What about a ball? Or a pencil? :smile:
"Stone" was just an example, Patterner. Any object would do. And surely you must have heard about matter having consciousness in a panpsychist context. — Alkis Piskas

Of course, the specific object is not important. I have not heard any panpsychist say any inanimate object has a minds. Although I guess the exact definition of "mind" might need to be agreed upon.

But I would like better to hear about your own ideas and position on the subject. — Alkis Piskas

You can get a pretty good idea of my own ideas and position on the subject in the last post I made before that one, looks like eleven posts before it.

Simply, I cannot imagine how a stone can have a "mind". — Alkis Piskas

I have never heard of anyone why thinks a stone can have a mind. Here are a few quotes that give a more accurate idea of panpaychism.

In this article, Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

So, i'm not entirely sure I'm grasping what you mean — AmadeusD

Primarily because it’s a half-baked idea that I haven’t figured out how to put into words. :D

Yes, i would think if there are multiple systems interacting that would constitute a network, right? So that's just a more complex system which, to my mind, comports with the theory in the sense it would give rise to higher levels of consciousness. — AmadeusD

Does consciousness have a sliding scale of lesser and greater? I think it's like an on/off switch. One is either conscious or not, although the things one is conscious of can be said to be "richer" or "fuller" than the things a bat is conscious of, although that might be wrong too. Who's to say the conscious experience of a vft catching a fly is less than my conscious experience of seeing a sunrise? — RogueAI

I don’t know if I can separate my responses to you two. I think I’m addressing both. (And my apologies. I seem to have gone to some length.)

Let's just say, for the sake of argument, that there is a property of matter called proto-consciousness. A mental property, rather than a physical. Here are some thoughts from that starting point.

1) Every particle has what Skrbina called “a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.” It amounts to nothing at the level of individual particles. A particle with proto-consciousness (if there is such a thing) would be indistinguishable from one without it (if there is such a thing). It’s just a building block.


2) A rock has... quite a few particles. All of which are experiencing their instantaneous memory-less moments. They are all experiencing the same thing, which isn't anything to write home about. There's nothing going on. Particles on the surface might experience more light, warmth, physical contact with things that are not part of the rock, and other things than particles in the interior are experiencing. But they aren't doing anything. There is no information processing. No processes of any kind. Not even any movement relative to each other. I suppose erosion is a process that the exterior experiences but the interior does not. But all in all, there's not enough going on to raise "instantaneous memory-less moments" up to something more.


3) This is from Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment

Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the body’s health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.

A mind, then, is defined by what it does rather than what it is. "Mind” is an action noun, like “tango,” “communication,” or “game.” A mind responds. A mind transforms. A mind acts. A mind adapts to the ceaseless assault of aimless chaos.

The simplest hypothetical mind would have one sensor and one doer. That's it. But I guess such a mind doesn't exist. (At least they can't find one.) The simplest existing mind is that of the archaea. It has two sensors (molecules of sensory rhodopsin) and two doers (flagella).

Archaea "is an example of a molecule mind, the first stage of thinking on our journey. All the thinking elements in molecule minds consist of individually identifiable molecules."

Archeae moves toward light. Compared to a rock, that's a significant thing. Different parts of the critter are doing different things. I'm not knowledgeable enough of definitions to know if this is considered information. The rhodospin changes its shape in different degrees of light, "which triggers a cascade of molecular activity that activates the" flagella. It isn't "trying" to move toward the light. It doesn't "know" it is doing so. There is no intent. Still, there is a good deal of stuff going on. Many particles are experiencing many different things. A big step up from a rock.

Is it all that different from a thermostat? Or a tiny machine that we might make that acts exactly like the archaea?


4) Journey of the Mind is a very cool book. It moves up several stages of mind-complexity. It compares things like the history of cities with consciousness. It speaks about Stephen Grossberg, who I had never heard of, but seems to be an amazing person. I would like to know more about the steps between the stages of complexity that are discussed, but I can understand the need to keep the book at a manageable size. The problem is, without those between steps, I'm not able to follow it. It seems pretty important to discuss, for example, the stages of development of neurons.

