And I speak to the homuncular incoherence of leaving out the social construction of the “we” that has an “actual body”. — apokrisis
According to Apel, in light of these innovative traditions, the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be fundamentally reconceived. In particular, the conditions for intersubjectively valid knowledge cannot be explicated in terms of the structure of consciousness or the cognitive capacities of the individual knowing subject but only through a systematic investigation of language as the medium of symbolically mediated knowledge. The pragmatic turn, initiated by Peirce and Charles W. Morris (1901–1979) and continued in the early twenty-first century in speech act theory, further implies that an adequate explanation of how meaningful communication is possible cannot be achieved by a semantic theory alone. Rather, it must be supplemented by a pragmatic study of the relation between linguistic signs and the conditions of their use by speakers.
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Apel argues that the most important contribution of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer's in particular, has been to show that interpretation is not another method of investigation in addition to the methods used within the hard sciences, but an unavoidable dimension of all understanding. Every empirical investigation of a domain of objects implies at the same time a relation to other subjects, to a community of interpreters.
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The so-called Münchhausen trilemma—that is, that all attempts to discover ultimate foundations result in either logical circularity, infinite regress, or an arbitrary end to the process of justification—can be overcome by moving from the level of semantic analysis to the level of pragmatics and recognizing that some presuppositions are necessary for the very possibility of intersubjectively valid criticism and argumentation.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/Feuerbach made his first attempt to challenge prevailing ways of thinking about individuality in his inaugural dissertation, where he presented himself as a defender of speculative philosophy against those critics who claim that human reason is restricted to certain limits beyond which all inquiry is futile, and who accuse speculative philosophers of having transgressed these. This criticism, he argued, presupposes a conception of reason is a cognitive faculty of the individual thinking subject that is employed as an instrument for apprehending truths. He aimed to show that this view of the nature of reason is mistaken, that reason is one and the same in all thinking subjects, that it is universal and infinite, and thatthinking (Denken) is not an activity performed by the individual, but rather by “the species” acting through the individual. “In thinking”, Feuerbach wrote, “I am bound together with, or rather, I am one with—indeed, I myself am—all human beings” (GW I:18).
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This loss Feuerbach finds reflected in three general tendencies of the modern age: 1) the tendency to regard human history solely as the history of the opinions and actions of individual human subjects, and not as the history of humanity conceived as a single collective agent, 2) the tendency to regard nature as a mere aggregate of “countless single stars, stones, plants, animals, elements and things” (GTU 195/14) whose relations to one another are entirely external and mechanical, rather than as an organic whole the internal dynamics of which are animated by a single all-encompassing vital principle, and 3) the tendency to conceive of God as a personal agent whose inscrutable will, through which the world came into being from nothing and is continually directed, is unconstrained by rational necessity.
Feuerbach’s basic objection to the theistic conception of God and his relation to creation is that, on it, both are conceived as equally spiritless. Rather than consisting of lifeless matter to which motion is first imparted by the purposeful action of an external agent, Feuerbach argues that nature contains within itself the principle of its own development. It exercises “unlimited creative power” by ceaselessly dividing and distinguishing its individual parts from one another. But the immeasurable multiplicity of systems within systems that results from this activity constitutes a single organic totality.
Nature is ground and principle of itself, or—what is the same thing, it exists out of necessity, out of the soul, the essence of God, in which he is one with nature. (GTU 291/86)
God, on this view, is not a skilled mechanic who acts upon the world, but a prolific artist who lives in and through it.
Basic skills like fishing or stitching clothing can just disappear. You need a critical mass to allow the specialisation that keeps innovation alive and developing.
The genius is standing on the shoulders of countless others. Some genius once said that. — apokrisis
Is human evolution a story of individual hominid genius or collective hominid habit. Paleoanthropology points firmly to the later. — apokrisis
I’m OK with that. Time binding is actually a semiotic concept in my book. — apokrisis
Tis true, and now I'm wondering now, what role my body being there played. I'm a big guy too, but she had only known me for a couple of hours. — wonderer1
I'd love to know what thoughts went through Meri's head. Would she have done the same if it had been just her and Barb there? I'd guess yes. — wonderer1
Does this mean that cooperation is not an evolutionary adaptation? — Joshs
If you are a mathematician, for instance, there are almost no standards of social grace that obtain. — apokrisis
Shakespeare stands accused of the literary sin of plagiarism – turning the prose of others into poetry. But no one minds that as he just told the stories better. — apokrisis
Once again a code is putting itself in charge of the physics needed to give itself existence as a structure that can grow and evolve. — apokrisis
You want to be able to quantify the "genius personality" in terms of some individualistic paradigm of the human mind and spirit? — apokrisis
Computationalism works as very rough metaphor. But it is another foundation of sand. — apokrisis
The problem with the subjective stance is that even the self as a first person viewpoint is socially constructed.
