If, according to Nietzsche, all manifestations of life are manifestations of the 'will to power', and there is no ultimate 'right' or 'wrong' way to manifest it (someone in the classical tradition would perhaps say that the 'right' way is what fulfills the nature of the will, but Nietzsche rejects that), it is somewhat inconsistent to write books glorifying some way of living and criticizing others.

Mind you, I think that Nietzsche had pretty interesting things to say (e.g. about how resentment works and can condition our thoughts, about creativity and so on). But his extreme 'voluntarism', expressed in his mature 'amoralism' and 'will to power' etc is IMO more consistent with an empty philosophy rather than a philosophy that can teach a 'way of life'. To put it differently, the 'pars destruens' was so pervasive than no 'pars construens' seems consistent with it, not his. — boundless

Human beings are pattern-seekers. That is how we are able to function in a world which never repeats itself identically from one moment to the next. We have to have a way of anticipating what is coming next in spite of the constant flux we are presented with. Older ways of thinking in philosophy and the sciences dealt with this challenge by carving up the world on the basis of categories. There were now law-governed objects and causal relations that it was our job to properly represent. Nietzsche was among those who attempted to show the dangers of taking the changing patterns we experience in our world and freezing them into such mathematical identities and absolutes. He tried to show that we do the same thing with moral values as we do with empirical objects, and the result has been endless wars and violence over what is right and what is wrong.

Nietzsche’s argument was that trying to locate a value system with the right CONTENT could lead to nothing but nihilism. This didn’t mean that he abandoned all possibilities of distinguishing what is a better way of life from what is worse. What he did was to separate this issue from the particular content of meaning of specific value systems. Instead of focusing on arriving at a final correct content of knowledge or values, our focus should be on accelerating the process of moving through value systems. Process , not content. And speed, not depth of foundation. The best way of living is that which can enjoy the delights of creative becoming and re-invention in the most optimal fashion, which means keeping itself free from repressive attachments to content-based absolutes and foundations of all kinds. He recognized this as an enormous challenge, because we are precisely NOT volunteristic in our decisions.

Contrary to Sartre, the will is not free to choose whatever it wants to choose. We find ourselves choosing, we are driven to choose. This lack of volunteristic freedom is the result of the fact that the psyche is a society of competing drives, and the self is an amalgam of such competing forces. It’s hard to be volunteristic when the ego is a mere byproduct of a play of drives. In addition. the psyche isn’t walled off from the social sphere, but is intertwined with it. As a result, we always find ourselves immersed in larger normative cultural structures, and thus we always run the risk of becoming entrenched within norms that eventually suffocate and repress. We thrive on recognizing patterns , regularities and norms from within the flux, but Nietzsche suggested how we could allow ourselves the intense pleasure of such creative ordering while steering clear of the tendencies to ossify such assimilating activity into life and meaning-destroying certainties. And we can get better and better over time at allowing the creative future to flow into the present. This seems to me to be a promising , growth-oriented way of life. If it is empty, it is only empty of content-based prescriptions, as I think it should be.

This gets complicated, but with NOS4A2 I would say that the act of activism precludes this response to one extent or another. The activist is treating everyone, friend and foe, as a means to an end. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that we should prefer compassion and understanding, the advice that we should treat everyone with an equal amount of compassion and understanding turns out to be false. It is false because it is fitting to treat those who are attempting to use us as a means to their end with less understanding and compassion — Leontiskos

Doesn’t this raise the issue of the difference between theory and practice? Dont we all walk around with interpretive frameworks in our heads allowing us to make sense of our world? Don’t our ethical principles and political instincts come from such ‘theoretical’ structures, and don’t we put such instincts and principles into practice every day in our interactions with others? Is the head of a family not an activist in putting into practice their understanding of moral standards in their child raising decisions? Are their parenting decisions not means to an end, that being the raising of good people? Aren’t all ‘activists’ simply actively putting into practice what they believe to be in the best interest of society as they understand it? How are the critical comments about wokism in this thread not a form of activism? What are the ends the criticisms are a means to?

The subject receives those intensities and translate them into ultimate truth. Feeling of ultimate moral certainty resembles the ‘return of all names and intensities of history.’ It is the result of hyper-intensified machinic affect. — Number2018

But wouldn’t AO argue that it is only on the dimension of the molar (rather than within molecular intensities, the body without organs) where a ‘feeling of moral certainty’ can be manifest? Isnt it the molar regime of social formations which crushes , binds, plugs, arrests, cuts off the circulation of flows, constricts, regularizes and breaks singular points, and imposes on desire another type of "plan”? This crushing and plugging activity of stratification and molarization would seem to be the opposite of ‘hyper-intensified machinic affect’. Moral certainty, a clearly codified, representational affect, is a molar formation, not an effect of free-flowing molecular intensities or the body without organs (BwO).

Doesn’t one have to de-stratify from social formations and make oneself a body without organs in order to free up continuous intensities?

“This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions [intensities] here and there, try out continuums of intensities [plane of consistency] segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole "diagram," as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs.

We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows [intensities], continuum of intensities [plane of consistency]. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines.

If so, then an ‘anything goes’ relativist would have to embrace the proliferation of an unlimited multiplicity of diverse and incompatible totalitarian systems.

Why? Are they committed to some sort of inviolable principle that leads from the truth of relativism to this sort of open-ended tolerance? I don't see why they would be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

According to one way of reading Nietzsche on Will to Power, he is advocating the creation of values systems which , in themselves and in terms of their structure, may act in totalitarian fashion. My point about the radical relativist was not that they must tolerate all and sundry systems of power , but that what it means to be a value system is to constitute, for a time long or short, a monolithically self -perpetuating normative totality.

According to Deleuze’s way of reading Nietzsche, heterogeneity and difference inserts itself into every moment of the unfolding of any system of values, such that it is never the exact same system which unfolds itself every moment. As I said earlier, the idea of categorical identity is an illusion, but the most dangerous one. Deleuze writes:

When we say that the eternal return is not the return of the Same, or of the Similar or the Equal, we mean that it does not presuppose any identity. On the contrary, it is said of a world without identity, without resemblance or equality. It is said of a world the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity (the world of intensity). The eternal return is itself the Identical, the similar and the equal, but it presupposes nothing of itself in that of which it is said. It is said of that which has no identity, no resemblance and no equality. It is the identical which is said of the different, the resemblance which is said of the pure disparate, the equal which is said only of the unequal and the proximity which is said of all distances. Things must be dispersed within difference, and their identity must be dissolved before they become subject to eternal return and to identity in the eternal return…

If repetition exists, it expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneous opposed to variation, and an eternity opposed to permanence… in univocity, univocal being is said immediately of individual differences or the universal is said of the most singular independent of any mediation…In this manner, the ground has been superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and cause only the yet-to-come to return.” (Difference and Repetition)

Deleuze doesn’t deny that values systems are produced out of this riot of differentiation, but these systems are only totalitarian from the illusory perspective of distance.

