But Banno, of course that argument is invalid. That argument is only 1 step. My argument is three steps. I should be quite surprised to find that the argument I laid out is invalid.

Hmm, I am surprised to see that the argument is invalid and would very much like to know why it is invalid. It seemed to me to be quite a good formal argument.

Very well Banno, I shall look to see if Socrates is around. He is usually most amenable to having a discussion.

Banno, where are you going? I am quite sure we were just now on the verge of a breakthrough. Are we to turn away from the discussion at this critical juncture?

Still, I would like your opinion on the conclusion, is it acceptable or not?

Would you endorse the above conclusion, or reject it? I mean just the last line, does it seem agreeable to you?

Splendid!

Now consider this argument:

If not (if I think, then I exist), then (if I don't exist, then possibly I think).
Not (If I think, then I exist).
Therefore, if I don't exist, then possibly I think.

I do not know what your emoji means.

I just mean formally speaking, let's not worry about what our premises are for now.

It's a secret. So what do you say, does that argument look agreeable?

Here is a more formal statement of an argument:

(1) if not (p then q), then (if not-q then possibly p).
(2) not-(p then q).
(3) Therefore, If not-q then possibly p.

Can we all agree with the first conditional, or would someone object to it (and if so what is the objection).

(1) If I think, then I exist.
(2) I think.
(3) Therefore, I exist.

Premise one is not explicitly stated in the cogito argument (at least I don't think it is), but surely it is implied.

The formal structure of this argument is:

(1) If p, then q.
(2) p.
(3) Therefore q.

It is a valid argument.

Or have I missed the boat on this one?

I am reminded of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. This is a debate that may have implications for both naturalists and supernaturalists and one that both can engage.

Nevertheless, couldn't one maintain that God is "in" the world in a non-spatial sense in addition to having a causal or sustenance role? I do not see how that would be problematic or even controversial for most theists.

I am less concerned whether someone else' argument is fallacious or ill-reasoned, of greater concern to me is that someone (including myself) can understand and represent the argument stated. If they can't do that, or if I can't do that about someone else's argument, then that is a sign of not comprehending. Further, there can be no "meeting of the minds" if the others' argument is not stated and represented as that individual has stated it. In other words, social reason collapses if no attempt is made to understand (even a fallacious reasoner).

So in summary, I would give less prominence to the "reasoning" abilities of an individual (because that may assume a criteria of knowledge or rationality to which the interlocutor may not agree), and greater prominence to their ability to re-assert and understand another's view. If someone won't do that then there is simply no discussion to be had.

We also must distinguish between an argument's soundness and its validity. An argument can be valid without being sound. If so, that's not a reasoning error, that just means an assumption is wrong. I am not sure that someone can be "reasoned" out of an assumption.

Unless they do not accept the law of noncontradiction

I think it is important to understand the "other side " of an argument. If someone can't do that , that's a sign they do not have understanding of the "other side." And in that case, they can't reasonably object to it. Someone with understanding of both sides is in a much better position to adjudicate.

I think the proper theist response is not to try prove that God is something that exists, but is the ground or cause of anything that exists. That is not an empirical argument.

So, for those who are supernaturalists in this forum: what phenomena do you believe cannot be sufficiently explained naturalistically? — Bob Ross


Phenomena are appearances - that is the origination of the word. And from a non-theistic philosophical perspective, something this doesn’t account for is the nature of the being to whom phenomena appear. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, looks like your answer to Bob Ross regarding the phenomena that are not accounted for on a naturalistic account is just this: everything.

I find that just a bit humorous.

If reason functions as a social product (I think Habermas says something like that (perhaps Fichte to some extent too)) then it may be that reason can be instilled into this individual viz. interaction with other rational individuals. In that case, patiently correcting someone for their logical infelicities may be best. Also, logic classes help. Lastly, I think epistemic humility is important.

Also, I assume this post is not about me, otherwise...irony!

