As you may or may not have noticed I dislike Descartes, and his legacy in the world. Whether Descartes actually tortured dogs as an expression of his moral ethic towards irrationality, or if it is analogical to the psychiatry he spawned, or did not is simply a matter that he raises in his cogito. The accusation of dog torturer, persecutor of irrational, or however it is interpreted is something that can be doubted. However, Descartes' philosophy has a kind of fake news Trumpist mechanism where anyone who likes him for whatever reason will have greater cause for doubt of any claim against him. It is a fact that the modern period featured an intensification of the persecution of the irrational, defined by a prevailing rational order. Laying the groundwork for modernity's foundational fake news ethos has created rationalists that are impervious to any claim that threatens their cartesian biases. I have anticartesian biases, so I accept mythos as a source of knowledge and understand that will draw the ire of rational modernists. I see the physic this relation of the modern rationalist being antagonized by the irrational, and the symbolic nature of a human bein violent towards a dog with the added layer of scientism, as an important message.

I would argue the same thing that there is relativistic rationality. There is a high standard for 'ability' in modern society. Some people are not able to meet those standards, and standards create expectations and expectations of people will always be somewhat deficient of the reality/ actuality. To create a set of standards or rules or expectations that allow for a broader range of ableness would mean not creating economic rationalizations that place people out of the market for income sources and housing. There is an undercurrent of acceptance of letting the sick and weak trickle into the margins where risk will slowly kill them off improving the stock of society, but that is naive. There will always be a distribution that creates margins in any social system. What happens at the margins is likely related to the grading scheme of the society, like in university where there is a bell curve of test performance with the superior marginal being promoted and the inferior marginal going off to die somewhere or something. I have an unconventional, but still technically correct understanding of marginal, that is really just neutral in connotation. That marginal is connotated but really represents atypicality in a distribution, should be used fairly in understanding naturalistic distributions, rather than focussing on the bad or problematic type of marginality. When I say the grading scheme of society there is an ideal valuation that creates a kind of material distribution. From grade A prime to, hot dogs, to dog food.

Yes, clearly on topic. I'm thinking that color is not inherently meaningful, but the signification of color is made by their association to objective truths, but the connection between color and the object are flimsy at best. Most of the preceding discussion has been abstract in a way that color is being talked about in how it is understood but not in concrete ways that it is understood. As such someone who is forming the theory is working up a way of understanding color, designing, rather than reverse engineering from concrete examples. Let me give some examples of color and code: in the mythology of ancient Ireland a 'king' who was converted by St. Patrick was convinced of the trinity as the concept was analogical to a natural form of significance that is green. Green thus has a certain code about rationality that can be in agreement or at odds with other forms of rationality and the difference in power of the epistem makes each seem irrational to the other in a relativistic phenomenon. Catholicism and Protestantism feature conflicts in rational epistem. So colour is not something with objective meaning but the relativistic objectivity in the interpretation of colour is not how the color is understood but why it is understood. When I say relativistic objectivity, I am stating my belief that biasless objectivity must be relativistic as objectivity is biased towards an epistem of one kind or another, the current prevailing one being about facts but at the same time is deindividuating to the extent that it will create agreement. That it creates agreement is not that it lacks subjectivism but the kind of objects one looks at and the way they are looked at is epistemological of collective intersubjectivity. Objectivity has contradictory nature that must be considered, and thus modified with relativism or other concept. The color code for orange is a little different, still complex but not about concept::material analogy that connects the color green to code. Orange is from a similar sounding location in France that has no material analogy to the concept. Although there is an annual meeting of gingers on Netherlands now that is an ironic implosion of rational idealusm. That doesnt mean the color has no object nature but really the predominant theme has been a rationalization of belief from ancient and primitive godlessness before Christ and the modern transmorgification of that rationalization as it itself evolved from its primitive form. This is just a very simple explanation, for communication purposes. Antischizophrenia is really effective. Cartesian antischizophrenia is a simple opposition of 'delusion' in the most general sense to scientism, and the certainty of one prevailing over the other. But it is more than that, it is a complex that is not necessarily coherent with the architectural designs of Cartesianism. As in all orange rational ideals, the repentance of sin of their rational delusions is not ironic but progress towards the future.

The point is to discuss symbols as code that are between natural law and subjectivity. That is if a picture of colors needs a point if subjectivity is going to derail the rules of the discussion I have attempted to lay out. I say rules on this case because the experience of material phenomenon does have effect on thought. I use symbols then you experience them the law is that it will have some effect but it is not ultimately deterministic, you can think anything.

