The property dualism although it can explain bottom-up causation, the existence of experience for example, cannot explain top-bottom causation, for example, how a single experience like a thought you have can lead to you typing the content of your thought. — MoK

Sez you :grin: I'll tell you what I think about causality asap. Hopefully tomorrow. And everyone reading this who already thinks I'm off my rocker will want to call the men in the white coats after that.

Hm. I somehow missed your recent post that begins with "Although its been a few days now..." I do everything on my cell phone, so I sometimes miss things. (I also have a ton more spelling errors than I would typing, because my phone"corrects" me a lot.)

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*. — javra

I have some quotes in my OP. They are at the end here. The idea is that understanding isn't intrinsic to all consciousness. I think that idea is a mistake.

I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. — javra

Long to explain...

I don't think a rock has subjective awareness. I apologize. I know I said it that way, but it was just for the sake of posting sooner than later. Busy day. Rather, each particle has subjective awareness. Physical bonds don't make a rock a single unit, as far as consciousness is concerned, so they're all on their own in that regard. A rock doesn't have consciousness, and breaking a rock in half doesn't give you two rocks with consciousness. An old grandfather clock is not one unit, as far as consciousness is concerned. Physical connections aren't enough.

Information processing is what makes a group of particles one unit, in regards to consciousness. A system processing information subjectively experiences as a unit. I use the term proto-consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of units.

It all started with DNA. DNA is extraordinary beyond words. DNA, mRNA, tRNA, ribosomes, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases, and other things, are part of the information processing system that produces the amino acids and proteins that are coded into DNA. One unit that is processing information. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit.

Add more information processing systems, all one unit/one organism, all working to keep the group of systems/the organism alive. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit. And what that unit is experiencing is much more than what the unit in the previous paragraph is experiencing.

Add any kind of brain, an information processing system that controls and coordinates all the others, and we're talking about consciousness of something serious. Building up to the human brain, which is obviously capable of thinking things, and kinds of things, no other species is. Even thinking about information. Even thinking about information just for the sake of thinking about information.

Maybe AI has consciousness, because it processes information. But maybe it needs more information processing systems before it will subjectively experience anything like we have. We aren't just pure information, as AI is. We are several times more information processing systems than I know about.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation.


-------------------------------------

In this article, Philip Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of? — javra

Yes, that is my thought. Consciousness is always the same. It's just the subjective awareness of the thing in question. A rock's consciousness is extremely limited. Certainly no understanding/comprehension. Nothing I would even know how to discuss. Skrbina's "instantaneous memory-less moments of experience." But it's there; the basis of all, including human, consciousness.

8 chapters away, but I'll get there.

Although as you get later (spoiler alert), you discover that she DOESN'T think mass is fundamental, primarily because she doesn't think space-time itself is fundamental (and mass is itself defined in relation to space time) — flannel jesus

Well it will be interesting to hear how she thinks of space-time if it's not fundamental!

Thoughts are not the same.
— Patterner

Yes, describing things from the outside seems so far removed from what it feels like to be inside. Experience does seem drastically different, hence the hard problem.

I've been listening to a new audio book, a so called "audio documentary" that touches on this. It's called Lights On by Annaka Harris. Perhaps not up your street because she's an unabashed physicalist, but she explores concepts of fundamental consciousness because she's become increasingly convinced that that's more the right approach to talking about experience. — flannel jesus

This is one if the reasons I started this thread. Whether or not my thinking agrees with Harris', I'm sure she's not a substance dualist, so didn't want to further derail MoK's thread.

Thank you for the recommendation! I'm loving it! I'm a few hours in, talking to Sean Carroll atm. I wish there was a ebook version. I usually have audio and ebook versions of things, so when I want to discuss a particular thing, I can just copy & paste the quote.

I don't know why she calls herself a physicalist if she thinks consciousness is a pervasive, fundamental field. I could say I'm a physicalist for thinking proto-consciousness is a property of matter, as mass and charge are. But I don't think it's a physical property, and I wouldn't think her idea is that it's a physical field.

In any event, based on the little I know, I can't disagree with her. It might amount to the same thing I have in mind. The fields could be why every particle has the property of proto-consciousness. But then we could also suggest that mass is a pervasive, fundamental field, and that's why all particles have mass.

