↪Joshs Interesting. Thanks. I kind of missed any exposure to science too, so there's no hope for me — Tom Storm

I consider personality theory and models of psychopathology to count as science. They had more impact on me than any other science.

As someone who is here mainly to see what he may have missed in not reading philosophy what do you think you have gained from all this reading? What were or are you looking for? If it's awareness... what does that mean in practice? — Tom Storm

If your main exposure to science has been through physics and chemistry , then I would suggest that that there are two generations of philosophical theory that have moved beyond the limits of these sciences. Put differently. these philosophers have peered into their crystal ball and produced sketches of what future sciences will look like. On the other hand, if your acquaintance with science extends beyond physics to include the new extended synthesis in biology, predictive processing and enactive , embodied approaches in cognitive science, the. I’d say that you’re not missing much by avoiding philosophy. There’s only a small handful of philosophers who have ventured into territory beyond these newer sciences, and most of them consider themselves to be scientists as well as philosophers.

I had thought that creativesoul was claiming that there were other species who were capable of symbolic langauge, though, which would be something else altogether. — Janus

Did you mean something different than this?

“Evidence that an animal is capable of some degree of symbolic, human language processing supports the argument that the animal's consciousness is to some degree human-like.”


One can , of course, distinguish between ‘capacity for’ and natural use of symbolic language. Bonobos have been shown to have this capacity, but only demonstrate it in artificially induced situations prompted by humans.

Only humans, as far as is known, are capable of symbolic language and linguistically mediated thought. — Janus

I agree with Joseph Rouse’s take on the homologies between humans and other animals with respect to language.

“Elisabeth Lloyd (2004) shows that the fortuitous success of the bonobo Kanzi in acquiring a rudimentary linguistic capacity has changed the terms in which these issues should be addressed (Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, and Taylor 1998). Kanzi inadvertently participated in experi­ments on language acquisition because his mother was a research sub­ject, and he was too young to be separated from her. While his mother struggled with the experimental protocol, Kanzi did much better despite not being initially targeted for instruction. Eventually, Kanzi acquired not only a substantial vocabulary of symbols but also the ability to produce novel, intelligible syntactic recombinations. The experiment­ers plausibly characterized his eventual linguistic capacities as in some respects comparable to those of a thirty-month-old normal human child. The interpretation of these data is controversial (see Pinker 1994,Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, and Taylor 1998; Lloyd 2004; Bickerton 2009), but I follow Lloyd in her insistence that Kanzi’s achievement shows that the neurological capacity for linguistic understanding is ho­mologous between humans and bonobos and probably extends further to common ancestors.

…the capacity for producing and consuming linguistic expressions is not uniquely human and did not emerge as a novel capacity in the Homo lineage. Other species in the primate lineage who share this ca­pacity have nevertheless not developed language on their own, even in rudimentary forms, despite having the neurological basis for produc­ing and understanding symbolic expressions with syntactic structure.
This capacity for linguistic expression and understanding has only been expressed in experimental settings that bring other apes into contact with an analogue to human language adapted to their perceptual and expressive abilities. This fact strongly suggests either a lack of selection pressure in other lineages for linguistic communication or substantial barriers to the realization of this latent capacity.”

He provides evidence that Bohr was an entity realist
— Joshs

Could you explain what that means? — frank

"entity realism" asserts the real existence of unobserved entities.

“Entity realists think that when we accept a theory we have warrant for believing that the objects and events spoken of in nonobservational theoretical terms really do exist as the unobserved causes of observed phenomena; whereas antirealists hold that acceptance of a theory justifies no such belief.”

It says that and also speculates on “a direct Kantian influence on Bohr”. So it is suggesting both.
— Joshs

Didn't exactly demonstrate that, did it? — frank

I’ve been reading NIELS BOHR'S CONCEPT OF REALITY by Henry J Folse. He provides evidence that Bohr was an entity realist , a position that seems to represent a pre-Kantian form of realism.