…the thesis from Deleuze's late 1960s writings holds identity to be a simulation or optical illusion…identity and fixed markers, which may be considered natural and pregiven or contingently constructed but indispensable, are surface effects of difference. Identities and fixed markers, I want to say, are like patterns on the surface of water, which appear fixed when seen from a great distance, such as from the window of an airplane in flight: their stability and substantiality, in short, are a matter of perspective.” ( Nathan Widder)

If it's inevitable, we should value all the more the restraint our conservative nature gives us: first, do no harm. — frank

I’d rather audaciously stumble into the unknown. It beats a lobotomy.

But let’s say for the sake of argument that wokism’s roots contribute nothing innovative or valuable to the canons of philosophical thought.
— Joshs

I'm certainly not committed to the idea that all philosophy is good...
— Count Timothy von Icarus

-

What I am talking about is humanizing (as in respecting)the claim as if it is made by a serious person.
— Antony Nickles

Isn't it confusing precisely because it involves lying to ourselves? Because it involves treating someone who we believe to be unserious as if they were serious?
— Leontiskos

-

It seems that a fundamental disagreement here is over the question of whether humans are capable of bad ideas. The woke, as well as Antony Nickles and @Joshs, seem to lean into the idea that humans are not capable of bad ideas.

Consider an analogy. Human beings and human culture are, in part, ideational. In part, they are collections of ideas. In both cases the ideas are domesticated into a sort of garden. Now gardens have lots of weeds, and require weeding. The camp that leans into the no-bad-ideas direction is effectively claiming that weeds do not exist, or that gardens should not be weeded, or that weeds can be pruned but should never be uprooted. I think that's crazy wrong. There are bad ideas aplenty, and they should be uprooted. Indeed, I would argue that the very idea that there are no bad ideas is itself a bad idea. This is true even though weeding requires energy and constant diligence, and even though it is possible to learn from bad ideas (because evil is a privation of goodness).

So backing up, do bad ideas exist? — Leontiskos

Let me use your analogy of the garden. It is a human-constructed niche, and like all of our built niches, what constitutes a proper or improper garden, a weed or a non-weed, is subject to criteria that change over time as a result of our ongoing interactions with gardens, people and other aspects of our world. So we can say that for a given person within a given time and culture, there will be specific criteria for the goodness or badness of a garden. What are such criteria of goodness based on, and can we generalize these criteria across persons and historical eras? I do believe in a certain notion of cultural progress, both empirical and ethical, so my answer is yes. But since the criteria I thinking are fundamental have to do with the concept of sense-making, it will be less clear in the case of aesthetic phenomena like gardens and works of art how this applies than in the case of the sciences or political systems.

Our understanding of the world is amenable to an unlimited variety of alternative interpretations. Any of these interpretations can ‘work’ , that is , be predictively useful. That’s why we shouldn’t wait until an scientific theory is invalidated to search for alternatives. It work beautifully in its way , with an underlying mathematics which is accurate to the millionth decimal, and yet we can come upon an alternative framework that we prefer because it reveals the relationships between the elements of the world in a more integral and intimate way. What the previous mathematically precise model assigned to randomness the new model organizes in a more meaningful way.

The one price one pays for abandoning the old model for the new one is that the new doesn’t simply correct the mistakes of the old and supplement it. It changes the sense of the old model’s concepts. As a result, in order to gain entry to this new approach, one must be persuaded to view the world in a different way.

Because the observations and facts are reliant on the overarching interpretive framework of the model for their intelligibility, it is. or necessarily a simply matter to be ‘converted’ to a new way of seeing. Especially if that new way has nothing to form a bridge between it and one’s familiar ways of thinking.

Therefore, our overarching systems of interpreting the world , empirically, politically, ethically, spiritually, have a certain necessary inertia to them. I may have happened on a theoretical or ethical or political model which I find better than the previous one I held, but I cannot foist it on you if your own system of interpretation does not have the resources within itself to form the necessary bridge to allow it to modify its organization to accommodate the new model. I may believe my way of thinking is better for me than your way of thinking, but that’s not the same as believing that my way of thinking is better for you than your present way of thinking.

I believe that all of us are continually evolving within our systems of thought, but at a pace that is determined by the limits of that system. My goal in debating with others is to understand their system of thought from their perspective as well as i can, and to test the validity of my efforts by attempting to plug into the leading edge of their own thinking. If my thinking doesn’t find them where they are at, I will just get the equivalent of a glassy eyes stare of incomprehension or outright hostility. If I am successful in plugging into their cutting edge, they will respond enthusiastically, seeing me as a partner in thought rather than as a threat.

I didn't say the activists who ran the transitioning facilities were idiots. I said we were. The whole society took a vacation from reason. It's a drama that echoes the eugenics craze in the US. That also started with pseudo-science that was caught up in a campaign to engineer a better human. If there is a Spirit of Progress, this is its dark side. — frank

I think it is the eventual fate of all our best ideas to appear from the vantage of hindsight as the ravings of idiots. As my favorite psychologist, George Kelly wrote:

I must still agree that it is important for the psychological researcher to see the efforts of man in the perspective of the centuries. To me the striking thing that is revealed in this perspective is the way yesterday's alarming impulse becomes today's enlivening insight, tomorrow's repressive doctrine, and after that subsides into a petty superstition.

Getting rid of absolutism doesn't necessitate a move away from totalitarianism; it can in some cases motivate the opposite move (indeed, I think the case in point is such an example). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Totalitarianism has to lock in, to totalize something. Doesnt it totalize a particular value system? If one says that a radical relativist acquiesces to totalitarianism
because they sanction an ‘anything goes’ approach to values and ethics, how are the systems that are ‘ going’ their own way treated by these radical relativists? Doesn’t anything totalitarian have to get going and then ossify into a self-perpetuating structure? Isnt the indefinite temporal repetition of the same system or structure a necessary condition for calling anything totalitarian? If so, then an ‘anything goes’ relativist would have to embrace the proliferation of an unlimited multiplicity of diverse and incompatible totalitarian systems.