Regardless, I don't know at what point actual consciousness is present. Where is the point at which different kinds of activity being experienced within an entity in a proto-consciousness sense become a "what it's like" kind of consciousness? Nagel chose the bat because we literally cannot imagine what it's like to be a bat, experiencing the world through echolocation, flying and catching bugs while flying to eat. OTOH, it's a mammal like us, with a neo-cortex like us, so we might reasonably think it has subjective experience; that there is something it is like to be a bat. But when did that happen? How many different processes, and how many processes containing information, were needed for consciousness to exist? (I would say this question applies whether or not something like proto-consciousness exists.)

But I think information is essential. Proto-consciousness might experience any number of purely physical things without leading to consciousness. But information is not physical. It's not a physical property, like mass or charge. It's not a physical process, like movement or flight, which we can see depend on the physical properties like mass and charge. So proto-consciousness experiences something entirely different when it experiences systems built on information. And that non-physical property experiencing non-physical processes is consciousness.

That's my story, vague though it is, and I'm sticking with it.

In the Chalmers/IIT type of sense? — AmadeusD

I don’t know what combination of the two has been suggested, but yes, I am thinking of a combination. I don’t think IIT explains consciousness by itself.

Otoh, if proto-consciousness gives anything like consciousness in the presence of only stimulus and response, without too much in the way of information, like if there is something it’s like to be a Venus Flytrap…. Well, whatever. Maybe more information systems within one entity give the proto-consciousness more to experience, and, therefore, greater consciousness. Like ours.

Do you think there is something it's like to be a Venus Fly Trap? — RogueAI

I suspect not. I do not suspect a vft is conscious. But I suspect it is filled with proto-consciousness.

Having the experience of consciousness, i.e. being aware, does not necessary involve meaningful mental images, or even mental images (i.e. thinking) at all. I can be aware that I am alive, that I exist, that I'm looking to an object, etc. I don't have to interpret or undestand what these things mean. In the case of the obkect, its image is of course created in my mind, but it can be just that, an image. If I start to think about the meaining of this image, etc. I'm using mental faculties, which have nothong to do with consciousness, except that I can be aware that I am doing so! :smile: — Alkis Piskas

I don't know how you mean this. I am not usually "aware" that I'm alive. I am when I think about it, as I am now. And if anyone ever asked, I'd suddenly be thinking about it.

Butt when Godzilla starts in 20 minutes, I won't be thinking about the fact that I am alive. I don't see how I could be considered aware of it at such times.

I have to add something here about how I use the term "perception": It normally means to become aware of something by means of our senses. And our senses are meant to be physical, of course. So I have to expand the term to also include being aware of our inner world --thoughts, emotions, etc.-- for which we are not using our senses. Unfortunately I don't have any other word. — Alkis Piskas

Do we not, with our senses, perceive things that exist; that can be perceived? I think our thoughts and emotions are created within us. Even if prompted by something external, such as you reading "4+2=", which you perceive, you create the thought "6" on your own. You didn't turn your head and perceive "6" written somewhere.

Never thought about this before...

I would also prefer he use "Consciousness" the way you describe. He says, "This thesis is sometimes called panexperientialism, to distinguish it from other varieties of panpsychism (varieties on which the relevant entities are required to think or reason, for example), but I will simply call it panpsychism here." How about don't simply call it panopticism here? Let's make things as consistent in all discussions as possible.

"Primitive precursor to consciousness" is fine, but a bit of a mouthful. I like "proto-consciousness."

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

Edit: This is his third paragraph:

For present purposes, the relevant sorts of mental states are conscious experiences. I will understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities are conscious: that is, that there is something it is like to be a quark or a photon or a member of some other fundamental physical type. This thesis is sometimes called panexperientialism, to distinguish it from other varieties of panpsychism (varieties on which the relevant entities are required to think or reason, for example), but I will simply call it panpsychism here. — Chalmers

Perhaps the most contentious feature of Consciousness is its experiential quality. He implies that "experience" --- as a form of generic information --- "is everywhere". And that sounds like Panpsychism, with the implication that even an atom has awareness of its environment. — Gnomon

I don't know that anyone believes an atom has awareness of it's environment, and I don't think Chalmers is implying it.