About an hour after my post to you, I happened to stumble upon this video of Annaka Harris. At 3:20, she says:

And when i use the word consciousness, I'm not talking about higher order thinking, or complex thought, or things that we think of in terms of human consciousness. But when I use the word consciousness I'm talking about consciousness in the most fundamental sense. Um, this, this bare fact of felt experience. — Annaka Harris

That's what i have in mind.

You argue that the macro is nothing other than a composite of the parts in an arrangement, but now you qualify with "under the conditions it is in", — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it's under the conditions it is in. I said that back in this post:

"Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes."

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily.

If I say someone weighs less on the moon than they do on earth, because the moon has less mass than the earth, and, therefore, the attraction between the person and the body they are standing on is not as strong, do I really have to specifically say "These are different conditions"??

Finally working my way through your post.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, — javra

I'm thinking otherwise. Let's take the world's best AI. We have conversations with AI. It gives us very good information. In speed and multitasking, it surpasses us. But, despite it's capabilities, it is not conscious. So there can be intelligence on par with ours, in at least some ways, without consciousness.

Although I don't know where along the evolutionary ladder consciousness begins, I believe many animal species are conscious. Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess.

I agree with Nagel's view in What is it like to be a bat?

...an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. — Thomas Nagel

Subjective experience. Not simply physical objects and/or processes.

What is it like to be a bat? A human? A fly? An amoeba? An oak tree? A fungus? A rock? A length of rope? I wouldn't be surprised if all agree that there is nothing it is like to be a rock; that a rock is not conscious. Some might agree that only living things can be conscious. Some might agree that we cannot know where the line between living things with and without consciousness is. That is, we don't know exactly what minimal observable physical characteristics or behaviors are proof of consciousness.

I'm going to plagiarize from something I wrote a few years ago. — T Clark

I think that's allowed. :up: :grin:

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.
— Patterner

So, you're disproving what you are asserting? — Metaphysician Undercover

H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells.

If you know otherwise, that the reason ice floats on water has nothing to do with the properties of its molecules, please share.

Or point me to any other macro characteristic that is not explained by how the micro properties of its constituents behave under the conditions it is in.

Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life. — kindred

Sure. But do you think the emergent property of life would be the same as it is if carbon's properties were other than they are?

Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. It's solid form floats in its liquid form. Very unusual. And it's because of the ways the molecules are arranged in the two different forms. In this case, temperature is key.

Let's take another molecule. How about NaCl. Does that behave the same at the same temperatures? No. NaCl's melting point is 801°C/1474°F. There's one difference. Does solid NaCl float in it's liquids form? No. Another difference.

Why don't water and salt have the same characteristics under the same conditions?

In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter. — JuanZu

I agree. I used iron and water to show that, although macro physical characteristics are not identical to the properties of the particles that the macro object is composed of (which is a ridiculous notion), those macro characteristics are exactly as they are because of the micro properties. If the micro was different, the macro would be, also. It's impossible for things to be otherwise.

Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach. — flannel jesus

flannel jesus seems to want to say Patterner is claiming the opposite of what he has clearly said more than once, in order to weaken his position.

I just discussed water. The electron shells of oxygen are such that hydrogen atoms bond to it in a certain way, with a certain angle between the atoms. The hydrogen bonds between water molecules are weak, So they break easily in liquid form. but, because of the angle between the atoms of the molecule, when the temperature goes down, and the hydrogen bonds do not break as easily, they solidify into a lattice arrangement that is less dense than when they are in liquid form. Therefore, A solid form floats on top of the liquid form.

DNA is the beginning of life. It is an information processing system. It is coded information of amino acids and proteins. The system assembles the amino acids and proteins, creating an environment in which it replicates itself. Then the process repeats. The environment is the living organisms. Because of evolution, more coding has been added to DNA, resulting in more information systems being added to organisms, which often means greater intelligence.

I say again: properties of higher levels are often, if not always, different from properties of lower levels. However, the properties of higher levels are exactly what they are because the properties of lower levels are exactly what they are. For example, the properties of hydrogen atoms are such that, within a certain temperature range, hydrogen is a gas. The properties of iron are such that, within that same range of temperature range, iron is a solid. Three states of matter are not properties of particles. But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping?