But is this way of thinking compatible with writers like Deleuze, Focault and Derrida? Decidedly not. Their method of analysis of texts, discourses and cultures is to
show that belief in the existence of monolithic systems are dangerous illusions that are nonetheless responsible for perpetuating all manner of social violence, repression and domination in the name of their preferred totalitarianism.

I suppose you could argue than the very claim that all supposedly totalizing, monolithic structures are composed of heterogeneous elements that don’t venting to the ‘identical’ structure is itself a totalizing claim. But if so, how does such a claim encourage or excuse the very totalitarianisms it is breaking apart?

Was lobotomy idiotic?
— Joshs

Yes. Have you read much about the advent of transitioning pre-pubescent people? — frank

Yes. Lobotomies were performed in the U.S. for 40 years, sanctioned by all the proper scientific authorities. What’s the point of calling them idiots? Do you call yourself an idiot whenever you agree to a medical procedure which has been approved for 40 years, because you can’t know in advance which ones will eventually be discredited, just as lobotomy was.

Of course the difference between trans therapy and lobotomy was than the policies were rushed into place before the chance for any society-wide debate. Did this happen because of the decisions of idiots, or because this commonly happens when a new conception appears on the scene which blurs the lines between the medical, the psychological, the sociological and the religious and results in polarizing political debates which draw in the medical establishment when they are not prepared to navigate the political minefield.

↪Joshs That has nothing much to do with me. What I'm telling you is they are not synonymous (which is an empirical fact. Wokists do not play out hte tenets of legitimate critical theory. They play dress-up to justify shitty, incoherent moral points of view (on my view)). You can say that you think their actions are justified under CRT and Ill say no, they expressly are not. I'm not personally interested in that debate because it is clear to anyone who has a clue about CRT that things like BLM (2019-2021 type of BLM action, anyhow) were not part of the agenda. We don't need some theoretical approach to notice this. I assume you've read the basic texts. There is no debate here.

If, on the other hand, you are saying that the basis for what's called wokism is something legitimate, so we should trying to tease out what that is - yes, but that has nothing to do with understanding those wokist actors. — AmadeusD

Maybe we can find something to agree on here. Let me say that there are a lot of crazy-ass wokist actions I’m not in a position to attach a CT pedigree to. But I will say that at least one Critical theorist, Theodore Adorno, espoused some positions that on their own merit are a bit crazy-assed, and whose interpretation by activists would predictably lead to the kinds of trouble we’ve been seeing.
So let me propose the following scenario: those wokists following crazy-assed doctrines fall to the wayside, and a new wokist moment arises based closely on the CT ideas of Habermas. No more pitting of power against power. Instead an emphasis on communicative rationality and hermeneutic consensus-building. Does this sound like a palatable scenario to you?

At this point progress means waking up to how idiotic we were. — frank

Was lobotomy idiotic?

Appeals to status seeking can be merely descriptive as well. It doesn't seem they are prima facie wrong. If they were categorically off-base, then it would also be the case that segregationists and white nationalists cannot be acting to defend their own status and interests. Yet that is, quite explicitly, what they claim and understand themselves to be doing. In their newer forms, they just claim that everyone else is also doing the same thing, covertly or not, and that they're at least honest about it. However, earlier defenders of segregation were much more covert about their ends, and yet I hardly think we can avoid the conclusion that these too were also partly motivated by defending their status and control over resources. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Concepts like status, self-interest, power and control can inform diametrically opposed positions depending on how the subjectivity, or ‘self’, they refer back to is understood. If we start from the self as homo economicus, a Hobbesian figure the attainment of whose desires need not have any connection with the desires of others, then we either settle for a Darwinian Capitalism or find a way to insert into this self an ethical conscience which we will not always be able to depend on. If instead we see the self not as an entity but as a process of unification, self as self-consistency, and desire as oriented toward anticipatory sense-making ( We don’t desire things, we desire coherence of intelligibility), then there is no i weren’t slot between the needs of my own ‘self’ and the needs of other selves. The unethical is then not a result of bad conscience but a failure of intelligibility. The unassimilable Other is found wherever injustice occurs (slavery, genocide).

Second, I think I'm the only one who mentioned fascism and the idea (Milbank's, although the seeds can arguably be found in Dostoevsky) is that the logical conclusion of the ontologies of violence is fascism. That is, when there is no transcendent order of peace, goodness, or truth, instead only contingent systems of power, difference, and conflict—when truth, law, and morality are not a participation in Logos, but are rather constructed through acts of force (e.g., discourse, statecraft, capital, language games)—then violence is original, and there can be no counter-violence which truly transcends violence. There is only ever assertion over and against counter-assertion, will to power against will to power (plus or minus some post hoc rationalization, which is itself merely another assertion of value). This is precisely the spiritual logic of fascism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have argued that the doctrine of nihilistic will to power is not a plausible explanation for the moral absolutism characteristic of wokism. Such absolutism can only justify itself on the basis of a realist-idealist grounding of some sort, which happens to be the stock and traded of Critical theory. I suggested in another post that the most noxious totalitarian tendencies of wokism can be moderated or even eliminated as more activists discover Habermas’s hermeneutical, communicative brand of Critical Theory and begin to leave behind the violently oppositional language of folks like Adorno, Fanon and Gramsci.

As for Woke becoming the dominant ideology the way Neoliberalism has been in 50 years, in 50 years China and India will be the world's largest economies. The EU in particular is on a growth trajectory to become increasingly irrelevant, and the war in Ukraine has shown that it seems likely to continue to underperform its economic standing in both hard and soft power. It would take a radical sea change for these ideologies to be allowed to get anywhere in China, even if they were popular there (whereas they are popularly ridiculed on Chinese social media). I don't think India will prove exceptionally fertile ground either. Whereas sub-Saharan Africa will be to that epoch what Southeast Asia was to the 90s-2020s, the main target for new investment and consumer markets, and there are a lot of reasons to suspect Woke would need to be radically transformed to have an appeal there too. I'm just not sure that it will make sense in these settings, and a look at how Woke analogs have developed in Japan and Korea might be a good indicator here. In particular, the Sexual Revolution seems key to Woke, and yet this is probably the number one area where thought indigenous to the developing world has said: "no thanks," and "please stop trying to force this on us." — Count Timothy von Icarus

When I said the philosophical underpinning of wokism would be mainstream in 50 years, I didn’t mean necessarily in China and India. China would first have to find a way to institute representative government. However, one can use the popularity of Gay Pride parades around the world as a measure of the rapidity with which new social
movements spread internationally. The recent one in Budapest even served as an anti-fascist protest.

