Just think about it: if this something with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything would now write here what you Patterner will say, how could it get it right? Because before you write you next comment you would read it, think about and comment on it. — ssu

I think I am finally understanding you. :grin: I don't know if you changed your wording in such a way that I finally caught on, or if I was just too dense to figure it out until now. The latter is certainly a good possibility, and I don't want to embarrass myself by going back and looking at what you were saying before.

Without ever trying it, you and I are smart enough to see the problem that will arise if the thing with the perceptions and intellect to understand everything [Maybe we can just call it Laplace's Demon (LD)?] declares what my next post will be. I don't see any reason to think LD would not also see the problem. It would, in fact, have perfect knowledge of what my response would be. And it would be unable to state that ahead of time without changing what I would have said. On and on and on.

That doesn't invalidate the idea of determinism. Requiring LD to announce the forecast, and an endless chain of revised forecasts, is just setting up an impossible condition. LD wouldn't announce the forecast ahead of time. But it would know, if everything I think and do is the result of determinism. Maybe it could write it down, only to reveal it after I made my post.

There is a science fiction book called ]I]Thrice Upon a Time[/i], by James Hogan. A scientist puts his friend in front of a computer. A small piece of paper prints out. The scientist looks at it, but does not show his friend. Then the scientist tells his friend to type six characters on the computer and hit enter. After the friend does that, the scientist shows him the print out from a minute earlier. It matches what the friend just typed. The scientist found a way to send that amount of information back in time one minute. So what was printed out a minute before it was typed. At that point, of course, the friend tried to outsmart the machine. After the scientist gets a print out, the friends typed nothing. And the scientist revealed a blank printout from 60 seconds earlier. And then the friend tries to double-fake the machine, and on and on.

Is everything in this reality deterministic,
— Patterner
I don't think that the idea that everything in this reality is deterministic is an empirical hypothesis. It is a completely different kind of proposition. — Ludwig V

Is it not the proposition of this thread? Some think it is, some think it isn't. Not to say we can prove it one way or thre other. If we could, there wouldn't still be new threads about it.

And before he or she thinks that you are attacking the whole idea of determinism, it should be told that the issue in the limitations of modelling that determinism, not the determinism itself!
— ssu
So you are saying that the world is deterministic, even though our models will never demonstrate that? — Ludwig V

This is what I'm trying to understand about where some of you - you two in particular, at the moment, but others who are not posting in this thread - stand. Is everything in this reality deterministic, and we just don't have the necessary information and intelligence to be able to calculate terribly much, particularly regarding human choices, about the future? Or are some aspects of this reality - notably, human choices - not deterministic? Understandable if anyone does not know which they think is the case.

That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given.
— ssu
Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking — Ludwig V

I'm basically asking the same thing again. Does ordinary life require a whole different way of thinking in the same sense that we need to think of large numbers of air molecules as thermodynamics, because we simply can't perceive such a gargantuan number, much less calculate all the interactions that will take place between all of them within the space they occupy?

You cannot write a comment that you don't write, even if obviously those kind of comments that you don't write do exist. — ssu

Why is that? Whether I chose to write a comment or not, it is a decision. I have perceived what I perceived. It is all converted into bio-electric impulses, neurotransmitters, and what not. Then it all runs to whichever parts of my brain each thing runs to. Parts where memories are stored, parts where logic examines, etc., etc. Then things move towards a decision. Particles collide, neurons fire, structures do their job, action potentials are initiated, etc.

If, in principle, something with the perceptions and intellect to understand how all those physical events interacting translates to decisions and actions, and can forecast what response I would type, why would it not be able to forecast that I would choose to not respond? It's still a choice. Surely, the choice to not move is not, in principle, of such different nature from the choice to move.

Second scenario is fine. Not at all scary. Dying can be scary. Being dead isn't.

The crucial part here is that modelling the past there's no interaction and the model doesn't have to take itself into account. What has happened has happened. That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given. But you hopefully understand that it's different to model this when it hasn't happened, especially you know about the model before you have thrown it. Then a whole Pandora's box has been opened from the determinist view. — ssu

Yes, I understand. But why can't how a model takes itself into account be calculated? That's just more input fed into the algorithm.

If a "fatalistic" determinist argues that this kind of determinism (where all of our reactions can be forecasted) is perhaps possible in the future (as we don't know what the future holds and what kind of technological/scientific advances there are), then one has simply to remind them that this science then simply can't be logical. — ssu

I believe the idea is that all of our actions are determined by the progressions of arrangements of all the constituents of our brains. Mental states are either identical to, or entirely determined by, brain states. In theory, a more advanced technology could pinpoint all the constituents of our brains, see all the forces acting on them, and calculate future arrangements. Why can that not be logical?