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.
— Patterner

Isn't mind a necessary condition for subjective experience? — RogueAI

My position is that it is not. I'm saying subjective experience is in all things. But a rock, for example, doesn't have a mind, so the subjective experience isn't noticed.

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.

Perhaps the fallacy of division is more apropos to panpsychist thinking than the fallacy of composition? — wonderer1

Finally got to read your link. No, many things that are true for a whole are not also true of all or some of its parts. But what is true for a whole is due to the properties of all or some of its parts.

H2O is one of the rare things that is less dense in its solid form than its liquids form. The hydrogen bonds between molecules are weak. In liquid form, they break easily, and the molecules move around and pack together.

Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes. And, because of the properties of the electron shells, and the "empty spaces" on the oxygen atom where the hydrogen atoms bond, the molecule has a 104.5 degree angle. SO! When it freezes, the molecules form a lattice that is less dense than the jostling molecules in liquid form.

So ice floats. Surfaces of bodies of water freeze, and, instead of sinking in it's liquid form like most solids, it stays on top insulating the water beneath, where life goes on.

Can you think of an example of anything that is composed of other things that has characteristics that cannot be explained by properties of those other things?

Semantics — 180 Proof

I suppose. But I'm trying to explore my thinking, and think being precise will help me do that.

What I'm thinking is, you wouldn't say:
just as particles of (any) X are not "mass".

"Proto-consciousness" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is subjectively experience.

"Mass" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is produce and respond to a gravitational force.



The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.

Consciousness is the collective subjective experience of information processing systems. The particles act as a unit to physically process the information, so their subjective experience is also a unit. Just as their collective mass generates gravity that can be measured as one unit.

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me: — 180 Proof

At least I get credit for grandiose! :grin:

atoms which constitute strawberries do not themselves in any way taste, smell or feel like strawberry, for example — 180 Proof

I agree. But I don't see how's that's counter to anything I said.

just as particles of (any) X are not "proto-conscious". — 180 Proof

Well, maybe this has to do with the rewrite I need to do. No, they are not proto-conscious. One of their properties is proto-consciousness, which means they have subjective experience. Just as another of their properties is mass, which means they produce and respond to a gravitational force.

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true. A sort of "bigism" where parts are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole seems to have at least as much to recommend itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While that's true, do you think those big things would have the specific parts that are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole if the atoms and molecules they are made of did not have the specific properties they have? That would be the same as being made of different atoms and molecules. Either way, those "parts of the whole" would not exist. An iron rod can be heated and bent. Although you can't do that with iron atoms, it is some of the specific properties of iron atoms that make it possible with the rod. If iron atoms did not have those specific properties, you wouldn't be able to heat and bend the rod. You might not be able to make a rod at all.

Instead, I think a lot of high level things are explained by the processes that are happening at a lower level, processes that are enabled perhaps in part by properties. — flannel jesus

Yes. Processes cannot take place if the properties do not allow them. The properties of iron do not allow it to burn if you put it in your fireplace. The properties of wood do not allow it to be magnetized.

Macro things are regularly explained by properties that the building blocks do not possess. For example bits of iron don't float on water, yet iron (as steel) is regularly formed into ships that float on water. — wonderer1

The properties of iron don't allow it to float when it is formed into certain shapes and sizes. But its properties allow it to float when it is formed into other shapes and sizes. A ship does not float in violation of iron's properties.

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me:
— 180 Proof

I think this is really at the center of a lot of disagreement in these types of conversations. Things often are very much unlike the things that make them up. — flannel jesus

I don't currently have the time to respond to you. Work is insane. But I just want to quickly respond to this. Although things are often much unlike the things that make them up, what they are like is always because of the qualities of the things that make them up. The emergence of any macro characteristic is always explained by the properties of what it's made of. How can it be otherwise? Macro things cannot be explained by properties the building blocks do not possess.

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean?
— Patterner

That's a good question. I can find no coherent difference. If something experiences anything, however 'proto', it's fully and totally conscious in the phenomenal sense. Differences are always a matter of content, not degree of consciousness. — bert1

Ha! I completely agree. I think this requires a pretty extensive rewrite. I wrote all of this over a fairly long period of time. My views of consciousness changed in ways over that same period of tim, but I didn't change what I had written in the earlier days. Didn't even notice it needed changing, having moved on in my head. Thank you very much.