I'm pretty rigid in the ironic ecotone of world and idea where there is some kind of actuality, world and the mind or some aether of forms and the soul, I don't differentiate and refer to any conception as indirect reality. Idealistic conceptions are entertainable, but ultimately I am materialist or green not lorange like Kant.

Rose colored glasses in this thread. Modernity has been a quarterly Cartesian axis of increasing rationality over time, decreasing irrationality, and going back in time from point zero increasing rational knowledge about the premodern and decreasing irrational knowledge.

It is difficult to understand how Descartes can be the architect of a modern system that simulates in each rational modern agent his incompassion in the subjection of the irrational to scientific methods. I have to conclude he is no architect, as Calvin isn't either but simply the nerve ending in societies cerebellum that makes itself aware of a throbbing vein of social types in the body. Descartes and Calvin are merely body builders who want the growing body to become aware of the pump in the extremeties they aim to hypertrophy. The body they build is one meant to destroy and oppress a foe. I use an organic analogy there to represent a prevailing ethos, that is kind of like saying machines are driven by libido.

It's an interesting topic. I agree with your theory. Maybe I think in a too philosophical and abstract way for a nonphilosopher, but it is in metaphysics and not science where there is an analogy of concepts rather than an isolation and objectification of everything. Metaphysics is not hard to teach people. Theres a lot to be said on the topic but metaphysics in the modern period is actually in a state of oppression. I believe the premodern was more metaphysical in thinking and this too is akin to schizophrenia. It's a complicated subject to talk about, but what has happened in the modern period from pogroms to prescriptions was really based on an emerging psychiatry. A modernization of morality of the soul of society. There is a lot to know on the subject and despite the argumentative nature of opposing forms of knowledge, and the potential of argument to make revolutionary change, science is a moral decision one makes about metaphysics: about restricting what is understandable. Science is psychiatry, period. Metaphysics connects interrelated webs of concepts that science persecutes: metaphysics-schizophrenia-irony-religion-primitive-natural-soul etc. Antipsychiatry is not just about being against systematic poisonings its about resisting the scientific construction of a reality that isolates, objectifies, and applies methods on everything problematic to it.

Seems to be the case. The Matrix film hasn't really caused anyone to notably form a resistance against the machines, whatever those may be. The film if anything has caused people to find deeper illusory experiences in their relationship with machines, such as the one I currently type these very illusions on, and to content/pacify themselves in completely fabricated experiences found in modern machines. Maybe there is no red-blue dichotomy in pills, it's the same pill with a contradictory dual nature. That the same pill can be red or blue, is likely secondary to the actual will of person to fight or submit.

Yes antipsychotics can be both pills. A red pill of Cartesian scientific skepticism, and a blue pill you take to keep you from resisting an established order. More than a few people have taken this 'purple' pill and it has either become a complete red pill of antipsychiatry or a blue pill of complete tranquilization and early death. The 'philosophical pharma' I prefer is the symbolic pill in the Matrix film, that changes its form factor based on whatever the liberating agent is against the oppressive regime.

'Analytical', very nice. My plane is landing. Might reply later.

I enjoyed that. It's an interesting topic logic+empiricism. I notice that your empirical knowledge is someone's writing. It is not logic but it is rational to use authoritative work as the basis of empiricism. I personally find that work is authoritative can be because it is sanctioned by authority which is a circular argument. So there is a difference between being empirical and logical when the source of experience is academic work, and being logical and empirical when your experience is worldly and you use logic against the work. That's just a caution I advocate as I am personally against established authority, so irrational on that sense, but in the Platonic spirit use logic as it is intended ironically, whatever that means to you.

The countervailing power of irony against rationalism is interesting. Irony has a quasi-rational form but it ultimately undermines rationality. Everyone, even rationalists can appreciate irony, in some of its forms. But certain types are resisted if the person 'fails to see the irony'. This is usually if the irony is argumentative against their rational code. However, irony in one form or another, or nuances of the same platonic form, can be used argumentatively, juvenalian-ly, or sarcastically etc. by anyone to any end rational or irrational. However the use of irony acknowledges the fundamental irrationality of human perception, action, and expectation, so it is an irrationalism. The tie in to bodily dysfunction here is that the imperfect ability to expect, expect wrong then realize actuality, or to act against expectation is a dysfunctional aspect of indirect realism which is our bodies producing an inadequate simulation of the world.