“Natural phenomena, as experienced through the medium of our senses, often appear to be extremely variable and unstable. To explain this, it has been assumed, since early times, that the phenomena arise from the combined action and interplay of a large number of minute particles, the socalled atoms, which are themselves unchangeable and stable, but which, owing to their smallness, escape immediate perception. Quite apart from the fundamental question of whether we are justified in demanding visualizable pictures in fields which lie outside of the reach of our senses, the atomic theory was originally of necessity of a hypothetical character; and, since it was believed that a direct insight into the world of atoms would, from the very nature of the matter, never be possible, one had to assume that the atomic theory would always retain this character. However, what has happened in so many other fields has happened also here; because of the development of observational technique, the limit of possible observations has continually been shifted.

We need only think of the insight into the structure of the universe which we have gained by the aid of the telescope and the spectroscope, or of the knowledge of the finer structure of organisms which we owe to the microscope. Similarly, the extraordinary development in the methods of experimental physics has made known to us a large number of phenomena which in a direct way inform us of the motions of atoms and of their number. We are aware even of phenomena which with certainty may be assumed to arise from the action of a single atom. However, at the same time as every doubt regarding the reality of atoms has been removed and as we have gained a detailed knowledge of the inner structure of atoms, we have been reminded in an instructive manner of the natural limitations of our forms of perception.”
( Niels Bohr 1929)

That quote isn't saying that Bohr was influenced by Kant. It's just saying people have noticed parallels — frank

It says that and also speculates on “a direct Kantian influence on Bohr”. So it is suggesting both. And I would suggest that those quoted believe the parallels between Kant and Bohr are close enough that it really doesn’t matter whether Bohr ever read Kant. The point is that these authors believe there is strong overlap in their ideas. You apparently disagree.

The Copenhagen interpretation (especially John von Neumann's view) is not Kant. There is no thing in itself. There is no determinate thing prior to wave function collapse, and we have a clear idea of the math that describes what's there prior to collapse. — frank

The authors of the Copenhagen Interpretation weren’t simply duplicating Kant, but theyr were strongly influenced by him:


”Many philosophers and physicists have recognized a strong kinship between Kant and Bohr’s
thinking or a direct Kantian influence on Bohr. In the thirties C.F. von Weizsäcker and Grete Hermann
attempt to understand complementarity in the light of neo-Kantian ideas. As von Weizsäcker puts it many
years later, “The alliance between Kantians and physicists was premature in Kant’s time, and still is; in Bohr, we begin to perceive its possibility”. A series of modern scholars (Folse 1985; Honner 1982, 1987; Faye
1991; Kaiser 1992; Chevalley 1994; Pringe 2009; Cuffaro 2010; Bitbol 2013, 2017; and Kauark-Leite 2017)
has also emphasized the Kantian parallels. Although these scholars find common themes, they also disagree
to what extent Kantian or neo-Kantian ideas can be used as spectacles through which we may vision Bohr’s
understanding of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, Cuffaro (2010) holds that any proper
“interpretation of Bohr should start with Kant”, and that “complementarity follows naturally from a broadly
Kantian epistemological framework.”
(Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics)


“After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a 'practical' transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as 'practically a priori', in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of 'objective reality', though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense.”(Heisenberg and the Transformation of Kantian Philosophy)

Just to clarify, in terms of our folk notions of reality, QM goes far beyond saying that things work differently on a small scale. QM suggests that there is no distinct reality outside measurement events (which don't require consciousness, but human activity is a kind of measurement.)

So when you say physicists are realists, that doesn't necessarily answer the OP. If the OP had some sort of Newtonian picture of the world, then the answer is yes, QM says that a fair portion of that absolute realm is not real. — frank

There is no single ‘folk’ notion of reality any more than there is a single philosophical or scientific notion of it. There are so many variants of realism that different philosophers adhere to that it is possible to accommodate QM within one or more of them. It is true that the most traditional conceptions of the real can be ruled out by QM ( naive realism) but then we reach some difficult territory.

As far as the quotes in the OP making what is observed dependent on the existence of the observer, this shows an assimilation of Kant’s work on noumenon and phenomenon , concept and sensation, and the inaccessibility of the thing in itself. But embracing Kantianism only rules out older conceptions of the real , like Newton’s. This is why one can find a hodgepodge of realism and anti-realism within a single account of QM.

