it is a wrong or injustice that arises because the prevailing or hegemonic discourse actively precludes the possibility of this wrong being expressed. — Joshs
Cool. I’d go as far as to take it a step further, and call it the limits of reason. But then, I suppose speculation presupposes reason, so….close enough. — Mww
But the diagonal proof is beautiful. No matter how many gods you worship, there are always more ... — unenlightened
The resolution to this "hidden dualism" is to recognize that the brain and its functions are also representations and, thusly, the brain-in-itself is not what one ever studies in a lab. — Bob Ross
The fundamental condition of existence is alterity. (c) — Quixodian
Usually philosophy is critical of something, but Kantian philosophy on the other hand, is critical of philosophy itself. Or maybe the general metaphysical discipline specifically. — Mww
I think we can better understand subjectivity by perceiving individuals as being overburdened with truths and being required to organise them. In organising them, we must make choices, that is subjectivity. — Judaka
Taking a view of what the reader needs to know, or what the report needs to convey is necessary, but demonstrates how the goal is not truth. — Judaka
Given that all observation (perception) is theory-laden, in essence, learning new knowledge can be like opening a door that lets you peer into a completely new dimension of reality. — Pantagruel
Using a phenomenological method, having interviewed many people who have that same experience, one may come to the conclusion that time is indeed slower when you put your hand on a hot stove and quicker when you are spending time talking to someone you find attractive. This is saying something about time. — PhilosophyRunner
I don't know where I sit precisely. I do believe we 'construct' the world, our cognitive apparatus has foibles and limitations and there is embodied cognition - along the lines of phenomenology. I'm not sure any of this matters to how I go about my daily business. — Tom Storm
Mind is, in this sense, ontologically prior to the physical, not in the sense of being a class of object or substance that temporally exists before the physical, but as the fundamental ground for which and in which the physical is made manifest. — Quixodian
An experiment is performed. A machine registers the outcome. This is when the "collapse" occurs. An hour later a scientist reads the measurement - his reading doesn't mystically create an answer. — jgill
Imagine a guy called Luke. It is fair enough if Luke takes after Feyeraband and it is fair enough if he takes after Popper. However I hope that whichever he takes after, he stays true to the assumptions underlying it. If Luke adopts Feyeraband but also believes strongly that many theories are pseudo-science, then I find that self contradictory. The same is true if Luke adopts Popper and believes there is no such thing as pseudo-science. And so on. — PhilosophyRunner
As a first point of call, what I hope to get to myself, is a place where an understanding of science is self consistent. — PhilosophyRunner
I still believe that the development of science would have been much slower without fossil fuels, but of course I wasn't wishing to deny the importance of mathematics and geometry in science. — Janus
I’m a firm supporter of the relation between the human intellect, and the method by which the world is understood by means of it. It’s not weird at all, it’s impossible that is could be otherwise. — Mww
YIKES!!! A Young Hegelian?!?! Schopenhaur’s favorite targets, and he t’weren’t proper gentlemanly about it, neither. — Mww
Mathematics is fabulous! — unenlightened
For Husserl, the brain is indeed ‘real’, but then he analyzed the real as a higher level construction of intentional acts, just as real spatial objects are constituted out of correlated perceptions. — Joshs
All facts of nature for Husserl are contingent and relative. Consequently, we can’t use the ‘reality’ of the brain as an explanatory grounding for the constitutive process out of which it emerges as an ideal object. — Joshs
Form is the general, and substance the particular, and they are two aspects on one world. — unenlightened
As for philosophy itself, I think it is reducible to every other subject and their interrelations. — sime
I think it is most useful to consider the academic disciplines of pure Mathematics and logic as not having subject matter in themselves, but as defining semantical norms of representation that facilitate the translation, coordination and comparison of language games that do possess subject matter. — sime
Mathematicians are also "spiritual advisors", for mathematics and logic are normative disciplines. — sime
Form and substance - the first dualism. I sometimes call them 'stuff and arrangements'. I would say that mathematicians explore the possible arrangements of anything- pattern, chaos, order, disorder, symmetry, asymmetry. whereas physicists and biologists look to explore the actual arrangement of stuff. — unenlightened
Some mathematicians seem to think that there can be, or are arrangements of nothing. It makes no sense to me. — unenlightened
It is this constant category error that trips people up into not understanding any "hard problem" — schopenhauer1
so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser
Also, everyone grapples with questions of purpose, meaning, ethics, duty, etc. I think these questions are a lot more important to people than hoe old the universe is or what Dark Matter/Energy are. — RogueAI
Bearing in mind we all routinely do things that would have been thought ‘excluded from reality’ by our forbears. — Quixodian
Physics necessarily leads to metaphysics. Philosophy can't be avoided. — RogueAI
Whatever reality is, reality necessarily excludes – negates – unreality (i.e. ontological impossibles (e.g. un-condittionals, un-changeables, reified ideas ('ideals'), etc)). — 180 Proof
It's better they are unaware that's what they're doing. :roll: — jgill
Maps are not "far from" models yet neither are equivalent to the territory as (sub)personal – existential – biases would have us believe (re: folk psychology). — 180 Proof
... or minimally egoic (e.g. Laozi's wu wei, Epicurus' aponia, Pyrrho's epochē, Spinoza's scientia intuitiva, Nietzsche's amor fati, Zapffe-Camus' absurd, Rosset's cruelty ...) — 180 Proof
:up:How about you – second person plural – such as Buber's Ich-Du (or even Dao)? — 180 Proof
IIRC, Husserl begins as a mathematician ... I imagine Spinoza, like Epicurus, would "take" thinking – reflective inquiry/practice – impersonally. — 180 Proof
:up:This immanentist agrees. — 180 Proof
I suppose to the degree one believes the path is not the destination. — 180 Proof
Flesh (facticity). — 180 Proof
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).