I think the problem is that the interests and needs of young trans people was created by woke culture. — frank

Is that any different than the interests and needs of gay people being created by gay culture? Onencould apply a Foucaultian genealogical analysis and trace concepts of sexuality to the formation and transformation of discursive systems. When did the Western concept of homosexuality emerge? When and how did it change to gayness, and then Queerness?

The question is: was this catastrophe just the cost of progress? Or is it a sign of something gravely wrong under the hood of wokism? — frank

Lobotomy was once a thing. But it led to progress. After all, we still use ECT.

Do you think there is something internal to Critical Theory that would adjudicate between these many divergent views? Can CT tell us whether Rorty or Adorno or Habermas is the better way? Or is indeterminacy inherent to CT, and we will always need to wait for something even better, and/or always return to something left unfinished? — Fire Ologist

My belief is that to critique CT from the vantage of Rorty, Deleuze or Derrida one must step outside of it in the direction of an alternative stance. Their questioning won’t make sense from within the confines of Frankfurt school CT. But I do think there is reason to hope that the most noxious totalitarian tendencies of wokism can be moderated or even eliminated as more activists discover Habermas’s hermeneutical, communicative brand of CT and begin to leave behind the violently oppositional language of folks like Adorno, Fanon and Gramsci.

As someone who began studying for his doctorate in Paris in 1989, Barron knows a fair bit about figures like Foucault and Derrida. — Leontiskos

Based on the video, I would say he knows next to nothing about them, but in order to demonstrate this, I would have to locate a more extended text of his on the subject and compare through it line for line with actual quotes from the authora.

As someone who began studying for his doctorate in Paris in 1989, Barron knows a fair bit about figures like Foucault and Derrida. — Leontiskos

Based on the video, I would say he knows next to nothing about them, but in order to demonstrate this, I would have to locate a more extended text of his on the subject and compare through it line for line with actual quotes from the authora.

Critical theorists and realists are distinct groups, but there is overlap between some critical approaches and a philosophical position known as critical realism. In general, most critical theorists are not realists in the traditional philosophical sense—especially within the Frankfurt School tradition and related approaches, which often critique the very idea of objective reality and emphasize the role of social constructions and power in shaping what counts as "truth"...
— Perplexity AI

So my intimation that your claim is highly inaccurate is now stronger. Note too that the folks on TPF who gravitate towards Critical theory generally do not consider themselves realists. — Leontiskos

Run Adorno through Perplexity. I ran him through ChatGPT and found this:

“Postmodern relativism (as seen in thinkers like Lyotard or some interpretations of Foucault) often claims that truth, meaning, and values are socially constructed, contingent, and plural, with no overarching meta-narratives or objective standpoint. Adorno rejects this kind of relativism. He believes that there is an objective world and that truth matters, but that our conceptual frameworks and societal structures distort our access to it.

Habermas, a member of the Frankfurt school born a generation later than the original group, endorsed a hermeneutic approach influenced by American Pragmatism. According to ChatGPT:

“Habermas does not endorse naïve or metaphysical realism (the idea that we have direct access to objective truths independent of any interpretive framework). Like many post-Kantian thinkers, he acknowledges the linguistic and intersubjective mediation of knowledge and meaning. In this sense, Habermas shares some insights with postmodern and pragmatist thinkers: all understanding is mediated, contingent, and historically situated. Despite this, Habermas explicitly and repeatedly rejected postmodern relativism, particularly as found in the works of Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault (at least in his earlier interpretations of them).He argued that postmodernism undermines the possibility of rational critique, normativity, and consensus, leading to epistemic and moral relativism—which he viewed as self-defeating and politically dangerous.”

The points I’m trying to make concerning Crrical theory are twofold. First, that regardless of how unconventional their realism was, they should not be in danger of being accused of an ‘anything goes’ relativism. Instead , they beleive that material and social formations are grounded i. truth , and truth is grounded in metaphysical certainties. Rorty had endless debates with his friend Habermas ( one of which I attended) over the latter’s insistence on Kantian rational norms. My second point is that, to the extent that wokists draw form critical theory, their moral absolutism gets its justification from theblatter’s realist stance.

Deconstruction shows what continues to bind together groups on either side of an oppositional divide, so one can never simply overcome what one opposes.
— Joshs

Now apply that to your post, because you transgress this principle multiple times. You say, for example, that Derrida was critical of Marxism and therefore Marxism cannot be used to explain his thought. On the contrary, a critic of Marxism is by that very fact informed by Marxism - especially one who holds that one can never simply overcome what one opposes. — Leontiskos

Congratulations. You have just summarized a a central feature of deconstructive reading. it can one be ‘informed by’ and at the same time move in a wholly other direction? Derrida say yes. Even repetition of the identical meaning
returns the same sense differently. Absolutely other but at the same time informed by what it differs from.

critical theory moves away from Cartesianism by showing the subject to be formed through structures of bodily, material and social interactions. Postmodernists like Derrida and Foucault go much further, making the subject nothing but an effect of these worldly interactions.
— Joshs

I just wonder why this process which sounds like it should be neutral as to outcome always yields the same political conclusions. Liberal wokism is the only result of postmodernism - how is such uniformity of outcome possible given such undefined unformed clay as “bodily, material and social interactions.” Why is there no legitimate facist dictator, but there can be a legitimate woke pontificator? — Fire Ologist

As I mentioned earlier, wokism, to the extent that it can be connected with Critical theory, is realist in outlook. So it shouldn’t be surprising that it is not neutral concerning what is real and true with respect to material or political structures. The situation is quite different for post-realist postmodern writers such as Foucault and Derrida. Unlike wokists, they do not point moralistic fingers at those who fail to take the ‘right’ course, and do not articulate social and political change via a legitimate/illegitimate binary.

