Also, we could just as well say to objectivists, "Why should anyone care that such and such is factually right/wrong. If it's factually wrong to murder others, why should a serial killer care about that? He likes to murder people. He'd rather do what he likes." — Terrapin Station

That's the point I'm making about relativism vs objectivism. Objectivists DO acknowledge that people can be and sometimes are wrong about morality.. objectivists do acknowledge that serial killers don't care... If it is wrong to murder, then someone who murders is in the wrong, and murder would not be allowed. Whereas, according to relativism, a murderer isn't wrong, he just has a different point of view/different preferences.
It seems you must have some way of judging between preferences, if some preferences (murder) are not allowed, but others are. ( Objectivists obviously do have a way of judging.)

Maybe! However, I would tend to think these -isms are more defined than ietsism, which picks out that supremely (and seemingly deliberately) vague, unhelpful, and frustrating reply that one's typical fellow apes give in response to whether they believe in God: "I think there must be something out there," "I believe in a higher power," or "I think there's something bigger than myself." These phrases are fit to make any philosopher fly into a rage, but they represent, in my view, the extent to which people have pondered anything metaphysical and make up the predominant belief of most people today, at least in the industrialized world. — Thorongil

You may be too quick to dismiss these people. I've found that most people can explain what they believe, and why, if given the chance.

I'm trying to understand moral relativism.. I'm trying to understand what it would be like for me to be a moral relativist (and trying to determine if any moral relativists actually exist).

Is it correct to say that moral relativists believe that the majority determines what is moral? That doesn't sound right.... because I try to imagine myself as a moral relativist, living in a society where slavery is accepted. I hear reformers trying to convince other people that slavery is wrong... I know the reformers are wrong, because they are arguing against the majority. If reformers succeed (presumably because the majority aren't moral relativists), and now slavery is determined to be wrong, wouldn't I be disappointed that our society made a mistake (because they now accept the minority position)?

OR, is it rather the case that moral relativists believe that morality is merely a matter of preference. In that case, then why do I care what other people prefer? Why would I think that other people would care about my preferences? Why would I complain or attempt to change the view of other people, since I understand that they just have different preferences?

And so a thing is moral if it's agreed upon by society (as an example). If some members of this society would prefer something else to be moral then they try to change the moral rules. But it's still only moral once it's been agreed upon by the society. It's not the case that morality is just preferences. — Michael

You're contradicting yourself. Societies did believe that slavery was ethical. So, it was ethical (according to relativism). But, a minority believed it was wrong... If morality is based on consensus, then why would anyone try to change what the society believed? And why would that society change? By definition, a reformer is just wrong (according to relativism) because he disagrees with the consensus.

So, is it preference? or is it consensus?

What I'd like a moral relativist to talk about is whether or not it's possible to be wrong about morality. What does it mean for a moral relativist to change his mind about morality? Was his previous position wrong? or just different? If it's just a matter of being different, then why change his mind?

What about the changes that have occurred in societies? Is there such a think as moral progress? Why do people listen to moral reformers?

Because people want and like different things. They'd prefer a different morality. — Michael

Then morality isn't actually based on consensus.... Apparently it's more about preferences (according to moral relativists). Apparently, we must decide whose preferences to follow. And then it looks like we're back to "might makes right" again <-- as javra pointed out.

Does that sound right to you? If there is a consensus about morality, then that makes that thing moral?

Why try to change anything in any society then? Reformers go against public opinion.

So part of taking action against something that is bad in my moral framework is to try to persuade others to reach the same moral conclusion in their frameworks, so that they will help me in my attempt to defeat fascism. — andrewk

Can you elaborate? Your framework seems to be "I don't like it". We should anyone care what you do or don't like? From the standpoint of a serial killer, he likes to kill. How would you convince him to change his mind?

One reason I'm adverse to moral relativism is that it appears to inevitably results in the dictum of might makes right—be this the force of an individual or the force of the masses (slavery can come to mind).

Is there any way that moral relativism can remain consistent without resulting in right/good/ethical being that which is willed by the whims of power? — javra

Sure.. they could just call for a vote. But does consensus really mean something is morally acceptable?

Re: Scientology.. (from wiki)

Theological doctrine

Scientology does not preach or impose a particular idea of God on Scientologists. Rather, people are expected to discover the truth through their own observations as their awareness advances.

