It's really hard to know how to proceed with this. I'll do my best. — Ludwig V

:lol: I appreciate your efforts.

Do you think the definition is correct?
— Patterner

It depends what you mean by correct. It's not as if there is an existing definition, or even an existing (mutually agreed) phenomenon that we are trying to "capture". We can agree what a rainbow is, both in the dictionary and in the world. So there can be an argument about the correct definition - and there isn't one, because there are criteria. — Ludwig V

I’m asking your opinion. Do you think qualia are non-physical things?

In my book, Nagel is trying to persuade us that there is a phenomenon to be captured, one that everybody can recognize. But he also knows that there isn't universal agreement about that. It's a pity he doesn't actually engage with the issue. — Ludwig V

Such a discussion with him would be great. However, I don’t see anything wrong with anyone writing about topics on which there is not universal agreement, even controversial topics, from their pov. Brian Greene can write a book whose starting point is that String Theory is fact, and the pope can write one whose starting point is that Catholicism is fact. The target audience for every book isn’t necessarily every human.

That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all.
— Patterner

It's not that simple. If you try to list every event, both the ones that are relevant to what the car does and the ones that are incidental, like comfortable seats or a sun roof and the ones that are irrelevant - side issues - like (in years gone by - the pollution it creates, you would, I suggest never come to the end. — Ludwig V

No, not simple. But I don’t think we should only think about and discuss things that are simple.

Make a complete list of all the events going on in the desk that is supporting your computer. — Ludwig V

I hadn’t explicitly said it, but I’m comparing two things - cars and brains - that do things. Things whose functions/purposes are in what they do. We might say my desk supports my computer, and “supports” is a verb, so the desk’s purpose is an action. But there’s an obvious difference between that action and a car’s or brain’s.

I'm sorry if this is too much, but it seems right to show what is involved in this issue. — Ludwig V

No, there is nothing simple about it. It may be the most mysterious and complex thing in the universe. IMO, it’s also the most important and fascinating, and worth discussing and trying to understand. How many topics here are simple and universally agreed upon?

Consciousness may not be physically reducible now. But that doesn't mean it always will be. One day, I'm sure, there will be a physical account. — Ludwig V

Why do you think we don’t have one now? Do you suspect there are physical things or properties that we cannot yet detect? Or do you think we have not yet figured out how the things we can detect are doing the job? Or another idea?

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see.
— Patterner

If you are asking for an explanation how we see the table, it doesn't help to say that a copy or imitation or model of a table appears in our heads. Even if we found a little model of a table, how would that explain anything? — Ludwig V

True enough. Although I would never suspect such a copy or imitation or model.

There is no hint of qualia.
— Patterner

Of course, a list of physical events won't include any qualia. They are defined as non-physical things. — Ludwig V

Do you think the definition is correct?

We need a different list to capture the experience.
— Patterner

What do you mean by "capture"? — Ludwig V

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible.
— Patterner

Lists aren't necessarily helpful. But it is certain that a list of all the parts of a car isn't a description of a car, nor an explanation of how it works, and a car is not the same thing as a list of its parts, or a description of it, or an explanation of how it works. — Ludwig V

We already have the assembled car. I said a list of physical events. If we made such a list for a car, starting with turning the key, then saying what turning the key would do within the engine, then saying what would happen next, and next, and next, we would understand the purpose of the car, and everything it does. That list of events captures - or perhaps describes, it all.

If we did the same for a brain, a much more gargantuan task, we would understand how it perceives the world through the senses; how its stores information; how it moves parts of the body; how it learns so that it comes to move parts of the body in the best ways, and at the best times, to increase its chances of survival and reproduction; etc.

But we would not understand everything the brain does. Like the car, the list of physical events only describes, or helps us understand, the physical functions of the brain. It does not touch upon consciousness. Each physical event within the car helps bring about what the car physically accomplishes. Each physical event within the brain helps bring about what the brain physically accomplishes. How do the physical events bring about the brain’s physical functions and its mental functions. Two things accomplished, by one means, and one of those two things is of a different nature than the means.