The world works differently at different scales. Why would we think that wouldn't be true. Different metaphysical regimes apply at different scales. That's the thing about metaphysics - there's not just one appropriate view of reality. The philosophical lesson of QM is that what works at human scale doesn't work at all at nano-scale — T Clark

There are ways of accommodating within a a single metaphysics the situation in physics that the world appears to work differently at different scales. For instance, one can argue, as the followers of Quine do , that facts and value systems ( accounts of the world) are inextricably bound together. Thus, it is not just the human and nano scales of physical description that can’t be fully integrated. It is also the myriad descriptions of reality within the various subsegments of the biological and social sciences. Whatever we study within one approach responds also to other theories and procedures, but with
different new precision. Since it responds to various systems, it cannot be how one system renders it.

“ Alternative approaches develop separate webs of precise findings. Precision develops within each
web, but they are not consistent with each other
Quine rightly saw that the order of nature cannot be just one of these "webs." Although they can be internally consistent, they cannot be reconciled. Even if they could be, we know in advance that more of them will soon form. Since we know it in advance, we can assert it in advance:
Nature ..... can respond with surprising and precise detail, but differently to different approaches.
The responsive order provides a "reality" to check against. We can check each approach (procedure, performance, set of experiments, measurements) against the feedback of an equally precise "reality." But there is no way in which we could "check" so as to decide between these "realities.” Eugene Gendlin, The Responsive Order )

Notice that the concept of fact-value inseparability is a unitary metaphysical conception describing a situation of multiple accounts. You will find that almost all philosophers treat metaphysics as a way to synthetically unify disparate accounts at the most general level of thought.

If you search for "real" in your Schaum's Outline of Quantum Mechanics you will find nothing, save mentions of the real number system. "reality" is in the domain of speculation by both experts and quantum mysticists. — jgill

On the other hand, among those physicists who are aquatinted with philosophical accounts of realism and anti-realism, most consider themselves philosophical realists.

Human nature more than ever has become more and more susceptible to degrees of corruption that has become so widespread in current society as to be normalised, go uncriticised and go unchecked.

And it’s not just the base vileness of most human beings to be nasty to each other that is the problem it’s the platform to do so in this ever increasing fragmented society. — Deus

If we were to populate an entire planet with clones of you, people who not only share the moral philosophy in your OP but follow its implications to the letter, channeling only their most noble instincts in dealing with others and assiduously avoiding what they define as corruption and vileness, what would be the result? I suggest it would be similar to the world that you describe. When we try to hold others to normative primciples of right and wrong, when we understand human behavior in terms of a universal framework of ethics, we will have no effective means of making sense of ways of seeing the world very different from ours , and we will be forced to condemn rather than sympathize with behaviors that don’t fit our norms. In this way, our moral righteousness is part of the problem rather than the solution. As Ken Gergen wrote:

“We do not suffer from an absence of morality in the world. Rather, in important respects we suffer from its plenitude.”

Is your first thought aware of itself? Or is your second thought a reflection on your first thought (as mine is).

My feeling is that thought distracts awareness away from the present into the labyrinth of thought — unenlightened

There is an assumption common to meditative practice and cognitive science that one can make a distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective form of awareness , and a distinction between attention and what what one attends to. But if reflecting on one’s consciousness is distorting, then so is the ‘pre-reflective’ experience of awareness. Any form of consciousness or awareness is an awareness of something other than itself. There is no self to be aware of except a self that arrives to us from the world every moment as a changed self. To turn back to oneself, to turn ‘inward’ in order to examine the being of consciousness is a being exposed to an outside. Studying consciousness is studying g self-transformation, and this means participating in the transformation rather than standing outside of it.

But would you agree that someone like Nietzsche or Kierkegaard , who spent their whole lives with no recognition of their ideas, benefited from the guidance of those ideas as much in isolation as they would have if the ideas had formed the basis of a community paradigm?
— Joshs

You tell me. In what way did they benefit in their isolation? In what way would they have profited more if everyone else had joined them in applying the same existential analysis?

I have so little interest in them that I simply couldn’t even guess. I never saw anything of pragmatic use, although perhaps you mean how their writings function as romantic spectacle or popular entertainment? — apokrisis

Substitute a thinker you find relevant and see how you might answer the question.