The superimposition of the evil genius interpretation over the demon in Descartes work is an object of possible speculation. I am satisfied right now that it is to represent a mind that creates a 'rationality' opposed to Cartesian rationality. Any opposing schizo delusion espoused by the 'evil genius' must be resisted by anyone who adheres to Cartesian rationality. This superimposition is possibly an effective way of oppressing anyone who dares argue an opposing rationality. No-one needs to be a genius to produce an opposing argument, even dare I say to the great Descartes, and evil should not have survived the rationalization of morality. However, it is possibly effective in the persecution of someone stigmatized by mental diagnosis, stigmatized being an absurd word to use in this context, who is talking irrational gibberish like this to an agent.

Of course the pursuit of this demon by Cartesian dissection of the new dually parted mind and body and a refined scientific perspective for the study of both led to an explosion of irrationalities, some which have lasted as ever updated diagnostic categories, and others which led to the horrific treatment of now normalized groups which have been swept under the rug only for the irrational opposed to the good sense and reason of psychiatry to remember in advocacy of their sickness. However, irrationality is a complex beast, and oppressive rationality can take subtle forms and underly all social action. Due to these oppressions irrationality will always surface here and there and is thus an indomitable beast. The Will of people in marginalized groups is antagonized by a modern rational order that creates conflict with the known order of their heritage forming a diathesis that is persecuted as mental disease by modern agents. Resistance to the modern rational order of nationalistic patriotism, work ethic, and health also forms a resistance amongst the people contributing to opposing irrational behaviors in self destructive acts, as no easy path for their inward focussed aggression can be taken against their oppressors. This dialectic conflict, although manifest as disease amongst the oppressed, seems advantageous to the prevailing rational ethos. However, consciousness arises from material conditions and the nature of the oppression is resisted little by little, reforming the institutions formed by the ethos. Whether a synthesis takes place, something entirely unrelated and new emerges, or one unlikely as it is triumphs over the other is for nature to decide.

As a general thesis, that modern rationalism oppresses the irrational is fairly easy to accept. That all proceeding modern psychology does so, is challenging to argue in specificity. That Descartes' philosophy is against the demon is fairly easy to accept. That the demon is the same as schizophrenia is on the surface easy to accept, but accepting it outright fails to acknowledge the conceptions of this demon have changed as well as likely the human focus of its persecution. You may say medical science, has profiled this demon precisely and the persecution/ treatment is exacted with similar precision, but I contend the medical scientific rationalism, if based on a denial of the basic irrational will, oppresses in everyone by virtue of creating dually a discrepancy between self and understanding-of-self, a rationalized suppression of this nature-akin-to-schizophrenia, and implication of madness for challenging what would have been moral order for the souls, but is now modern scientific rational order for the health of the body.

Just to leave a post script to this one-off idea, it is a result of speculation to fill in the gaps in the complex of premodern- irony-modernity-orange-rationalization-capitalism-postmodernism-schizophrenia...

The essences of what in this writing is attributed to will to power and schizophrenia, were different at the time of Rene Descartes and the contemporary modern conception of it is an extension of his philosophy. How these essences continue to be associated with evil/demonic is a function of their opposition to a rationalized modern order.

I understand that, and I don't expect something I wrote in five minutes to change anything about that. However I do believe this very action is motivated by the Will, the creation of argument, though sublimated into rational discourse is an irrational drive. I feel as if psychology/ psychiatry has objectified the objects of the Will as mind and through the way it is studied and rationalized further supplanted it with its objectified and rationalized interpretations. This Will can be conceptualized as a bodily force and any objects it produces as externalized things, but not the mind. This argument stems from an irrational Will and whether it
Is true/false, knowledge or misknowledge is secondary to whether it overcomes the oppressive rationality that currently prevails and becomes code.

Yes mis/knowledge is a tool by the irrational force of the will. If you take a leap and conceptualize the Will as shizophrenia which is a withdrawn solipsistic introverted state, the nature of the misknowledge by this misdirected Will is against social codes. So one simple way irrationality becomes rationality is through the creation of codes or rules or norms through conflict with another person/ mind. That is only one type of rationality, but it can 'evolve', for lack of better word, from there as the irrational Will comes into conflict with itself, for example in an internal dialogue learned from contact with other minds, where the struggle for power against oppressions inherent in social interaction leads to rational methods that can overcome those oppressions.

I have further thoughts on this conception of Will to Power that relate to my anti-schizophrenic thesis. If 'schizophrenia' is an extension of the irrational bodily force known as Will to Power, Descartes moves from the absurd premise of a demon to an antithetical rationalist philosophy opposed to the Will to Power. As such all proceeding modern institutions subvert and oppress this Will. Modernity is inherently productive of certain kinds of conflict that cause constant institutional change based on the antagonism of this Will. Modern social phenomenon with schizo essences are a function of this ironic aspect of the Will and modernity. But even in the premodern, Socrates exhibits an irrational Will to Power that becomes rational through a complex process. Divergent conceptions of this Will occur throughout the premodern with the ancient greeks likening it divinity and the later western cultures after christ likening it to demonic possession.