I asked the question because I wanted to check that you agreed with me and to make the point that we don't need any more explanation. But I hesitate to call it reductionist because it is called reductionist to suggest that it somehow implies that because there is a physical explanation, rainbows somehow don't exist. — Ludwig V

I would think that being physically reducible is the surest was to prove that something exists. Physical reductionism is how science works, more or less. It’s how we prove things. No? We know something exists. The fact that consciousness is not physically reducible is the reason some people say it doesn’t exist. Because we can’t prove it with our scientific tools and methods.

Don't give up too easily. We don't have an explanation yet. But the future is a long time and we can't rule anything out. — Ludwig V

I think we have enough brain scans and dissections to know that the brain does not reshape itself into to match things we see. Also, how would it reshape itself in order for us to hear or smell?

Yes, a distinguishing between frequencies of light is different from distinguishing between colours. Neither is an attempt to describe experiencing colours. But a description is never the same as the real thing. A description of a table isn't a table. A description of a chess move isn't a chess move. A description of an smile isn't a smile. And so on. Why would a description of an experience (though I'm not really sure what that might be) be an experience?

Someone who is colour-blind is unable to experience see colours. Why would a description of a colour (whatever that might be) substitute for that? It's like trying to substitute money for food. Money can be exchanged for food, but it can't substitute for it. — Ludwig V

What I mean is, if I listed every single physical event that takes place within a robot that can perceive different frequencies of the visible spectrum, and act in different ways depending on the frequency, nobody would conclude that the robot is consciously experiencing colors. There is no hint of qualia. Same for if I listed all the physical events that take place within us, beginning with a photon hitting a retina. I would not be giving a description of someone experiencing blue.

If aliens quite unlike us, who knew nothing at all about us, ran across that list, they would have no reason to assume we were conscious beings. They might wonder if we are, just as we might wonder if any given AI is. But we don’t, and might never, know about the AI. And these aliens might never know about us. Because the chain of physical events on this list does not describe two different things - our ability to perceive and differentiate frequencies of electromagnetic radiation within a certain range and our experience of seeing colors. We need a different list to capture the experience. But such a list does not exist.

Nagel, according to this video summation of What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (particularly beginning at 17:07) says such a list is not possible.

No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical.
— Patterner

Fine. But you don't want to say that rainbows don't exist just because they are fully explained by physical processes, do you? — Ludwig V

Certainly not. I don’t know why you are asking me that. I never intended to suggest such a thing. Maybe I worded something badly? Rainbows do exist. And we understand the physical reductionist explanation for them.

Now, we don't know what is going on when Macbeth sees the dagger. Why can't we leave it at that rather than positing some dagger-like phenomenon in his head? — Ludwig V

We should not posit such a thing. I dare say that explanation is impossible.

Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops.
— Patterner

I'm not sure what you have in mind in that sentence. Can you give an example or two? — Ludwig V

Sure. Sunlight refracting through raindrops does not bestow solidity to rainbows. Or audible output. Or the ability to store data. Or consciousness. It does the one thing it does. It makes a rainbow.

It may be that one physical process, or one set of physical processes, seems to produce more than one thing. Such as the process that leads to both lightning and thunder. But that’s just one thing that has visual and audible (probably more) characteristics. I don’t know if one process produces two truly different things. Like if sunlight refracting through raindrops lead to a rainbow that you could slide on. If we ran across such a rainbow, we would be very surprised. We would assume something else is at work, and go looking for it.

Physical processes lead to my brain being able to perceive, and discriminate between, frequencies of visible light. But distinguishing between frequencies of light is a different thing than what it is like to see blue and red. Understanding those processes in perfect detail does not describe experiencing colors, and does not help a person who sees in great detail, but is color-blind, understand what blue is. We should be surprised that physical processes that bring about the one also bring about the other. More so, in fact, than if we ran across a solid rainbow. Because lights and solidity are both physically reducible. If consciousness is physically reducible, no one has been able to figure it out. At least Christof Kochdoesn’t think so. We should assume something else is at work, and go looking for it.

