz's concept of possible worlds. Now, at 'time' (event) of the Big Bang, life on planet earth was possible even though there was no planet. So it is a possible world.

Are you saying that the universe/multiverse distinction is only one of language? I don't think that's what you're saying. Let's define "universe" as everything that is or previously was observable, at least in theory. — T Clark

Right, I am saying that is an indeterminate reference.

From what I've seen, multiverses are proposed as physically existent entities, not logical ones. If a parallel universe is not physically observable, one of three conditions apply 1) It is metaphysics and useful, 2) It is metaphysics and not useful, or 3) It is meaningless. In my understanding, multiverses associated with quantum mechanics are not even theoretically observable. — T Clark

I don't agree. But I am not an expert on physics and cannot cite current research. That said, a parallel universe is not part of multiverse theory. I think of it this way. If we say there is one universe we have to explain why there is nothing which unifies that reference other than 'all that exists.'

In my understanding, possible worlds are different from the multiverse. Possible worlds are metaphysical entities while the multiverse is, at least purportedly, science. It is also my understanding that neither possible worlds nor a multiverse associated with quantum mechanics are even theoretically observable. A multiverse associated with cosmic inflation may be. — T Clark

A possible world is a logical structure, so a multiverse would qualify.

In other words, it seems to me that metaphysics just lack self-criticism. — Angelo Cannata

Can you give an example? I mean, lots of philosophers publish papers on metaphysics and criticize each other.

Any statement about how the world is, is metaphysics. Say, here are the limits of knowledge, is metaphysics.

Along history metaphysics was criticized by historicists, because, by trying to understand how things are, it looses sight of the fact that things, rather than being, are becoming (Heraclitus). — Angelo Cannata

And that is doing metaphysics.

I think that metaphysics, whatever meaning you give to it, has the defect of being bound to being: in certain contexts it is almost a synonim of ontology. The consequence of being bound to being is that it ignores time and subjectivity. — Angelo Cannata

I do not think that is true.

Here's the first article I've seen that discusses the possibility of determining whether alternate universes might exist. It still seems a reach.

In mathematics, a dynamical system might proceed to evolve along alternate paths at points of bifurcation. But what happens in math may be mere fiction in the physical world. — jgill

The idea of the multiverse is what I think possible worlds refers to. There is no universe, just multiple universes.

What was Kant's experience? Walked to university same path every day and died. That guy is going to tell me what experience is?!

Kant was just a platonist, establishing absolute fiats as if no other way of thinking about the world was possible.

Epistemology cannot posit "knowing" it's own "conditions of possibility" — 180 Proof

Exactly. Like jumping over your own shadow.

Kantians think everything is about science. It is not.

Ad hominem attack. If you want to discuss philosophy, I will. If you cannot refrain from ad hominem attacks then I will not respond.

Kant is talking, not about any purported objective characteristics of space and time ( for him they are not objective, but subjective), but about how they are experienced by us. You may have read a lot of Kant, but it doesn't look like you've understood him. — Janus

A shame you need to make a personal attack. We're done.

uration. All experiences must persist for a time. I wasn't thinking of sequence; but that raises a different question: can we understand events without sequentiality?

Kant was a Newtonian. He thought there was absolute time and space.
— Jackson

And...?
seconds ago — Janus

And I don't accept Kant's concept of space and time. So, his conditions of experience are contrary to science.

Kant was a Newtonian. He thought there was absolute time and space.

What do you mean "determine all possible experiences"? Are you saying we cannot think of the necessary general characteristics of any experience? That seems just plain wrong; since time, for one, certainly seems to be necessary for any experience. — Janus

What is time? Sequence? We can't understand the world without framing it by sequences? Even Leibniz knew time was relative, before Einstein showed it empirically.

Why do you say that? What about the necessary conditions for any actual experience (which is the same thing expressed differently). — Janus

I can explain my objection. But, basically, experience is an event. We cannot determine all possible experiences.

Or was it epistemology under the guise of (a new kind of) metaphysics or proto-phenomenology? Do you think it is possible to reflect on and know what characteristics any possible experience or judgement must have? — Janus

No such thing as the condition for any possible experience.

David Lewis:

"I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. I believe that things could have been different in countless ways; I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been.’ I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds.’ (1973a: 84)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/

"Metaphysicians want to know what the world is like, and tend to ask questions about what sorts of things exist (e.g. are there numbers?), as well as what sorts of things are fundamental (e.g. is everything made of simple elements?). "

https://philpapers.org/browse/metaphysics

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Where? Write it again or link to it; I couldn't find it. — Janus

"Janus;681633"]

That's okay. Read the thread and you will see it stated explicitly.

Where? Remember I'm asking for traditional definitions, not your definition. — Janus

I wrote Aristotle's definition. Even the SEP entry on metaphysics starts with Aristotle.

Can you offer some other traditional definitions of metaphysics? — Janus

Stated it several times.

If you think he is boring and pedantic it wouldn't have taken you much reading to discover that you think that, would it? — Janus

Part of course work for my graduate degree.

No, it is traditionally considered to be that which is absolutely existent (as opposed to what appears to us to be existent). — Janus

One definition, yes.

You may not, but traditionally metaphysics was understood according to that definition. — Janus

Aristotle defined metaphysics as "first philosophy." Where a philosopher discusses his basic principles of philosophy.