I think of it as every particle having a mental property, proto-consciousness, in addition to the physical properties we're familiar with. Mass, charge, spin... Proto-consciousness. Not consciousness. Perhaps every particle in a rock is experiencing. Not aware of anything, simply experiencing whatever happens to the rock. But there's not much going on within a rock. There aren't even different physical activities taking place inn a rock, much less exchanges of information. So all particles experience pretty much the same, basic, physical things. That's not sufficient for actual consciousness to come about.

I don't know how many people would argue with the belief that rocks are not conscious because they are too homogenous (I don't know if there's a better way to say that), and that humans have the degree of consciousness we have because there are so many things going on within us. Many different physical systems; different kinds of physical systems; many different systems of information sharing. I assume physicals agree with that. I just don't think our consciousness is explainable by physical properties and laws of physics. I think something more is needed, and proto-consciousness seems worth considering.

A valid approach, imo. We can assume anything, just to have a starting point. Then see where it leads.
— Patterner

Do I have to know I'm going to be a great artist or athlete or warrior or whatever to begin the path? — Vaskane

Not as far as I'm concerned. Go for it.

Still curious why anyone needs a reason to believe? Beliefs can be built on faith and thus you don't even have to have any evidence. Simply believe and go from there. — Vaskane

A valid approach, imo. We can assume anything, just to have a starting point. Then see where it leads.

In which case, you will no longer be part of the conversation about how to determine what is objectively real
— Patterner

Only if you're right and our experiences are accurate. If you're wrong and our experiences are inaccurate then we might just wake up. — Michael

Dreams naturally end. they do not last throughout the entire time. We are asleep.

So far, every time I have slept, I have awoken. It’s just how things work with humans. So any dream I’ve ever had that did not end while I was still asleep ended when I woke up.

Sometimes, I have woken up because of what happened in a dream. Boulders crashing down upon me, for example. Thus ending the dream.

Sometimes, while dreaming, I have woken up because of things that happened in the real world. A loud noise, for example. Again, ending the dream.

Occasionally, I have been aware that I was dreaming as I was dreaming. Sometimes, that knowledge caused me to wake up.

None of those things has ever caused me to "wake up" from what I call reality into what some might call a higher reality. Nothing else has ever caused me to wake up from what I call reality into what some might call a higher reality. You may be suggesting that death in what I call reality will wake you up to a higher reality. While I am not going to encourage you to test this idea, I ask that, should you die before I do, and discover that you are correct, you try to send a message to me. I would be most interested to learn that you are correct.

You certainly can assume that your experiences are inaccurate without reason or evidence. By all means, have at it. But I will advise caution. While dreaming, you may believe the boulders rolling down the hill toward you will kill you. But when they kill you in your dream, you will simply wake up into the real world. (There may be rare cases where someone dies in reality of a heart attack, brought on by the anxiety of what is happening in the dream. But boulders in a dream have never killed anyone in reality.) You can assume the boulders in what I call reality are as powerless to harm you as the boulders in what I call a dream are, and ignore those that are rolling down the hill toward you. In which case, you will no longer be part of the conversation about how to determine what is objectively real, as opposed to what we choose to believe without reason or evidence.

But is there any reason or evidence to suspect either is the case?
— Patterner

Is there any reason or evidence to suspect that neither is the case? — Michael

I don't need reason or evidence to disprove something for which there is no reason or evidence to suspect is the case. If there is no reason or evidence to consider a proposal, I won't. If reason or evidence to consider it exists, I'll listen.

Are you suggesting that the reason we believe in the veracity of our experiences is simply that we have no good reason to believe them false? Believing them accurate is the "default" position that should be assumed unless presented with evidence to the contrary? — Michael

Yes. Are you suggesting we believe otherwise without reason or evidence?

That seems reasonable to me. But you ask: "How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating..." If you don't know how to tell the difference, how do you know there IS a difference?
— Patterner

I know that there's a qualitative difference between the experiences I consider dreams and the experiences I consider wakefulness. I presume that the things I experience when I dream are not of external world objects. I then wonder if perhaps that the experiences I consider wakefulness are also not of external world objects. I then further wonder if there are external world objects at all. — Michael

But is there any reason or evidence to suspect either is the case? Any reason not to accept that things are as they seem? Sure, many things turned out to be other than what had always been assumed. They were proven to be otherwise with evidence, math, logic. What about your wonderings?