... the Church of Scientology has no set dogma concerning God that it imposes on its members. As with all its tenets, Scientology does not ask individuals to accept anything on faith alone. Rather, as one’s level of spiritual awareness increases through participation in Scientology auditing and training, one attains his own certainty of every dynamic. Accordingly, only when the Seventh Dynamic (spiritual) is reached in its entirety will one discover and come to a full understanding of the Eighth Dynamic (infinity) and one’s relationship to the Supreme Being.[118]

118 "Does Scientology have a concept of God?". www.scientology.org . Retrieved 2015-12-31.

From the Scientology site above... "DOES SCIENTOLOGY HAVE A CONCEPT OF GOD?

Most definitely. In Scientology, the concept of God is expressed as the Eighth Dynamic—the urge toward existence as infinity. This is also identified as the Supreme Being."

Wittgenstein and Sartre are in the running.

So who would you consider as the most convincing atheist then? (taking that as the opposing view to what you hold now) — Agustino

That's a tough one... maybe Don Cupitt... He believes that God is not real, (but does deny being an atheist- although if I read him correctly, he believes we invented the concept of God- w/o man God wouldn't even exist) and calls himself a Christian non-realist.

Indeed, I find that the main belief of most people is ietsism. — Thorongil

Ietsism (Dutch: ietsisme (pronounced [itsˈɪsmə]) – "somethingism") is an unspecified belief in an undetermined transcendent force. It is a Dutch term for a range of beliefs held by people who, on the one hand, inwardly suspect – or indeed believe – that "there must be something undefined beyond the material and that which can be known” than we know about, but on the other hand do not necessarily accept or subscribe to the established belief system, dogma or view of the nature of a Deity offered by any particular religion.

Yeah, I can buy into that. But, I wonder what distinguishes ietsism from deism or a belief in Logos or some kind of pantheism or panentheism (Stoic theology has qualities of both pantheism and panentheism)?

Perhaps deism, pantheism, panentheism, and Logos could be seen as forms of ietsism?

@Bittercrank
I'm still thinking about this topic in relation to the way people categorize systems like religions and philosophy. It seems to me that people think of religions as being about supernatural beliefs, and people think of philosophy as not necessarily including supernatural beliefs.

So, I see no reason to argue with this observation

There are people who attend religious services who don't, in fact, believe in supernatural stuff. — Bitter Crank

@Bittercrank
I'm still thinking about the way people categorize systems like religions and philosophy. People think of religions as being about supernatural beliefs, and people think of philosophy as not necessarily including supernatural beliefs.

So, I see no reason to argue with this observation

There are people who attend religious services who don't, in fact, believe in supernatural stuff. — Bitter Crank

@Agustino
There are differences of opinion (see Konstan and Sedley above)...

Konstan, David, 2011. “Epicurus on the Gods,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–71.

Sedley, David, 2011. “Epicurus' Theological Innatism,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–52.

But, at first glance, Epicurus believed there are ethical, powerful eternal beings who live in a different realm, and that these beings created us.

I am operating under the assumption that supernatural beliefs are what differentiate religions from philosophy. But, I'm open to other possibilities.

I was thinking of some very small groups like 'ethical societies', secular humanist organizations, some unitarian groups that are just about free of supernaturalism, and the like. — Bitter Crank

What is it about them that makes you consider them to be religions? — anonymous66

I consider them "religious" because they seem to think they are practicing a religion. — Bitter Crank

The UU's definitely think of themselves as a practicing a religion, the history includes supernatural beliefs, and they don't currently deny the supernatural (even if many atheists feel comfortable attending- I know this from first hand experience). So they fit my definition of a religion And there has been a call to return to these original beliefs...