I see below that you just responded to a previous post of mine. Off I go! :grin:

The language-games around actions are unbelievably complicated and very difficult to summarize. The same is not true of events — Ludwig V

The causes of some events are more complicated than others. The causes of our simplest actions are probably more complicated than the causes of most events. Possibly any event. As I recently said, there are many variables, many kinds of variables, and all of the variables are interacting with at least some of the others. We don't have the ability to track that, much less predict future actions. We barely have the ability to predict future events. (Some people are amazing at pool.) Still, is it not all on the same spectrum?
Simple Events > Complex Events > Simple Actions > Complex Actions.

Can you give me an example of a free action?"
— Patterner
Tempting. But it wouldn't be a clear case. Almost everything we do can be described as free from some perspectives and not free from others. — Ludwig V

You said, "We could not act freely..." What do you mean?

The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
— Patterner
The answer to those questions is yes. But the questions are asked in the context of the glass breaking and so lead us to neglect the conceptual difference between the glass breaking (an event) and my throwing the pillow (an action, normally). — Ludwig V

Can you explain the conceptual difference?

If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack.
— Patterner
So you are an epiphenomenalist?
I don't agree. If the answer is yes, that doesn't justify your conclusion. It defines our problem. If the answer is no, that also doesn't justify any conclusion. It also defines our problem. — Ludwig V

Can you tell me what the definition of our problem is if the answer is Yes?

I am as far from an epiphenomenalist as can be. I am playing Determinist's Advocate, presenting the case for determinism as I see it. Not knowing the definition of our problem, I don't know how you can both agree that the answer is Yes, and not be an epiphenomenalist. At the moment I typed this post, given every bit of sensory input I've ever received, every bit of information I've ever learned, the physical structure of my brain that my DNA is responsible for, the physical structure of my brain that was determined by other factors, and every other variable we can think of, could I have posted a different response? Could I have posted the same ideas, but in different words? Could I have chosen to respond later tonight? Could I have chosen to not respond at all?

I'm asking for a definition. I've been expressing what I take determinism to be. I tried to be as clear as I could here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/910043

I honestly can't be sure, but it seems that you are saying we are in a deterministic reality, but you disagree with my post. If so, then I ask what determinism means.

Now, does this deterministic view of there being your answer 1038, 1039 and 1050 limit what you can write? No. Could they be forecasted? Again no, this isn't simple extrapolation from what has become for. — ssu

Why is determinism called determinism? What is deterministic about it?

That's a very long thread, and he has some great stuff to say.

And you can't go wrong with scifi. :grin:

Your post brings a post on another site to mind.
https://kevinswatch.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?p=1098685#p1098685

It's a site dedicated to a series of fantasy books, and the author in general. But we have forums for various other things.

Freedom is not opposed to determinism; it requires it. — Ludwig V

Can you define "freedom"? Freedom from what?

We could not act freely if the causal network was not (reasonably) reliable. — Ludwig V

Can you give me an example of a free action?

Also, by "reasonably reliable", do you mean the casual network is not always reliable? If that is what you mean, can you give an example of it not being reliable?

Does this refute the idea that you let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain? Actually not. The determinism holds. But it shows that this determinism isn't at all a limit here. — ssu

Unlimited determinism is still determinism. That's my point. Many say we can make choices within an entirely deterministic reality. My position is that those choices are equivalent to the glass breaking. Yes, glasses hitting floors can break in in gigantic number of different ways. But every glass that has ever actually hit a floor broke exactly as it did because that's the only way it could have. Because of the speed it was going when it hit, the spin, the exact location that first made contact, the material it and the floor were made of, and many other factors.

If all is deterministic, then every decision I've ever made was exactly as it was because that's the only decision I could have made. Pointing out things like stored memories that affect how I react to stimuli, or how hearing a forecast of when I will take action affects when I do, don't change the fact that it's all just physical events. Even if our decisions are the result of more physical events, more kinds of physical events, and physical events that interact far more than anything else that we are aware of.

We call the glass breaking an event, but what I do a choice. But, despite the different levels of complexity, the only actual difference is that I am aware of what's going on, and the glass is not. and if the determinists are correct, my awareness is also only physical events, and it doesn't have any causal power.

Sorry. Not ignoring you. I would answer you as I just did ssu. Ssu's was last, so I just quoted that post.