Well it is first neurobiologically constructed. Pragmatic modelling means I can chomp my food with out chewing off my tongue.
But the kind of self that exists the social world where individuals can be acclaimed as "genius personalities" is a social construction. And needs to understood as such. Otherwise you are building your philosophical cities on foundations of sand. — apokrisis
When I was 16 or 17 I read Mere Christianity by C.S. Lewis, and not having much in the way of exposure to philosophy, I was impressed and felt ready to argue with any atheist I had the chance to. — wonderer1
I would think human intuition was a huge component of the training ingredients, but I would think there was a fair bit of slow thinking thrown in as well - in reaching a diagnosis to tag each X-ray with. I'd guess that in some cases there was evidence in addition to the X-ray. E.g. biopsy results.
In any case, you bring up a good point - that the training data involves more than just the X-rays. — wonderer1
One is that I think the lack of really caring about one's masculinity is itself a masculine trait. Who are you to tell me what kind of man I am? I can get by on my own without your approval -- like a man. — Moliere
A big advantage AI has over humans for tasks like this, is the ability to be trained on such a huge dataset without getting bored and quitting. — wonderer1
Sometimes philosophy looks a bit like ancestor worship. — wonderer1
He was singular and different because of the generality or universality of what he had to say. We can focus on him to understand what we all ought to think. — apokrisis
I think this is a properly balanced view. It's not either all social construction or the sovereign individual, but somewhere in between. — Janus
If evolution can code for cooperation , [ then ] it can just as easily code for the opposite. — Joshs
Meaning has to be smuggled in somewhere to give life to the syntax. You want to claim it starts with the individual and so artfully arrange your thought experiment to achieve that illusion. I say go back and start again. — apokrisis
Better yet, let’s imagine the infinity of randomly typing monkeys banging away until the end of time.
We agree that they “must” produce every possible work of genius of any kind? And hence this proves something about genius? — apokrisis
...the nature of which is the point at issue. — Wayfarer
Sorry. I couldn't help myself with the "Smith" name. — Moliere
Oh I know of one Smith who not only thought of himself that way, but also convinced enough people to start a religion.
Though he had wives. — Moliere
A certain kind of inquiring intelligence? — apokrisis
So your acts of solitary genius are meaningless until they are understood as having been matched by an equal amount of intelligent response. — apokrisis
The game is to differentiate AND integrate. Go in both directions with the vigour that can arrive at a high state of dynamical contrast. — apokrisis
You seem to want to ask how to measure genius,I say the yardstick is obvious. Action and reaction. The push and its effect. A simple reciprocal equation, or Newton’s third law of motion. — apokrisis
There would not seem to be many proponents of the blank slate these days. The salient question seems to be whether it is merely capacities or tendencies which are innate (like Chomsky's idea of a genetic capacity in humans to learn language) or whether there is also innate knowledge (along the lines of anamnesis, I guess). — Janus
But yea, a detective, for one example, likely wouldn't be worth squat without this ability or relating and understanding other - including that other with which one is in an antagonistic relation to. — javra
But really good chatting with you! — javra
Of course eyes are objects, but it is not as objects that they are significant. The significant factor is sense perception and its interpretation. Plainly we are subject to illusions, for instance optical illusions. More subtly, we are subject to delusion - misinterpreting what the senses tell us - and even more subtle errors, such as errors of judgement. — Wayfarer
"wisdom" consists in being able to simultaneously entertain different perspective such that one's thoughts and actions satisfies all these otherwise disparate perspectives with the same breath, — javra
What is that an objection to? Who is treating the sense organs as illusions? — Wayfarer
Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are none but thinking beings, all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be termed idealism? It is the very contrary.
No, they're not. Your eyes are organs of sight, but your eyes are not what you look at, unless you have some cause to do so. Yes, you can see the eyes of others, and in some metaphorical sense see 'with the eyes of others' (like 'standing in another's shoes'), but they're not objects, unless you're wanting to examine the eye or other sense organs objectively. — Wayfarer