Language of reverence
During the presidency of the Rev. William Sinkford, debate within the UU movement has roiled over his call to return to or create an authentic UU "language of reverence." Sinkford has suggested that UUs have abandoned traditional religious language, thereby abandoning words with potential power to others who will then dictate their meanings in the public sphere. He has suggested that Unitarian Universalists regain their proper seat at the interfaith table by making this language their own. Others have reacted to this call by believing it to be part of an effort to return UU congregations to more orthodox Christian worship patterns. Sinkford has denied this, citing the words of UU humanists as examples of what he means by the "language of reverence." The debate seems[original research?] part and parcel of an attendant effort at increasing biblical literacy among Unitarian Universalists, including the publication of a book by the UUA's Beacon Press written by former UUA President John Buehrens.[70] The book is titled Understanding the Bible: An Introduction for Skeptics, Seekers, and Religious Liberals,[71] and is meant as a kind of handbook to be read alongside the Bible itself. It provides interpretative strategies, so that UUs (among others) might be able to engage in public debate about what the Bible says from a liberal religious perspective, rather than relinquishing to religious conservatives, and other more literal interpretations, all control over the book's contents and significance in matters of public and civic import. Also an important work by Rev. Buehrens, along with Forrest Church, is A Chosen Faith: An Introduction to Unitarian Universalism,[72] in which the authors explore the many sources of the living tradition of their chosen faith.

But, do "ethical societies" and secular humanist organizations think of themselves as practicing a religion?

If anything, De Botton is making my point for me. He also thinks of religions as including a belief in the supernatural... he is making it clear that he is doing something very different by suggesting that atheists can benefit from specific practices/traditions of religions w/o giving up their atheism.

Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;) — Agustino

Not according to this...

Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings. Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear.

But this suggests there is some disagreement about how to interpret Epicurus' views on the gods...

although the precise nature of the gods according to Epicurus remains obscure (for contrasting intepretations, see Konstan 2011 and Sedley 2011); but the gods, for him, do not interest themselves in human affairs, since this would compromise their beatitude (see Obbink 1996: 321–23).

Sure, but what would you take your opposite to be? :P — Agustino

Well, let's just say that I went through an atheist "phase" and that I was influenced by the history of the concept of Logos in general. I was also influenced by Paul Davies (I'm reading The Mind of God- I also would like to read The Goldilocks Enigma) the Stoics in general, and Max Jammer and his book Einstein and Religion: Physics and Theology.

@The OP
Is there any room for deists in this discussion? Or pantheists, or panentheists? Or believers in Logos?

So part of what I'm saying is the view (or unanalyzed assumption as it often is) that "Joe is getting beaten up" somehow (a) has meaning, and (b) matches or fails to match states of affairs in the world independent of someone thinking about it is nonsense. — Terrapin Station

Would you also argue that independent of someone thinking about it, there would be no moon?

I will start; for me the most convincing atheists are Epicurus — Agustino

Believe it or not Epicurus was not an atheist. He had an argument for the existence of gods. He just also believed they had nothing to do with us, and that we are on our own.

Why do moral relativists think of morals at all? It does seem that moral relativism goes against itself because it'll start disproving it's own reasons for why an action was good or bad, sooner or later.

I would like to take a look at the list when it's done if you don't mind sharing it. — Kazuma

One of the arguments in relation to moral relativism is that a true moral relativist would have no reason to judge another's morality. If a moral relativist was consistent, then everyone else's opinion/preference about morality has just as much validity as their own. If relative morality, then no opinion/preference about morality could be better or worse than another... a moral relativist can only talk of differences.

Here is my list of philosophers who argue for objective morality from a secular point of view.


Paul Boghossian is Silver professor of philosophy at New York University, where he was Chair of the Department for ten years (1994�"2004) and responsible for building it into one of the top philosophy programs in the world.[1] His research interests include epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language. He is Director of the New York Institute of Philosophy and research professor at the University of Birmingham.

Timothy Williamson is a British philosopher whose main research interests are in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics.

He is currently the Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford, and Fellow of New College, Oxford. He was previously Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh (1995�"2000); Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Oxford (1988�"1994); and Lecturer in Philosophy at Trinity College, Dublin (1980�"1988). He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 2004 to 2005.

He is a Fellow of the British Academy (FBA),[1] the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters,[2] Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (FRSE) and a Foreign Honorary Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.