There’s a lot that needs to be absorbed in order to situate the various positions within and after wokism. For instance, among Critical theorists, why does Habermas reject Adorno’s negative dialectical realism in favor of a positive hermeneutic model of communicative action? Why does Rorty believe that Habermas’s reliance on Kantian categorical norms of rationality is too metaphysical? Why does Deleuze attack Rorty’s pragmatism as platonic dogmatism? Which of these positions is most or least compatible with the moralistic blamefulness of wokism?

reform of wokist excesses can take place within the bounds of these philosophical ground
— Joshs

They can't, it appears. Theory isn't particularly of any moment here — AmadeusD

What if that theory appreciates, as Antony appears to, that ‘rationality’ can’t be separated from what’s being dichotomously treated as merely “feeling -based’ and emotional? Let’s say one articulates what arises incipiently in the guise of an intuitive feeling into a system of logically coherent assertions amenable in principle to empirical test. How far does that articulatory effort go toward alleviating the need to do what Antony is prescribing, making oneself responsible for stepping outside of one’s system of rationality in order to have the chance of glimpsing another’s affective-rational system from their own perspective? Or should one only be responsible for anchoring discourse to some overarching meta-rational facts of the matter?

the problem with Nietzsche's philosophy is that it is inconsistent here IMO. If the 'highest form of life' is a life where we impose our values and there is no critierion in which we distinguish, in a non-arbitrary manner what is the best way to 'affirm life' then a 'life affirming' stance is no 'better' than a 'life denying' one, as both are said to be manifestations of the 'will to power'. Why should a manifestion of the will to power be better than another if there aren't criteria to tell which is better? In other words, I do not see in Nietzsche's philosophy enough convincing arguments for avoiding a compeletely arbitrary stance of life where absolutely any stance is no better or worse than any other. — boundless

We always have criteria for the best way to affirm life, but those criteria come from within the contingently produced perspectives we create. Within a value system we inhabit for a period of time, perhaps our whole lives, that stance is clearly better than the alternatives. When we transition from one perspectival valuative system to an another, our criteria change along with it.

To assume that one could impose a criterion for the goodness of a value system, the ‘best way’ to affirm life, from outside of all contingent perspectives, a god’s- eye view, view from nowhere or sideways on, is to impose a formula which is meaningless. In Nietzsche’s sense such aesthetic ideals are the definition of nihilism. And given the fact that most of the suffering in this world comes at the hands of those who act on behalf of supposedly perspective-free principles and criteria of truth and righteousness, it may be time to think differently.

0. Suffering is not the problem to solve, but the meaninglessness of it.
1. Aesthetic justification: “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified.”
2. The Will to Power. Suffering acquires its meaning through overcoming it. — kirillov

Just to clarify, for Nietzsche suffering is necessary because life is eternal , creative becoming, and suffering is that phase of becoming in which something must be negated in order to move onto a fresh, transformed meaningful perspective on the world. This cycle is endless, and suffering plays a substantive and positive role in the heightening growth of experience.

That the world's "Value lies in our interpretation (- that somewhere else other interpretations than merely human ones may be possible -); that previous interpretations have been perspectival appraisals by means of which we preserve ourselves in life, that is, in the will to power and
to the growth of power; that every heightening of man brings with it an overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every increase in strength and expansion of power opens up new perspectives and demands a belief
in new horizons - this runs though my writings. The world which matters to us is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fictional elaboration and filling out of a meagre store of observations; it is 'in flux', as something becoming, as a
constantly shifting falsity that never gets any nearer to truth, for - there is no 'truth'.

The 'meaninglessness of what happens': belief in this results from an insight into the falseness of previous interpretations, a generalisation of weakness and despondency - it's not a necessary belief.

I think you may be missing a trick wihch is implicit in all our comments here... These are not synonymous. At all. — AmadeusD

Then you’ll need to inform Bishop Barron of your tricks, because apparently he hasn’t gotten the memo. It’s clear from the video that he believes Critical theory is, if not synonymous with, then the basis of wokism. He specifically states that Critical theory has expressed itself as wokism (24:54). If what is implicit in “all your comments” is something contrary to this, then I’m not sure why Leonstikos directed me to this video.

I’m watching the Bishop Barron video. The first factual error I noticed is that he claims Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault belong to the Frankfurt school of critical theory (he says Derrida is the patron saint of critical theory) , which is not true. Instead, they were critical of Marxism and the Frankfurt school. Deconstruction overturns the assumptions of Marxism. The second one is where he says that critical theory privileges the subject over the body in a radicalization of Descartes. On the contrary, critical theory moves away from Cartesianism by showing the subject to be formed through structures of bodily, material and social interactions. Postmodernists like Derrida and Foucault go much further, making the subject nothing but an effect of these worldly interactions. Barron also claims that gender theory privileges subjectivity over the body, as when someone claims that they were born in the wrong body. But at least some within the transgender community accept the biologically-based theory that psychological gender is a function of brain ‘wiring’ that one is born with. Furthermore, as someone who is apparently so concerned about protecting the truths concerning the body, Barron should know that many of today’s leading theorists associated with the new synthesis approach to evolutionary biology as well as embodied approaches to cognitive science are sympathetic to critical theory.


Barron also argues that Critical theory is radically relativistic. It isn’t. It adheres to a form of realism and as a result believes in the notion of social progress and emancipation. Only postmodern writers like Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida reject realism and grand narratives of emancipation, but wokism embraces these narratives and their accompanying moralism.

Barron blames Derrida’s use of binary oppositions for the sorts of black and white oppositions used by wokists (oppressor/oppressed, master/slave, privileged/marginalized), but unlike in Crrical theory, Derrida’s binaries are not dialectical oppositions. Deconstruction shows what continues to bind together groups on either side of an oppositional divide, so one can never simply overcome what one opposes.
Finally, he asserts that for Critical theory power is the central principle of society, and that it supersedes truth (such as that 2+2=4). But there is no central tenet of wokism arguing that 2+2 can equal anything we want it to (in spite of a handful of wokists who may or may not have made that claim), because critical theorists are realists, not radical relativists.