You might be interested to read Shamik Dasgupta, especially what he has to say on "Absolute Velocity" -- http://shamik.net/papers/dasgupta%20symmetry%20as%20an%20epistemic%20notion.pdf

I think you will also find discussion of the "Invariance Principle" as it pertains to physics interesting and perhaps quite agreeable. -- I think Nozick talks about it to some extent.

Let me sum up my point about a vicious infinite regress. In a YouTube video, Dr. Craig says that without creation, God is timeless and temporal after it. On the other and, classical theists believe that God is absolutely simple with no parts of any kind. And potentials are metaphysical parts. So, if God is purely actual, there's no potential in him. But Dr. Craig implies that God is metaphysical parts when he, Craig, says that God went from being possibly in time to being actually in it. Any object with potential is a composed object. And each composed object needs cause to put the parts together. So you end up with infinitely many composers but no composed object. — BillMcEnaney

Time aside, would it not be the case that God as pure actuality is "in" the universe in only a "potential" way prior to creation, and in a "non-potential" way once creation has occurred? How do you make sense of that? (Note: I guess it would not have been a problem for Aquinas if Aquinas thought the universe was eternal/infinite).

Perhaps it is a mischaracterization to describe the state of God outside creation as "potentially" in time? In wonderer1's quote, Dr. Craig does not use that term.

If creation does not yet exist, can God bear any relation to it viz. potentiality? But if not, then God needn't be a composite of potentiality and actuality and there is not infinite backpedaling.

Hi,

I would begin by questioning the soundness of accepting a principle such as the principle of parsimony. Why would a simpler theory be prima facie preferable? What virtues does it espouse over a more complex theory? It may be easier to understand a simpler theory, so maybe there are practical reasons to choose it; but in terms of the veracity of a theory, I don't see why a simpler one is of greater import.

Secondly, I do think there are some phenomena that are not accounted for by the naturalistic thesis. What I have in mind are much the things you would expect me to say as a supernaturalist: places like Heaven and Hell, entities such as angels and demons, but also events such as the miracle of Fatima, and other miracles that I believe in as a Christian, such as the resurrection. I realize that the occurrence of such supernatural phenomena may provoke incredulity from a naturalist. Belief in these things is not only through testimony, but also an article of faith for me.

Time has nothing to do with it though, so the principle of plenitude is not doing any work in your argument. Not to mention, you are describing Aquinas' Second Way: if everything is contingent and contingent things require a cause, then there would be nothing because nothing would cause all the contingent things (even if there were an infinite number of them); that is approximately the Second Way.

Oh I see, so then you are saying that there would have been nothing today if everything were contingent because there would have been nothing before any contingent things and that that nothing would have prevented all the contingent things from existing entirely. Do I have that right?

Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. I am asking you: "if everything is contingent, would there have been nothing today because there would have been nothing after all contingent things existed, or because there would have been nothing before all the contingent things began to exist?"

Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude — Metaphysician Undercover

And would you say the nothing that occurred happened after all the contingent things passed away, or would you say the nothing occurred before the contingent things were generated?

prior to now — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the crux of the matter. The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated?

By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent.

I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived. — Metaphysician Undercover

But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent."

There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the original argument I formulated (1-4) does not make use of the past or future, rather it only discusses the present, so again I am not sure how my use of "now" is different than Aquinas'.

you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent?

I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not see where the objection was in these two paragraphs.

This does not resolve the issue with "now". — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:

1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being.

Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too?

You said you would start the sim as a zygote. I am asking: what is the difference between this zygote and a zygote in reality? Or is the zygote you are postulating a mere simulation of a zygote? If so, that seems problematic.

What is the difference between the simulation and reality if you are constructing "simulated people" based on the same historical states that result in non-simulated people? If the physicalness of both systems is identical in all respects, what is the difference?