Simon Blackburn is a British academic philosopher known for his work in metaethics, where he defends quasi-realism, and in the philosophy of language; more recently, he has gained a large general audience from his efforts to popularise philosophy. He retired as professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge in 2011, but remains a distinguished research professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, teaching every fall semester. He is also a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and a member of the professoriate of New College of the Humanities. He was previously a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford and has also taught full-time at the University of North Carolina as an Edna J. Koury Professor. He is a former president of the Aristotelian Society, having served the 2009�"2010 term.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (born 1955) is an American philosopher. He specializes in ethics, epistemology, and more recently in neuroethics, the philosophy of law, and the philosophy of cognitive science. He is the Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.[1] He earned his Ph.D. from Yale University under the supervision of Robert Fogelin and Ruth Barcan Marcus, and taught for many years at Dartmouth College, before moving to Duke.[2]

His Moral Skepticisms (2006) defends the view that we do not have fully adequate responses to the moral skeptic. It also defends a coherentist moral epistemology, which he has defended for decades. His Morality Without God? (2009) endorses the moral philosophy of his former colleague Bernard Gert as an alternative to religious views of morality.[citation needed]

In 1999, he debated William Lane Craig in a debate titled "God? A Debate Between A Christian and An Atheist".[3]

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that God is not only not essential to morality, but moral behaviour should be independent of religion. A separate entity one could say. He strongly disagrees with several core ideas: that atheists are immoral people; that any society will become like lord of the flies if it becomes too secular; that without morality being laid out in front of us, like a commandment, we have no reason to be moral; that absolute moral standards require the existence of a God, he sees that people themselves are inherently good and not bad; and that without religion, we simply couldn't know what is bad and what is good.

Louis Paul Pojman [1935 - 2005] grew up in Cicero, Illinois, where he attended Morton High School and Junior College. He went on to receive a B.S. degree from Nyack College and a B.D degree from New Brunswick Theological Seminary, becoming an ordained minister in the Reformed Church of America. After serving an inter-racial church in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, he returned to seminary, attending Union Theological Seminary at Columbia University in New York where he studied under Reinhold Niebuhr and earned a Ph.D. in Ethics. During this time he received several fellowships to study abroad. In 1969-71 he was a Fulbright Fellow and a Kent Fellow at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, and in 1970 a Rockefeller Fellow at Hamburg University, Germany. Upon receiving his PhD from Union, he decided to study analytic philosophy and went to Oxford University from which he earned his D. Phil in 1977. He also lectured at Oxford. In 1977 he became a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Notre Dame. After this he taught at the University of Texas (Dallas), and became a Professor at the University of Mississippi, where he was Chair of the Philosophy Department. He was also a visiting Scholar at Brigham Young University, University of California, Berkeley and New York University among others. He recently retired as Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus from the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he was a Professor for nine years. In 2004-5 he was a Visiting Fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge University, UK, where he became a Life-Fellow. He has read papers at 60 universities in the USA, Europe and Asia.

I just came across this talk by Peter Singer: Ethics Without Religion.

There are no disembodied institutions or belief systems apart from people. No matter the institution or the belief system, it is always peopled (or it is dead). — Bitter Crank

My point is that if it is the case that a religion includes supernatural beliefs, the fact that some people who follow said religion (or claim to be followers) don't take the supernatural beliefs seriously, it doesn't change the fact that a religion includes supernatural beliefs.

It's a good question. If someone like De Botton succeeds in creating something (Religion for Atheists) that looks a lot like a religion, but that thing doesn't include supernatural beliefs, should it be considered a religion?

I was thinking of some very small groups like 'ethical societies', secular humanist organizations, some unitarian groups that are just about free of supernaturalism, and the like. — Bitter Crank

What is it about them that makes you consider them to be religions?

I've been impressed by Alain De Botton. He's written Religion for Atheists, but the gist of his book is that religions have great qualities (like traditions that remind us what is important), he just rejects the idea that God exists.

Can't it be said that religions require a belief in the supernatural, while a belief in the supernatural is not a requirement for philosophy?

Perhaps I should have typed "Can't it be said that to be considered a religion, a system/institution would have to have supernatural elements? While a philosophy may or may not have supernatural elements?"

Most religions require belief in the central supernatural elements. — Bitter Crank

Can you give an example of a religion (not people who claim to be followers) that doesn't include supernatural beliefs?

All that aside, it is the case that what believers actually hold to be true about the supernatural varies a great deal. For instance, not all Christians believe Jesus rose from the dead. Not all Catholics and Lutherans believe in transubstantiation. Not all Christians believe in miracles. Not all Jews believe in God.