Left and right with Andrew Breitbart:
https://youtu.be/ftZfdrqVpOk?si=2ZxxQ3vVX16y4xwW

But I think wokeness is correctly construed as wanting to throw the baby out with the bathwater. — Leontiskos

And I think the superficial characterizations of the grounding presuppositions of wokeness i’m seeing in this thread are also wanting to throw out the baby with the bath water. And what is the baby? if one remains at the surface level of ‘things wokists do that annoy us’, the baby is nothing but these arbitrary and wrongheaded actions. In the hands of the better journalists delving into this socio-political phenomenon, the baby is a spectrum of philosophical positions, bookended on the right by Hegel and on the left by 1960’s French thinkers like Foucault. Throwing out the baby then means that one refuses to accept that reform of wokist excesses can take place within the bounds of these philosophical grounds, that these philosophies were unnecessary in the first place given that there are already perfectly workable, intellectually superior ethico-political frameworks to guide action. Much of the critique Ive read so far ranges from ad hominem attack on character flaws in the activists ( status seeking) to historical regressiveness ( it’s a return to fascist thinking or a twisted variant of Romanticism.

But let’s say for the sake of argument that wokism’s roots contribute nothing innovative or valuable to the canons of philosophical thought. Arent development and innovation qualities to be expected of political thinking? Doesn’t progress in thinking about justice move in continuous cycles from counterculture to mainstream culture? Isnt it a sign of progress that what was once deemed
socially acceptable is now considered cruel and unnecessary? And if so, what contemporary counterculture would you point to as superior to wokism? Or are we supposed to rely on tradition rather than evolutionary transformation in considering how to think about justice?

A terrible line has been crossed when transgression is valued for transgression's sake, but I want to say that the precursor is the undervaluation of the conservative instinct, or the status quo, or tradition (or whatever else one wants to call it). I don't think that line ever gets crossed without this preliminary — Leontiskos

Antony’s contributions to this thread I think exemplify the kind of thinking that doesn’t throw the baby out, but instead occupies a position (later Wittgenstein) within the philosophical spectrum that includes wokism, from which vantage he can reform and moderate its excesses.

I’ve read only one work by Brassier on Deleuze, in ‘A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy’, so I’m not familiar with his overall perspective on Deleuze. However, I read a few works by Brian Massumi, who is an affect theorist — Number2018

Have you read John Protevi’s work on political affect?

Protevi, J.: and Christian Helge Peters. (2017). Affective Ideology and Trump's Popularity. http://www.protevi.com/john/TrumpAffect

These are beliefs and activities that seek to confer a certain status and halo upon those that express them, while damaging those who they claim to support — NOS4A2

You’ll never get anywhere in understanding the origin or purpose of these beliefs by dismissing them as personality defects (status-seeking on the part of the economically privileged). If I introduced you to non-affluent woke activists who have sacrificed personally for the sake of their social justice aims would you try to poke holes in their sincerity, or make an effort to accept their ethical intent and try to understand why they think their approach is superior to more conservative politics?

However, I disagree with your claim that Foucault and Deleuze do not offer a full-scale critique of affect. Your statement that “the analyses of Foucault and Deleuze are not critiques of affect per se, but of how affect is disciplined and made legible—subsumed into power/knowledge formations” is only partially accurate. While insightful, it risks downplaying the ontological commitments both thinkers make toward affect and desire.Foucault, for instance, interrogates the bodily, emotional, and relational dimensions of power. Power, in his view, does not merely repress; it incites, induces, and seduces. His concept of the microphysics of power within disciplinary regimes becomes a theory of affective modulation. His method reveals how affect is produced, channeled, and governed. In this sense, his theory of power becomes a philosophy of affect, in the sense that is thoroughly conditioned by and entangled with power relations. — Number2018

You mentioned Ray Brassier as one interpreter you read Deleuze through. His treatment of Deleuze has been described as realist, rationalist, and deflationary, and he appears to embrace an eliminative scientific realism beyond human experience (He was considered one of the founders of speculative realism, although he disavows this movement now). Do you think this is a fair assessment of Brassier, and would you say that you are in general agreement concerning his reading of Deleuze, and his philosophical outlook in general? I ask this because it would help clarify for me where you’re coming from with respect not only to Deleuze but to Foucault, especially concerning the possibility and sense of a critique of affect. As you know, there are anti-realist, or if you prefer, ‘radically relativist’ postmodern readings of Deleuze and Foucault which strongly disagree with Brassier’s take on Deleuze.

What the Civil Rights Movement in the US fought for or labour laws in my view isn't anything to do with woke or wokeism. Just as isn't the shortly lived protests against Israel's actions in Gaza. The proponents of DEI surely might see them as the continuation or those that continue to further these past political struggles, but in fact they are not — ssu

Certainly Marxism and post-colonialism were elements of 60’s activism, but It tends to be the psycho-social aspects of wokism that some surviving participants of 1960’s activism object to. The focus on the power of language and material structural aspects of social practices to create and sustain implicit bias derives from Critical theoretic and poststructuralist sources. Critical theorist Herbert Marcuse was the intellectual darling of the 60’s Berkeley intelllectual scene, but didnt have an influence on the theoretical wing of the civil rights movement. Writers like Foucault were writing in the 1960’s but their work didn’t make its way into the playbook U.S. political activists until at least the 1980’s. While 60’s figures like Angela Davis and Noam Chomsky are avid supporters of the pro-Palestinian cause, the anti-zionism associated with it is anathema to some 60’s social justice veterans, and I suggest this may be due to the ‘wokist’ belief that even if one is a well-meaning zionist who espouses equal rights for all citizens of Israel, nonetheless one comes up against one’s own ineradicable implicit bias owing to the religious or cultural nationalism zionism enacts.

It really didn’t seem to last very long. There was a backlash, university administrators took control and protected free speech, due process became a thing again. I think what has happened is that what started as an active policing of speech has morphed into peer pressure. If one cares about and identifies with the perspectives of those who are active within a ‘woke’ community, then one will find oneself making an effort to be conscious of such things as the use of pronouns. Ultimately, it’s positive persuasion rather than threats which cause a movement to spread. Acceptance of gays by mainstream culture resulted from the discovery made by people around the world that their own parent, child or co -worker was gay, not by lecturing from liberals.

About 10 years ago the U.S. news media was filled with stories about how the me-too movement ruined the careers of celebrities like Senator Al Franken and tv journalist Charlie Rose. In academia, professors were fired over the innocent use of words like ‘spook’. It seemed as though administrators were letting a small group of students dictate policy based on arbitrary grievances and the policing of language. Invited speakers were uninvited or prevented from speaking based on their conservative views. Meanwhile, trigger warnings and safe spaces protected students from even the suggestion of uncomfortable ideas, or ‘micro aggressions’.