A rainbow is distinct from the raindrops and light that create it. Yet it is an effect of the sunlight refracting through the raindrops, not an elusive something. There is no hard problem there, is there? — Ludwig V

No, there is not. Because, as you just explained, we know how it happens, and it’s all physical. If a rainbow started showing signs of consciousness, we’d have a problem. We would not have any idea how physical things and processes that produce this thing we understand - the rainbow - also produce these other characteristics at the same time. Characteristics that are not reducible to sunlight refracting through raindrops.

What do you mean by “ something dagger-like in his head or mind”?
— Patterner

Something like a picture or a model. — Ludwig V

If the matter inside our skulls does not take on the shape or color of whatever we’re thinking of, in what sense is there a picture or model in my head?

I read the Nagel's original account and carried out the thought experiment he proposed. Nothing. Am I deficient? A zombie? Hard to bamboozle? — Ludwig V

Can you direct me to this thought experiment?

The formulation of the hard problem is misleading. One day, perhaps, we will recognize that and develop less misleading ways of thinking about these things. But I'm not holding my breath. — Ludwig V

All matter has properties. From primary particles like quarks, electrons, and photons, to atoms, to molecules, on up to galaxies. We can study these properties. We know how these properties and the four forces produce the interactions that take place between everything.

Knowing all that, we can understand how various things are reducible to the physical. Perception, perceptual discrimination, memory, learning, on and on. Freakin’ monarch butterflies migrate from Canada to a relatively small part of Mexico, to roost on specific trees for the winter. They head back north in the spring, but die along the way, and the next generation continues the journey. It takes four generations of them to do a complete cycle. No monarch that flies to Mexico has ever been there before. I don’t imagine anyone thinks they have a great degree of consciousness, or that one generation teaches the next in order to make this happen. It’s all just physical. Massively complex, but physical.

I think the Hard Problem is explaining why/how the physical is accompanied by subjective experience, and awareness at different levels (of an event; of myself; of my own awareness). Butterflies have the physical without the subjective or awareness. We’ve built machines that can perceive, discriminate, react, and learn, but don’t have the subjective or awareness. If I did not hate the pain of burning my hand, the system of protecting the body would still pull my hand away from the fire. So why is the subjectivity and awareness there, and how is it accomplished? What, in addition to the physical, is there?

What do you mean by “misleading”?

Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means?
— Patterner

It depends what you mean by "of the same nature". They are clearly radically different, since there's no dagger. But they are clearly similar because Macbeth is behaving as if there is a dagger in front of him. The question is whether the similarity can only be explained by positing something dagger-like in his head or mind. I know it seems mysterious. But if you approach the question in a different way, it will seem (it has seemed to many philosophers) the best and only explanation possible. This is why philosophy is hard. — Ludwig V

I’m only speaking of what my consciousness perceives, regardless of whether what it perceives is the result of signals from the retina, or the result of … whatever causes hallucinations. Either way, I see a dagger. My question is, are the two instances of my consciousness seeing a dagger - the moment of “Is this a dagger which I see before me?” Not what leads up to that moment - the same? At least as far as we can tell from any type of brain scan? Or could we look at brain scans and know that one is a hallucination? Maybe the vision centers of the brain are not active during (visual) hallucinations.

What do you mean by “ something dagger-like in his head or mind”?

It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what ↪goremand is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions. — Ludwig V

I understand the difference in the two ways of wording it in your first sentence, and it makes sense to me. However, rather than disposing if illusions, isn’t seeing a bent stick as straight (or seeing an image of a person projected onto a sheet of glass as a ghost, etc.) pretty much the definition of “illusion”?

I don’t know what to think about the word image. Again, there’s no literal image in my head, as there is on a movie screen. Still, if I close my eyes and imagine an apple, there seems some logic in saying I have an image of an apple in my head. Imagine and image having the same root, though image is possibly limited to the visual, while we can imagine things with regard to any of our senses, and then some. Can we say the verb does not result in the noun?

I extended the discussion to hallucinations, dreams, etc. to register that there are other cases of getting things wrong that are less amenable to this kind of explanation. It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. (Dreams are even more difficult, because we are asleep (i.e. unconscious) while we are dreaming.) The psychological explanation that Shakespeare expects us to adopt is that Macbeth is secretly guilty, but that doesn't help philosophically. I don't have a pat answer to that, so to avoid misleading you any further, I'll stop there, at least for the time being. — Ludwig V

Is there reason to believe MacBeth’s hallucination of a dagger and his perception of an actual dagger are not of the same nature, even though they come about by different means?



