In my opinion, if there were an easy answer to quantum-classical issues it would be elucidating the correct theoretical understanding, although I think we would have figured it out by now if it were a merely theoretical problem; that suggests to me that answers to such issues, if there are answers to be found, will depend on empirical observation and experimentation. But that depends on asking the right questions, which is kind of theoretical I guess. I myself am not sure what "the right questions are" in regards to a quantum-classical bridge. Are there any quantum physicists in the house?

Oh contraire mon frère, this is more something we thought we knew at the high point of reductionism. The case for this is now more difficult. IMO, it would be foolish to assume reductionism as a given until it is decisively disproved, since reductionism itself was never been decisively proved in the first place. Reductionism trades off millennia old intuitions and philosophical arguments, and this might be grounds for dismissing it as much as supporting it. — Count Timothy von Icarus


You bring up a good point, but rather than swing between supporting or dismissing, why not simply recognize the need for a more complex and nuanced view? — wonderer1

To put that in my own words, I would say "reductionism" is ill-defined. Perhaps a properly defined reductionism may not be at odds with emergentism at all.

One clue to the puzzle of Personal Experience may be that both Consciousness and Energy are special forms of non-specific Generic Information (the power to change form ; to transform ; energy?). And in human experience, Information is also Meaning, Significance, Relevance to Self. — Gnomon

The information is basic. Metaphorically. Because what is transformed is the physical into the mental, no? Or is it the physical into the physical? Energy, mind…what do they have in common? Nothing, and that’s the point – one must transform into the other by means of a unity that is the(i)re.. informational content. Information is meaning, but it is also wave functions. A graph of reality?

Transformation implies what? – that what is transformed becomes what it is not. If I am seeing red, and this is a transformation of an informational content (as I am calling it), then either I am not seeing red or red is not red. Phenomena, nouema, what’s the real red, what I see or what is there, a quantative signal -- A mathematical entity?

We interpret the Information. Whose interpretation? The brain’s I guess. Mine or yours? Too many questions. “Excuse me, am I interpreting this correctly?” “No, although your brain is.” “Okay, great.” Can meaning be physical? I would think it would have to in some sense if it is in this universe. “I’m a doctor, not a linguist Jim!”

There are two senses of a why question. There is the “why” in the sense of more of a where… where did this come from, “why” is it here. Then there is the purpose sense: “why” am I doing such and such, for the sake of what. “How” is a different question, but if you’ve got answers then I’m all ears, metaphorically speaking.

In conclusion, I’m not a fan of abiogenesis because I don’t see how something that lacks a kind of self-motion can acquire it. And I agree, panspermia has never been much of an answer.

True, it is a dichotomy I guess, but I think it is worth the trouble because of its explanatory power; namely in explaining why brains are conscious and why rocks are not conscious.

Good questions. Were it the case that the use of b-matter turned it into a-matter, that would seem to preclude it from use in an artificial brain, but that seems to suggest something like an observer effect, maybe. And I'm not sure how to articulate a difference, other than to say that b-matter is made of b-protons and b-neutrons, not sure if that answers though.

How does the 'history' change the actual 'formula' which results in consciousness? — AmadeusD

Perhaps the history doesn't change the formula; the formula changes the history.

Perhaps there are just different kinds of matter (a-matter) and (b-matter). b-matter happens to be able to arrange into conscious brains, a-matter cannot. Nothing is necessarily non-physical in this explanation of consciousness. And I don't see why different kinds of matter is controversial or anti-scientific; after all, if you accept physics you would already believe there to be variations in matter such as protons and neutrons and electrons.

But as you say here with "history" is what I mean by guiding principles, something that affects a system to form complexity in a certain way. — Christoffer

"guiding principles" "to form" "goal" I don't mean to be overly critical - do you mean these terms metaphorically or literally?

Thanks for your comments. I've had somewhat of a shift in perspective the last couple days. I now think the question you cited -- why is this energy conscious -- may not be the most productive. It would be like asking, why are coyotes alive, but rocks are not? The fact is, coyotes are alive and rocks are not. So the answer both for consciousness and living organisms, in my opinion, has to do with the biological history to which both belong. On that understanding, we needn't postulate anything extra or in addition to the physical.

Is that a fair reply or is there something about the question (or your answer) that I am missing?

You got it!