The mind-body problem interests me. Deleuze bases a lot on the cogito, but at the same time is critical of psychology/ psychiatry which I believe starts with cogito as first premise. It is difficult to do philosophy without the concept of thought or mind, but I think there is a problem where conceptualizing mind as cogito is creating an object that can turn against itself, rather than a more physicalist understanding that is synergistic between the material manifestations of the concept of mind (physical behavior, speech, and the code and calculation inherent in it) and its ways of exciting or pacifying the body. Psychiatry has a physicalist mode of treatment mostly, but psychotherapies and psychology isolate the cogito in a way that I believe produces a mind rather than actually proves the existence of one. My hunch is that thoughts and ideas are indistinct from mind, so the establishment of a cogito is the production of physical content that the body misperceives as mind. The inner voice that I identify as my mind thinking is actually my body working with code I got from outside my body. I know this because my thoughts are English and I am not English. That Descartes establishes the cogito after acknowledging that he could possibly have schizophrenia but in a premodern manifestation of a demon illustrates that how mind is conceptualized can change based on physical manifestations of ideas.

The red pill is the 'read' pill.
The blue pill is you blew it

It's really interesting that if you are indeed behaving coherently to normative reason and thus rationally how it is not ironic to you these discursive practices in philosophical argument are considered rational and not fallacious/ irrational. A few that I have noticed are mockery, nit-picking, gaslighting, misinterpretation, lack of charity, ad hominem etc. That these culturally prescribed actions are rational because they are culturally prescribed, begs. To me they are jarringly irrational but to another brit you must seem extremely rational.

you can't disagree with a normative reason — Bartricks

Yes, I can disagree with a normative reason when it refers to a culturally influenced argument which is a belief about rationality.

Culture's don't have beliefs — Bartricks

Yes cultures do have beliefs, they don't have them the same way as people, but cultures have beliefs the same ways they have traditions, or practices. A culture is a cultivation of all the objects of a given people. The total cultivation 'has' different parts.

Galileo was a person, not an example of rationality. A person may exhibit rationality. But a person cannot 'be' rationality. — Bartricks

Not being very creative repeating the same non-argument over and over. A nit-picking point doesn't invalidate that Galileo is an example of opposing rationality.

I am disagreeing with your normative reason for acting which correspondingly is an argument about rationality that conforms to your culture's (I assume British) long standing belief. I do not think that is rationality. I referred earlier to Galileo as an example of rationality that defies normative reason. That you are acting so ignorantly and irrationally in the face of argument against your culturally prescribed codes is further indictment of not only your argument but your society's beliefs.

The only thing I will give you credit for in this thread is that your rigid inability to render meaning from anything that slightly defies cultural prescriptivism is coherent with your mostly incoherent argument for normative reason.

"A normative reason is a reason (for someone) to act—in T. M. Scanlon’s phrase, “a consideration that counts in favour of” someone’s acting in a certain way (1998 and 2004). A motivating reason is a reason for which someone does something, a reason that, in the agent’s eyes, counts in favour of her acting in a certain way." plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/

When I say 'a' normative reason is rational I mean having a normative reason. Having is implied. It's like saying 'if a logical idea is rational' the 'having' is implied.

'a rational normative reason' — Bartricks

I never used this combination of words.

Here's an interesting puzzle for anyone interested. If 'a' normative reason is rational then 'a' reason is reason, so in a prescriptive linguistic culture to say 'normative reason' when the singular form normatively or 'ought' to be used is irrational, but is logical, so is actually rational. Proving, incidentally, that normative reason is not the ultimate reduction of rationality.

I don't really care to talk to you, you're not a civilized person.

Most people on the forum would agree that you talk nonsense,

Something is not incoherent because it is missing a single letter.

No, I don't see. You have your own ideas about it, but they seem to be mostly semantic traps rather than philosophy.

Back on topic, is taking the blue pill rational? I would say the blue pill is not rational, but it is possibly utilitarian. If the blue pill pays homage to Platonist and Cartesian traditions then it is not in the spirit of rationality to take it. The common spirit of rationality in these cases is to overcome illusions.

Rationality concerns action? Possibly. It's a standard dichotomy to separate thought and action. I could argue the dichotomy, but I'll give you that. Then?

reason to act is not in itself rational. Rational is a quality of certain reasons to act. Conventionally that is logic. But even logic is not the end of the story. There are certain ways of acting rationally using nonrational methods such as intuiting the local customs of a strange place without justification.