What is the sham here is thinking that determinism limits your actions or you don't have the ability to choose... because it's somehow preordained, because there is the deterministic future. — ssu

If I knock a glass off of a table, I do not think it is preordained that it will then fall to the floor and break into pieces. But it will fall to the floor and break into pieces. And, given all the factors, it can only break in one specific way, with x pieces of various sizes and shapes. What I mean is, exactly how it falls determines what part of it hits the floor first, at what angle, at what speed, etc. If it falls without spinning and lands on its base, it will break in one way. (I support it might not break at all in the scenario.) If it spins at a rapid rate, it might land not quite horizontal, with its rim hitting first, and shatter spectacularly. No matter how it hits, even though we don't have the ability to calculate everything the instant before it hits the floor and know how it will break, once it hits, there is only one possible outcome.

Exactly how it hits is the result of exactly how it was knocked off the table. Again, not preordained. It's just physics. Did I throw a pillow across the room and hit it? That pillow was going at exactly this speed, and was spinning in exactly such and such a manner, and, when the impact came, the glass could only moved on one exact way.

We have nothing close to the ability to see the pillow flying, and calculate exactly how it will hit the glass, exactly how the glass will fly and land, and exactly how the glass will break. But, in principle, it's all calculable. It's just physics.

There's nothing preordained in any of that. There's also no "choosing."

The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?

Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?

If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack.

Determinism doesn't say much. It also doesn't limit our choices. — ssu

It seems to me that the idea of choices in a deterministic reality is a sham. Sure, it is possible for a human to choose cake over ice cream. But when one of us is actually presented with the two options, if we pick one up because the billion bouncing billiard balls landed that way, and we could not have picked up the other because the balls landed in the only way they could, then how is such a "choice" is of no greater value or interest than is the final arrangement of the rocks and dirt when an avalanche settles?

Thank you for bringing this idea to my attention, Patterner. I really like how a seemingly hopeless situation like uncountable air molecules can – by their motion – actually bear fruit by giving us definitive information… namely temperature. And expanding this idea to “firing neurons” and “thought” is interesting. — Thales

I guess the idea is common enough. In How to Create a Mind, Ray Kurzweil writes:

Although chemistry is theoretically based on physics and could be derived entirely from physics, this would be unwieldy and infeasible in practice, so chemistry has established its own rules and models. Similarly, we should be able to deduce the laws of thermodynamics from physics, but once we have a sufficient number of particles to call them a gas rather than simply a bunch of particles, solving equations for the physics of each particle interaction becomes hopeless, whereas the laws of thermodynamics work quite well. Biology likewise has its own rules and models. A single pancreatic islet cell is enormously complicated, especially if we model it at the level of molecules; modeling what a pancreas actually does in terms of regulating levels of insulin and digestive enzymes is considerably less complex. — Kurzweil

Of course, there is much debate over whether or not consciousness is explained by this physical system.

For some reason, this brings to my mind the principle of “Operationalism,” which gained some popularity among certain logical positivists in the 1920s-30s. It goes something like this: Scientific concepts that lack direct, empirical evidence can be “saved” by linking them to experimental procedures. “Gravitation,” for example, can not be seen, heard, smelled, tasted or touched, but it can nevertheless be determined “operationally” by observing phenomena such as planetary orbits. — Thales

We can take that a step further. Knowing what we know about gravity, we cannot fully explain the motion of stars and galaxies. it has been determined that there must be something that we cannot detect in any way, but which has a gravitational effect. It is called dark matter, and the amount of it that exists has been calculated.

I recently posted the following to @Relativist when we were talking about Peter Tse's The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation.
---------------------
There are an uncountable number of air molecules in my living room. They are all flying about in various directions, at various speeds. We have nothing resembling the slightest hint of hope of tracking them all. But we can measure the temperature of the room. As Anil Seth writes in Being You : A New Science of Consciousness:

Importantly, thermodynamics did more than merely establish that mean kinetic energy correlated with temperature—it proposed that this is what temperature actually is. — Seth

We, likewise, have no hope of tracking the activity of every neuron and synapse in someone's brain. As with the air molecules, the numbers, alone, make it impossible. But it's even more complicated, because, due to the nature of neurons, as Tse says, "The criteria for what makes a neuron fire can change." If we have no hope of mapping out the motion of the molecules of air in the room, then "no hope" is a pitifully inadequate way of expressing our ability to map out neutral activity. Nevertheless, if I'm understanding this, Tse is saying that, to paraphrase Seth, neural activity doesn't merely correlate with thought— this is what thought actually is. Although we can measure the macro property of temperature in a room, but cannot map out the motion of the air molecules, we know that the temperature is nothing more than the motion of the molecules. And, although we can comprehend thoughts, but cannot map out the neural activity of the brain, we know that the thoughts are nothing more than the neural activity.
---------------
I asked Relativist if that's what he thought Tse was trying to say. It seems some people here are saying the same.