↪Joshs You mean can paradigm shifting genius exist? Sure, why not?

But paradigm shifting means bringing the community with you. Otherwise nothing has happened — apokrisis

I guess technically a paradigm requires a partially shared set of practices among a community, so a lone genius is not the originator of a paradigm until they are no longer alone. But what does it mean to say that nothing has happened? Certainly nothing has happened for anyone but the lone innovator. But would you agree that someone like Nietzsche or Kierkegaard , who spent their whole lives with no recognition of their ideas, benefited from the guidance of those ideas as much in isolation as they would have if the ideas had formed the basis of a community paradigm?

Positive psychology is about recognising that reaching higher levels of mind is a collaborative enterprise. Team work. A collectively developing community of minds — apokrisis

To what extent, if at all, can one talk about an individual way of thinking that enters into territory not trod by others in the surrounding community? This would not be to say that an individual perspective is not formed through reciprocal interaction within the community , but that it is more than a node in a reciprocal network. It can exceed to some extent the culture it is shaped by. When Peirce introduced his ideas in the mid 1800’s , were they only a variation within a larger network, or did they play a leading role in transforming the network?

Everyone becoming their own world is another way of saying the same thing.

And when plurality is taken to its own logical extreme, it becomes wokism. We see the hard, fixed and eternal becoming the enforced collective norm that tolerates no diversity when it comes to its diversity. — apokrisis

Wokism is mostly Marxist and pre-Marxist dialectics. Modernist emancipatory dialectics is what postmodernism rejected.

I'm talking about those in power, whether in an organization or the whole country. — L'éléphant

Do you ever wonder how different things might look to you if you were the one in power?

Semiosis is the explanation for how such "first person" points of view arise as part of the information economy of a dissipation-driven enterprise. Meaning and value is what emerges as a result of that thermally embodied modelling process. — apokrisis

Peirce already takes us into another world where nothing is eternal and fixed, all is co-emergent and developmental. — apokrisis

What about the formal basis of such concepts as semiosis, code, information and thermal dissipation? Is there not an assumed irreducible ground for them , a formal content of some sort that is not itself co-emergent but is instead the condition of possibility of co-emergence?

The self can seem to exist as it own hard centre of value and meaning. Otherwise how else would Romanticism and PoMo find their claims to metaphysical legitimacy? — apokrisis

Doesn’t seem to be much use among postmodernists for the depiction of self as a “its own hard center of value and meaning.” Hardness and centers are hard to come by in their writing. Decentering difference is the watchword. Genes and thermodynamic processes exist for a postmodern writer like Deleuze, but a difference in degree does not exist without simultaneously being a difference in kind. Is this thinking consistent with a Peircean grounding of codes, information and thermal dissipation processes?

There are few who view themselves as explicitly immoral. There is always a way to rationalize. But this fact does not impact the legitimacy of our own judgements of them. — hypericin

The legitimacy of our own judgments goes only as far as the normative framework we buy into, within which the others actions appear immoral. But such normative
frameworks specify a certain way of interpreting the meaning of situations( the so-called objective facts), and do not take into account that the facts may appear very different from a different normative interpretive framework . This is because for many moral systems there is assumed to be only one meta-normative framework. As a result , we end up assuming that the other understands the facts just as we do , and it is their intent that is to blame. We say they ‘rationalize’ to themselves or to us, which is another way of saying they know what they do and why they do it , and they are lying about this. By confusing ‘immoral’ intent with a different interpretive understanding of the world, we justify our condemnation , punishment and even violence against them, but we never succeed in understanding how differently their world looked to them than to us.

Joshs You have to understand that greedy individuals do not try to hide the fact. Arrogance comes with greed. Love of power and wealth with no cap is displayed amongst them. It is understood. But for good PR, of course, they're going to say they're building communities and wealth for everybody. — L'éléphant

Some have extolled the message that greed is good. What they mean by that is the ability to accumulate wealth is associated with creativity and innovation that benefits society. They are praising the productive powers of self-interest and would insist that this is the only reliable way to produce wealth that makes its way to an entire nation. I don’t personally support this neo-liberal view, but they believe it is an eminently moral position rather than a form of destructive selfishness.