Thank you for your posts.

Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different.
— Patterner

I think it has, in the second paragraph. My point there is that the idea of an internal image makes better sense in the context of an illusion or hallucination. The argument then is that if we actually see internal images when we see an illusion or hallucination, it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong. — Ludwig V

I don’t understand what you mean by “we actually see internal images” or “ it doesn't make sense to suppose that we only see images when something's gone wrong.”

Honestly, I don’t know that I’m in the right thread. My apologies to . I don’t know that illusions are as relevant to what I’m thinking as hallucinations and dreams are. It’s not a physical thing. As we said, no part of my brain changes color or shape. There’s no image being projected onto a tiny movie screen in my head. I’m thinking that, whether the image I have in my head is a representation of an external object that my senses perceive, or an hallucination or dream, the nature of the image is the same.

Now, the question is, when I see an illusion, what is the object that I see? — Ludwig V

Has that question been answered in regards to when I see an actual object? I might suspect it would be the same answer, even if the source material is different.

I maintain (and so do a lot of other philosophers) that this is a conjuring trick. — Ludwig V

Can you be more specific? Certainly, no part of my brain turns yellow and shapes itself like a rubber ducky if I see one floating in the water. So, yes, some thing that might be caught the conjuring trick. But how was it achieved?

All of that makes perfect sense to me.

Unfortunately, I'm a bit lost. I'm not well read on a lot of these things. I may use terms incorrectly, or misinterpret what is being said.

Phenomenal properties don't exist outside of our consciousness. Illusions don't exist outside of our consciousness. They aren't physical things that we perceive under certain circumstances.

But they exist. "Only" within our consciousness, sure. But that's still existence. They are the subject of the conversation. We have a lot of common ground when we discuss them. A magician doesn't do something, and hope somebody in the audience gets something out of it. Something objective is at play, and the magician works with it.

How am I doing?

It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know.
— Patterner

But the thing is the image does not "contradict what we know". To those who understand how light travels through water, the image is a straightforward representation of reality, no-one is getting fooled. — goremand

True, it does not in a literal sense. But it does in an illusory sense. That's what gives us the sense of wonder and makes us laugh. No, the magician didn't break any laws of physics, and what she did was not a contradiction of reality. But I *know* she put the ball in her hand. I saw her so it. So htf is it in my pocket?!?

If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction?
— Patterner

Illusionists do not believe consciousness is an illusion, only phenomenal properties. If you believe phenomenal properties are by definition necessary for consciousness, or that phenomenal properties are necessary for perception, I guess it amounts to the same thing. But I think that is a very trivial argument, basically laying claim to as many words as possible to increase the odds of the Illusionist undermining themselves with careless language. — goremand

I'm not sure of the wording "phenomenal properties are by definition necessary for consciousness." More like "phenomenal properties wouldn't exist without conscious." Without consciousness, there would be nothing but particles and groups of particles, interacting as their properties and the laws of physics determine. But we have consciousness, and the physical interactions are accompanied by subjective experience/phenomenal properties. The Hard Problem of Consciousness being figuring out why/how it is not just physical interactions. So no, I don't think it's trying to lay claim to words inappropriately. (Love your last sentence!)

Something is an illusion only if there is consciousness to be fooled by it. The stick in the water is not an illusion to the stick, or the water, or the stick and the water. It's not an illusion to a camera that captures the image. It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know.

If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? The idea that consciousness is, itself, an illusion, but an illusion that perceives itself as real, is like picking yourself up by your own bootstraps.

All I know is that it was the novel in which there was a metal dildo called Steely Dan which then provided the name for the well-known musical ensemble (and my personal all-time favourite band). — Wayfarer

You have fantastic taste.

I still have difficulty imagining Atomic (elemental, unanalyzable) Minds exchanging knowledge with other "tiny minds" on a sub-atomic scale : a tiny chat room or Twitter. That sounds like a Reductive definition of an otherwise Holistic concept. — Gnomon

I just quoted these elsewhere recently.

