some pansychists just conceptualize it as "there's something it's like to be EVERYTHING". — flannel jesus

I think the question remains. As Chalmers respeatedly asks, why is there something it is like to be anything?

I think this is a good article:
Why Epiphenomenalism is Almost Certainly False

I want to make sure I'm following. I asked "From which aspect of encompassing reality are we separable?", and you said "Nature." If natural beings cannot be separated from nature, then that means we are not natural beings?

And in what way are we able to be separated from nature?

I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just as things like mass and charge are. We don't know what mass and charge are, and we don't know what proto-consciousness is.

I don't think the combination problem is a problem. No, I can't explain how it combines. But our not understanding very important things doesn't mean I don't accept them. How does mass warp spacetime? How do negative and positive charges attract each other?

We can be separated from nature?

More than that: nature is that aspect (i.e. causal nexus) of encompassing reality, or being, from which human beings are fundamentally inseparable. — 180 Proof

I don't understand. From which aspect of encompassing reality are we separable?

The question as to whether 'mind' is 'natural' or 'supernatural' may be of significance but the division between natural and supernatural may not be clear.
— Jack Cummins
So then decide whether 'mind is either natural or supernatural' and consistently follow the implications of that decision as far as it goes. — 180 Proof

Is 'natural' defined as that which we have discovered with our senses and sciences?

Point number 1:
Our intuition is the source of that complaint. We have no logical grounding to claim yay or nay to whether computational physical processes could yield conscious feels. I think it was Ned Block in his "The Harder Problem of Consciousness" that argued strongly that we have no grounding for such discussions. So why do we hold so strongly to such views? Clearly it's our intuition. It just "seems wrong". — Malcolm Lett

You can explain the mechanics of walking in all the detail you want. Every muscle fiber; every muscle group; every blood vessel; every nerve. What every tiny component is doing at every moment; what every large component is doing at every moment. When you're done, you can demonstrate how it all comes together, producing walking.

Then, you can take a lightbulb out of your pocket, hold it in your hand, and begin walking. As you walk, you can explain that all of these things you just described in such detail also produce electricity, as the lightbulb starts to glow.

I have a problem with this. Everything you said about the mechanics of walking accounts for the walking. I'm going to need a heck of an explanation as to how all of those things are doing the double duty of producing walking and generating electricity. Do we notice any of the events that you said are part of walking doing other things at the same time they are helping to produce walking, but have nothing to do with producing walking? From my understanding of electricity, nothing you described accounts it. I'm no electrician, but I know the general idea. And I can Google all day long, but I'm not finding anything that suggests the mechanics that produces walking also explains the production of electricity.

I'm going to start looking for another explanation. Maybe you're wearing something under your clothing that generates electricity with the movement of your body. Maybe there's a wire coming out of the back of your shirt that's plugged in somewhere, and goes to your hand where you hold the bulb. Maybe it turns out you're a robot, and have batteries inside your body.

You can also explain the workings of the brain in as much detail as you want. And that can be pretty extensive. This is from Darwin's Black Box, by Michael Behe:

When light first strikes the retina a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis-retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. (A picosecond is about the time it takes light to travel the breadth of a single human hair.) The change in the shape of the retinal molecule forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein’s metamorphosis alters its behavior. Now called metarhodopsin II, the protein sticks to another protein, called transducin. Before bumping into metarhodopsin II, transducin had tightly bound a small molecule called GDP. But when transducin interacts with metarhodopsin II, the GDP falls off, and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP.)

That's the beginning of the beginning of the beginning of the beginning of the series of events and processes that explains/describes how we detect a certain range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Add some other events, and we can distinguish different frequencies within that range. More events explain how patterns of our perceptions are stored in our brain. And still more explain how what is stored becomes part of the algorithm that chooses which action we take when stored patterns are perceived again.