Is there a difference between reality, dreams, and hallucinations?
— Patterner

Well, if here were not, why would we have three distinct terms for them?

And that pretty much sums up this thread: failure to pay attention to how words function. — Banno

Indeed. That is my point. If you know they are different things, why ask how you can know which you are experiencing? Which category does your experience fall into? There's your answer.

Is there a difference between reality, dreams, and hallucinations?
— Patterner

The things we see when we dream and hallucinate are not mind-independent, and don't continue to exist when we don't see them, whereas (many believe) the things we see when we are awake and not hallucinating are mind-independent, and do continue to exist when we don't see them. — Michael

That seems reasonable to me. But you ask: "How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating..." If you don't know how to tell the difference, how do you know there IS a difference?

Regarding Demon/Matrix scenarios, my default position is that things are exactly as they seem. If anyone thinks my disembodied brain is wired up and being fed a simulation, I'd be interested in the evidence. I don't expect there is any.

Is there a difference between reality, dreams, and hallucinations?

Of course things we aren’t perceiving exist.
— Patterner

I don't perceive Santa. Does he exist? — Michael

No.

How could I perceive something that doesn’t exist?
— Patterner

Dreams? Hallucinations? A VR headset? — Michael

Yes, yes, of course We can come up with many different scenarios that are not the topic under discussion. I believe the topic is physical things in the real world.

Of course things we aren’t perceiving exist. The alternative is nonsense. The function of our sense organs is to perceive things that exist. How could I perceive something that doesn’t exist?

If a cup doesn't exist before I turn my head and look at it, why is it a cup that comes into existence? Who not a land shark? Or tomato? Or neutron star?

If something doesn't exist until I turn my head and see it, it seems a bizarre coincidence that the things that did not exist but come into existence happen to be perceptible with my eyes. Or are we suggesting many other things also come into existence that are not perceptible with any of my sense organs, and I only perceive those that happen to be perceptible with my sense organs?

Why do I need to turn my head for something that does not exist to come into existence? Why don’t things pop into existence in front of my eyes as I’m staring at a blank wall?

I doubt anyone has ever perceived a bullet that killed them. How is it they died if, not perceiving the bullet, it could not have existed?

If something that exists goes out of existence because I’m not perceiving it, then comes into existence again at a later date when I perceive it, why would it appear different, as though it existed throughoit that period of time?

All of these questions are easily answered if things exist whether I perceive them or not. They are not easily answered, particularly not all of them, if things do not exist when I do not perceive them, but do exist when I do perceive them. The laws of physics makes sense if things exist whether I perceive them or not. The laws of physics do not make sense if things do not exist when I do not perceive them, but do exist when I do perceive them.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain?
— Restitutor
Feelings. These play a significant role in the choices we make. We could simulate the role of feelings in software, but neither the hardware nor software would actually experience feelings. — Relativist

I am often surprised by how others feel about things. A woman once asked me how I was able to react the way I had, because she would have been angry, and wanted to learn how to be otherwise. I asked what on earth she was talking about, because I didn’t remember anything happening that should’ve made me angry. When she told me, I was just as stunned, because there is no reason I should’ve been angry about what happened. I'm sure we all witness people reacting with different emotions to things than we would have.

We might sometimes be surprised by our own emotional reactions to things.

So while we could program reactions into software that would give the outward appearance of an emotion we think we would feel to a given situation, aside from, as you say, it being a sham, we would all sometimes disagree with the programming. So who gets to decide?

If intelligence includes consciousness, then our organizations are conscious, intelligent beings, no different from us albeit a magnitude higher than us on the ladder of fractal collective intelligence. — ken2esq

Are you saying intelligence is always conscious?

I simply asked what you mean by ‘exist’.
— I like sushi
The concept "exist" is not a simple term. One can write a PhD thesis with it.
Not sure if it is meaningful to ask simply, and answer simply on it. — Corvus

Since it is the very point of your thread, the word "existence" even being in the title, I would think it's fairly necessary for you to explain what the word means, at least as it applies to your thread, whether or not it's a simple task.