Goff is quoted in an article:

Panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

In a Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

Skrbina said:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

I don't know if any panpsychists believe anything like the scenario you have difficulty imagining, but it doesn't seem these three do.

If true, what does this suggest about free will, — Michael

It doesn't seem to me that either of them has anything to do with the decision of whether or not the fleet launches.

When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B.
— Patterner

I agree. But we can still know of A and B, and not fully knowing B does not negate what we fully know of A. — Philosophim

(FYI, I added the sentence "And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B." after you had hit Quote.)

I may be misinterpreting, but it seems to me that, every time I ask about B, you give me an explanation of A, and say you are giving an explanation of B.

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do."
— Patterner

Sure, we don't know everything yet. Just like we don't know how quantum physics fully works. Doesn't mean we can't take what we do know and work with it from there. Doesn't mean that we don't understand the part of quantum physics that we do. Subjective states are internal, whereas we measure externally. If we could one day measure something internally, perhaps? Or its just something that isn't possible. We don't have to know everything about component parts to use the parts that we do know. — Philosophim

That's all entirely true. That is the state of our understanding of consciousness. When we have two different things, such as objective and subjective, outer and inner, physical and mental, or any A and B, we should not assume that understanding and having explained A is the same as understanding and having explained B. And we should not claim that, by talking about A, we are talking about B.

You are aware of ‘reductionism’, though, right? It is 'the practice of analysing and describing a complex phenomenon in terms of its simple or fundamental constituents, especially when this is said to provide a sufficient explanation.' — Wayfarer

Indeed. I've been arguing that it does not suffice to explain consciousness, or even make the attempt. It addresses only the physical activities.

Organic chemistry, for instance, involves the study of molecules and their interactions, which can give rise to emergent properties such as self-assembly or enzymatic activity. These properties cannot be accounted for solely on the basis of the physical analysis. — Wayfarer

Can you give me an example of this kind of self-assembly or enzymatic activity?

I've never understood this thinking. Every animal living thing is matter and energy. Many living things have consciousness at a basic level. Therefore matter and energy can be conscious. Why deny what's in front of your eyes? — Philosophim

I do not deny it. I have gone to lengths, with my words and with Nagel's, to make clear that it seems obvious that matter and energy are conscious. Our consciousness is not separable from our brain.

However, some aspects of consciousness do not seem to be explainable by what we have learned about the properties of particles, the forces we are aware of, and how they all interact. I have not heard a theory that attempts to explain how those properties and forces can explain those characteristics. The stance seems to be an unspoken "They just do."

Its all matter and energy Paterrner. I already covered that with Bob in my last reply, so feel free to sort through to that section. If my reply to Bob doesn't fully answer your question, feel free to ask again. — Philosophim

Let me try to explain my thinking this way... It we saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid water, we would look for something else going on. Because the properties of liquid water cannot account for the characteristics of a skyscraper.

The properties of matter and energy are even farther removed from the characteristics of consciousness than liquid water from skyscrapers. At least water and skyscrapers are both physical objects, composed of primary particles.

Water and skyscrapers are also closer to flight, though flight is a process, rather than an object. Because flight is a physical process. We can see how flight takes place due to the physical macro characteristics of various physical things; that these physical things are comprised of the primary particles; and how the properties of the primary particles make it possible for them to make the physical things.

I do not see an attempt to explain how the characteristics of consciousness that are not physical things or processes can arise from physical things and processes. It is less logical than building skyscrapers out of water. The fact that there is, clearly, a connection between consciousness and the brain, and consciousness would not exist without the brain, doesn't mean that, when we ask how physical building blocks can lead to non-physical properties, we should settle for the answer "It just does." We should look for what else is going on, as we would for a water skyscraper.

the properties of subatomic particles that give rise to flight in birds are present in the subatomic particles that make up rocks
— Patterner

However, such bare reductionism presents no credible account of the higher-level factors that come into play in the organic domain. You could never deduce from the examination of fundamental particles the principles of organic chemistry, let alone evolutionary biology. Furthermore as you're no doubt aware physics itself nowadays seems to implicate the higher-level (and non-reducible) role of the observer. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure what you mean by deduce. If you mean, for example, someone who has never heard of chemistry or organic chemistry, but knows all the rules of physics, would never come up with the idea of organic chemistry, or evolutionary biology, you’re probably right. But that’s because our intellect’s are not up to the task. I am not aware of any events taking place in the realms of organic chemistry or evolutionary biology that are not reducible to fundamental particles.