Picture 'reality' R0 as the trunk of a tree. It has 9 boughs (S1-S9) coming out of it, the simulations being run on R. Each of those has 10 branches, labeled S10-S99. Those each in turn have 10 sticks (next level simulations (S100-S999), Then the twigs (S1000-S9999) and the leaves (S10000-S99999). Every one of those simulation has say 10 billion people in it, so a given person is likely to be simulated (all except the ones in R0), and most of those (90%) find themselves in the leaves — noAxioms

Ah, I see, thanks for explaining!

Regarding your objection re: physicalism. The problem with conscious people within/part of a simulation has to do, in my opinion, with the historical necessities of consciousness. That is to say a simulated person does not have the requisite history to be conscious. We need not evoke anything supernatural in this description of consciousness, we can keep everything purely physical. All we're saying is that someone that is conscious must be alive, and someone alive must come from someone else who is alive, that is, from the womb.

You are proposing that the sequence of contingent beings has a beginning, in order to avoid the infinite time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude, which would indicate that in that infinite time there would be a time of nothing. But contingent beings must have a cause. If there is a first contingent being, one which is prior to all other contingent beings, it cannot have a contingent being as its cause, then its cause is necessary, and this is necessary being as distinct from contingent being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not exactly, what I am proposing is this: First, let's assume that all beings are contingent only; that is, that there are no necessary beings. On that assumption, whether the principle of plenitude is applicable or not, but especially when it is applicable, the problem I articulated is salient. The problem is not that there are contingents posterior to "now." The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only.

That is why I am forwarding the argument that I forwarded. But you mentioned an objection to that argument:

This is sort of like Aristotle's law of identity. Whatever exists [now] must be what it is, and not something else. This is expressed as the following necessity: "A thing is the same as itself". Notice though, that this relates to a thing's essence, what the thing is, which cannot be other than the thing's essence, what the thing is. But this principle has not been extended to a thing's existence, as you propose, and I believe it cannot be, for the following reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure if the law of identity can be extended to a thing's existence either. Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false.

And I would like to address the further objection you described concerning "now" --

In fact, the "now" changes as we speak. Therefore we cannot make the proposed statement, "it is necessary that what exists now exists now", because time has past between the first "now" and the second "now" such that they refer to different times which accordingly have different existents. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment.

I don't think someone who knows they live in a machine/simulation can truly be happy.

I take your question to be whether God would bless one with knowledge of the good even if that person lived in a world that was merely simulated. I think the answer may be yes, although I do not say this with certainty but with a speculative mind.

It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..."

And I think I can now better appreciate what you are saying about the principle of plenitude, but...

I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection.

First of all thanks for engaging in this discussion with me.

Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says.

Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved.

Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory.

Lastly, the argument I am suggesting is grounded in the law of noncontradiction. We both agree that contingent things exist now. I maintain that, to avoid contradiction, the contingent things existing now must exist now (but can not-exist at another time). But if something must exist now, then there cannot be nothing now. But if everything is contingent then there could be nothing now. However, there cannot be nothing now based on the law of noncontradiction. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent i.e. there must be a necessary being

It is unclear to me why there would be more leaf worlds, could you spell that out for me?

I think I have heard it said that if a future people decided to make a simulation, they would make A LOT of such simulations. And these simulations would be nested -- simulations within simulations. If there are a huge number of simulations within simulations, that means only a small number of these simulations will be simulations that do not have a simulation that they are themselves running. But if we are living in a simulation, we must be living in one of the simulations that is not itself running a simulation. In that case, the odds that we are living in a simulation would be astronomically small.

On the other hand, I do not think we would be conscious if we were "in" what you are calling an actual simulation. But we are conscious. Therefore, we must not live in a simulation.

In any case, I know I am not living in a simulation.

I see what you are saying about contingents requiring an efficient cause. In fact, I think you are correct. However, I am not sure that that is Aquinas' argument in the 3rd Way. The argument for an efficient cause of an accidental series is covered in the 2nd Way I think.

because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now — Metaphysician Undercover

-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now.

To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings."

And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not.

What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being.

I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not.

That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being."



Do you think there are any "necessary non-beings" ? A square circle perhaps.