Then you explain that all of these things you just described in such detail also produce my subjective experience of red. I have the same problem I had with your lightbulb. Everything you said about the mechanics of vision accounts for vision. How are all of those things doing the double duty of giving us vision and generating subjective experience?.

This problem is, in fact, more difficult than the walking/electricity problem. Walking is a physical process, ultimately dependent on the physical properties of particles and laws of physics. Electricity is electrons. Physical things. Particles. The defining property of these particular particles, their negative charge, accounts for different things in different circumstances. In some circumstances, it accounts for electricity.

Consciousness, on the other hand, is not an obviously physical process, clearly built up from the physical properties or particles and laws of physics. We can't point to any property or event in the whole process of vision, and say, "There! That is redness." Whatever we point to will be a physical thing that plays a part in the explanation of perceiving part of the spectrum, distinguishing wavelengths, remembering what we've seen, using memories to help make decisions...

"Philosophy is not a theory but an activity." –TLP, 4.112 (i.e. NOT SCIENCE) — 180 Proof

Not sure what you're getting at. Biology, physics, and chemistry, to name a few, are not theories.

Is there any definition, or list of characteristics, of mind (I wish that button was italics instead of bold) that is agreed upon by most people here? I would think it would help to have a working definition of the subject of the conversation. Surely there is some agreement?

I think of p-zombies as having come about without the help of anything that is thinking, sentient, conscious. Not anything that might have, even unintentionally, built it with, or later even so much as mentioned, the slightest concept of consciousness. Like another planet that had no contact with anything off-planet. If such a thing is possible - physically identical to us but entirely lacking consciousness - then they are inconceivable. Because such things would not have thoughts of, conversations about, or words for, consciousness.

The means is enough without an end? Means can justify the end, and the end can justify the means. But the means by itself? Surely we are looking for a truthful answer here, and that is the end we want. — Metaphyzik

Not saying I wouldn't be happy to get an answer. :grin:

I'm not at all concerned with any universal, or objective meaning. But I'm not going to give up my own. The kind of mind humans have is, perhaps, the only thing in the universe that contemplates such things. I intend to as long as I'm able.

What is the goal of trying to discover a way to think about the mind - or that thing that brains do…. (At least that does seem true)…. Is there some problem we need to solve with this information that is fruitful somehow beyond the questioning? — Metaphyzik

I don't know whether or not there's anything fruitful behind the questioning. But there doesn't have to be. The questioning is enough, even if there is never an answer. It's what humans do.

The meaning and purpose of a problem seem to lie not in its solution but in our working at it incessantly. — Jung

Data: I am curious as to what transpired between the moment when I was nothing more than an assemblage of parts in Dr. Sung's laboratory and the next moment, when I became alive. What is it that endowed me with life?

Crusher: I remember Wesley asking me a similar question when he was little. And I tried desperately to give him an answer. But everything I said sounded inadequate. Then I realized that scientists and philosophers have been grappling with that question for centuries without coming to any conclusion.

Data: Are you saying the question cannot be answered?

Crusher: No. I think I'm saying that we struggle all our lives to answer it. That it's the struggle that is important. That's what helps us to define our place in the universe. — Star Trek: The Next Generation

I've been out here now for some days, groping my way along, trying to realize my vision here. I started concentrating so hard on my vision that I lost sight. I've come to find out that it's not the vision. It's not the vision at all. It's the groping. It's the groping, it's the yearning, it's the moving forward. I was so fixated on that flying cow that, when Ed told me Monty Python already painted that picture, thought I was through. I had to let go of that cow so that I could see all the other possibilities....... I think Kierkegard said it oh so well: “The self is only that which it’s in the process of becoming.” Art? Same thing. James Joyce had something to say about it too. *draws sword* “Welcome oh life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience, and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscious of my race.” We’re here today to fling something that bubbled up from the collective unconsciousness of our community.........