You ask rhetorical questions without giving hints as to what I should be contemplating here — Deus

You should be contemplating the correlation between level of cultural development and what we call ‘morality’.Cultural development brings with it greater insights into how others unlike ourselves see the world , and this allows us to engage with them in ways that are less violent, hostile and punitive. In other words , in more ‘moral’ ways. Once we have achieved a certain level of development , we turn around and accuse others who haven’t arrived there yet of being ‘immoral,

Many serial killers grow up in home environments very different from our own , and this can produce a kind of social intelligence that has profound gaps.

And an example of this is...what? — L'éléphant

I would argue that every time you use the word ‘greed’ to describe another you are failing to see how they legitimately justify their actions based on their perspective and personal history. For instance, ‘greedy’ CEO’s see the world through the value of what they produce. It is what they know best and that biases them in favor of rewarding themselves and building an ever more powerful empire that seems to them to be a gift to mankind. ‘Greed’ is really a kind of tunnel vision

My point is that intellect and morality are not intrinsically linked.

The misuse of high IQ for example has produced some of the US most prolific serial killers. — Deus

I.Q. is not the measure of social intelligence you need in order to see the correlation between what we call
morality and intellectual development. Ever notice how so many of the practices we label immoral are associated with older, traditionalistic cultures?

Good point. It is greed that is one of the big factors of the rationalised and unrationised aspects of ego — Deus

Unless of course labels like ‘greed’ are our attempts to blame others for our failure to understand situations that seem justified from the ‘greedy’ one’s vantage.

↪Deus Serial killing is not "misuse of high IQ"; that's psychpathy (or antisocial sociopathy) — 180 Proof

Nice label, but is there really any coherence in its definition other than people doing things that seem to be in severe violation of social norms? It seems mainly to serve as rationalization of the assumption that there is such a thing as an objectively determinable definition of suffering. See , there must be because of the existence of individuals who are allegedly constitutionally incapable of empathizing with others suffering.

Our consciousness is the sum of all four levels of semiosis or self~world making. And each level imposes its own mechanistic kind of measurements on the world — apokrisis

You have offered a story of genesis , unfolding from the physical to the biological to the social. The detailed twists and turns of the structural innovations at each level are contingent and relative , but there are non-relative , non-contingent meta-principles common to all levels, forming their condition of possibility. These would seem to be transcendental , but not in a strictly Kantian sense. What they do have in common with Kant is that they are objective formal principles. The implication is that personal experience , any kind of history and subjective time will forever be guided by a specific unchanging normative meta-frame. Is this right?

How have you established that you have have a fair interpretation of his choices/situation?
— Tom Storm

What we have is the public, actionable discourse, The stuff philosophy doesn't do. — Banno

Not sure what you mean here. I would say that my determination of my friend’s perspective and motivation is a process of trying on for size different ways of construing his actions , and seeing how well each of these templates can anticipate and make sense of his future behavior. The aim is to be able to fluidly ‘dance’ with him discursively so that my surprise at what he does or says is minimized, and I can constructively contribute to his needs. a

How have you established that you have have a fair interpretation of his choices/situation? Is self-medication a reaction to suffering, a form of suffering or something else in your view? — Tom Storm

He had been sober for about 5 years after a long bout with alcohol and was trying to complete a graduate program in psychology, while aiming to transition to female gender. He was thrown out of the program for failing to compete certoa. requirements and this led him back to drinking. But I could see the tremendous anxiety he battled with while he was sober, on a daily basis. There were all sorts of signs that life was becoming too much for him to cope with without assistance.

m

I have noticed that people who are homeless often have chronic and severe depression - it often presents after becoming homeless (but may also sometimes be a cause of homelessness) and i generally see it as part of the suffering intrinsic to many people's experience of living homeless.

that 'stalled creativity' or frozenness seems to eat people alive and I certainly recognise this in the lives of many folk I have worked with (and colleagues, but that's another story). — Tom Storm

Would you agree, from your experience, that what shatters people’s lives is the loss of the sense of connection with others, of having worth, of being held in esteem, more than material deprivation or physical illness? This is really at the heart of what I mean by ‘ ‘creativity’. For most people, what gives them their sense of being creatively vital is knowing that they belong, that they have a purpose that touches the lives of others. A family can be homeless, and for the children the homelessness may not have much meaning. Instead, what they will care about is the bond with their parents. If they have that , their physical situation will be less relevant. Even for the parents, the most painful aspect of being homeless may not be the material deprivation as much as the wound to their sense of worth and dignity, the trauma of failure.