How can this be? — Bitter Crank

You're concentrating on the people. I'm talking about the institution and/or belief system. . It's still a pretty good rule of thumb. I can't think of any religion that doesn't include supernatural beliefs. But, there are plenty of forms of philosophy that don't.

There is some question about whether or not Buddhism is a religion or a philosophy. Why? Because some forms of Buddhism don't include concepts of the supernatural.

We ought not to forget that Socrates was put to death for atheism, among other charges, notably his questioning of the civic deity worship of Athens. — Wayfarer

Socrates did a great job of defending himself against that charge (as described in Plato's Apology).

Can't it be said that religions require a belief in the supernatural, while a belief in the supernatural is not a requirement for philosophy?

I've been reading Max Jammer's (love that name!) Einstein and Religion: Physics and Theology. It's a great book, if you want to understand Einstein's view of God and Religion. He didn't believe in a personal God and did not follow any religion, but he was not an atheist. He believed in an impersonal God and strict determinism. He referred to his belief system as a cosmic religion.

It's more about providing for his family. It would be less odd if he was a good provider.

My understanding of objective morality is that it is the belief that some actions are bad/wrong/immoral in and of themselves. From a moral objectivist's point of view, it is more likely that there is something wrong w/ someone who does X (killing for fun, etc), than it is that there is nothing actually wrong with action X (in the same way we are right to think there is something wrong with someone who says 2+2=5). There is a difference between moral objectivism and moral absolutism. Just because someone is a moral objectivist or moral absolutist, it doesn't follow that they go around telling other people what they must or must not do... or that they have fundamentalist attitudes in regards to morality.

Moral relativism is the belief that there are no actions that are intrinsically bad/wrong/immoral.. rather, relativists believe that morality is a matter of opinion and/or preference. So, if asked, "is it wrong to X?" The moral relativist would just ask, "from whose point of view?" Or perhaps they would merely state their opinion/preference.

The moral relativist denies that morality could be objective (no moral facts), while an objectivist believes that morality is objective (perhaps moral facts, or quasi-realism... while admitting there are disagreements). Relativists believe that morality is and can only be opinion and preference.. Objectivists suggest that morality is more like the field of medicine, or mathematics- there are differing opinions, but some math and some medicine is objectively better than others.

I suspect a moral relativist would just tell you his opinion or his preferences about the questions above, while from the standpoint of moral objectivism, an objectivist would make an argument for why said thing is objectively right or wrong, based on a system of morality (virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, etc.).

(By the way, I've been compiling a list of philosophers who argue for objective morality from a completely secular point of view).

So enjoy it. Go talk to people. Engage with the world in person or on sites like this. Because at the end of the day that's where the raw fun of philosophy is. In a very real sense, what you're doing with your coffee group is substantially more pure philosophically then what academics do. Sure - you might not be as specialized, but you're enjoying it! And maybe by chatting with a few people about your interests, you'll encourage a few other people to get into philosophy as well. — Carbon

Thanks for this. I do remember a time when philosophy seemed really weird to me. I would like to find ways to popularize it.. that is my basic goal.

he brought up Descartes... Because everyone who took a damn philosophy class in college brings up Descartes. — Carbon

LOL. So true, the exact same thing happened to me recently.

@Cavacava Thank you for those thoughts...
I think if I were to know someone who acted like Socrates today, I'd probably think of him as either a slacker and/or a nut. "I'm on a divine mission" does sound rather odd.... especially seeing that he never had much money.

But, I do see a common thread in ancient philosophy. It's "philosophy/living the good/virtuous life is most important". Everything else is secondary. And for Socrates (and the Stoics), it's also very important to listen to your Daimon.

I'd have to say that I have a great deal of respect for Socrates (as described by Plato), because he lived out what he believed and he stuck to his convictions, even though it cost him dearly.

Rosalind Hursthouse is someone else I would consider.

How about Rebecca Goldstein?

I don't know enough about the subject or the options to have an opinion.

Now that I think about it... Davies did lay out the history of the computer. The first computers were completely mechanical... so no software. I think what Davies is suggesting is that the universe is in reality, a computer with physical parts- so more like the older mechanical computers, not a computer running a program.