What was new about wokism was that a huge domain of speech suddenly became the equivalent of yelling fire in a crowded theater.

I'm not saying there aren't issues, but what I’m looking for are concrete, institutionalised examples, something with real substance, that's meaningfully different from, say, right-wing identity politics where people view all of life through the lens of gun ownership, MAGA, or Christian nationalism, where ridicule and debate are also used to silence dissent. We know this group censors libraries, for instance. — Tom Storm

You mean examples where people got hurt , had careers ended, etc, because they were on the wrong end of wokist politics?

I've wondered about this myself. Simple question: do you think wokism is a significant and growing issue in society? — Tom Storm

Well, ssu pointed out that wokism tends to be used by those hostile to practices they associate it with, so right from the start the term defines behaviors deemed problematic. But I think what makes them problematic is fascinating. If you introduce a new way of thinking about social and political interactions which has not had time to be absorbed into the general culture, and then you proceed to demand that everyone whose behavior doesn’t conform to its standards be cancelled, you will be vilified as a tyrant (or as privileging irrational affect over logic).. It’s not the demand for conformity by itself that produces the hostility, it’s that what it is in service of is incoherent to most people, so your efforts will be explained as a desire for power and control. We already live in a society controlled by strict norms of conduct, but there is a general consensus of understanding about the nature of those norms and standards. My own critique of wokism is that it keeps too much from traditional societal norms (righteous moralism).

Critics argue that emotional discomfort has become a trigger for restricting speech, displacing debate with moral claims based solely on feeling hurt or offended — Number2018

What do you suppose elevates the role of feeling to the status of sovereign arbiter of justice for wokists? Is the affect doing all this ethical work by itself, or is it the interpretation of the discursive context within which the affect arises which grounds the supposed moral authority of feeling? I’m suggesting it is a certain moral absolutism associated with the attribution of causes for the sources and triggers of pain which is the culprit here, not affect in itself. If I address you with the wrong pronoun and you respond with pained moral outrage, it is because your feelings are expressing your assessment that I am culpable for my slight, even if I insist that it was inadvertent. There are no accidents or innocent mistakes when concepts like while privileged and implicit bias judge us guilty in advance. It is this assumed culpability by association, birth and ingrained use of language that is at the bottom of the hyper-moralism attributed to wokism, not a blind reliance on the authority of affect.

But is there not something of value to be gained from concepts like implicit bias? Do they not act as a corrective to the metaphysics of the autonomously willing subject? What such wokist memes could stand to learn from Focault and Deleuze is that there is no privileged moral vantage from which to judge whose community is more or less biased. What we want to do is to continually follow lines of flight away from the entrenchment within any particular bias, not reterritorialize on a transcendent objectivity beyond all bias.

Does the wokist reliance on a sovereign ground of moral truth amount to an abdication of factual accuracy and logical coherence? On the contrary, the most secure, emancipatory Hegelian logic can be located as an important thread within many strands of wokism, fueling their moralism and providing the metaphysical support for their objectivity. What they need more of factual accuracy and logical coherence but Deleuzian paradoxical nonsense, a logic of sense.

I had edited the post you responded but apparently too later for you to see it. Here’s the edited post:

The analyses of Focault and Deleuze are not critiques of affect per se, but of how affect is disciplined and made legible—subsumed into power/knowledge formations. Critique is aimed at sedimentation, normalization, and instrumentalization—not at affect’s foundational role. Deleuze’s entire philosophical project (especially with Guattari) can be read as a critique of how desire/affect is captured by molar systems—Oedipal structures, the State, Capitalism, Signifiance, etc. Not a critique of affect as such—but of affect when it gets captured by stratifying assemblages that block lines of flight. When it is allowed to become via lines of flight, affect is liberating. When it becomes stratified within epistemological logics, it becomes repressive. It sounds like this is your point, also:

Whereas the wokeness machine induces emotions like shame, guilt, and vulnerability to generate moral authority and political legitimacy, the philosophical machine must resist this affective economy by refusing to be coded within it. Instead, it amplifies its own intensity and its capacity to think and feel. In this sense, the line of flight is an experimental process that exceeds the coordinates of recognition and representation. It constructs an autonomous plane of consistency where thought is no longer mediated by identity, morality, or social function, but engages directly with the real. — Number2018

↪Joshs
Timothy Snyder and Jason Stanley appear in the video. They are completely genuine in expressing not just their concerns about fascism, but also about wokism.
— Joshs
But what is your assessment of the academic content of this video—especially considering that Snyder is a leading scholar on fascism and Nazi Germany? — Number2018

I think I’m understanding a bit better the points you’re making about the discursive structures within which affect is captured in wokist thought, but in the case of the contributors to the video, don’t we need to extend that critique to normed practices that I would argue are little changed from what they were prior to the emergence of wokism? And then wouldn’t it be useful to make distinctions between the sorts of affective stratifications you associate with wokism and those that are applicable to moderate conservatives and centrist liberals, both of whom disavow most aspects of woke practices?

I am no fan of wokeness either but I think there are more careful considerations and critiques of it from the likes of Sam Harris to name one, or Zizek, from the little I watched of the latter, but I doubt this guy will fall into that category. I suspect it will just be the usual right-wing dog whistles of cultural marxism and such — unimportant

To effectively critique wokism you have to understand its philosophical underpinnings. As someone drawing from Freud, Lacan, Hegel and Marx, Zizek is actually a lot closer to these underpinnings than you might think. On the other hand, I don’t think writers like Sam Harris and Steven Pinker are in a position to do so, given their embrace of conventional aspects of their own field of psychology. Harris and Pinker may be limited by their empirical/rationalist frameworks, which aren’t well-equipped to grasp the continental philosophical roots of woke ideology. Zizek is just as likely to defend wokism from the likes of Harris and Pinker as he is to take their side.

