Third: what type of computing power would be required to 'house' this virtual universe? Are we talking about computers that are bigger than the universe itself? Is this possible even in principle? — jasonm

My understanding is that a nucleotide of DNA is the best way of storing information. A nucleotide of DNA is about 2 nanometers in diameter by .33 nanometers in length; it stores 1.8 bits of information. The earth, according to some estimates, now contains approximately 10^44 bits of information or something in that ballpark. If you took all the information contained by earth, cultural artifacts, digital information, etc. and stored it on nucleotides of DNA, you would need, if my math is right, about 1^28 cubic meters of nucleotides, The sun is only 1^27 cubic meters. That means, our hypothetical simulated world needs to be stored on a device that is no less than 10 times the size of the average star.

Let's put aside the fact that there is no good reason to build a simulated world in the first place, the sheer size of storing the data to build this simulated world seems preposterous.

whether determined to deliberate or not doesn't really matter. I am content to say that a determinist who deliberates is acting irrationally and he will agree with me that he is acting irrationally; that is, that he is not acting according to his deterministic convictions.

Perhaps there is a way to integrate POM with the idea of freer choices having priority when there is a dispute over preferences.

As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I follow this Metaphysician Undercover. You mean to say that when I act according to my free choice, I am actually less free than when I am figuring out what I want to do?

The concern is that when we say "this free choice to use my arm is more important than that free choice to use the cheese grater," one choice cannot be more important for being free. Both choices are free so freedom is not what is making one choice more important; there has to be some external criteria that is the basis of "more important." In terms of consequences, it is not the freedom that differentiates the choices but some other factor.

That being said, I suppose one might insist that one choice is more important because it is a freer choice.

Dan, I am not a professional philosopher, but here are my thoughts on the document you posted:

As I read, I asked myself, how do you define "good?" It seemed to me that you went on to answer this question. It is as if you had said, "the good is when someone is maximally free, and free of any constraints on their choices; the freedom to make choices is good." But then you asked a question about weighing freedoms and about the "importance" of choices. And I found myself very much with the same question I had started with. The "freedom is good" paradigm seems to require further criteria that make the consequence good that is quite separate from the freedom derived as a consequence, an independent standard for the rightness or wrongness of a consequence. But isn't that antithetical to the freedom consequentialist project? If freedom does not make a consequence good, what does?

That being said, it is easy to be a critic of another's writing and there may be nuances to your view that I didn't catch.

Anyways, thanks for sharing the idea.

P.S. This comment is from someone who is skeptical that a comprehensive moral theory is ever forthcoming.

That is exactly what I am doing by showing that belief in determinism is consistent with the belief that one should not waste time deliberating. The point being, of course everyone should deliberate on important questions, therefore the deterministic worldview leads to imprudent decisions.

noAxioms, you said my decision will be different after deliberation then what it would have been had I not deliberated, will it also be better for having deliberated?

I understand the position that my feelings concerning what I could have done could be mere illusions. What doesn't make sense to me is why someone who believes in determinism would ever take the time to deliberate.

Deliberating can either change one's decision or it cannot not. If determinism is true and I am someone for whom deliberation does make a difference, then it seems like I could save myself a lot of time by simply choosing the opposite of what I otherwise would have chosen without deliberating.

It would be foolish, but yes.

Yes.

Here is an argument:

If determinism is true, then there is no good reason to deliberate because such thought will not change how I decide (I must choose, or "act" the same way whether I deliberate or not).

Then, deliberation is pointless and no one should ever take the time to deliberate.

But that is terrible advice; therefore, belief in determinism is counter-productive.

:ok: :up: I myself did not catch that.. good point.

Also, I am confused by some of the claims contending that everything is "part of" the universe. In a loose sense, this is true. But there is not some "thing" that is "the universe." And in that sense, the universe does not have any "parts" in the same way that a solar system does not have parts. Maybe the parts are structurally related, but there is not some existent "thing" there, it's more of a convention that helps us organize the world, thought, speech, writing. This is not true of everything. Living things, at least, are differentiate wholes.

I would object to the notion of a simplest "building block" to the universe. Anything with extension, that is, the sort of things that populate our universe, are infinitely divisible. I think Kant identifies this problem in one of his antinomies.

So I'd like to try to add some nuance to my argument.

If determinism is true, there can still be morality in that we can consider an action right or wrong. Further, we can still give moral reasons in a determined setting.