Is it possible for any system of pipes, valves, and pumps to be conscious? Or for consciousness to emerge from such a system? — RogueAI

Although wonderer1 and Christoffer may disagree with me, I think it is not possible. And I think it is not possible because of the kind of history that is needed, specifically a biological history, for consciousness. This may be more of a local, as opposed to a global explanation, of why one system is conscious but not another, but I think a historical explanation is adequate.

I am of the opinion now that consciousness may be fundamentally physical, at least I have no qualms with that being the case.

I am unfamiliar with the change from a supernatural to a natural explanation as a "reduction." I am more familiar with taking two scientific fields (chemistry and physics) and reducing one to the other.

I interpret your second question to be asking "can" sciences be reduced? I think the answer to that is yes.

How, precisely, would you define reductionism?

Here is a definition of reductionism: "a science can be reduced to another field of study if that other field of study gives a coherent account of the initial science."

What do you think of this definition?

On this understanding, chemistry and even consciousness is reducible to physics. Although, physics would not be reducible to chemistry.

In terms of a complete explanation of something, I think what is problematic is not that chemistry or consciousness are irreducible, but that physics is itself incomplete. I think this may not be a problem with reductionism on its own terms (as I have defined it), rather it is a problem with the field of study that some other field is reduced to.

Okay so if I'm understanding you correctly, what I'm calling a physical process emerges from, is a result of, not the physical fundamentals, rather it is the result of the interaction of those fundamentals where that interaction results in properties that were otherwise not present. As an analogy, H2O, the result of interaction between atoms, is a liquid at room temperature, while oxygen and hydrogen atoms, the constituents, do not have the property of being liquid at room temperature.

Thanks for referring me to that article.

In the interest of responding in a not unreasonable amount of time, I'm going to go ahead and write what I'm thinking.

The objection is well said.

I understand you to be objecting to the reduction to physics on three grounds which I will now summarize: 1. incomplete explanation, 2. potentially untrue, 3. raises questions.

To your first point, I think what I am looking for if I were looking for a physicist's explanation of tasting coffee, is whether we can describe the experience in terms of atoms and so on. Given that there seems to be a level of analysis at which the tasting of coffee can be elucidated in terms of atoms and laws discovered by physicists, I am content that that analysis is adequate, if not complete from the subjective perspective.

If we are talking about human behavior, I do not think physics can adequately describe that, but given that physics is supposed to acquire knowledge about atoms and planets and such, I don't think human behavior is the right domain for physics.

Okay javra, thanks for your comments.

all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical — javra

Why would it trouble us if everything was reducible to the physical?

Seems to me that all those thoughts are just physical processes.

I get the sense there is something about physicalism that has not been articulated that you are concerned is problematic?

But this move probably requires jettisoning a lot of what makes physicalism "physicalism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure why that is so. Unless by process metaphysics one is arguing that only processes, not the physical constituents involved in the process are real? If that is what is meant, that's starting to sound like some kind of idealism in my opinion. In any case, that is not what I mean by "process physicalism."

In the end you have a simplistic counter to physicalism that only functions against reductionism specifically...

I'm sympathetic to the idea of something like "physicalism without reductionism," but as is discussed earlier in this thread, I'm not sure such a thing currently makes much sense with how physicalism is generally defined — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction").

Not first thing in the morning
— frank

No energy until coffee. — wonderer1

ALL IS COFFEE - NotAristotle (c. 2000 - 2200)

Hi Christoffer, I find myself inclined to endorse what I will coin "process physicalism." Due to religious commitments, I do not think "all of reality" is physical. But I do think consciousness may be one of the things that can be given a meaningful physical account. And I think science is not only the best method for learning about the physical world, I also think accepting the results of science are crucial for truth and understanding.

What I wanted to ask you is, can you say more about "emergent physicalism?" Is it roughly the same as "process physicalism" (my thesis here is that consciousness just is a physical process) ?

In a somewhat less robust formulation, I maintain that physical processes give an adequate explanation of consciousness.

Nosferatu, see above.

I don't think Congress is the final arbiter of a determination of whether Trump is guilty. That being the case, each Secretary of state can and should make there own determinations. If Congress disqualified Trump from election on the basis of insurrection after having acquitted him, that would be contradictory. However, it is not Congress, but the Secretaries of states who are currently making the determination. The Secretaries simply are not bound by Congress' erroneous acquittal. To answer your question more directly: is it right to disqualify from election a candidate who has been acquitted by Congressional vote? The answer is absolutely; the Secretaries definitely still have that right. I think it is right both legally, and in this case, morally too.

Comment rescinded.

But seeing as he is guilty of insurrection, I highly doubt he will be acquitted.