The thing I learned folks, this is absolutely key: It’s not the thing you fling, it’s the fling itself. — Chris on Northern Exposure

There is no story to it but the ones we superimpose upon that natural bond with our Minds’ Language.
.........
Why have we, in all our millennia of mythologies and philosophies not settled upon that we are not in God’s image — ENOAH

Well, I'm not sure how much flack I'm gonna get for this, but you went and reminded me of something. And it's not inappropriate for the site, even if it doesn't necessarily belong in this thread.

Arguably, the best thing that the world of comic books has ever produced is a twelve-issue series called Watchmen. In it is a character named Rorschach. We learn his origin in issue #6. He was trying to rescue a little girl who had been kidnapped. When he found the kidnapper’s house, he found out that the girl had been killed, butchered, and fed to the dogs. Rorschach handcuffed the man to a pipe, and set the house on fire. He left a saw with the man, but told him that he’d never be able to cut through the cuffs in time. Implying that, if he wanted to live, he’d have to cut his own hand off. Then he went outside to watch the scene. Here's how he describes that moment:

Stood in firelight, sweltering. Blood stain on chest like map of violent new continent. Felt cleansed. Felt dark planet turn under my feet and knew what cats know that makes them scream like babies in night. Looked at sky through smoke heavy with human fat and God was not there. The cold, suffocating dark goes on forever, and we are alone. Live our lives, lacking anything better to do. Devise reason later. Born from oblivion, bear children, hellbound as ourselves, go into oblivion. There is nothing else. Existence is random. Has no pattern save what we imagine after staring at it for too long. No meaning save what we choose to impose. This rudderless world is not shaped by vague metaphysical forces. It is not God who kills the children. Not fate that butchers them or destiny that feeds them to the dogs. It's us. Only us. Streets stank of fire. The void breathed hard on my heart, turning its illusions to ice, shattering them. Was reborn then, free to scrawl own design on this morally blank world. Was Rorschach. — Alan Moore

Which one of you is this??
:grin:
https://www.denofgeek.com/tv/star-trek-characters-died-transporter/

Metabolism is involved for sure. — Lionino

Metabolism is involved with every aspect of a living thing, if we want to go that route. Still, we categorize things. This is cognition. This is metabolism. This is respiration. This is circulation.

True, but it is the belief that everything is made of mind-stuff. Not sure how it addresses things such as photons. — Lionino

I think there are panpsychists who after with that. Not all do. Some of us believe everything has a mental property, just everything has physical properties. I don't believe mass is mind-stuff. I don't believe charge is mind-stuff.

If by beginning you mean something that must happen before thinking, the big bang is much more of "thinking" than the poison situation. — Lionino

I don't think the BB sensed something in it's environment, and did something in response to what it sensed. Although people think about things outside of those parameters, it's how we start thinking when we're infants, and how thought began.

If you mean the chemical reaction of a jellyfish avoiding poison is the most basic type of thinking, then the same question:
But then again, are they reacting any differently than when a rock reacts when we kick it by flying away into my neighbour Giorgios' window? — Lionino

The same answer: Yes. If there was no difference between the movement of the rock and the movement of the jellyfish, we wouldn't have biological sciences. But we do, because, even though it's physical processes in both cases, they are different types of processes.

A kicked rock is moved by simple physical contact. A jellyfish does not moved away from poison because the physical bulk of the poison pushes it away. There is no change to the rock, unless it breaks. And that tells us nothing. There are changes within the jellyfish, because its sensors reacted to the poison, and signals were sent to its means of propulsion.

What field of study says there is no difference?

Thank God that's settled. :lol:

A few years later I read Ursula Le Guin's A Wizard of Earthsea trilogy, and though I was mad for Tolkien's "Middle Earth" back then (re: my fantasy roleplaying games days), the only fantasy world that was ever an "ideal place" for me was the archipelago-world of "Earthsea" – especially the islands of "Roke" & "Gont" – which became more real to me with each subsequent book. — 180 Proof

Earthsea, specifically Gont, is the place I would go if I could go anywhere. I paid an artist to paint the Old Mage's house. After 40+ years, I finally have a gorgeous depiction of it. I occasionally tried myself over the years. Alas, I can't draw a stick figure that's recognizable as a person.