↪Tom Storm The challenges of how one might keep warm and dry living rough present splendid opportunities for creativity, for fresh projects and directions. — Banno

The most hellish fate you could wish on someone is not homelessness, which people cope with in a wide variety of ways, but severe chronic depression, which can befall the wealthiest as easily as the most destitute. Severe depression, not torture , illness or poverty, is the closet approximation there is to a living death. And the reason is not only because the present offers no sense of relevant meaning , but it becomes impossible to imagine a future different than the present. This is the purest example of stalled creativity. William Styron would have exchanged his 10 years of depression for homelessness in an instant if given the choice.

Interesting and I am sympathetic to this view. How do you understand the kinds of suffering generated by abject deprivation or illness - living homeless on the streets with addictions and mental ill health or terminal cancer? — Tom Storm

Living with a terminal illness , and dying generally , isnt necessarily a monotonous unrelieved trajectory of suffering. It often has the same textured ups and downs of living. I think of Wittgenstein, who after a year or so of distraction from philosophy while dealing with his cancer , suddenly found a burst of creative inspiration just before his death, during which time he was able to write “On Certainty”.

I’ve known friends who were homeless and addicted off and on. The circumstances of people in this situation are complex and vary widely from person to person, depending on the reasons for their addictions, etc. My severely alcoholic friend seemed less concerned with his homelessness than with escaping the anxiety of social responsibilities, which is why he self-medicated with pills and alcohol.

So the purpose of suffering is to avoid suffering.
— Banno
When we look for meaning in suffering, we are looking for some use in it, are we not? Looking at suffering as a teacher about what not to do seems very practical. — Yohan

If one believes the world with which a person interacts is basically static , that the situation they find themselves is fixed and unchanging, then suffering , as a loss of previous thriving, could potentially be unending. One has no reason to expect the unpleasant situation to change.But many philosophers and psychologists today don’t look at our circumstances in this static way.
They believe we constantly transform ourselves as well as our circumstances , rather than merely being the victim of outside forces. We move through cycles of creative engagement with aspects of our world. We begin projects and relationships , move through periods of peak satisfaction and productivity, and then find ourselves at the end of a cycle. We temporarily run out of passion and inspiration, we become confused about our goals and purposes, we doubt our value, a relationship comes to an end, etc. Suffering marks the end of this cycles. If we believe i. the endless renewal of creativity, then we can view suffering as an opportunity to discover fresh projects and directions, as well as deeper insights. But it is only an opportunity if we take advantage of it and seek out new ways of thinking or living, and new relationships. Believing our world is static can become a self-fulfilling prophesy, freezing our suffering into a permanent condition.

You are treating this like some kind of cultural power struggle. But that is a bad lens for understanding the sociology at play in the scientific community. — apokrisis

Yes, the clash of metaphysical worldviews is a cultural, political and aesthetic power struggle. But ‘power’ here doesn’t mean that persuasion is blind to reasons. On the contrary, the choice of a particular metaphysical framework is essentially based on pragmatic utility. But the pragmatic advantages are internal to the framework itself rather than to anything in the world supposedly external to it. The realist would insist that the metaphysics must conform itself to what the evidence points to, and this gives the methods of the scientist a certain priority over those of the metaphysician. I would argue instead that concepts like evidence and observation are so thoroughly intertwined with the metaphysics ( the holistically organized pragmatic ways in which we interact with the world) that makes them intelligible that no significant progress in science is possible without a transformation in metaphysical underpinnings, which precede rather than follow the observations and the evidence.

Mechanics itself needs a proper metaphysical foundation. Atomism was always just the convenient story that fitted with a particular mathematics. — apokrisis

This makes it sound like the metaphysics comes later, to be tacked onto the science as an ad hoc specific account of the theory from a slightly higher level of abstraction.