What is your take on this video about contemporary fascism? It highlights the stance of critical intellectuals against authoritarian regimes that are increasingly targeting academic freedom. They are completely genuine while expressing their concerns. The video constructs a stark us vs. them narrative. In fact, its moral binary and emotional framing reflect characteristics often associated with “woke culture”: strong normative certainty, oversimplification, moral urgency, and an appeal to identity and belonging. This resemblance suggests that the crisis revealed by wokeness is not merely cultural or political. Also, it reveals a deeper epistemic, ethical, and moral rupture — Number2018

Timothy Snyder and Jason Stanley appear in the video. They are completely genuine in expressing not just their concerns about fascism, but also about wokism. In The Road to Unfreedom and On Freedom, Snyder critiques identity politics and the politicization of group-based grievances. He explicitly criticizes “identity politics” as a divisive force that fuels cultural polarization, framing it as part of authoritarian memory politics. He warns against narratives driven by victimhood and “us vs. them” thinking—structures often associated with woke discourse—even if the label isn’t used. In sum, Snyder’s critique overlaps with what critics call “wokism” — particularly around moralism, identity-based politics, and the erosion of shared facts.

Meanwhile, Jason Stanley offers a theoretical critique of political language and propaganda. Stanley’s work discusses woke moral language, examining “woke” discourse as a phenomenon that has peaked. He has also strongly condemned book bans and restrictions on speech tied to identity-driven moral politics, framing them as authoritarian and illiberal.

I think you’ll find moderate religious conservative like David Brooks and Peter Wehner making exactly the same points as the contributors to this video.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/04/donald-trump-authoritarian-actions/682486/

Does this fact make them woke? If so, then it seems to me the concept becomes meaningless.

In the case of wokeness, the issue is not one of disagreement or misunderstanding. Rather, it lies in the complete blurring of boundaries between the authenticity of identity performance and the sincerity of moral expression — Number2018

Btw, you never responded to my question to you:

“Are you placing ‘factual accuracy’ on one side of a divide and ‘emotional expression’ on the other side in order to deconstruct and overturn this metaphysical dualism, as Nietzsche, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida have? Or do you seriously want to justify such a reason-privileging split? Or is ‘emotional expression’ as Deleuzian desire, Heideggerian attunement and Foucaultian power the very pre-condition of factuality?”

The similarities lie more in the focus on identity, grievance, narratives of power, skepticism of institutions (instruments of power), and as Doyle puts it, "admission of spectral evidence," (i.e., personal feelings of grievance as indicative of moral wrong). There is also a similar distrust of scientific, journalistic, academic, etc. institutions as mere instruments of power, a sort of epistemology of power to go along with the metaphysics of power. The "nu-right" is a heavily aesthetic movement, drawing a lot from ancient epics and art, and so you also have an "aesthetics of power." The preference for classical art styles for instance, is not mere reactionary preference for the old, but obviously because these are taken to by symbols of imperial power and warrior spirit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is essential to separate questionable political applications of ‘wokeness’ by individuals and groups who call themselves woke from the mix of underlying philosophical ideas they claim to be drawing from (and in many cases misinterpreting). This is important because I believe many of what are now seen as repressive excesses of the movement will likely be eliminated as the movement becomes more conversant with the most rigorous and forward-thinking philosophical elements it now engages with in an often superficial manner. As a result, far from ‘fading away’ as another regressive fad alongside far right thinking, the substantive grounding of what we
now call wokism will remain and eventually become the dominant political thinking among mainstream cultures around the world.

In order to separate the superficial from the substantive, it is necessary not to settle for surface comparisons like the following: both the far right and wokism is concerned with “narratives of power, skepticism of institutions (instruments of power), and as Doyle puts it, "admission of spectral evidence,"”.
While the Frankfurt school of critical theory understands the concept of power in terms of a willed force concentrated within , controlled and wielded by individuals and groups, this is not at all the case for poststructuralists like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida. Foucault’s notion of power, for instance, is a relation of mutual affecting connecting each individual to other individuals within a community rather than hierarchical weapon of domination. For him power isn’t something to overcome or control, it is the motivational and valuative basis of the reciprocal interactions from which our institutions of ethics, politicos and knowledge emerge.

There is the transformation of the foundations of normative, intersubjective argumentation, particularly in the realms of identity politics and online discourse. In this emerging framework, factual accuracy and logical coherence are increasingly overshadowed by emotional expressions of identity and marginalization, which come to serve as autonomous validations of truth and moral authority. — Number2018

Are you placing ‘factual accuracy’ on one side of a divide and ‘emotional expression’ on the other side in order to deconstruct and overturn this metaphysical dualism, as Nietzsche, Focault, Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida have? Or do you seriously want to justify such a reason-privileging split? Or is ‘emotional expression’ as Deleuzian desire, Heideggerian attunement and Foucaultian power the very pre-condition of factuality?

it wouldn’t take me very long to demonstrate that he never even attempts to analyze the underlying philosophy
— Joshs

For for it. Review his entire output on this topic, including books, podcasts, lengthy posts and articles. I'm not going to claim to hav ea citation to hand, but he has explicitly spoken about the Marxist, and then Frankfurtian bases through Critical Theory and on into CRT - running that through the milieu of the 60s-70s civil rights activations and then making his conclusions from there. He is not an idiot. I do recall him going relatively deep into this in The New Puritans.

It seems you've rejected his position without knowing it. Odd. — AmadeusD

Yes, he has made his way through some Marxist and Frankfurt school texts. If his critique were based on a perspective inside of the relevant philosophies, he would be comfortable with the following ideas:
Languaged discursive conventions shape the meanings of concepts, so any attempts at ascertaining objective truth cannot look for a position outside of all normative cultural configurations from which to ground truth absolutely. These normative structures and their associated linguistic concepts can ossify into an entrenched status quo, and as a result become repressive in relation to marginalized individuals and groups. But one must be careful in how one points attention to these repressive, self-entrenching tendencies. One cannot simply demand that others change their vocabulary. They should instead attempt to demonstrate the benefits of alternative intelligibilities. This would be a positive use of power rather than a punitive use.

A critique from the outside, as I believe Doyle’s is, rejects the Kuhnian implication of critical theoretic approaches to objective truth, in favor of something closer to Popper’s Kantian notion of falsification. Truth isn’t just a culturally negotiated pragmatic way of knowing one’s way around the world ( although Kuhn doesn’t reject the idea of scientific progress in toto), languaged concepts hook up to objective truths which transcend cultural dynamics. I suggest that Doyle’s rejection of this crucial philosophical underpinning of wokism motivates his rejection of it. Even if wokists no longer tried to impose their notions of discursive openness onto others, he would still find it wanting in comparison with his non-relativistic liberalism. He would simply pivot from an attack on wokism as too repressive to one in which it becomes too permissive and anything-goes, ungrounded in the objective facts of the world.