But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

I am aware of that view. But it ultimately reminds me of idealism, though there is likely some minute difference between the two. — Lionino

Perhaps, although I don't know much of anything about idealism. Regardless, it's not a belief that the photon has a mind.

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body.
— Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam

One does not need to think a lot to see the issue with this physicalist account of what a "mind" is. The problem is that this definition of "mind" also describes things that we don't call mind. At this point, you are just changing the definition of 'mind' to mean something that seems pretty close to what we call metabolism. — Lionino

Is it metabolism when an organism's sensor detects poison, and, because of the signal it seems to the doet, the doer takes the organism away from the poison? What was the beginning of thinking, if not this?

Ok, but the definition of panpsychist I am aware of is someone who thinks all things (alive or not) have a mind. — Lionino

I, of course, don't know the source of your definition. But none of these are nearly as cut & dried as "all things (alive or not) have a mind."

Panpsychism is the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.
...
The word “panpsychism” literally means that everything has a mind. However, in contemporary debates it is generally understood as the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world. Thus, in conjunction with the widely held assumption (which will be reconsidered below) that fundamental things exist only at the micro-level, panpsychism entails that at least some kinds of micro-level entities have mentality, and that instances of those kinds are found in all things throughout the material universe. So whilst the panpsychist holds that mentality is distributed throughout the natural world—in the sense that all material objects have parts with mental properties—she needn’t hold that literally everything has a mind, e.g., she needn’t hold that a rock has mental properties (just that the rock’s fundamental parts do). — SEP

Panpsychism is the view that all things have a mind or a mind-like quality.
...
Panpsychism, then, is not a formal theory of mind. Rather, it is a conjecture about how widespread the phenomenon of mind is in the universe. Panpsychism does not necessarily attempt to define “mind” (although many panpsychists do this), nor does it necessarily explain how mind relates to the objects that possess it. As a result, panpsychism is more of an overarching concept, a kind of meta-theory of mind. More details are required to incorporate it into a fully-developed theory of mind. — IEP

Panpsychism, taken literally, is the doctrine that everything has a mind. In practice, people who call themselves panpsychists are not committed to as strong a doctrine. They are not committed to the thesis that the number two has a mind, or that the Eiffel tower has a mind, or that the city of Canberra has a mind, even if they believe in the existence of numbers, towers, and cities.

Instead, we can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental states. — Chalmers

Consider the version of panpsychism that holds that there is a material universe, and that a fundamental and universal (and not at all understood) property of all matter, from the smallest portion up, is that it is experience-realizing or experience-involving. — Galen Strawson on in Mental Reality

And here are quotes about it.

In this article, Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

Perhaps I'm not slightly familiar with nihilism. I thought it meant I am the only thing that exists. But I don't want to derail the thread.

Thanks. I'm sightly familiar with nihilism. Not enough to have ever heard of positive nihilism.

I've never read anything about existentialism, but I agree with both of these.

One definition said: "The existentialists argued that our purpose and meaning in life came not from external forces such as God, government or teachers, but instead is entirely determined by ourselves." — BC

The definition that I am working off of is this:

a philosophical theory or approach which emphasizes the existence of the individual person as a free and responsible agent determining their own development through acts of the will. — Chet Hawkins

Disagree that there is nothing without a mind? :chin: — Lionino

Correct. The idea is that there's a mental property, just as there are physical properties (mass, charge, etc.). Although some panpsychists think that mental property is an actual mind, or consciousness, not all do. My own thinking is along the lines of proto-consciousness. As the physical properties combine in various ways that give us macro physical properties, like liquidity, perhaps proto-consciousness combines to give us consciousness.