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not.

Anyway, parts of my OP were written back when I equated consciousness with things like mind and intelligence. Having a different idea in my head, I moved on without changing what I had written. And, truth be told, I probably need to shake off some remnants of that kind of thinking.Again, very sloppy. Again, thank you.

You've set out your view well. What do you want us to talk about? Anything in the OP? — bert1

You're doing great! :grin: Anything that helps me clarify my thinking, or even my writing. I don't know if there are ways to prove or disprove various theories of consciousness. But any theory should at least be internally consistent. Pointing out anywhere that I am not is appreciated.

I don't know much about the terminologies. It seems every term has a dozen sub-categiries. Matter and energy are all the same thing, aren't they? It's all particles. But there are multiple primary particles, right? Photons and electrons are not made of anything else. Protons and neutrons are made of quarks. Aren't neutrinos also primary? Can monism be the answer if we already have those? And I believe there are others.

we know what the meaning is, because we put it there, and it's only to us that there is meaning.
— Patterner

Not only did we 'put it there', but we enabled the worldview which allows us to think that the universe as a whole is devoid of it. — Wayfarer

I meant it's only to us that there is meaning in that specific situation. The meaning in any computer coding ultimately reduces to binary. We arranged the system so that the computer, without the capacity for understanding meaning, would mechanically do things that have meaning for us.

But there is meaning in the universe aside from any we put in it. DNA being the prime example. DNA means strings of amino acids and proteins. It is the basis of all life, and, I believe, the first step toward consciousness.

Thanks! I got Harris' audio. Only listened to the preface so far. Doesn't particularly make her sound like a physicalist. So this'll be my commute for a while

I've been traveling for a few days. Finally back to this..

I don't know if you guys are talking about the same thing I am. Let me try to describe my thinking in more detail.

A house is physical. You can build one. Put it together, brick by brick. You can go back forgetsl by digging up the clay, getting molds and a furnace, and make the bricks from scratch. You can even, in principle, start with particles, sticking then together to form the bricks.

Nobody will ask what the bricks, or clay & molds, or particles, have to do with the house.

Nobody will say that houses only seen to exist where they're are bricks (etc), but the connection isn't obvious, and nobody had given an explanation.


Thoughts are not the same.

You can give a physical description of the squiggles that we call writing in any detail you want.

You can discuss the medium. If they are on a computer screen, you can discuss the materials of the screen, and how electricity does whatever it does to make pixels different colors. If they are written on paper with a pen, you can discuss what paper is made of, what ink is made of, how ink remains in its place on the paper, etc. If they are scrawled on a wet beach, you can discuss the composition of the sand, how water holds the sand together, so it keeps the shape of the scribbles for a time, etc.

You can talk about the length, thickness, and angle of each mark making up the scribble.

You can discuss primary particles, and how their properties allow all of the above.

But you will not, regardless of which approach you take, or if you take them all, be discussing any of the thoughts found in the sentence The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.. Unless they read English, nobody who ever hears/reads your description of the squiggles will ever come to understand those ideas if they don't read English.

But writing is too far removed. You can also describe the brain states, from any angle, in any detail, of anyone thinking the thoughts in the sentence The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog., and, again, you will not be describing any of the thoughts in the sentence. Nobody who doesn't know what a brain is will suspect you're talking about thoughts. Those who know you're talking about a brain mighty day, "Oh! Is that thoughts? How does it do that?" Because there isn't any obvious connection.

We don't think a computer that is acting according to it's programming is having thoughts, even though we know it's programming haw meaning. But we know what the meaning is, because we put it there, and it's only to us that there is meaning.

No. I'm suggesting that they might be about the same things, under two different descriptions. — Banno

I like the idea, but don't see how it can be. Can you explain? I suspect you have been doing that, but, if so, I haven't caught on. I am but an egg.

Make sure you use real maple syrup. — Metaphysician Undercover

Damned right!!!

The trouble is that the topic is waffle, and specifically it is waffle because it tries to mix two different types of language games - the physical and the intentional. — Banno

You're saying the intentional is not physical.

Sorry. I don't understand.

Well, no. How the system interacts with the data is physical. What we have is two differing physical descriptions of the same physicality. — Banno

How is the the idea of the quick brown fox jumping over the lazy dog a physical description of the squiggles "The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog"?

1. Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

2. An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.
Two very different ways of talking about the very same thing.

Do we need to reduce one to the other? — Banno

I do not believe it's possible. But if someone says #2 can be described entirely in terms of #1, then that is what they are saying, and I would like to hear how it works.

This does not rule out that the reaction of a mind to the environment is just that - an energetic reaction which can be described entirely in physical terms. — Banno

The Taj Mahal cannot be described entirely in physical terms. Its coming into existence over a span of 22 years cannot be accounted for without love, pride, art, and various other things that are not arrangements of matter/energy. The idea of it existing in the future, knowing it would take a very long time, knowing that tools, people, and material would have to be gathered from far and wide, knowing that many different construction techniques would need to be used and combined... None of that happens without meaning and intentions that do not exist in purely physical explanations.

I think this is a mistake. The idea that consciousness is not causal. It seems to me that it would be a very strange for the world to be full of people writing about consciousness, writing about qualia and the ineffable experience of consciousness, if consciousness were not casual. — flannel jesus

Indeed. If consciousness isn't causal, what causes us to write about consciousness?

I question the interpretation Libet's study. It seems odd to say that the task, flexing the wrist, was well-defined; they talked about moving the wrist; and the subjects sat thinking about moving the wrist. Consciously thinking and talking about it, and consciously debating when to do it. But when it happened, it wasn't a conscious decision? Seems very suspicious.

I'd be more convinced if the brain made a decision with no involvement from consciousness. Like if they're all watching for the wrist to move, but the ankle moves instead. Or the hand picked up a pencil and started writing.

I read this long ago in a book called WHY GOD WON'T GO AWAY - Brain Science and the Biology of Belief. It discusses the posterior superior parietal lobe:

The primary job of the [posterior superior parietal lobe] is to orient the individual in physical space - it keeps track of which end is up, helps us judge angles and distances, and allows us to negotiate safely the dangerous physical landscape around us. To perform this crucial function, it must first generate a clear, consistent cognition of the physical limits of the self. In simple terms, it must draw a sharp distinction between the individual and everything else, to sort out the you from the infinite not-you that makes up the rest of the universe.

It may seem strange that the brain requires a specialized mechanism to keep tabs on this you/not-you dichotomy; from the vantage point of normal consciousness, the distinction seems ridiculously clear. But that's only because the [posterior superior parietal lobe] does its job so seamlessly and so well. In fact, people who suffer injuries to the orientation area have great difficulty maneuvering in physical space. When they approach their beds, for example, their brains are so baffled by the constantly shifting calculus of angles, depths, and distances that the simple task of lying down becomes an impossible challenge. Without the orientation area's help in keeping track of the body's shifting coordinates, they cannot locate themselves in space mentally or physically, so they miss the bed entirely and fall to the floor; or they manage to get their body onto the mattress, but when they try to recline they can only huddle awkwardly against the wall.

And they found that this area of the brain is inactive at the times when Franciscan nuns and Tibetan Buddhists feel the most intimately connected with their respective godheads, which is during prayer and meditation, respectively. They theorized:

What would happen if the [posterior superior parietal lobe] had no information upon which to work? we wondered. Would it continue to search for the limits of the self? With no information flowing in from the senses, the [posterior superior parietal lobe] wouldn't be able to find any boundaries. What would the brain make of that? Would the orientation area interpret its failure to find the borderline between the self and the outside world to mean that such a distinction doesn't exist? In that case, the brain would have no choice but to perceive that the self is endless and intimately interwoven with everyone and everything the mind senses. And this perception would feel utterly and unquestionably real.

I started to write "Yes" but then I asked myself, "Well, why exactly?" What's so exceptional about such a claim that puts it outside anything we can reason about? Is the experience itself seen as so esoteric as to defy description, and perhaps credulity? This may be a Western bias. — J

We can barely have a reasonable discussions about the kind of consciousness we all live with every day. How much more difficult to discuss kinds of consciousness we have only heard about from the writings of a tiny percentage of people, who claim it cannot be described?

You are thinking the thought. There can be no doubt about that.

The accuracy of the thought may be doubted, of course.

I think I'm watching my laptop drink a milkshake. Well, I certainly am thinking that. But it's not accurate.