How could Mechanics ‘need’ a proper metaphysics when it wouldn’t have been possible to create it in the first place if the scientific concepts weren’t already guided by a metaphysics?The space between Medieval Scholasticism and the Cartesian Enlightenment provided this metaphysical grounding for the intelligibility of Mechanics as it was understood in Newton’s time. QM, by contrast, links to a very different metaphysical backdrop.

So from my own point of view, my own interests, QM interpretations are a part of that much bigger adventure. Which also drags it back towards metaphysics as the conversation to be had. What ontology can have both the classical and the quantum as its dichotomous faces? — apokrisis

The indirect influence of Kantian Idealism , and more recently, of Hegelian and post-Hegelian metaphysics on the outlook of physicists is what made the formulation of QM possible. This doesnt mean that physicists needed to have read a word of Kant or Hegel , but these ways of organizing the world have slowly made their way into the general culture. Your favorite philosopher , Peirce, who has closely been influenced by both writers, wouldn’t seem to have any trouble in synthesizing classical and quantum models within his metaphysics.

what does it mean that there are a whole bunch of QM interpretations that try to demystify its mathematical success in one way or another?

Well, the thing they all have in common is that they want to assimilate QM to a more familiar everyday metaphysics – the classical view which is founded on determinism, composition and locality.

This simply shows the prevailing metaphysics in scientific circles is out of step with the prevailing physics — apokrisis

Isnt the relevant question, who in particular wants to, as you say, assimilate QM to a more familiar everyday metaphysics? What if it turned out that a majority of the key players in the development of current QM thinking were in this category? Would we have any justification in claiming that they are failing to grasp the correct metaphysics? There is a cottage industry of philosophers wanting to assimilate QM to their favored philosophical foundation , but could there be any arbiter better suited to determine what sort of metaphysical foundation is implicated by QM than one of its inventors? What is the metaphysical underpinning of Newtonian mechanics? Isn’t Newton’s own metaphysics writing an excellent source?

Individuals who form unsound beliefs will "disagree" with the sound beliefs. Many of them will try to assert that it is merely a "difference of viewpoints, opinion and outlook" or whatever other disingenuous rationalizations that they may dream up — ThinkOfOne

On the other hand, one could argue that the accusation leveled against another of ‘unsound critical thinking skills’ is often a convenient way to blame the other for our failure to understand their framework for interpreting a situation.

But it's mainly about outlook. Offering people more experience or information does not suit the case. People may have equal knowledge, experience and information and still disagree. — Cuthbert

One could make a similar argument about rival scientific paradigms. But if a new paradigm , by organizing experience in a new way, can ‘solve more puzzles’ as Kuhn put it, than the paradigm it replaces, even though it is not simply a matter of a linear increase in ‘information’, then perhaps we can say that grasping the idea that we each are born with a global perceptual style that subtly shapes all of our interactions with others offers an enriched understanding an aspect of human behavior that is missing from those for whom the concept of gender is non-existent except as a male-female binary, even though grasping this ‘gender paradigm’ is not simply an accretion of information. Word-views , including notions about sex and gender, are very resistant to change, precisely because they are such complex organizational structures. But this doesn’t mean that once we have transitioned from one framework to another we don’t feel that we have gained in understanding, even though we know also understand differently than before.

. I did not take it as an attack per se, but on one level a very poor response, philosophically/discussion-wise. On another rude. It's as if I didn't write other things which I did write. It took a position and instead of responding to it, plucking one quote out of context as if one is responding to the post — Bylaw

I quickly slapped together a set of fuzzily articulated thoughts, not being sure how interested I was in actually getting into this topic , and you interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to demean you. One can only be rude if one intends to be rude, and my interest was not in punishing or slighting you. Let people be inarticulate, disorganized or poor readers without personalizing it. It may save you some unnecessary angst in your life.

And it may also give others an opportunity to sharpen their argument, which I will do now. In my second post, I meant to include guns alongside portable neutron bombs
to indicate that my concern was with the distinction between the need to control weapons technology and the need expressed in various forms and to various extents by self described neo-Luddites to control all sorts of other technologies , motivated not by the perceived threat of physical harm but the concern over the psycho-social effects that technologies can have.