I think Hume would say, things do exist, but when you are not seeing them, why do you believe them to exist? What is the ground for the belief that they exist when they are not perceived.
So your premise "If nothing exists behind me," sounds unfounded. — Corvus

It's not my premise, and it is unfounded.

That thought's gonna keep me up at night...

If nothing exists behind me, how does my turning my head bring things into existence?

He then gives a thought experiment to show this where a man has his brain put in a vat but it is still connected, so his body is moving with out the brain in it. — Lexa

I don't see this as anything but me.

Then he pushes it further by copying the mans consciousness onto a computer and then downloads it into another person. — Lexa

The moment the consciousness changes mediums, from biological to electronic, it is no longer the same consciousness. What you upload to another person will not be what was in the original. Plus, each body's chemistry is different. And our personalities are strongly influenced by things like hormones and neurotransmitters.

So it is you, except you are going through a different life experience than the other you. So, it would just be a different you, not in the sense of function, but in the sense of experiences, where one you would think one way going through one set of experiences, and the other would think in the exact same way (functionally not content wise), but having began to lead a different life with different experiences. — Lexa

Even if not for the chemical differences, they would be different people. Just as identical twins are. How we think is influenced by our experiences. Different experiences means different ways of thinking.

These AI systems can in many instances make decisions on par with humans, or better. — punos

How is "better"defined here?

The very scientists that create these neural networks themselves do not understand what exactly is going on in these artificial decision processes (black box). What is clear is that there is nothing else going on in those neural networks than mere calculations (deterministic math and logic). — punos

How is it they do not understand what is going on if there is nothing else going on aside from the mere calculations they programmed into it?

↪Patterner sure, any spot on a board could be 0,0, so choose a spot to be your 0,0 and then throw the dart. — flannel jesus

What I mean is, maybe anywhere it lands can be 0,0. I'm just goofing around. Ignore me.

Is there anything else you would add or modify in this neuronal model of decision making to make it compatible with free will? — punos

Although it's impossible for us to list all the variables, figure out how much weight each has at any given moment, and probably many other factors, I think your general ideas is pretty clear.

Of course, if the Hard Problem is real, if there is subjective experience that is not explained by physicalism, it could be decision making is not entirely neuronal.

Fun fact: if you did throw a dart at an infinitely dividable board, and you got the x,y coordinates of the point it landed, you'd be more likely to land on irrational numbers than rational — flannel jesus

Couldn't any spot on such a board be 0,0? How would any specific spot be more legitimately the center than any other?

We don't make decisions with no memory of the past. And, remembering the past, we don't ignore it when we make decisions.
— Patterner

Like I explained, that does not imply that the past determines the decision. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that decisions are not determined, by the past or anything else. But the past strongly influences them. I doubt any decision is made without influence from the past. Even the decision to make lunch at all is made because of the past. We remember hunger. We remember that hunger came after some minimum period of time without eating. Those memories of the past combine with the thought that, in the near future, we will be going that minimum period of time, so will likely be hungry.

You probably don’t often make something you have never tried before.
— Patterner

There must be a first time for everything. Have you never heard of a process called trial and error? — Metaphysician Undercover

Even that is influenced by the past. You couldn't try something new if you didn't know you never tried it in the past. I would say sometimes the decision to try X is made because we want to try something new, and know we haven't tried X in the past.

Knowing you are going to want to enjoy your lunch in the future, you likely make something that you know you like because you’ve had it in the past and you liked it. When you are shopping at the grocery store, you think about what you were going to take to lunch for the next several days. You pick out things that you have enjoyed in the past. That’s why you pick them out.
— Patterner

Not necessarily, that's the point, we often like to try different things. Since we actually do choose, and try things we've never done before, your argument that choosing familiar things is evidence of determinism fails. Those examples are all irrelevant because we actually do sometimes choose otherwise, therefore the necessity required for determinism is lacking. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not arguing for determinism. I don't believe determinism. I'm arguing that we don't make decisions without the influence of the past.