However, it seems that it would be wrong to hold anyone morally accountable in a deterministic universe (since all actions are not in the control of, or caused by, the actor). Then, in a deterministic universe, we would find ourselves in a situation where certain actions are wrong but where it would be unjust to do anything about those wrong actions.

But if I do hold someone morally accountable, am I myself morally accountable or not?

I guess I think morality breaks down and is incoherent within a deterministic world in a way that it does not if we take ourselves to have free will.

To Gnomon's original question - in a deterministic universe, if a wrong act is committed, then the world is thoroughly unjust because any attempt to punish is itself unjust.

sue me.

Folks, have rightly been objecting to A in my opinion. But if you assume B or not-B, you end up with Not-A.

Thus, A -> (notB or B) -> not-A. Or more succinctly, A -> not-A

A -> not A

That is the argument you forwarded.

I am not a logician, but might...
"A -> not A"
mean that
"not (A -> A)."
But surely A -> A. Therefore, not "A -> not A."

But Janus, morality may have no rational justification whether determinism is true or not. I think it evident to all that if determinism is true, morality makes no sense.

Yes, I agree with your second paragraph. It seems to me that free will may not even be conceivable when thinking of a deterministic universe.

"indirectly intended" I'm not sure I understand how someone can indirectly intend something.

Yes, you really do. But to appreciate the argument -- the argument is not that the illusion is what seems to be the case to you, rather, some may argue that the illusion is that we actually do have those choices.

due to "counter-predictive mechanisms" built into the deterministic thesis we can never know our own future no matter the computing power, that is so even if one accepts determinism as true.

"And some amoralists or nihilists who think its all "just one damn thing after another" "

Here is an argument:

If determinism is true, then there is no morality.
If determinism is true, there is no morality because it would not be just to hold someone morally accountable for actions that are outside their control.
But this is a moral reason for saying that 'if determinism is true then there is no morality.
Therefore, there is morality.
Therefore, determinism is false.

Why is that the answer? Why is it easy that the other answers are wrong? What if the twig was the intent? — noAxioms

It doesn't matter what the intent is, it matters what object has objectively been contacted by Midas' hand.

How did Midas not touch the forest? — noAxioms

I thought you said Midas touched a twig, not a forest. Why do you think the entire forest becomes golden? By this logic, wouldn't literally everything on Earth become golden when a twig is touched. I don't understand your reasoning here.

Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? — noAxioms

That's an easy one; it would be the tree in its entirety that turns to gold. Not the branch nor the forest, for neither of these are standalone things like the tree is, unless the branch is broken off the tree.

I have to admit my perplexity towards the question you are asking. Am I understanding you to be saying that you are unsure of whether trees are "things" or "objects?" Or that rocks may not be "things" or "objects." Is that your view noAxioms? Because I think the physical basis for the object "this tree" would just be the tree itself. Or is your view that trees are only trees by convention?

forget it

Go ahead, explain fully what you meant, not just in-a-nutshell.



Okay, so explain it to me in terms of chemistry and physics, I can wait.

I do not understand the purpose of your line of questioning. Then again, I am not sure that you do either.

Interesting perspective Benj96. So you mean something like, if I had enough knowledge about, say, dark energy, maybe that would fill in the blanks about abiogenesis? I am not so sure. I think someone on the forum said this already, but life seems categorically, discretely, quantumly different than non-life; a difference that does not seem explicable by physical mechanisms, no matter the complexity.

James Tour has enumerated the known issues that need to be solved for non-living to produce living (in theory although perhaps not in entirety). That is not to say that solving those issues would result in a living organism, or that such problems can even be solved, practically speaking, in a lab.

Okay, that is fine with me, my point is, and this is what I take to be the central issue, something living, however you define it, emerges from the combination of atoms, and that is very strange, one might even say, as I have, miraculous.

Can you clarify whether you think there is a difference between living and non-living things, and what you take that difference, if any, to consist of?

"atoms and molecules follow the rules" yep, agree with that, I just think they are also ruled by a further principle, namely, the organism of which they are a part.. even though they can't act contrary to the atomic and molecular rules that govern them.

But I think you and I just disagree as to whether the atoms and molecules could behave differently were they part of a living organism.

That is not the central issue/mystery anyhow.

your mother never said that, nobody ever said that, except you just now.

Or put another way, living or non-living is the relevant context.