Most people would say sponges are not conscious, but they are "aware" of their surroundings because they react to stimulus. But then again, are they reacting any differently than when a rock reacts when we kick it by flying away into my neighbour Giorgios' window? In a way, a sponge reacts to its environment through a series of chemical reactions in its structure, which are physics-based — in the deep end it is all Newton's third law. — Lionino

I would say they are reacting differently. The rock kicked through the window is a chain of brute-force, physical interactions. Like dominoes.

In Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged From Chaos, Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam give a bare-bones definition of mind:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment

Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the body’s health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.

A mind, then, is defined by what it does, rather than what it is. “Mind” is an action noun, like “tango,” “communication,” or “game.” A mind responds. A mind transforms. A mind acts. A mind adapts to the ceaseless assault of aimless chaos. — Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam

They then discuss several increasingly complex minds. The sponge is not one of them. They start with the simplest existing mind, that of the archaea, which has two sensors (rhodopsin) and two doers (flagella, more properly called archaella). When the light changes, the rhodopsin changes shape. This begins a chain of chemical events that reach the archaella, which move, thus moving the archaea.

Chemical reactions are, of course, nothing but physical events. But it's not the same as a solid object hitting another solid object, and moving it simply because that's what happens when solid objects hit each other. If the archaea is not reacting any differently than the kicked rock, are we?

Can anyone think of alternative arrangements that might work better? — Vera Mont

It is only in tribal settings (non-civilised societies) where everybody does a little bit of this and a little bit of that. — Lionino

That's a good solution

Things without a mind are not conscious/aware.
— Lionino

Sure, but there are no things without a mind.
— bert1

Ok, so you are a panpsychists. Most people disagree, so do I. We can leave it at that. — Lionino

I'm a panpsychist, and I also disagree.

Has anyone here read Stanislaw Lem's The Cyberiad?

Much earlier than Bostrom, and if not the best, at least the funniest thinking on such topics. — wonderer1

Never heard of it. But the first few paragraphs are already a riot!

I just corrected the last sentence of my previous post.

Not sure what the term 'active medium' means. Googling it didn't help. — noAxioms

That's because I just made it up. Sorry. I'm not well read almost anything that's ever discussed here. There are many in which I'm not at all read. I know what I want to say, but often don't know what words are normally used. I had hoped I explained it well enough to make what I am thinking clear.

But I am hitting 'run'. I wouldn't need the pencil if I didn't 'run' it. — noAxioms

If you say the simulation is not found only in the paper and the squiggles on it, but also in the pencil, the handholding the pencil, the mind directing the pencil, you still cannot simulate human consciousness this way. I know human consciousness is a fairly hotly contested issue. But does anyone disagree that it involves multiple processes taking place simultaneously? If we agreed that a process can take place in the scenario you're describing, you cannot write multiple things simultaneously. You can't write two, much less the presumably huge number that are required for human consciousness.

You can write, "The Following list of 200 processes occur simultaneously." But writing that doesn't make it happen. That can't happen with things written on paper. It can't happen if you write the words of one process over top of the words of another process. It can't happen if you have different processes on different sheets of paper, and stack them on top of one another.

It can't even happen in the mind that is writing these things down. Nobody can hold that many things, much less that many processes, in their mind at the same time. (If someone could, would they need to bother with the paper and pencil?)

At no time, in no sense, is everything needed for human consciousness happening at the same time in the paper and pencil scenario.

If a computer can simulate human consciousness, it would have to be because it can run the same number of processes at once that our brains can run.

There is no technology constraint on any pure simulation, so anything that can be done by computer can be done (far slower) by paper and pencil. That means that yes, even the paper and pencil method, done to sufficient detail, would simulate a conscious human who would not obviously know he is being simulated. — noAxioms

It seems to me you cannot simulate with paper and pencil, because it is not an active medium. You can write about the game of basketball in all conceivable detail. You can write down every rule, and describe as many scenarios as you like, explaining how each rule applies at each moment. You can describe every required object, as well as the physical, mental, and emotional characteristics of every possible player. You can write all this down in every conceivable detail, but it would never be a basketball game.