We don't make decisions with no memory of the past. And, remembering the past, we don't ignore it when we make decisions. When you make lunch before going to work, hours before you eat it, you don’t make something you do not like. You probably don’t often make something you have never tried before. Knowing you are going to want to enjoy your lunch in the future, you likely make something that you know you like because you’ve had it in the past and you liked it. When you are shopping at the grocery store, you think about what you were going to take to lunch for the next several days. You pick out things that you have enjoyed in the past. That’s why you pick them out.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" The uncaused is random, and there is no reason anything uncaused should tend towards any choice and not another. It seems incoherent to me to say "our wills are determined by our past experiences, thoughts, desires" but then also that there is also an "extra bit" that isn't determined by any of these. Ok, even if this is true, it doesn't result in more freedom, it just makes my actions partly random and unfathomable. If I can't possibly know what determined my actions, how am I to become free — Count Timothy von Icarus

When we do not understand the cause of an act, we might be inclined to say that the act is random. This is due to our failure to understand, and it does not necessarily mean that the act is truly random in any absolute sense, it may just be that we do not have the ability to understand the cause. The determinist will say that if the cause is not a determinist cause then it must be truly random, because the reality of a freely willed cause, as a true cause, is not allowed by the determinist.

Therefore your statement reduces the act which is caused by a free will to an "uncaused" act, in the determinist way of excluding free will causes as possible causes, and concludes that such an act would be "random". The mistake is in categorizing the act of the free will, which is a type of act we do not completely ,understand as "uncaused", rather than categorizing it as a cause which is inconsistent with "cause" as defined by determinist principles, and therefore not understood by those principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, I can't say I understand your position. But I believe I understand the Count's. I believe he's saying that, if things in my past aren't causing my decisions in the present, then my decisions are random. So, for example, I will not have chosen chocolate ice cream over vanilla for any reason more significant than a coin toss. In fact, the fact that I don't like, or am allergic to, strawberry will not make it any less likely that I will choose strawberry than either of the other options.

My position is that my past does have bearing on my present decisions. However, it doesn't determine them. I could have chosen vanilla. But I didn't. Obviously, there's no way to prove that I could have done other than I did. But that's what I believe.

I entirely agree with you. If it's not the result of influences, then it's random.

My answer to the question of "What is free will free from?" is "The properties and forces that physics is aware of." My decisions/choices are not reducible to arrangements of the constituent parts of my brain, progressing from moment to moment due to the laws of physics.

So what we know doesn't determine our actions at all? Then why does everyone choose to get up when the fire alarm goes off? — Count Timothy von Icarus

What we know does determine our actions. At least it plays a big role. I'm saying that the accuracy of what we know plays no role in our freedom to make choices. Whether what we know is accurate in all ways, the result of flawed experiments, lies we have been told, or whatever, if we think we have accurate information in all cases, our freedom is the same in all cases.

Manipulation and brainwashing are different. In this case, the information guiding us is largely an extension of another person's will. We aren't acting completely freely if we wouldn't commit to the same acts if we weren't being manipulated. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think I agree. If an easily recognizable person is known to beat to death any child he sees, and I see him approaching my child, I can choose to do whatever is necessary to prevent him from reaching my child, ignore him and live the consequences, or anything in-between.

If I have been lied to about this easily recognizable person, my options, freedom, and decision are the same. No?

Indeed. I worded that badly. I didn't mean to imply the information, alone, caused the action, or that the Count suggested such.

Then it seems like the manipulation plays a key causal role in your actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We often base our actions on the information we have, regardless of the accuracy of the information. But does that mean the information caused our actions?

I see what you mean. I wonder what differences in brain activity brain scans would reveal in various situations. No, I cannot flip my awareness in your scenario. But I would say the same when comparing being aware of something on the desk, and choosing to pick it up. Have I flipped my awareness in that scenario? Not that I am, uh, aware of. But I have clearly done something different. Something brain scans would surely pick up. I wonder if brain scans would pick anything up in your scenario.

I did not understand that scenario at all. The field is black, but yesterday it was painted white? I... don't understand

Edit. I understand. You're saying, in a very hard to follow way in my opinion, that the previous day it was painted as if the person painting it knew exactly the path this guy would take - he predicted it perfectly so the guy would only see black.

I don't really see what this has to do with free will at all tbh. The scenario tells me nothing about it the guy had free will or not. Knowing how other people answer this question doesn't really tell me much about what they think of free will either. — flannel jesus

Thank you for echoing my confusion, and for figuring out what was going on. I was lost.

How did painter know the path shoveler would take?