Regardless of if he is acquitted for insurrection, I think the Secretary of each state still has a right to make their own determination of whether he should be disqualified from the ballot.

This is a good explanation of how the 14th amendment disqualifies Trump from the upcoming election. https://www.npr.org/2024/01/02/1222389987/donald-trump-maine-election-ballot-2024-supreme-court

Thank you for sharing that.

I don't know much about process philosophy; I am surprised that causal closure is not relevant to it.

I have to say, too, that the whole notion of "non-reductive physicalism" (nrp) is somewhat confusing to me. So it's difficult for me to parse it in process terms or in any terms.

NRP seems to stand in opposition to, as an alternative to, reductive physicalism.

I think it is Jaegwon Kim who forwards the argument against non-reductive physicalism. This argument can be picked-up by reductive physicalists who maintain that causal closure and causal exclusion prohibit non-physical mental events (or at least these principles render non-physical mental events casually inefficacious). This seems to me like a strong argument for physicalism. I myself am not an adherent to physicalism because I believe in supernatural explanations in addition to physical explanations.

the behavior of a boulder. — wonderer1

:lol: hey, that boulder's misbehaving, im gonna give it a piece of my mind!

There is ego and there is conscience. Therefore there is duality. Where there is duality there is choice. Where there is choice there is freedom. Therefore, there is freedom.

Existence is magical and fascinating. — Philosophim

Yes, it is! :100:

I won't get into it too far because I don't think this is the right thread, but I do believe I have a free will and I am not a compatibilist. Whether consciousness is entirely physical, or consciousness is non-physical, I am certain that I am free.

When I reflect on consciousness I try to think of it in physical terms to see your point of view. I put on my science helm (yes, it's a science helm and not a helmet), and I reduce all of reality to the level of atoms bouncing around in the void. Thanks Epicurus or Lucretius or Hobbes or whoever's idea that was. "Here are some atoms in this rock. But these atoms in my brain produce consciousness," I think to myself. And I wonder, "why are these brain atoms producing consciousness? What is special about them?" "Well maybe when you arrange atoms in that way they are conscious?" "But Not Aristotle," I say to myself, "that is entirely an ad hoc explanation and besides, why would the arrangement of the atoms matter?" And I am unable to answer. And that's the hard problem as I understand it. If you have an answer to that problem, I would be happy to hear it.

And I actually do think consciousness as we know it, whether it is itself physical or nonphysical, arises out of physical matter/energy.

How the physical activity produces consciousness is a mystery — Patterner

All we're worried about is the details in how the brain generates it. — Philosophim

I don't think those details are forthcoming Philosophim, and the reason why is that a physical account fails to include consciousness. I think you are right that the brain is necessary for consciousness. But I still have trouble seeing what it is, in physical terms, that is special about the brain and I think that we will never answer that question.

As Patterner pointed out, consciousness is not empirically observable. Water is empirically observable; so is hydrogen and oxygen. We can directly see and measure water as the product of hydrogen and oxygen. We cannot see consciousness as the product of neuronal activity in the same way.

You might say, "well we can observe consciousness viz. the reports of people." That's certainly true but I think it misses the mark.

The question, to my eyes, is really this: why is the brain conscious at all? Or perhaps to put the question more precisely: How is the brain different from non-conscious physical stuff? My answer is that it's not different and that's the mystery.

Do you see where I'm coming from?

I wouldn't go so far as to say that anatomy is the reason why someone engages in activities. A full account of why I, let's say, go for a jog, seems to require consideration of the subjective conscious experience, not just my physiology. If asked why I did this, I wouldn't say "because I have functioning limbs" or "because of my brain states prior to and during the jog." Rather, the reason I went for a jog is because I wanted to get some exercise.

Okay, gotcha, thanks for explaining.

What of your own question begging?

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing.
— NotAristotle — wonderer1

I think my argument is something like this:

If consciousness is physical then consciousness can be accounted for in physical terms.
But consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms.
Therefore, consciousness is not physical.

What about that argument is question-begging?

Just what is 'a physical thing'? — Wayfarer

Maybe I'm missing the boat, but when we say "physical" I think we mean things like atoms, brains, neurons, entire organisms, and so on. If consciousness is physical in the same way as the things I've just listed, then SH must be entirely physical, mustn't he? Because Sherlock Holmes would just be his brain, arms, consciousness etc.

Hmm, so you think there can still be truth in a meaningful way even if determinism is true?

To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question.