You can describe a game that actually took place, or a fictitious one, in every conceivable detail. Exact speed and spin of the ball at every moment. Exact angle it took every time it hit the floor or backboard. Exactly how it lost its spherical shape with each impact. Heck, even how much sweat came out of each of every player's pores.

In neither scenario is there an actual basketball game. Not even simulated. Because you need action for a simulation. It is just squiggles on paper that. When someone who knows what those squiggles represent interprets them, describe events and possible events, and allow the reader to imagine any events that you have not described (assuming you have not described every possible event). But the events are not taking place. Not even as a simulation. There is no action.

Even an actual gathering of all the people and objects required for a basketball game is not a basketball game if all the players do not act in accordance with the rules.

If you program everything necessary to simulate consciousness into a computer**, but never hit Run, you will not have a simulated consciousness. If it is running, and you hit Stop, or cut the power, you no longer have a simulation.


**You would have actual consciousness. no such thing as simulated consciousness.

In any case, I know I am not living in a simulation. — NotAristotle

Agreed. With no reason to suspect things are not as they seem, I won't seriously consider the possibility that I'm living in a simulation, or a simulation myself, or a Boltzman brain, or whatever else. But I don't see reason to consider one type of simulation scenario any more ... "realistic" than any other.

This runs smack into the 'hard problem of consciousness', which is that no description of physical processes provides an account of the first-person nature of consciousness.
— Wayfarer
Pretty much, yea. All the same arguments (pro and con) apply. — noAxioms

I am not familiar with any arguments for how physical processes provide an account of the first-person nature of consciousness. It seems the answer from anyone who takes that stance boils down to: "Since we can't find anything other than physical processes using the methods of physical processes, there must not be anything other than physical processes. Therefore, the question of how physical processes provide an account of the first-person nature of consciousness is, they just do."

I think a simulation scenario could be otherwise. Maybe we are all AI, and the programmer of the simulation just chose this kind of physical body out of nowhere.
— Patterner
In the VR scenario, the mind would be hooked to the simulated empirical stream, but it would not be itself an AI. — noAxioms

Maybe not in the VR scenario. Still, maybe it's the truth of our existence.

Drat

Any number of objections might be valid. The idea that they are identical, and talking about one is the same as talking about the other, is an invalid starting point. That might be the end point someone wants to arrive at. But they wouldn't get there. If it worked like this, we wouldn't have different fields of study, with different methods, different terminology, etc. What else do we talk about in this way?

Now, how can people who have no idea of what brains are talk coherently about brain states? — RogueAI

My take is that, if brain states and mind states were the same thing - that is, if there was an exact, one-to-one mapping between the two - then you wouldn't have to know anything about brains, or that they existed at all. The ancient people could discuss and come to understand mind states in extreme detail. Then, as their knowledge of physical things grew, and they came to learn of the existence of the brain, all its functions, all its structures, etc., they would come to realize they already knew what they were looking at, because of their extensive understanding of the mind. They could interchangeability use words they had long used to refer to mind states with words they had more recently been using to refer to brain states, and the conversation would not change at all.

Of course, this is not the case. The problem is not that the ancient people didn't know a brain existed. The problem is that brain states are not mind states. Even if they had extreme knowledge of the brain from the beginning, there would have been different terminologies and conversations all along. We don't interchangeably use words for mind states with words for brain stayed today, eh?

I suppose the least bad analogy would be different CPUs. C code can be compiled to run on different CPUs, and yield the same user interface, although the details of the physical processes that occur in running the code would be different. — wonderer1

Yeah, "the least bad analogy" is about the size of it, eh?

That all makes sense. And, although I know computers don't have the flexibility that you are describing, what about computers are The differences between brains most analogous with? The difference between windows and iOS? Or the difference between C++ and Java? Or between phpBB3 and whatever is used at this site? Or some other level? I don't know nearly enough about all this stuff to even know what the possibilities are.