To think the brain does not cause consciousness is to invalidate decades of working science and medicine. — Philosophim

That answers the question of Where. My question is of How. How do the physical processes that explain our senses, and our behaviors resulting from the signals our senses send to the brain, also aware at different levels? These physical processes are doing two things at once, and one of them isn't physical. And the one that isn't physical isn't necessary. There are living things that react to stimuli without awareness of the stimuli or their reaction to it. We have also built machines like this. If our awareness is causal, then their benefit, and the reason evolution choose for them, is obvious. But it still doesn't explain the How. (If our awareness is not causal, of course, and merely observes our actions, which are simply physics-driven interactions of particles, then it is of no value, and there is no reason evolution would have selected for it.)

Its not that we can't know how consciousness occurs by measuring brain states. — Philosophim

If we can, can you explain it? Particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them, are doing things other than interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. We know this subjectively, because we are each experiencing. And we know it objectively, because scans of our own brains during this experiencing reveal nothing but particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them. What I mean is, we don’t look at those scans, and say, "What the...! What's going on there??" And if we didn’t know what the scans were, we would not think, "Ah. this is a conscious being." Because we are only seeing, if you will forgive me, particles interacting with each other in the only ways they can, due to their properties and the forces acting upon them.

Nagel said

Finally, so far as we can tell, our mental lives, including our subjective experiences, and those of other creatures are strongly connected with and probably strictly dependent on physical events in our brains and on the physical interaction of our bodies with the rest of the physical world.

I don't see how it could be said our consciousness would exist but for our brain.

However, that's not the same as an explanation of how the brain produces consciousness. That is, how do physical particles with their properties that we're aware of, acting in accordance with the forces that we're aware of, become aware of things, themselves, and their own awareness, and have subjective experience on top of the physical interactions? We know where in the brain certain aspects of consciousness take place. But we don't know how. I've never heard of a scientific theory that even addresses it. "It just does" seems to suffice. Adding more and more physical structures and process doesn't suggest it will ever become other than physical.

Q: Which is worse, ignorance or apathy?

A: Who knows. Who cares.

I'm not sure what exactly do you mean by "static". But I agree that consciousness is not an "object".
Anway, you agree then that consciousness is not a process either, right? — Alkis Piskas

No, I do not agree. There is no consciousness without activity.

[Re: ChatGPT being conscious] I don't have reason to believe it is. I've chatted with it quite a bit. Amazing though it is, it does not at all seem like chatting with a conscious being. And it claims not to be.
— Patterner
:up:
Unfortunately, Science and Techology are advancing too fast for people to follow, undestand and assimilate their development, even when there's a hype about them. AI is a classic case. They all talk about it, but few know what it actually is, how it works, etc. Personally, as an AI programmer, I find this quite disheartening. — Alkis Piskas

Indeed. But that's always the way of it. People still say that about the internet. Before that, it was television. And radio before that.

Can you give me a quote from a panpsychic saying that kind of thing?
— Patterner

Panpsychism is the idea that consciousness did not evolve to meet some survival need, nor did it emerge when brains became sufficiently complex. Instead it is inherent in matter — all matter.

In other words, everything has consciousness. Consciousness is not limited to humans and other animals.
https://www.discovermagazine.com/mind/panpsychism-the-trippy-theory-that-everything-from-bananas-to-bicycles-are

That jibes with the stuff I've heard. — RogueAI

Ok. But that article was not written by a panpsychist. Let's see what some of them say. Goff is quoted in that article:

Panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

In a Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

Skrbina said:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

"This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts."
"...some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness."
"...instantaneous memory-less moments of experience."

They're talking about subjective experience. Not sentience. The theory (I'm not sure it qualifies as a theory. How can it be tested?) is not that all matter is conscious. The theory is that all matter, even every particle, has the property of protopsychism, just as they have properties like mass and charge.