The Matrix is also an example of a VR, not an example of the simulation hypothesis. — noAxioms

I guess the Matrix is a simulation to many sentient programs, and VR to many other sentient programs (Smith and Oracle, for example) and humans.

Thanks!

I just find it difficult to read fiction. — punos

After decades of reading fantasy/scifi, I haven't been able to get started for the last few years.

I never read the Dune book or books — punos

If I could makes any one book required reading for everyone, it would probably be Dune.

Heh. Thanks, but I'm not overly concerned with these mis-taps. I was just thinking that knowing I was doing something I didn't want to be doing, but being unable to stop, is very interesting. I like the idea in punos' second post.

I assume it takes practice to get very good at that. — punos

And they usually fail, it seems to me. The large muscles that are in motion can't be stopped sufficiently by the smaller ones. Still, they are able to try.

I'm also sure you can train yourself to be more conscious about taping that icon. It's probably a good idea to at least run that experiment on yourself. See how it goes, and see what you learn. — punos

Difficulty to test it. If I know I'm on the wrong screen, I don't commit myself in the first place.

Fighting what I guess would be called reflexive action is interesting, though. When an animal darts out in front of me as I'm driving, it seems like a reflex to slam on the brakes and turn the wheel to avoid it. But that's not a good idea, because you might end up in the other lane, hitting another car head on. Better to kill the critter than yourself and others in both cars.

But, for some reason, even though the movement began, just as when I start to tap the icon, the batter can put a stop to it, unlike me with the finger tap. My guess would be that check swings were never actually fully committed swings that were stopped. Rather, with so many muscles involved in swinging, some never got the swing command. The wrist muscles might be the last to get the signal. Instead, they get the signal to prevent the swing. But many muscles earlier in the chain were already moving, and many swings can't be checked.

That makes perfect sense. Thank you very much.

I wonder what happens when a batter tries to check his swing.

I'm apparently not describing the situation very well. It's not a visual problem at all. I should scroll twice before tappint the top left icon. But I'm not paying enough attention, and I only scroll once before tapping the icon.

The oddness is that I realize my mistake after my finger begins to descend, but before it touched the icon, but I can't do anything about it. It seems my "tap the icon" command to my finger is irrevocable. Even though I know it's a mistakes, and want to correct it, I can't. I believe it's what these two are experiencing:
https://www.instagram.com/reel/C7ukDr-uagx/?igsh=NWV4bTl2aGhwbW43
In at least some cases, they know they're about to hit the bell, but can't stop. We could possibly say their arms have too much momentum. But when it's just my finger, that's not the case. I simply can't give my finger the command to stop in time.

Thanks. Never heard of that.

Heh. I'm thinking it's something that might be common in people, like those other things I mentioned. I learned long ago that I'm not the first person to do or think anything. So others must have this, and it's probably already a field of study, or at least there's been an experiment on it. Delay between being conscious of something, and being able to do something about it. Seems like the flip-side of Libet.

↪Patterner if it doesn't exist because of physics, it exists because of human minds, but human minds exist because of physics, then...

Then human minds aren't fundamental, they exist because of physics, and indirectly those other things exist because of physics too. — flannel jesus

Yes. If human minds exist because of physics. Or, since the human body, particularly the brain, seems indispensable for the existence of human minds, if they exist solely because of physics.

I think we need a way for non fundamental things to still be real. Basically. Because WE are non fundamental, and my mind is the most real thing I know. — flannel jesus

Indeed. Fundamental things are not responsible for books, televisions, the internet, space shuttles, music, automobiles, bombs, poetry, mathematics, and a billion other things we could list. Not one of these things exists because of the laws of physics and properties of particles. They only exist because of human minds. I do not think the sole cause of the world being reshaped so thoroughly, in so many ways, could be not real.

. It's really hard to type causal instead of casual using swipe text on my phone — flannel jesus

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

The second important point is: the lack of determinism does not imply free will, it only implies randomness, and randomness is not what makes free will possible. — noAxioms

What makes free will possible?

Speak for yourself. I picked the cars as an example since I consider it to be making choices, even if I don't think it is a very good example of AI. They're complicated, but still very much automatons, but they do make choices about which route, which lane to use, and so on. If that's not choice, then fundamentally, as a physicalist, what am I doing that is different? — noAxioms

That's what I'm asking.

"Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?" -Patterner

Quite the opposite. It implies that it is far better to say "We don't know how X works yet" than to say "X? Oh, that's done by Gods, magic, woo, whatever. The latter attitude discourages research. The former methodology encourages it.
Hence the dark ages when methodological supernaturalism was prevalent, and the explosion of knowledge when methodological naturalism took over some 7 centuries ago give or take.

If your question is about a new kind of physics that implements mind, well, if it can be shown that such is how it really works, then it falls under naturalism, yes. But nobody is treating it as something that can be investigated. The whole point of woo is that it be based on faith in lieu of lack of evidence. So empirical research into any of it is discouraged. — noAxioms

I suspect the reason believers who don't engage in empirical research don't engage in empirical research is their minds aren't strong in that area. "God did it" and "How does it work" are not incompatible thoughts. Francis Collins is such a strong believer that, when he finished mapping the human genome, he called it the Language of God. Also Mendel, Carver, Maxwell, Cantor, Kelvin, Heisenberg, and many others.

Other minds don't much function in one sphere or the other. Some see the two as incompatible, and are opposed, even violently, to the one they don't function in.

Some don't seem inclined to either.

Yes, that's right. But that form of determinism does not amount to anything that could threaten freedom. There's a difference between being able to determine which horse will win the race, in the sense of being able to predict the result of the race and being able to determine which horse will win the race by fixing the race. Laplace's demon can do the first, but not the second. — Ludwig V

Agreed. The question of freedom arises when asking whether or not the decision to fix the race is anything other than physical interactions. Are we anything other than extraordinarily complex wind up toys?

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice.
— Patterner
Pool balls don't seem to be an example of something enacting will, of something making choices. — noAxioms

Right. But our will is the result of physical interactions. Regardless of their complexity, physical interactional are physical interactions.
-Physical interactions determine the final arrangement of the pool balls after the break.
-Physical interactions determine whether a bunch of particles will gather into a planet orbiting a star; become a loose gathering, such as the asteroid belt; or scatter to the various directions of space.
-Physical interactions determine if and when solid H2O will become liquid, and vice versa.
-Physical interactions cause the globe's weather patterns.
-Physical interactions determine what a person has for dinner, or how a person deals with a cheating spouse.

It is only when talking about what humans (some people include other animals) do that anyone calls the outcome choice. Why is that? The planet's weather is the result of more particles than are in our brains, and a huge number of different types of physical activity (gravity, tides, solar radiation, the many different ecosystems of all areas of the worlds, all states of matter, human activity, etc.) are involved. Yet, even there, we do not speak of choice or will. Why do we only when the physical activity within a human brain is involved?

Not having free will does not mean you have no choice. — noAxioms

The pool balls can come to rest in a huge number of arrangements after being struck by the cue ball at the break. But I wouldn't say any arrangement is ever a choice. Aside from the greater numbers and complexity of the types of physical interactions, in what way are our choices different if we don't have free will?

Thee simulator implements physics. Physics implements your consciousness, regardless of whether the physics is simulated or not. Under supernaturalism, this isn't true. — noAxioms

Does naturalism state that we currently know of all things natural?

I don't hold a presumption that the entities in the simulation will be held responsible for their choices, by entities not in the simulation. — noAxioms

If entities create a simulation that includes other entities that do not have free will, the creators would be ... what's there right word ... idiots if they held the creations responsible for their choices. i'm not sure it would be worse to hold characters in a story you write responsible for their choices.

I know there's no agreement regarding free will. But if we have free will, then we aren't simulations. I mean, how can you use rules and code to write something that doesn't follow rules and code?

Why are we simulating? Where will Voyager 1 be in fifty years? We don't simulate it's existence for every moment of the next fifty years. We just calculate.

Also, I don't think LD supposedly knows where every particle will be at every moment for the rest of time. I think it only has to be able to calculate the answer to specific questions. After it tells me where Voyager 1 will be in fifty years, I ask it where a particular particle in Jupiter's red spot will be next week. Then I ask it something else.

Of course, the farther into the future I'm asking about, the more other things will have an impact on it. But LD's intellect is vast enough.

And I really don't think Laplace was trying to convince us that such a demon is likely, or possible. He was just saying, in a universe where everything is deterministic, anything at any point in the future would be, in theory, calculable.

Sure. Demons are supernatural. I've never heard of a story with one that wasn't.

Hey, how about this idea... To try to put a natural entity in this role, it would, obviously, need to be made of particles. A quantum computer, or whatever the next step would be, made up of enough particles could calculate the rest of the particles. If there are finite particles in the universe. It wouldn't work for infinite particles.

It's a supernatural being in a thought experiment. I don't know how to put limits on that. It's all silly.