This leads me to my depiction of technologies as ‘neutral’ in themselves. I’m not sure why I used that word. My philosophical sympathies lie with postmodern relativistic approaches to culture and science, and the word ‘neutral’ almost never comes up in these discourses. On the contrary, technologies are considered forms of practical interaction , inseparably linked with other forms of practice. Technologies are essentially ideas, ideas are forms of cultural practices , and all practices change culture in specific ways. But in postmodern thinking , there is no overarching normative framework outside of specific social arrangement from which we can say that one set of ideas or technological structures is good or bad. For one thing , since technological knowledge intervenes in and changes social structures, even when it isnt being ‘used’, one cannot put the genie back in the bottle. Instead one can only regulate and clarify the ways we choose to use them, and this invariable involves the development of further technologies to regulate the previous ones. I think the issue comes down to whether and which uses of a technology are inherently ‘bad’, and this may be closely linked to the question which whether there are ideas which are inherently dangerous. The authors I follow suggest that all technologies are both inherently dangerous and inherently beneficial, sometimes at the same time.( I suppose it is in this sense that I called them ‘neutral’). The regulation of thought and technology both should be aimed at the avoidance of monopolization and dominant control of use, and the encouragement of differentiated and democratized proliferation of technologies. This seems to run counter to the desires of certain neo-Luddites who don’t see the accelerated creation of new technology as the antidote to the negative social consequences of current technology , but instead want to eliminate specific domains of techno-social structures.
Many are included to blame today’s gadgets for everything from obesity , lack of empathy , short attention span and incivility to a decline in sexual activity. But is the relationship directly causal, or is it that by opening up new options and possibilities , technologies make possible brand new challenges athat don’t necessitate throwing out the baby with the bath water?

For me the only way to protect society against the monopolizing and dominating uses of current technology is to move ever more boldly into new socio-political-technological terrain.

l

You'll pardon me if I ignore your posts from here on out and also please pardon me for hoping you never end up on any important regulatory body or find work as a debating coach or editor. — Bylaw

OK, I think that was a pretty crappy response. I also said

OK, no one is making a mistake about those
— Bylaw
referring to the neutron bombs. and I also pointed out that they didn't exist. I also mentioned that we are generally dealing with less immediately easy to track effects. — Bylaw

How easy it is to track an effect is a different issue from whether we agree on the fact that there is such an effect(harm) in the first place. That was my point. Those wary of the potentially harmful effect of a particular technology on society are already predisposed to see a cause-effect relation where others would not. This is not unlike disagreements among scientific approaches as to what constitutes evidence. Neo-Luddites may see all kinds of detrimental cause-effect relations between the use of cell phones and computers ( and e-scooters) and social functioning. I am much more inclined to see there effects of technology as dependent on an enormous range of factors. You say humans are not ‘ neutral’, but neither are they predisposed as a whole in any particular direction. Are guns and children an inherently dangerous mix? It depends on the age of the child and their gun training. It seems to me the greatest concern of neo-luddites isn't immediate physical harm caused by something like a weapon , but the psychological effects of tech. Here I reject the idea of any simplistic shaping effects of our machines on our behavior.

Some of the problems and potential problems with tech and non-neutral humans is not easy to track and predict like loaded guns on the floor of apartments with kids or teenagers being able to order neutron bombs online, say. — Bylaw

And , more importantly, whether a tech is ‘dangerous’, and what makes it so, is far from obvious when it comes to the concerns of many neo-luddites. We’re not just taking small neutron bombs here.

From Wiki:

In 1990, attempting to reclaim the term 'Luddite' and found a unified movement, Chellis Glendinning published her "Notes towards a Neo-Luddite manifesto". In this paper, Glendinning proposes destroying the following technologies: electromagnetic technologies (this includes communications, computers, appliances, and refrigeration), chemical technologies (this includes synthetic materials and medicine), nuclear technologies (this includes weapons and power as well as cancer treatment, sterilization, and smoke detection), genetic engineering (this includes crops as well as insulin production).

I think for many neo-Luddites, anything that destabilizes and transforms the long-standing social, economic and moral order is dangerous. Tech serves the role of scapegoat for them.