When matter is arranged in certain ways, and certain events take place within this arrangement, all of the protopsychism is going through it, also. And maybe that's point of the physical that we know. And maybe evolution selected for the things that have greater consciousness, starting way back in the beginning of life, if not even earlier.

Whether or not any of that is actually the case, no panpsychist I've ever heard about thinks all particles, or all arrangements matter, are conscious in the sense you are talking about regarding your toaster and car. But if you want to know what rights I would give any object that seemed to be exhibiting characteristics of consciousness, I want to know what rights you would give animals, which surely have some of those characteristics, as well as plants, which many will argue also exhibit some.

I don't have reason to believe it is. I've chatted with it quite a bit. Amazing though it is, it does not at all seem like chatting with a conscious being. And it claims not to be.
— Patterner

That's true, but it could be programmed to say it is conscious (I imagine). I've talked with it a lot too, and when I had it ranking jokes on a 1-10 scale, I was impressed. I won't say I think it's conscious, but the next iteration? And the one after that? Eventually, these Ai's are going to sound just like a human. And if someone did think it was conscious, and that consciousness was affecting ChatGPT's output? I don't think that's a stupid position. — RogueAI

Neither do I.

A panpsychist would say it's all conscious. — RogueAI

Can you give me a quote from a panpsychic saying that kind of thing?

Are you sure ChatGPT isn't conscious? — RogueAI

I don't have reason to believe it is. I've chatted with it quite a bit. Amazing though it is, it does not at all seem like chatting with a conscious being. And it claims not to be.

10 print "I am conscious"

OK, now what? Do we assume a Commodore 64 is conscious because it says it is and there's no downside? — RogueAI

Fascinating! How did your toaster respond? Audibly? Did it burn the words onto a slice of bread?

What tests do you propose we give an AGI that we suspect is conscious? Ask it? — RogueAI

I think that would be one of the tests. Let me know what your toaster's response is. I'm very excited!!

But as I said before, this applies to toasters and cars and my computer as well as AGI's. How far do you want to extend this courtesy to machines? — RogueAI

Let's give your toaster and car whatever tests of consciousness we can think of. I'll give them the benefit of the doubt until they fail a test.

We don’t need neuroscience to answer that. If we can't tell they're not, then what is the downside of treating them as though they are?
— Patterner

No downside. There's no downside to forbidding people not to abuse their cars or toasters. It just seems kind of odd to treat something as conscious when we have no idea whether it really is conscious or not. — RogueAI

I thought the conversation was about machines that pass every test we give them looking for consciousness. We could always refuse to believe they are, thinking we'll eventually come up with a test that will trip them up, and treat them like toasters or cars, despite what we think is their faux grief and horror.

Or, we could treat them as though they are what we have no legitimate reason to think they are not.

What's the upside and downside of the options?

What does neuroscience say about how we should treat them? Should we assume they're conscious, even if we don't know? — RogueAI

We don’t need neuroscience to answer that. If we can't tell they're not, then what is the downside of treating them as though they are?

Why aren't all brain processes associated with consciousness?

Because the brain automates all sorts of things in the body that aren't under direct conscious control, and if those elements of the brain weren't doing what they do, and were instead involved with consciousness, we would die. — wonderer1

Imagine consciously squeezing our heart every second. :D Hey, Magneto had his heart literally ripped out of his body. He consciously kept his blood circulating with his power.

Also, I've heard that psychedelics reduce brain activity but increase awareness. If true, would that suggest that consciousness and brain activity are two different phenomena. — Art48

Any idea what "increased awareness" means?

Re "But we could not point to their consciousness": Right. However, the examples of respiration and digestion are indeed procecess, in fact well defined ones. But how does consciouness function as a processs? Thi is what I asked.

But where is the "process" that you are talking about in all this? Or do you mean that consciousness, respiration, digestion, etc. — Alkis Piskas

I couldn't say the specifics. But my point is that, if there is no activity, like if the brain is frozen, or dead for some other reason (or if it was frozen in time in some sci-fi way), then there is no consciousness. It is not a static thing; not an object.